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Full text of "A History of the Greenbacks: With Special Reference to the Economic Consequences of Their Issue ..."

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THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS OF 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 



THE DECENNIAL PUBLICATIONS 



I88UED IN COMMEMOBATION OF THE OOMPLETION OP THE FIRST TEIf 

YEAB8 OF THB UNIVEB8ITY*8 EZI8TENCE 



AÜTHOBIZED BT THB BOABD OF TBU8TEB8 ON THE BBCOMMBNDATION 

OF THB PRB8IDENT AXID 8ENATE 



EDITED BY A OOMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE 8ENATE 

BDWASD CAPP8 
BTABB WILLABD CDTTINO ROLLIN D. 8ALI8BDRT 

JAMBS BOWLAND ANOBLL WILUAM I. TBOM A8 8HAILEB MATSEW8 

CABL DABLINO BDCE FBBDBRIC IVB8 CABPEMTEB OSKAB BOLZA 

JDLIÜ8 BTIBOLITZ JAOQCBS LOEB 



THESE VOLUMES ARE DEDICATED 

TO THE MEN AND WOMEN 

OF OUR TIME AlfD OOUITTRY WHO BT WI8B AND QENEBOU8 QIVING 

HAVE EirOOURAOED THE 8EABCH AFTEB TBUTH 

nr ALL DEPABTMENTS OP KNOWLEDOB 



HISTORY OF THE GREENBACKS 



A HISTORY OF THE 
GREENBACKS 



WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ECONOMIC 
CX)NSEQUENCES OF THEIR ISSUE: 1862-05 



BT 



WESLEY CLAIK ^ITCHELL 

Or TBB DSPABTMKNT OF POLXTXCAJL BCONOMT 



THB DECBNNIAL PUBLICATION8 
SBCOND SEBIES YOLUMS IX 



CHICAGO 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 

1903 

H 



Copyright 1903 

•f THB DKIVBBSITT OF CBIOAOO 



> • • • • • • 



• • «• 






• • 



• • 



TO J. W. M. AND L. M. M. 



PREFACE 

Apologies must be made both for the bnlkiness and 
for the fragmentary character of the foUowing monograph. 
These defects are due to the same canse: an attempt to 
ntilize all the well-authentícated statistical material becuing 
apon the snbjects treated. The amonnt of labor entailed by 
this attempt was so large that I have been nnable to carry 
the discnssion beyond the fírst fonr years in the history of 
th, greenb^l. 'ev» withto «ü. brie£ period two tojor. 
tant topics are passed over. Nothing is saíd of the effects 
of the greenbacks upon foreign trade, and no comparisons 
are made between American and foreign experiences with 
paper money. The former topic is omitted from lack of 
time to get the refractory statistical data relating to it into 
signifícant shape ; indeed, my dealings with the figures incline 
me to donbt whether any other than a speculative treatment 
íb feasible. As for the latter topic, I soon discovered that 
foreign comparisons presented too large a subject to be dealt 
with as a side issue in such a monograph as the present 
Moreover, the conseqnences of the abandonment of the specie 
standard in which I have been most interested are snch as 
can be traced only when one has much fnller information 
regarding prices, wages, and the like than are available to 
the student of foreign experiments with inconvertible paper 
currencies. 

All of the statistical data employed in the course of the 
discnssion are presented at length in the Appendix in such 
form that they can be readily verified, or employed in new 
combinations. The tablas have passed through the hands 
of two computers. While I can hardly hope that no errors 

zi 



TA-WB 



xii Pbepaoe 

of transcription, computation, or printing remain uncor- 
rected, I should be surprised to find any of sufficient 
conseqnence to affect the validitj of the conclusions drawn. 

Four of the chapters have appeared at various dates as 
articles in the Journal of Political Economy, and one has 
been reprinted in Sound Curr^ncy and the Report of the 
IndianapolÍ8 Monetary Commission. Three of these articles 
have been entirely rewritten, and the fourth has been care- 
fuUy revised. 

Professor J. Laurence Laughlin and Dr. Herbert J. 

Davenport, of the University of Chicago, and Professor T. 

S. Adams, of the University of Wisconsin, have read differ- 

ent parts of the book and made valuable suggestions and 

criticisms. Miss Mande L. Radford, of University CoUege, 

Chicago, has looked over all the chapters and done what she 

conld to amend crudities of expression. My thanks are also 

due to the late Professor Charles F. Dunbar, and to Colónel 

CarroU D. Wright, for answers to troublesome inqniries by 

letter. 

W. C. M. 

Univsbsitt of California. 



f. .: ^' 



TABLE OP CONTENTS 

PART I. HISTORY OP THE LEGAL-TENDER ACTS 

Chapteb i. The Suspensión of Specie Payments - - - 3 
I. State of the Finances, March, 1861. 
II. Chase's Adniinistration of the Treasury, March to June, 
1861. 

III. fHnancial Legislation of the Extra Session of Congress. 

IV. The $150,000,000 Bank Loan. 

ChaptbbIL The First Legal-Tender Act - - - - 44 

I. The Legal-Tender Bills, 
n. Debate in Congress. 

III. Attitude of Secretary Chase. 

IV. Passage of the Act. 

Chapteb III. The Second Legal-Tender Act - - - 82 
I. Government Finances, January to June, 1862. 
II. The Second Legal-Tender Act. 
III. The Postage Currency Act. 

Chapteb IV. The Third Legal-Tender Act - - - - 100 
I. The Finances from July to December, 1862. 
II. The Joint Resolution of January 17, 1863. 
III. The Third Legal-Tender Act 

Chapteb V. How Further Issues of Greenbacks Were A voided 

in 1864 and 1865 119 

I. The Congressional Pledge to Issue no More U. S. Notes. 
II. Financial Difficulties of 1864. 

III. Secretary McCuUoch and the Alley Resolution. 

IV. Recapitulation. 

PART II. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE LEGAL- 
TENDER ACTS 

Chapteb I. Preliminary Sketch 135 

Chapteb II. The Circulating Médium ... - 141 

I. Gold and Sil ver Coin. 

II. Bank Notes. 

III. Oíd Demand Notes. 

• • • 

xm 



xiy Table of Contents 

IV. ^ Shinplasters" and Fractional Currency. 

V. Minor Coins. 

VI. Treasury Notes. 

VII. Recapitulation. 

Chapteb III. The Specie Valué of the Paper Cunencj - 182 
I. The Markets for Gold. 

II. Factors Which AflFected the Qold Priceof the Currency. 
iiL The Course of Depreciation, January, 1862, to December, 
1865. 

Chapteb IV. Prices 2S9 

I. Falkner*s Table of Relativo Prices. 
II. A New Table of Relativo Prices by Quarters. 
lu. Relative Prices Paid by the Federal Government for 
Supplies. 

IV. Relative Prices of Various Necessities at Retail. 

V. General Causes of Price Fluctuations Other than the 

Currency. 
VI. The Currency as a Cause of the Price Fluctuations. 

Chapteb V. Wages -.---..- 280 

I. Falkner*s Table of Relative Wages. 
II. Scope of the Data Conceming Wages in Table XII of 
the Aldrich Report 

III. New Tables of Relative Money Wages Based upon the 

Data in Table XII of the Aldrich Report 

IV. Relative Money Wages in the Coal, Iron, Glass, and 

Pottery Industries. 
V. Relative Salaries of School-Teachers. 
VI. Relative Wages of Farm Laborers. 
VII. Tables of Relative Money Wages Based upon the Mate- 
rial in Vol. XX of the Tenth Censúa. 
VIII. Pay of Government Employees. 
u. Increase in Living Expenses. 
X. Relative Real Wages. 
XI. Conclusión. 

Chapteb VI. Rent 352 

I. Urban Rents. 
II. Farm Rents. 

Chapteb VII. Interest and Loan Capital .... 3^0 
I. The Problem of Lenders and Borrowers of CapitaL 
II* Purchasing Power of the Principal of Loans. 
III. The Rate of Interest 



Tablb of Contbnts xy 

ChapterVIII. Profits 380 

I. Profits as a Share in the Distríbution of the Product. 
II. Profits in Different Industries. 

iiL Statistical Evidence Regarding Profits. 

Chapteb IX. The Production and Consumption of Wealth - d&2 
I. Production. 

II. Consumption. 

Chapteb X. The Greenbacks and the Cost of the Civil War 403 
L The Problem and the Method of Solution. 
n. The Greenbacks and Ezpenditures. 
m. The Greenbacks and Receipts. 
lY. The Greenbacks and the Public Debt. 
V. Conclusión. 

STATISTICAL APPENDICES 

Appendix a. Gold Valué of the Paper Currency, 1862-65 - 423 
Tablb 1. Monthly Highest, Average, and Lowest Gold 
Price of $100 of Paper Money in the New 
York Market. 
Table 2. Daily Highest and Lowest Valué in Gold of $100 
in Currency. 

Appendix B. Relativo Pnces of Commodities • 429 

Table 1. Relative Prices of Farm Products. 
Table 2. Relative Prices of Various Commodities at 

Wholesale. 
Tablb 3. Relative Prices paid by Federal Government 

for Supplies. 
Tablb 4. Relative Prices of Various Commodities at 

Retail. 
Table 5. Comparison of the Relative Prices of Twenty- 

three Commodities at Wholesale and at Retail. 

Appendix C. Relative Wages 470 

Table 1. Wage-Series from Table XII of the Aldrich 

Report 
Table 2. Wage-Series from Vol. XX of the Tenth Censits. 
Table 3. Relative Salaries of School-Teachers. 



Index 569 



zvi Table of Contents 

Charts— 

Chart i. Qraphic lUustration of the EflFect upon the 

New York BankM of the $150,000,000 Loan - 31 

Chart II. Fluctuations in the Qold Valué of $100 in 

American Paper Money from January, 
1862, to December, 1865 - - - - 211 

Chabt III. Relative Prices at Wholesale and the Valuó 

of Qold Coin in Currency .... 2T7 



PART I 
HISTOBY OF THE LEGAL-TENDER ACTS 



CHAPTER I 

THE SUSPENSIÓN OF SPECIE PAYMENTS 

I. State of ihe Finances, March, 1861: 

Appointment of Secretary Chase — Financial Difficulties Inherited 
from the Buchanan Administration — ^Morrill TariflF Act. 

II. Chases Administration of the Treasury, Mareh to June, 1861: 
Improvement in the Credit of the Government — Chase*s Attempts 
to Borrow. 

III. Financial Legislation of the Extra Session of Congress: 
Chase*8 Program — Loan and Taz Laws — Inadequacy of Taxes 
Levied. 

IV. The $150,000,000 Bank Loan: 

Why Chase Applied to the Banks — Planof the Bank Loan— Chase's 
Refusal to Draw on Banks and his Issue of Treasury Notes — 
EflFect of the Loan on Condition of the Banks — Second $50^000^000 
Loan — Third $50,000,000 Loan — Effect of Finance Report and 
Trent Affair — Depletion of Bank Reserves and Susi)ension of 
Specie Payments. 

I. STATE OF THE FINANOES, MABOH, 1861 

Ok the day after his inauguration President Lincoln 
sent to the Senate the nomination of Salmón P. Chase, of 
Ohio, as secretary of the treasnry. Political considerations 
were of chief weight in determining this appointment. Mr. 
Lincoln perceived that the support of the various elements 
of which the yonng Bepublican party was compounded would 
be necessary to secare the success of his administration. So 
Seward, the recognized leader of the radical wing of the 
party, was made secretary of state; and Chase, the most 
prominent representative of the conservative wing composed 
of anti-slavery Democrats, became secretary of the treasnry.* 

In addition to political availability, Mr. Lincoln thought 
Chase poesessed pecnliar personal qualifícations for the 

1 Qf, NXOOLAT AND Hat, Ahroham Lincolih A HiMtory (New York, 1800), Yol. HL 

3 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbEEXBACKS 



poeition. True, his thirty years' conneotion with the Cin- 
cinnati bar, and the temí in the Senate and two terms as 
govemor of Ohio, that eonstitnted his experienee of pnblic 
^airs. had bronght him little familiaríty ¥rith fiscal qnes- 
tions. Bnt they had shown that he had a olear intellect, 
administra ti ve abilitv, and antiring indostrv. And, above 
alL they had given him a ñame for strict integrity that 
woold be of especial weight in gaining the pnblic confidence 
indispensable to snccess in the management of the then dis- 
credited treasary. Thongh Mr. Chase brooght ¥rith him 
little knowledge of financial administration, his mind was 
deeply impressed with certain financial theories. From his 
former Democratic affiliations he had imbibed the '*hard- 
monev "' principies of Jackson and Benton and their dislike 
for paper cnrrencies. Personal observation of the nnsoond 
methods of banking then prevalent in the westem states had 
fitrengthened these convictions and inspired in him an 
indiscriminating distmst of the issues of all banks whatso- 
ever. The early suspensión of specie payments and issne of 
an irredeemable corrency of legal tender paper in the Civil 
War íjccnrred, then, nnder the administration of a secretary 
of the treasury who cherished a strong predilection for 
metallic monev.* 

It was with great relnctance that Mr. Chase resigned his 
seat in the Senate to nndertake the arduous task of manag- 
ing the treasury in the face of threatening war.' The diffi- 

iTbree considerable bioirrapliies of Chase haré been pobliahed, ooe bj 
RoBCBT B. Wabdcx, An Account k^ the Privóte Life ami Public Servic€$ c/ 
íiaimujm Partlnnti CAoje, Cincinnati, 1874; ^ro, pp. zziii -^ S38 (Talaable chlefly 
for eopioos extraéis from Mr. Chase*s prirate papers> ; the secood bj J. W. 
ScBCCKUU, Lt/e aml PubUe Serrice$ k^ S. P. C%aMe^ Xcw York, lí«74 ; »▼©, pp. xt + 
&»; the third bj Pbofessob A. R Hast. Stiimon Poriland Cha$e (^American 
Scat^m^n" Series^ Boston and New York, 1899: 8vo. pp. xi -t- I6&. See also HcOH 
HrfuLLOCH. ilcn and ileaturt» of Half a Ccntury ^Ni>w York, 1888), chap. xtí, and 
W. M. Etabta, Euloff^ on Cka$e^ appended to Schcckkks's Life. 

i Cf. rhase'á letter to the «oTemor of Ohio. Si^hücbebs, op. cit., p. 301, and letter 
f>f F. A. Conklinic to E. G. Spauldin^, Octob(*r IT, 187d. in Spai:ldinq. Histoty of th€ 
Ltoal Tender Paper Momey Itgucd during tke Grúat RebeUion^ 2d ed. ^Baílalo, 18*5)« 
Anwtndix. p.84. 



Suspensión op Speoie Payments 5 

culties of his position were increased by the disorganized 
condition in which the federal fínances had been left by the 
preceding administration. When Mr. Buchanan was inaug- 
urated his secretary of the treasury, Howell Cobb, of Georgia, 
found himself embarrassed by a redundant revenue, to 
reduce which Congress had just passed the tarifF act of 
March, 1857, lowering the duties upon imports. Unfortu- 
nately the fínancial crisis of 1857 and the commencement of 
the Mormon troubles foUowed hard upon the date when the 
new tarifF took efFect ; the one, in conjunction with the new 
tariflF, decreased the treasury receipts from customs by a 
quarter, the other increased the expenses of the War Depart- 
ment. 8o, instead of a surplus the fiscal year 1858 pre- 
sen ted a déficit in the revenue.* 

To meet the shortage Congress authorized the issue of 
$20,000,000 of one-year treasury notes.'* As the déficit 
recurred the next year, a fifteen-year loan of $20,000,000 
was made;' and in March, 1859, when the one-year treasury 
notes began to fall due, it was necessary to extend their 
term to July, 1860.* Even by that time the financial situa- 
tion had not improved sufficiently to enable the govemment 
to pay the notes out of revenue, and another loan of 
$21,000,000 had to be authorized to procure the necessary 

funda.* 

Early in September, 1860, Secretary Cobb invited bids 
for $10,000,000 of this loan, a sum sufficient to meet the 
notes coming due before January, 1861. When the bids 
were opened, October 22, it was found that the whole sum 
had been taken at par or at a small premium. Payment of 
the subscriptions was to be made thirty days later. But in 

1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury^ December, 1858, pp. 3, 4. 

3 Act of Decomber 23, 1857, 11 Statutes at Large^ p. 257. 

> Act of Jane 14, 1858, i6td., p. 365. «Act of March 3, 1859, t6td., p. 430. 

* Aet of Jone 22, 1800, 12 StatuU» at Large, p. 79. 



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svr»^ .€ ,:i.vr«K/ Tlie day after :ie acc wí» approwJ. 



.f tur. 'yr r ^^ ftir y .í* A«r r-«umnr> I>Kw«iWr. Ü<«. p. T; ;.'. ^ ^- í*3 



Suspensión of Speoie Payments 



Thomas invited proposals for one-half of this loan. The 
response showed how low the national credit had sunk; 
11,831,000 was offered at 12 per cent, or lesa; $465,000 
more at rates between 15 and 36 per cent. All offers at 12 
per cent, or under were accepted.' 

To explain why the govemment was compelled to pay 
such high rates of interest is not difficult. Public confi- 
dence in the Buchanan administration was shaken; particu- 
larly, confidence in the management of the Treasury Depart- 
ment which for four years had been contracting debts to 
meet annnally recurring déficits. The check to business 
following the election in November had intensifíed the 
nneasiness. One secretary of the treasury had resigned to 
aid the eecession movement; his successor was distrusted 
as a southem sympathizer. South Carolina had already 
adopted the ordinance of secession ; other states were on the 
eve of following her example. At Washington there was 
disorganization and indecisión. Under such circumstances 
it was natural that there should be hesitation in New York 
about lending to the govemment. 

But the needs of the govemment were imperative. The 
full amount of the five millions offered was required to 
meet the treasury notes and interest on the debt due 
January 1. Foreseeing the failure of the public sub- 
scription, Mr. Cisco, the head of the subtreasury at New 
York, induced the New York banks to take at 12 per cent, 
interest whatever part of the $5,000,000 might not be bid 
for. Their offer was accepted by Secretary Thomas.' After 
the banks had paid a part of the money into the treasury 
they became convinced that Thomas intended ''to transfer 
the money into the confedérate región where it would be 
captured." Accordingly, they withheld payment of the 

1 J7. R. MUeeUaneom Document No. 20, p. S, 86th Gong., 2d Sess. 
iJlnd„loe.cit, 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 



next instalment and sent representatives to confer with Mr. 
BuchanaiL' The result was that Thomas resigned, ostensi- 
bly becaose he could not agree ¥rith the president "in the 
measures .... adopted in reference to the .... condition 
of things in South Carolina." ' He was socceeded January 11 
by General John A. Dix — a man who commanded the fuU 
confídence of the North — and the balance of the loan was 
paid« 

Dix found the treasury empty, $350,000 of unpaid war- 
rants accumnlated, and a déficit in the revenoe which was 
expected to reach nearly $27,000,000 by the end of June.* 
To meet immediate requirements he offered the remaining 
half of the $10,000,000 treasury -note loan authorized the 
preceding December. An improvement in the credit of the 
govemment was indicated by the fact that whereas 12 per 
cent, interest had been. paid for the first $5,000,000, the 
Becí)nd was borrowed at an average rate of lOf per cent.* 

But the sum thus realized did not last long and further 
borrowing became necessary. Judging from Cobb's failure 
that it would \ye im{x>ssible to negotiate the balance of the 
$21,0rX),()00 loan of June 22, 1860, under the terms of the 
law which forbade the sale of stock below par, Dix applied to 
Congress to authorize a new bond issue. He even suggested 
calling on the states to retum the $28,000,000 of surplus 
revenue deposited with them in 1836.* Congress, however, 
would only pass a $25,000,000 loan act.* Dix then urged 

1 Cormflpondonce between Mr. Oeonre S. Coe, one of tho bankers conccrncd, aod 
E. O. Himuldinff, in H. Kino, Tuminoon the Light (Philadolphia, 1896), pp. 186-9. 

2 Lett4)r of roHignatioD, G. T, Cubtib, Life of Jame» Buchanan (New York, 1883), 
Vol. II, p. 404. 

* f'f. Diz'ii lotter to tho chainnan of the Committee on Ways and Means, H. R, 
MUreltananiM Document No. 20y 36th Con«., 2d Sess. 

* Cf. J. J. Knox, United State» Note», 2d cd. (Loodon, 18X5), p. 76. 
ft //. K, MUcellaneon» Document No. 20, p. 6, 96th Ck)ng., 2d Soss. 

* Act <if Fobruary 8, 1861, 12 Statutc» at Large, p. 129. The bonds wcre to bear 6 
per cent. intftroHt and '* to be roimbursod within a period not beyond twenty years 
and not leiw than ten years."— Seo. 2. 



Suspensión of Speoie Payments 9 

that the states be permitted to add the pledge of their faith 
to that of the federal govemment for the repayment of the 
loan; bnt the House refused to consider a bilí for this pur- 
pose.* Nevertheless, when bids for $8,000,000 of the«new 
loan were ínvited in February, the whole sum was subscribed 
on terms that made the average rate of interest 6.63 per 
cent, indicating a forther improvement in the national 
credit.' 

Such small loans, however, could afford bnt temporary 
relief . The real difficulty was the insnfficient revenue. To stop 
the necessity of borrowing by increasing the treasnry receipts 
was the nominal purpose of the last important law passed 
doring the Buchanan administration. Bills to raise duties 
on imports had been presented at every session of Congress 
since 1858; but all had failed of adoption, ontil, shortly 
before the presidential election of 1860, the Morrill tariflf 
act passed the House. It was not taken np by the Senate nntil 
the following session, and even then its prpgress for a time 
was blocked. But fínally, after many of the southem sena- 
tors had left Washington, it was passed and became a law 
two days before the cióse of Mr. Buchanan^s term.' 

As a revenue measure the new schedule was foredoomed 
to f ailure. The heaviest duties were levied on articles largely 
produced in the United States ; sugar and molasses were lightly 
taxed, while coflfee, tea, and wool worth less than 18 cents 
per pound, were entirely free. Revenue was thus sacrificed 
to protection. During the quarter, January-March, the 
customs receipts were $9,800,000; in the succeeding three 

1 ConoreationcU Olobe^ S6th Congr., 2d Sess., pp. 871, 872. 

3 Bids were receÍTed for $14,460,250 at the rates rai^rin^ from 75 to 96.10. Of thcse 
bids $8,006,000 were accepted, ali below 90.15 Y>eing refused.— Senate ExectUive Docu- 
ment No. 2^ pp. 19-90, 87th Con^., Ist Sess. The average rate was 90.478.— Batlet, 
Natúmal Loan» o/ the United SUites, p. 151. 

»Act of March 2, 1861, 12 Statutes at Large, p. 178. Cf, F. W. Taussio, Tariff 
HiMtory of the United Statet, 2d ed. (New York, 1893), p. 158. Sec. 1 of the act author- 
iaed a loan of $10,000,000. 



l^^ HlHTOKY ÜP THB ObEENBACKS 



uiv^ilhn» whoii tlu* now tariflf was in effect, they were $5,500,- 
WK> H il^M'tiHiH) ot ovor 40 per cent* Thns, instead o£ 
(iu)a\iviii^ ttio |H»MÍtion of the treasury, the new tariflf served 
v44Í/ U» iuoi*\u(iHt tho financial embarrassment.' 

U. í'MAMM'm AOMINIHTBATION OP THE TBEA8ÜBY, MABOH TO 

JUNE, 1861 

U WHM Ht A timo, then, when the revenue of the govem- 
uivvtU WHM iiiMutHciont to pay its expenses even on a peace 
^K4in|5^ Hiiil wht^n distrust and frequent borrowing had mnch 
im)M4ÍiHHl Un onnlít, that Mr. Chase, with small experíence of 
UmhuoímI ii|K«rAtionB, undertook to raisethe means forwaging 
H M^ml ox|KUiHÍve war. From April to June the ordinary 
iViviptM of tho treasury were $5,800,000, its expenditures 
ytíit,MHMMH).* To fiU the déficit therewas but one recourse — 
U4'i\»wiiig. Disadyantageous as were the terms on which 
%\w iHHH^nt loans had been made, it was to a new loan that 
Mr. ( -hAiH^ was forced to resort. 

i hi the whole, he was in a more favorable position f or 
U^ritwing than Cobb, Thomas, or Dix had been. True, the 
|h4Uíi*h1 situation had become more grave. Mississippi, 
Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas had fol- 
U^wtHl South Carolina^s example in seceding from the Union, 
Miid when the new administration was installed at Washing- 
ton it saw itself confronted by a rival govemment in Mont- 
gomery. But to offset this, Buchanan, who had become 
thoroughly discredited in the North, had given place to 

I Report cf the Secretary of the Treasury, Deoember, 1861« p. 9k 
tOn tbecooditioDof the finances at the oommenoement of the CÍTÍlWar, </. 
E. J. Walkxb, American Finance» and Retourcea (London, 1864) ; VON HocK, Die 
^nanjun und die Finanxffeachichte der Vereinigten SttuMten (Stuttffart, 1867), pp. 
m-^; M. B. FlELD, Memoriea of Many Men and of Same Women (London, 1874), 
pp. 29(K52; John Shbrman, ReeoUectiona cf Forty Yean in the House, Senateand 
Oaldnet (ChieaffO, 1886), V«)l. I, pp. 251-4; KNOX,0!p. ctt., pp. 70-83; J. O. Blainb, 
Twemiy Yeart cf Omore— (Xorwich, Conn., 1884), Yol. I, pp. 396-401; A. S. Boi^LU, 
Wimamcial Histary cf the United State» from 1861 to IWS (New York, 1886), pp. 4-6. 

* Iteport c/ the Secretary qf the Treaeunf, Deoember, 1861, pp. «HB. / 



Suspensión op Specie Payments 11 

Lincoln, in whom the people reposed greater confídence. In 
raísing his fírst loan Mr. Chase had the benefít of this feel- 
ing. Moreover, the credit of the govemment was improved 
by a temporary increase of revenue. The Morrill tariff act, 
approved March 2, was to go into operation April 1. Import- 
are took advantage of the intervening thirty days to pasa 
their goods through the custom-houses as rapidly as possible 
in order to escape payment of the higher duties imposed by 
the new schedule, thus increasing the receipts f rom customs 
for the months of February and March.* 

Under the existing laws the secretary had authority to 
borrow some $41,000,000. (1) Of the $21,000,000 loan 
of June 22, 1860, Cobb had negotiated $7,022,000, leaving 
a balance of $13,978,000 which could be íssued in 6 per 
cent, twenty-year bonds — a resonrce available nnder the 
law, however, only when the bonds conld be sold at par. (2) 
The two $5,000,000 treasury-note loans raised by Secretaries 
Thomas and Dix had exhaosted the authority to borrow under 
the act of December 17, 1860 ; but (3) Dix had issued only 
$8,006,000 of the $25,000,000 of 6 per cent, stock provided 
for by the act of February 8, 1861. The disposal of the 
remainder of this stock — $16,994,000 — was not hampered 
by the customary provisión forbidding sales below par. (4) 
Finally, the opening sections of the Morrill tariflF act author- 
ized a loan of $10,000,000 upon 6 per cent, ten-twenty-year 
bonds at par, or upon 6 per cent, treasury notes ; but the pro- 
ceeds of this loan could not be applied to the service of the 
current fiscal year which would end June 30, 1861. However, 
this act made the authority to borrow, existing under other 
laws, more available, by permitting the president '* to substitute 
treasury notes of equal amount for the whole or any part of 
any of the loans for which he is now by law authorized to 

1 Cf, American Anmtal Cyelopcedia^ 1801, p. 296, and Hunt'a líerehanU^ MagO' 
xine, T oL XLIV, p. 006. 



12 HlSTORT OP THE GeEEXBACES 



coQtract and issue IkiiiiIs.*^ The Uvasorr notes so issned 
were to bear interest at t» jvr cent, be receivaWe for govem- 
ment cines, convertible at |^ar into t> per cent, bonds, and 
coold be made redeemable at anv time witbin two Teais; bnt, 
like the bonds, thev i\>uld not be iss^ned to cieditors or sold 
for coin at less than j^ar.* 

Mr. Chase began by advertising, on Mairh 22, $S,000,000 
of the 6 per cent, stoi^k which, under the act ot Februaír 8. 
oonld be sold to the highe^t bidder.* Ten dajrs were allowed 
for making propoe^ials, WHlien the bids wei^ opened, April 2, 
it was found that the loan had been snbscribed thnee times over 
at rates ranging f rom So to |Vir,' This indicated an encoora- 
ging improvement in the ciedit of the govemment, for the 
offers for an eijual amonnt of the $ame stocks made to General 
Dix less than two months beforv varied from 75 to 96. 10 and 
amounted to $14,4tU\250, as ix>mpai^ with Í27,lv2,000. 
Bnt Mr. Chase thought the tieasnrv notes, which he had 
authoritv to issue in lien of the bonds,conld be sold at better 
pricesw* Conseqnentlv he aixvpted only the bids at 94 and 
above, amonnt iug to $3,l>iHMXHK and on April i> invited bids 
for the balance — $4.iK>l,lKH^ — in treasurv notes.* Unfortn- 

m 

natelv, the dejuirture of the expedition to relieve Fort 
Sumter became known in the meautime. The news created 
mnch uneasinesSf and when the bids were opened April 11, 
bnt one-fifth of the snm had been taken. Financiers who were 
interested in the snccess of the loan procnied a delay. however, 

1 .ict of March *. 1<$1. Sec. 4. 1* Stuf«íe« al Lomr. |x IT^ Oq ChA^e's autboríty 
to borrow. :«« hU n^pc>rt oí July 4. Ittl. ^Vn itt £f«nil*rr CKKnmktent A\k ;. {k 11. Zlxk 
Cooc.. l5t Ses». 

i Semate Extrnt* rr D»JCMmt€nt .Vo>. 7. p. SI, 3?t^ C<.>Q«.. Ist Str^s. 

sSclw-dule of bid«. tb*d., PPL £-«. 

« Stncv' the Krea5iinr noC«!^ bore 6 per cenat. ioterract and wrv rvceirable for all 
p>wmis<»nt daesw Lárice importers drrÍT«rd a proAt fr\tm intiK4iait in cli^m the im^aej 
keM m ri^a'lini^A for the payment of custoia:» datie:». ly. Aa^t^c^n Anmual Cpcio- 
patata, imi. p. 9T. 

i SemaU Ereenitrr Docum^ni .Yo. 1. pp, 11 and SOL STtk Omb<.. 1í4 S«ssc 



Suspensión of Specie Payments 13 

and by dint of their eflForts subscriptions were secured for 
$5,340,000, of which sum $2,500,000 were taken by a single 
New York bank.* 

The means thus provided were soon exhausted by the 
large govemment disbursements, and it became necessary to 
borrow again. On May 11 the balance of the 6 per cent, 
stock of the Febniary loan — $8,994,000 — was advertised 
for sale.' Bids carne in very slowly, and a failure of the 
subecription seemed probable. Such an event would have 
seriously aflFected the price of all govemment securities. In 
self-defense, the Chamberof Commerce of New York and the 
banks of New York and Boston carne to the aid of the 
treasury. A card was issued signed among others by J. 
J. Astor, August Belmont, James Gallatin, A. T. Stewart, 
Moses Taylor, and George S. Coe, calling attention to 
the govemment loans and invitíng ''all capitalists and 
moneyed institutions to avail themselves of these opportuni- 
ties for investment.'" To give the committees appointed 
by the chamber and the banks more time to secare subscrip- 
tions, Mr. Chase postponed the opening of the bids four 
days, and also oflFered to consider bids for treasury notes at 
par in place of bonds, shonld that form of security be pre- 
ferred by any subscriber.* Finally, bids ranging from 60 to 
93 were obtained for $7,441,000 of the stock, and bids at 
par for $1,684,000 of the treasury notes. All the latter bids 
were accepted, and of the former all those at 85 or above — 
an amount of $7,310,000.* From this loan of $8,994,000 
the treasury realized the sum of $7,922,553.45.* 

1 Ibid,^ p. 51. Of oonrse only $4,901,000 of the bids — the amount advertised — 
were aooepted. The treasury realized $7,814,809.80 from $8,000,000 of securities sold. 
— Ihid,^ p. 11. See American Annttal Cyclopcsdia^ 1801, p. 296, on the difficulty 
ezperienced in negotiatinfirthe treasury notes. 

^Seríate ExectUive Document No. 2^ p. 52, 37th Gong., Ist Sess. 

3 American Annual Cyclopcedia^ 1861, p. 297 ; cf. '* Federal Finances Examined" 
(anón.), Hunt'8 MerchanW líagcuine, Vol. XLVII, p. 504; and ibid., Vol. XLIV, p. 791. 

*8enate Executive Document No, 2, p. 53, 37th Gong., Ist Sess. 

& /Md., pp. 58 and 60. « Ibid., p. 11. 



14 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

Requiring still more money, the secretary asked for pro- 
posals for the balance of the 6 per cent, twenty-year loan of 
June 22, 1860, amounting to $13,978,000.* Ab 6 per cent, 
govemment bonds could then be bonght in the market at 84, 
the offer of this stock which the act forbade to be sold below 
par was a mere formality; but, by advertising the bonds, 
Mr. Chase complied wíth the terms of the law, and was ena- 
bled to issne treasury notes for the fuU snm.' Three bids, 
aggregating $12,000, were received ; but they had been made 
under misapprehension and were withdrawn.* On account 
of this loan, however, Mr. Chase issued, by the end of June, 
$2,584,550 in treasury notes at par.* 

Finally, just before Congress met, the treasury was again 
in need. Five million doUars were required to carry it along 
until new means of securing funds could be devised. As 
the two-year treasury notes were selling at a discount of 2 
to 2^ per cent., they were not directly available. But the 
banks agreed to ad vanee the amount required for sixty days 
and take 6 per cent, treasury notes as coUateral security.* 

Two points in this review of the operations of the secre- 
tary of the treasury from March to July are of signifícance: 

1. When hostilities opened the federal govemment was 
receiving less than a quarter of its revenue from taxation ; 
for the remaining three-quarters it wasdepending upon hand- 
to-mouth borrowing.* From March 7, 1861, when Mr. Chase 
was installed, to July 1, there had been an addition of $14,- 
412,529.40 to the public debt.' 

1 SencUe Executive Document No, 2^ 97th Gong., Ist Sess., p. 11. 
3 Cf. Appleton'a Annual Cyclopcedia, 1881, p. 297. 
*8cnate Executive Document No. 2^ p. 11, S7th Gong., Ist Sess. 
« Of this som $1,710,650 was sold for ooin, and 1878,900 was paid to oreditors.— 
Ibid., pp. 00-62. 

6 Cf. American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, p. 297; and Hunfa MerchanU^ Magor 
sifie, Vül. XLVII, p. 506. 

* From April to Jone, 1861, the reoeipts from costoms, sales of publio land, and 
misoellaneoos soorces, were $5,800,000, from loans $17,600,000.— /Scport of the Secretarif 
cf the Treatury, Decembor, 1861, p. 30. 

7 Señóte Executitfe Document No. 1, p. 18, 87th Coof., Ist. Seat. 



Suspensión op Spbcie Paymbnts 15 

2. Mr. Chase had of his own accord inaogurated the 
policy of isstdng interest-bearing treasury notes mnning one 
or two years, in preference to long-time bonds, whenever 
they would fetch a higher príce, disregarding the fact that 
sach a conrse ezposed the treasury to the danger of beíng 
called npon to redeem its notes while hard pressed for funds 
to meet current demands.^ 

III. PINANOIAL LEGISLATION OP THE EXTBA SESSION OP 

GONGBESS 

Such was the situation when Congress convened in extra 
session July 4. Emphasizing the need of extraordinary 
measures, President Lincoln's message recommended that 
"at least 400,000 men and $400,000,000" be placed "at 
the control of the govemment.'" The fínancial program 
of the administration was outlined in a report submitted by 
Secretary Chase.' 

It was estimated that the govemment would reqnire $320,- 
000,000 to meet the expenditures of the coming twelve 
months. Of this sum the secretary thooght that '* not less than 
$80,000,000 should be provided by taxation, and that $240,- 
000,000 should be sought through loans." The $80,000,- 
000 would defray the expenses of a peace footing, estimated 
at $66,000,000, the interest on the public debt, $9,000,000, 
and provide an annual sinking fund of $5,000,000. By 
revising the Morrill tariff, Chase thought the customs could 
be made to yield a revenue of $57,000,000. An additional 
$3,000,000 from sales of public lands would leave $20,000,- 
000 of the $80,000,000 to be raised by direct tax or by inter- 
nal duties as Congress might decide. 

To secure $240,000,000 by borrowing new loans to the 

1 Mr. James OaUatin, presidenfc of the GaUatin Bank of New York, adyised 
strongly a^ainst this policy. See his Ttoo LeUen to the Hon. 8. P. ChoBc, etc., New 
York. 1881. 

^Ldncoln'B Complete Work$, ed. Nicolat and Hat, Yol. n, p. 00. 

s SencUe ExeaUive Document No. ;}, S7th Gong., Ist Sess. 



16 HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBACKS 

full amount would be necessary; for the $21,393,450 which 
the secretary still had authority to borrow under existin^ 
laws * was available only when creditors were willing to 
accept payment in 6 per cent, treasury notes at par, which, 
Mr. Chase admitted, was " not to be expected." He sug- 
gested (1) a national loan of $100,000,000 in 7.3 per cent, 
treasury notes, running three years; (2) a loan of like amount 
in 7 per cent., thirty-year bonds; (3) the issue of not over 
$50,000,000 of 3.65 per cent, one-year treasury notes to 
meet any need unprovided for by the proceeds of taxation 
and the other loans. But, said Mr. Chase, '^the greatest 
care will .... be requisite to prevent the degradation of 
Buch issues into an irredeemable paper currency, than which 
no more certainly fatal expedient for impoverishing the 
masses and discrediting the govemment of any country can 
well be devised." ' 

If Secretary Chase erred in thus proposing at the ontset 
to rely upon borrowing to secure three-quarters of the means 
for waging the war becau&e he doubted the readiness of the 
people to sübmit to heavy taxation, Congress was neither 
wiser ñor bolder than he. With his report were submitted 
draf ts of bilis embodying its suggestions.' Af ter one hour's 
debate, entirely taken up by Mr. Vallandigham in an attack 
upon the policy of the president, the House passed the 
$250,000,000 loan bilí by a vote of 150 to 5.* In the Senate 
a few verbal amendments were made;* these were quickly 
concurred in by the House,* and eight days after its intro- 
duction the bilí was approved by the president.' 

1 The issne of 12,584,550 treasury notes nnder the act of June 22, 1880 (p. 12, 
above), had rednced the balance of that loan romaining to bo borro wed to $11,393,450. 
Besides this thore was the $10,000,000 loan anthorized by the act of March 2, 1861. 
•'-tíeruUe Exerutive DocumerU No. 2, p. 12, S7th Cong., Ist Scss. 

3 /6tci., p. 14. 3 Ibid., pp. 65 ff. and 71 ñ. 

* Conf/renional Olobe^ 37th Gong., Ist Sess., p. 61. 

A Ibid., pp. 100 and 127. « Ibid., p. 147. 

• 12 Statutet at Largt, p. 250. Act of July 17, 1861. 



Suspensión op Specie Payments 17 

So hnrriedly, indeed, was the work done that a supple-: 
mentary act had immediately to be passed.* Together, the8e\ 
two laws authorized the secretary to borrow $250,000,000,*' 
for which he could íssue ín such proportions as he might 
deem advisable, (1) 7 per cent, twenty-year bonds at par; 
(2) 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds "at any rate not less than 
the equivalent of par for the bonds bearing 7 per centum 
interest;" (3) 7.3 per cent, three-year treasury notes, fondable 
in 6 per. cent, twenty-year bonds; or (4) treasury notes, 
either bearing interest at 3.65 per cent, and payable in one 
year, or bearing no interest and payable on demand. These 
demand notes were to be receivable for all public dues and 
of denominations as low as $5 ; but their issues were not to 
exceed $50,000,000. Finally, 6 per cent, treasury notes, 
"payable at any time not exceefding twelve months from 
date," might be issued to the amount of $20,000,000. To 
facilítate the negotiation of the loan, it was provided that 
any part, not above $100,000,000, might be borrowed 
abroad, and the principal and interest made payable in 
Europe; and that the secretary might "deposit any of the 
moneys obtained on any of the loans . . . . in such solvent 
specie-paying banks as he may select." 

Legislativo indorsement was also promptly given to Sec- 
retary Chase's suggestion of increased taxation. August 5 
a revenue act was approved which (1) raised the tariff by 

1 Ibid,^ p. SIS. Act of An^ast 5, 1801. 

>The amoiint of secarities, however, that might be issaed nnder these acts was 
Qot deflnitely limited ; for Sec. 1 of the act of August 5 provided that holders of 
the three-year 7.30 notes might ezchange them for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds. 
—12 8taíuteB at Large, p. 813. The total issues under the acts were as follows : 

6 per cent, bonds $189,321,350 

Demand treasury notes, no interest - 00,080,000 

7.30 treasury notes 189,099,750 

$389,351400 

R. A. Batlet, National Loans of tíie United States^ p. 78. Of the 6 per cent, bonds 
only 180,000,000 was sold for money; the remsdnder, $139,321,350, was issued in 
ezchange for 7.30 notes.— /&id., p. 153. 



18 HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBACKS 

imposing duties on tea, coffee, sugar, and molasses — 
important revenue articles admitted free or at low ratea by 
the Morrill act;* (2) apportioned between the states a direct 
tax of $20,000,000, of which, however, there was small 
hope of coUecting the quotas of the disloyal states, amount- 
ing to $5,000,000; (3) levied a tax of 3 per cent, upion the 
excess of íncomes above $800.^ While certain features of 
this scheme of taxation enconntered opposition, members of 
Congress evinced a striking readiness to waive objections and 
vote for any bilí that the admínistration and the leaders of 
the houses held to be a *'war necessity."' 

The striking feature of the plan of fínance thus recom- 
mended at the commencement of the war by the secretary 
of the treasury, and adopted by Congress, was the reliance 
npon borrowing to meet all the extraordinary military and 
naval expenditures. The taxes imposed were expected to 
yield revenue sufficient only to defray the ordinary expenses 
of govemment, to pay interest on the public debt, and to 
provide a small sinking f und. Nothing shows more f orcibly 
the inadequacy of this policy than the quickness with which 
the necessity for increased taxation made itself apparent. 
The heavy expenses of the months foUowing the adjoum- 
ment of the extra session begot a general conviction that a 
firmer foondation for the financial operations of the govem- 
ment was indispensable. When Congress reassembled in 
December it was met by a strong popular demand for a vig- 
orous tax policy. " The country presents," said the Boston 
Advertiser^ *'the spectacle of a people praying to be taxed." * 
An examination of the newspapers of the time shows how 

1 Cf. '' ComparaÜTO Ratos of Doty, 1842-61," Hunt'a MercharUi' Magasine, 
Vol. XLV, pp. 506, 507. 

2 12 Statute» at Large, p. 292. 

'As examples of this disposition 9eo the romarks of Senators McDoo^all, of 
California, and Wilkinson, of Minnesota.— ConifrcMioiux/ Olobe^ 37th Ck>nff., Ist Seas., 
p.309. 

« Febraary 4, 1882. 



Suspensión op Speoib Payments 19 

literally this was trae.* Urged forward by public opinión, 
the same Congress that had in August deemed $80,000,000 
a sofficient revenue to raise by taxation, resolved in January 
with but six dissenting votes in both branches, to levy taxes 
that wonld " secure an annual revenue of not less than $150,- 
000,000."' Mr. Chase, also, took a firmer stand, advocating 
in his report of December, 1861, an increase of the customs 
duties on tea, coffee, and sugar, and direct taxation aggre- 
gating $50,000,000.' With increasing experience his appre- 
ciation of the "great importance" of raising the "largest 
possible amount" of revenue by taxation became keener. 
" It is hardly too much," he declared to Congress in 1863, 
" perhaps hardly enough, to say that every doUar raised [by 
taxation] for extraordinary expendi tures or reduction of debt 
is worth two in the increased valué of national securities." * 
In the same report he explained his failure to recommend 
heavy taxation to the extra session of Congress in July, 
1861, by pleading the impossibility of foreseeing at that 
time the magnitude and length of the war.^ 

rv. THE $150,000,000 BANK LOAN 

While these bilis were pending in Congress and before 
the resources provided by them could be availed of , it was 
necessary to provide funds for the immediate wants of the 

1 Cf, New York Tima, June 20 and July 23, 1861, and Jannary IS, 1862 ; New York 
Herald, December SI, 1861, and January 7, 8, and 9, 1862; New York Tribune, June 26, 
1861, and Pebmary S, 1862; New York Commercial Advertiser, January 3, 11, and Feb- 
mary 26, 1862; Springfleld (Mass.) Republicaii, January 7, 15, and 21, 1862; Boston 
Ikiilif Advertiaery January 11, 13, and 24, 1862; Boston Joiimat, January 8, 1862 ; Boston 
Fcwt, January 28, 1862; Philadelphia Preu, Jannary 18 and February 5, 19íS¿\ National 
IntelUffencer (Washington), January 11, 1862. Cf. the letters urgiug heavy taxation 
reoeived by the Ways and Means Committee, Spauldino, <^. c»¿., pp. 23, 24; Speech, 
RoscoE OONKLJNO, Congressicnal Olobe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 633; '' Memorial of 
the New York Chamber of Oommerce," Senate Miscellaneovs Document No. 95, 37th 
Gong., 2d Sess., and Edwahd Evebett in Atlantic MontMy, March, 1862, Vol. IX, pp. 
a»-7. 

2 Conareuional Oiobe, S7th Ck>ng., 2d Sess., pp. 344, 349, 376. 

' fi^port of tíie SecTretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, pp. 13 and 13. 

« /6id., 1863, p. 12. B Ibid., p. 10. Cf. chap. ii, p. 72, below. 



:áP HlSTOET OF THE GeEESBACKS 



tr»asc7T. Mr. Chase accompEslied tkis br iasmng **for 
pkjTDKiit to poblic creditois or for adrances of cash.** $14.- 
(«•.•'•'■O in tvo-year 6 per cent, tnettsciy noles^ and $13,- 
(•».•»> in 6 per cent, notes mnning bat 60 daTS.' 

Thiac hoveTer, was bot a temporaír makeehift and tbe 
lEiore serióos task remained of proTiding for tbe regular and 
coatinaoos expenses of the var. For tbis parpóse the 
eecretarr at once set aboot negotiating a laige loan nnder 
the ampie povers conferred apon him by the extra aeasion 
of CongressL Borrowing abroad vas oat of the qoestion; 
for Earopean capitaUsts weie anwiUing to lend.' Rebanee 
o[K«i a popular loan seemed hazardoas. not only becaase of 
the ill soccess of recent Tentares, bat also becaase the 
market for bonds was stocked with the secarities of several 
etates which were negotiating war loan&' Circomstances 
eeemed. then, to indicate the banks as the most available \ 
soorce from which to obtain mean& 

FoTtanatelj the coarse of events had been sach as to 
render the banks, at least in the northem Atlantic states« 
anosoaliv strong. In the previoos Xovember the sadden 
panic following Mr. LdncoIn*s election had caased the banks 
to cortail discoantSw A severe pressaie for money fóUowed 
and a aospension of specie payments was averted in New 
York obIt hs the combination of bank reserves and the 



fay*>rf </lAe.Siecre<anr<if ttgT^ c a tf f . I>pce»ber. MO. pk 8L Tkew issiws veré 
;¿ *eer>rlfc&e« vith the actis of Jane 21 1S60 ^12 Slahttm of Large. pk 79; maá 
lUnÁ 1 LWl UfuL, p. I'»;. 

i ' í*. L* ntt^riy oot of theqnestion. in oor jodieiDeDU** $aid the Loodon Btomomitt 
td AiV4r»« 21. un. " that th» Americans can obtain. eitber «t bone or in Eorope. any* 
th¿£4r i-<^ tliM extrarairant «nins tbey are askínir for. Enrope woD*t lend tben: 
Aa^rvsk Ckut^AS'—K^^mmüal, IKL pp. SC?. 9S. Cf. Blatxk. Tkvnfy rcar« af Cbn- 
frcM. VoL I. PPL H». 4Ja 



* N«v York and Pennsjlrania had antborixed loans of IS^OOOLOOOeiaeb; Connecti* 
««t. Svm i^r¥>ff. Indiana and Obio loans of I2.000k.0u0: M assacbosa^cts. M aine, Illinois, 
aarf .V«v York city bad eacb offered loan.< of $1.0úa.oa(X lowa of imxOOOi. M icbi^an of 
|BCrj///j.axid Rbod« L»land of SIOÜlOUl— ¿JaNlYrt* JftiiM^iae iNew Tork>. Vol. XTL 
" %«A0A oo the lfoiw»T Market.** and Appletox'9 ^Mcncon AmmMaX C9^op«idia for 
un, fiffu 2S^. 3CC. JKfeu 



Suspensión op Specib Payments 21 

issne of clearing-house certifícatesJ But mostof the paper 
held by the banks was good ; liquidation proceeded f avorably 
and the threatened danger passed. The acute pressure was 
foUowed by general stagnation. In the unsettled state of 
the coTintry there was a general disposition to avoid new 
nndertakings and to keep oíd ones on a most conservative 
basis. The result was that the banks could make no new 
loans.' 

Dnring the winter difficulty was experienced in making 
coUections in the southem states. In the spring many fírms 
resorted to intentional fallares to rid themselves of northem 
obligations,' and in May a law was enacted directing that 
sach debts should be paid, not to the creditors, but into the 
Confedérate treasury.* The cessation of remittances from 
the South caused in May and June a series of failures 
affecting especially large jobbing houses.* But, owing to 
the very conservative nature of the business that had been 
done in the preceding half year, the crash did not become 

1 Banken* Magazine (Néw York), Vol. XV, p. 500; HunV» Merchants' Magaxinty 
Vol. XLTV, pp. 75-02, 196, and 327 ; Sumneb, Hisiory of American Currency, New York, 
1875, p. 189; DüKBAB, Chapien on the Theory and HUtory of Banking^ New York, 
1861, pp. 68-73. The Boston banks rejocted the ose of clearing-house oertiflcates, but 
•llowed 50 per cent, of balances at the dearing house to be paid in a bank*s own 
notes.— DuNBAB, op, ct¿., p. 79: c/. "Report of the Massachnsetts Bank Commis- 
siooers," Exeeviiive Documewt No, 25^ pp. 48-50, 37th Gong., 3d Sess. 

3**InacÜTÍt7, or increasing stagnation,** wrote Mr. James Gallatin to Chase in 
March, *^ is the oharacteristic of our business affairs.**— Ttiw Letten to the Honorable 
8. P, CkoieCSew York, 1861), p. 5; </. Hunt'a MerchanU' Magazine, Vol. XLIV, 
pp. 787 ff . 

iHunV» líerchanU^ Magazine, Vol. XLVI, p. 316; American Annual Cyclopcedia^ 
1861, p. SIS. 

^See text of the act in American Annual Cfffclopcedia, 1861, p. 310; J. C. Scetwab, 
The CoñfedenAt átala of America (New York, 1901), p. 113. 

» Hunfz Merchantt^ Magazine, Vol. XLV, p. 106. The indebtedness of the South 
to the North was estimated on the basis of R. O. Dun A Company's annual circular 
for 1861 at $300,000,000.— J&úi., Vol. XLVI, p. 317. The losses of northem creditors 
were nsuallj reckoned at $200,000,000. Cf, *'Report of the Massachnsetts Bank 
Commiasioners,** October, 1861; Executive Document No, 25, p. 50, 37th Gong., 
8d Sess.; New York Tribune, September 18, 1861; Presidentas Message, December 
8, 1861, in A, lAncoln, Complete Workz, ed. Nicolat and Hat, VoL II, p. 98. 
Schwab conaiders this estímate ezaggerated, op. ctt., p. 111. 



22 HlSTORY OP THE GeEEXBACKS 



general. It had the efifecU however, af wm^iT^g the times 
yet more dull : the transactions of the Xew York clearing 
house deolined from $12í>AXX\iXH) in the secoiid week of 
Marcha to ^SiXiXRXiXM) ia the correepondin^ week of Augist.^ 
The baabs were not seriously weakened by the Cailxtres^^ bat 
found it still more diffioah to leod their capitaL From 
Decemben ISiU)* to August. ImU, bank loans in Xew York 
diminished $23,lXXXiXH>; in Beatón the fall firom Jannary 
to Jnly was $ÍiXXXiXX> and in Philadelphia $3.iXX\iXXV 

This decrease of loans was accompanied by a slight 
decline in circulation« a more deoided inorease in deposits» 
and a marked gain in the amoont of specie hekL Small 
imports — dne jiartly to the Morrill tariff^ bnt chiefly to the 
depression of trade — and heavy exports of grain — the 
resnlt of good croáis at home and poor crope abroad — 
combined to tom the balance of payment toward the United 
States.^ Doring the spring and summer months steriing 
exchange sold from two to three points below par in Xew 
York.* Xot only was the nsual drain of specie to Eniope 
stopped, but the cnrrent was kepl flowing in this diiecticMi, 
so that, thongh the receipts from California declined and 
considerable amonnts were sent into the interior, specie accn- 
mnlated in the vanlts of the Xew York banks to an nnprece- 



I See t«bfe ot devine» in H. ÍL Krtcmtire IVctBMnU X«k Jk p^ H?. Stk Ooo»^ 

JdSesa. 

^Tbe ÜASsachoseUs commiái^iooers $tac«>«i in Otu>ber ckai tW kMS<« ot the 
Bo«too bnnká by tiie repodialiun of :!<4Maibem tk^it^ vookl not rxcved in «■owit tke 
oadivided praftu oo hnnd.— ffcrWire rkfcmmtemi .Voc Ik p». SOL S^th Coa«^ Jd Seas. 

^See tnbfe. p. 30. below. 

«So Inuse wms the ezportntion o# brettdstnff» durinc the rwcr and «nt«aui ot 
tm thnt it Bore thnn offset the effect of the hlockade in decrensínc shi|Mneats of 
enUoo. The novement is soMevbat cooeenled by the ttmnl $tnfeeawofes of i 
hf yenri endino Jone 90: bot appenrs clenrij in the oülctnl tnbie of 
expon* of merchnndiae at the port of New York by ■wwith-f, Frooi JmamMij to Aprü 
importA ezeeeded exporta, bot from Harto Deoember there vas an excMS of expon», 
aamoatinc to fi^e lillinn doUars in Jone, tvo in Joly. t«o in AncvA, loor in 
Sepcemb^r. fire in October. six in Novetaber. and six in Deeeaftbeff.^Saa tibien in 
amW9 MerthamU' Magazimc ToL 3ULV1. ppw TTr-^L 

^Ramkenr Mt^mximt • Xev Tork>. ToL XTI, pw aL 




Suspensión op Specib Payments 28 

dented degree. August 17 the ratio of the specie held by 
the associated banks of New York to their deposita and 
circnlation was 50 per cent. ; for Boston it was 27, and for 
Philadelphia 39 per cent.* Thus the banks were imusually 
strong; but they were making little profit because the stag- 
nation of trade gave them few opportunities of lending to 
business men. 

Consequently, when Mr. Chase appealed to them to assist 
the govemment, the banks were both able and willing to 
render efficient aid. A conference of representatives of the 
New York, Boston, and Philadelphia banks,' held August 
10-17 in New York, at the secretary's invitation, drew up in 
consultation with him a ''plan for assisting the United 
States govemment."' Fifty million doUars was to be 
advanced to the treasury by the associated banks of the 
three cities. In retum they were to receive at par a like 
amount of treasury notes running three years and bearing 
interest at 7.30 per cent. Further, the banks were given 
the option of taking a second $50,000,000 of the notes on 
the same terms October 15, and a third $50,000,000 
December 15.* Mr. Chase considered the plan highly 
advantageous to the govemment. In the face of war he 
was borrowing money at "a rate of interest only 1.3 per 
cent, higher than the ordinary rate of 6 per cent." Besides 
he received $50,000,000 immediately to meet the pressing 

1 See table, p. 30, below. 

2 '' It was greatly desired/^ said one of the most prominent of the New York 
bankers, *' to inclode also the banks of the West, bnt it was found impracticable to 
seciire the co-operation of the state banks of Ohio and Indiana ; and the state banks 
of Missoori, the only other organization onder a compacted system, were sorroonded 
by oombatants.**— Letter of Geor^ S. Coe to E. O. Spaolding, October 8, 187Si, 
Spauldimo, op. ett, Appendix, p. 90. 

s B^pori of the Secretary of the Tretuury, December, 1861, pp. 8, 9. A detailed 
aeoonnt of the conference is given by A. S. Bolles in LippincotVt Monthly Maoctzine% 
YoL XXXVm, pp. 200-206; reprinted in Bankera' Magcuine, Vol. XU, pp. 96^-7. 

*For tezt of this agreement see Banken^ líoffcusine (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 
162, 16S. 



24 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

demande npon the treasury.^ To the banks the plan offered 
profítable employment for their idle capital.' 

The banks which thus undertook to lend the govemment 
$150,000,000 in fonr months* time had an aggregate capital 
of bnt $120,000,000. Althongh unusually strong in specie 
at the time the agreement was made, their combined coin 
reserves amounted only to $63,200,000.* This sum would 
hardly more than pay the first instalment of the loan. To 
prevent its being exhausted at the very beginning, it was 
necessary that the banks should be able to replace very 
rapidly the specie which they paid to the goyemment 
They counted on doing this in two ways: First, they would 
sell the secnríties received from the goverment to the public 
for cash. It was part of the agreement that the treasnry 
should help in this by opening public subscriptions to the 
loan in all parts of the country. Second, the specie given 
to the govemment would be speedily paid out again in dis- 
bursements for the immense purchases of war supplies. The 
coin would thus be restored to the channels of trade, and 
naturally flow again into the banka 

If the banks could collect specie in these two ways as 
rapidly as they paid it out to the govemment, they could 
continué to supply the treasury with funds indefinitely. But 
the moment even a brief delay occurred in the retum of 
specie to the banks trouble would come. The reeerves 
would be depleted by the drafts of the treasury, and suspen- 
sión would be inevitable. Such a delay would happen if 
anything occurred to make the public slow in buying the 

SAt ftrrt tbe bftnks decidcd to diride tbe ISO.OOO1QQO amone tkeaiaelTes ia 
prciportk«i to tli^ir rofipMtiTv capitals. TIlís «tnild haT» iríT«n the ñttj'ionT Stm 
Tork bankii $S^J5áKk.iKXk, tbe fortr-^úi Bofton banks $I&.5O0lCP(I. aad the niaetoaa 
PkLÜ«d«df^U banks •&.(nunQL Bat the Bo«toa banks flnaUy decidid that thej ooald 
am take aKtre than $M.OQ0lOQO: so that tbe New Tork institatkias had to Baka ap 
thair fmbflcñpitkms to f&.O00uQn.— Aaaf « M€rcMamt»^ Magaxime. VoL XliV. pw SL 

< See tabte, p. Xl bekw. 



Suspensión of Speoie Payments 25 

7.30 treasury notes from the banks, or to interrupt the 
govemment's payments of specie out of the subtreasury, or 
to prevent men from depositing again in the banks the coin 
received from the govemment. The situation, both of the 
banks and of the treasury, was thus very precarious. The 
plan might work well in fair weather, but in the first storm 
it was likely to coUapse. Mr. Chase, however, seems to have 
been unconscious that danger lurked in the scheme. 

At the very outset the banks encountered an unforeseen 
obstacle. The independent subtreasury system required all 
dues to the United States to be paid into the treasury in 
coin.^ This would compel the banks to send the specie lent 
the govemment to the subtreasuries, there to lie in the 
vaults until paid out in disbursements to public creditors. 
But provisión had been made by Congress with the special 
intent of removing this difficulty." The law of August 5 
had relaxed the rigor of the subtreasury system so f ar as to 
permit the secretary ''to deposit any of the moneys obtained 
on any of the loans . . . . in such solvent, specie-paying 
banks as he may select," and allowed " moneys so deposited" 
to "be vithdrawn from such deposit for deposit with the 
r^ular authorized depositaries, or for the payment of public 
dues.'^' Under this law the banks expected that the loan to 
the govemment would be managed in the same manner as a 
loan to a prívate person ; they would credit the United States 
with a deposit of $50,000,000 upon their books, against 
which the secretary of the treasury could draw as he had 
occasion. But Mr. Chascas instinctive distrust of bank 
issues permitted no modification of the subtreasury system. 

lActBofJnly 4) 1840,8008. 19 and 20, 5 Staiuíet at Larffe^ p. 9ñ5; and of Au«rast 6, 
IMft, 8608. 18, 19 and 20, 9Sto¿utef (U Larffe, p. 59. 

sSee the letter of Mr. E. O. Si>anldinff, who drafted the seotion in qnestion, op, 
eit^ Appendix, i>. 51; and remarks of W. P. Fessenden, chairman of the 8enate 
flnanoe oommittee, Conffreasional Olobe, S7th Gong., Ist Sess., x>. 890. 

• Seo. 6, 12 StatuUt at Large^ p. S18. 



20 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEEXBACKS 

He declined to make payments in bank ehecks on the ground 
that, thoogh the eastem institotíons weie readj to pay sach 
ehecks in coin. their westem correspondents on whom tliey 
might draw wonld possibly ask creditors of the goyemment 
to accept bank notes in satisfaction. He therefoie insisted 
that the loan be paid in specie into the vaaltB of the snb- 
treasnry. Mnch against their wilL the banks complied.' 

Ñor was this the only point in which the banks fonnd the 
policy of the treasnry an obstaele to the snccess of the loans. 
Beside borrowing from the banks to eecnre fonds, Mr. 
Chase took advantage of his discretionary power to issne 
non-interest-bearing treasnry notes.* Thongh payable on 
demand in gold at the snbtreasnries, and receivable for taxes 
and cQstoms dnes, these notes were accepted with relnctance. 
To facilítate their circnlation, the secretarv and other treasnrr 
officials signed a paper agreeing to take them in payment of 
their salaries, and General Scott issned a circular setting 
forth the superior convenience of paper money to soldiers 
desiring to send home a portion of their pay.' Bnt the 
banks feared the govemment paper money wonld drive their 
own issnes from circnlation, and declined to receive the 
demand notes except on ''special deposit^^ Shonld they 
receive the notes as cnrrent fnnds, bankers said, they wonld 

1 Secretary Chase's reasoos for refosinc to drmw direcUy od tbe banks are givcn in 
a letter to Mr. Trowbríd«e,^WAEDEN, Ufe c/ ClUiJe, p. SS7). The side of the banks is 
repmented in G. S. Coe*s letter to Spauldinir {Histonf Pf M^ Legal Tender Paper 
Mone^. 2d ed.. Appendix. pp. 91. 9S); J. E. WiUiams*s letter to Chase of October 4, 
IMl (ihid.^ pp. 9»-%}, and his War Loaru of the AM9oci<Ued Bank» to tAe Gctemimení 
in ÍH8U (New York, 1876) : James Gallatin, The XaUanai Finaneet. Currenew^ Bank- 
imo. etr. (New York, U54.». Most writers haré concurred in the opinión that Mr. 
Chaw*! refosal was an error. Cf. Our yaUantU Finante»^ Wkat SkaU bt Donef 
[aorjo.] (Boston, 1862 1; SPAüLDENO, op. cit.. Introdnction to 2d ed., pp. l-<4, and 
Appendix. pp. 51-3; F. A. Consuno, <6id.. Appendiz, p. 85; J. S. Oibboxs, Tke 
Fnblie Debt <if the United State» (New York. 1867). pp. 135. 136; H. V. PooB, Mone^ 
amd it» Latn, 2d ed. (New York, 1877), pp. S6S-4; HoRACE Whttb, Moneif amd Bank- 
ing (Boaton, 18B6;. pp. 15(Mí2. 

SAcU of Jaly 17. 1861, sec. 1, 12 Statute» at Large. p. 2S«, and of Aocnsi S, IBSI, 
. 5 (t6id., p. 313). 

*Tezt in American Annnai Cifclopadia^ 1861, p. 



Suspensión of Specie Payments 27 

be nnder obligation to redeem them in coin on demand, and 
this would increase the burden which their reserves had to 
carry, and so endanger the maintenance of specie payments. 
Purthermore, the existence of a large amount of obligations, 
which the treasury might be called upon to redeem in coin 
at any moment of panic, was a standing menace to the sol- 
vency of the govemment, and in so far injured its credit, and 
made more difficult the rapid sale of the securities held by 
the banks to the public, on which the success of the loans 
depended. But it was in vain that the banks appealed to 
Mr. Chase to cease his issues. He replied: " If yon can 
lend me all the coin required, or show me where I can 
borrow it elsewhere at fair rates, I will withdraw every note 
abready issued, and pledge myself never to issue another; 
but if yon cannot, yon mnst let me stick to United States 
notes." * Unable to induce the secretary to alter this reso- 
lution, the banks again reluctantly yielded.' 

But though the position of the banks was weakened by 
Mr. Chase's refusal to allow the proceeds of the loan to 
remain on deposit until paid out to the creditors of the 
govemment, and by his issue of paper money, all went well 
for a time. Mr. Chase appointed agents in over two hundred 

1 Letter to Trowbridge, Wabden, op. cit.^ p. 388. 

SThe banks were the more annoyed at Mr. Chase^s refusal to malee pasnments in 
eheeks drawn npon them and at his issue of treasury notes, because when the 
arrangement regarding the loan was made they had understood him to agree to 
oonform his action in these respects to their wishes. See J. E. Williams's letter of 
October 4, 1861, to Chase and Qeorge S. Coe's letter of October 8, 1865, to Spaulding in 
Spauldino, op, ctt, Appendix, pp. 97-9 and 92 respectively. Mr. Chase, however, 
said in his report of December, 1861, that '* it was .... understood that the secre- 
tary of the treasury should issue a Umited amount of United States notes, payable 
on demand" (p. 9). 

On the inoonvenienoe caused the banks by the issue of the demand notes, see 
^*Objections to Govemment Demand Notes, by a New York Bank Officer," Bankeni* 
MiMgazine (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 853-7; Gboboe Mabsland, ''The Banks and the 
Greenbacks," Banken^ Magaxine (New York), Vol. XXXI, pp. 173-^1; Bolles, Finan- 
cial HigU^ry of the United States, 1861-65, pp. 34 and 37; H. V. Poor, Money and ita 
LauM, 2d ed. (New York, 1877), pp. 564 ff. ; J. K. Upton, Money in Politics, 2d ed. (Bos- 
ton, 1886), pp. 72 £P.; R. M. Beeckenkidoe, *'The Demand Notes of 1861,'* in Sound 
Currency, (New York, October, 1896), Vol. V, pp. 336, 337. 



*¿H lIlHTOliY OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



tíiwiiN ln n«(M«lvn Hubflcriptions for 7.30 treasury notes,* and 
InniiimI nti tir^Miit address, appealing to the people to assist in 
itmkin^ thn **national loan" successful.' His efiForts were 
wnríuly WM'oiidod by the newspaper press, which explained 
thn ndvnnia^cíB o£ the loan to investors, and represented sub- 
mTÍ|)tion aH an a(;t of patriotism. On their síde the New 
York bankH Btrongthened themselves by putting their coin 
into a conimoTí fund, and reviving the organization entered 
ínto to chock the panic of the preceding November. The 
'*loan comniitt<M)/' then appointed nnder the chairmanship 
of Mo»e» Taylor, was entrusted with the superíntendence of 
thcí (íXfHUition of the contract with the government. It was 
part of th(^ arrangoment that the stock of specie should not 
be nllowod to fall below one-fourth of the net liabilities, 
excílusivo of circulation and the credit given the treasury. In 
caHo aiiy Imnk failod to maintain this proportion of reserve, 
th(^ loan (!onnnittee was directed to charge interest on the 
déficit, and to j)ay the interest received to the institutions 
Iiolding the highest percentage of specie.' 

The aHHCK'Jated banks agreed to divide the subscriptions 
to the loan Ixjtween themselves in proportion to their respect- 
ive caiiitalH. Each bank was to pay 10 per cent, of its sub- 
íRTÍjition into the subtreasury at once, and to place the bal- 
aiKui to the credit of the government upon its books.* 
Agnirmt thcHC credits Mr. Chase was to draw only as fast as 

1 Hnn lUt i» ttanken^ Magaxine^ (New York), Vol. XVI, pp. 808-10. Asido from 
trniivury (ifllcInlH thore wore 148 agents.— H. R. ExectUive DocutnerU No, 66^ p. 2, 

iTnxt [h t» be foQDd in Banken' Magaxine^ Vol. XVI, pp. 290-2. The notes were 
o(Tnr«Hl ni par, and were to draw interest from Augnst 19, but on takin^r the bonds 
fiub«M*ri)Miri« wore roquired to pay interest from that date to day of subscription, so 
that thn interest reoeived by the purchaser began with the date of his purchase. 

*(*/. note 1, p. 82, below. The best authority for the banking operations is the 
'iCiMHirt of thn New York Loan Committee,*' Jane 12, 1862, published in the Bankert' 
AiiiU'»*inc^ Vol. XVII, and in i/. R. ExectUive Docunient No. 25, 37th Gong., Sd Sess., 
pp. ir» i'¿. 

* H«»e text of agreement of banks with government, and proceedings of the meet* 
iug of bankers in referenoe to it.—Banhert^ Magatine^ Vol. XVI, pp. 161-70. 



Suspensión op Specie Payments 29 

he needed funds for disborsement. It was anticipated that 
his drafts would be about 10 per cent, of the loan a week/ 
Consequently, the eflfect of the transaction may be traced in 
the weekly bank retums of the three cities. In New York 
the fírst instalment of the loan, $3,500,000, was paid into the 
subtreasury August 19, 1861.* Comparing the reports of 
August 17 and August 24, one finds a decrease of $2,600,- 
000 in the specie holdings of the banks, and a like increase 
in the coin held by the subtreasury.' At the same time the) 
balance of the government loan was added to the line of dis-f 
counts, increasing the loans reported by $29,000,000. \ / 
Finally, the sum placed upon the books of the banks to the / ' 
credit of the government to be drawn against produced a 
nominal increase of $26,500,000 in the deposits.* Similar 
changes are seen on comparing the situation of the Boston 
and Phüadelphia banks on August 17 and 31. In Boston 
payments to the subtreasury diminished reserves less than 
$300,000, while discounts and deposits were increased 
$3,600,000 and $4,200,000, respectively, in consequence of 
the government loans. The Philadelphia banks lost $600,- 
000 in specie during the two weeks, and increased their dis- 
counts $4,600,000 and their deposits $3,700,000. 

But the situation immediately began to change. The 
banks paid over the loan in instalments of about $5,000,000 
at intervals of six days.* Each payment thiis made into the 
subtreasuries decreased the sum credited to the government 
as a deposit. Loans also declined, for as fast as the 7.30 

1 American AnntMl CyclopoBdia, 1861, p. 64. Cf. Chase *s letter of October 2, 
1861, to Larz Anderson, in Schuckers, Life of ChcuCy pp. 430, 4S1. 

>'*Reportof the New York Loan Committee,'* Bankera^ Magcueine, Vol. XVII, 
p.ia9. 

sFor this and the similar stibsequent comparisons see the table showing the 
coodition of the banks of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, p. 3o, and the aocom- 
panyingchart. 

4 Cf. ** Report of the Bank Commissioners of Massachusetts, October, 1861," 
H R. Execuiive Doeument No. 25, p. 56, 37th Gong., Sd Sess. 

& Letter of G. S. Coe, in Spauldino, op. cit., Appendiz, p. 92. 



HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBACKS 



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82 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

notes were sold to the public through the treasury agencies 
the proceeds were remitted to the banks and dedncted by 
tbem from the loan to the govemment. From August 31 
to September 28 the decline of bank loans was $15,000,000 
in New York, $2,000,000 in Boston, and $2,000,000 in 
Philadelphia. The corresponding decline in deposits 
amounted to $23,800,000, $2,400,000, and $2,700,000 re- 
spectively. 

The point of crucial importance for the success of the 
bank loan, however, was the change in the stocks of specie 
held. The payments into the subtreasuries drained the 
bank reserves of about $5,000,000 a week. This loss was 
ofiFset in part by the re-deposit in the banks of money paid 
out by the govemment to army contractors and other 
creditors, and in part by sums received from the treasury on 
accoont of sales of 7.80 notes to the public through the sub- 
scription agencies — though it was not nntil September 3 
that the banks received any reimborsement from this latter 
source.' For the first five weeks the withdrawal of specie 
from the banks so f ar exceeded receipts as to cause a rapid 
reduction of reserves. From August 17 to September 21 
the New York banks lost $13,000,000 of specie. Whither 
the money had gone is shown by the contemporaneous gain 
of $11,000,000 in the coin held by the New York subtreas- 
ury. During the same time the Philadelphia banks lost 
$2,000,000, or over 30 per cent, of their specie. In Boston 
the reserves increased slightly for the first three weeks and 
the subsequent loss was less serious than in the other cities, 
a trifle less than 20 per cent. In New York the loan com- 
mittee found that the loss of coin reduced the reserves of 
some of the associated banks below the stipulated propor- 
tion of 25 per cent to net deposits, making necessary a 

1 '' Beport of the New York Loan Committee/' H. R. Executive DocuwietU 
No, as, 87th Gong., 8d Sess., p. 128. 



Suspensión op Speoie Payments 33 

reapportionment of the specie for tbe fírst time on Sep- 
tember 2.^ 

After September 21, however, the tide tumed. "The 
disbnrsements of the govemment for the war were so 
rapid," said Mr. Coe, a New York bank president, "and 
the consequent intemal trade movement was so intense, 
that the coin paid out upon each instalment of the 
loan carne back to the banks through the community 
in about one week."* Such fresb deposits, together 
with the reimbursements received through the treasurer 
from the pnblic subscríptions to tbe loan, carne to exceed 
the payments of specie into the subtreasury, and the 
reserves consequently rose again. By the middie of Octo- 
ber the New York banks held $5,500,000 more specie than 
on September 21. Meanwhile govemment disburdsements 
had reduced the specie boldings of thé subtreasury by 
$6,000,000. In about the same period the reserves of 
Boston banks gained $1,500,000 and those of the Phila- 
delphia banks $1,700,000. 

Encouraged by the gain in specie, the banks agreed to 
take a second $50,000,000 of the 7.30 three-year treasury 
notes October 1, fífteen days earlier than the time agreed 
upon in August, although they had not yet completed their 

1 The apportionmeDt was at flrst managed by charging interest apon the defl> 
ciency of resexre; bat on September 21 this acoount was olosed, and *Hhereafter 
the specie apportionment was made by reqniring the banks to ezchange loan oertifl- 
cates for specie whenever their specie was less than 25 per cent, of their net deposits, 
exclnsive of the amoont to the credit of the govemment." From September 21 to 
Becember 80 a daily apportionment of specie was made in this fashion. The com- 
mittee issned loan oertificates drawing 7 per cent, interest to banks whose reserves had 
folien below the limit, for 90 per cent, of the amonnt of 7.90 notes, or assistant treas- 
nrer^s receipts for payments on the loan, deposited with them. An issne of $10,000,000 
of such oertificates had been authorized by the banks April 24, 1861. This was 
increased to $15,000,000 December 18, to $20,000,000 December 28, and to $25.000,000 
Jannary 20, 1$62. The total issnes were $22,585,000, and the largest amonnt outstand- 
ing was $21,900,000 from February 3 to February 7, 1862. The interest amonnted to 
|3B6,436J2. Certifica tes were issned to thirty-nine of the flfty associated banks, 
thirty-one of which paid more interest than they received. All the oertificates were 
redeemed by AprU 28, 1862.-/6id., pp. 126-33. 

2 Letter of October 8, 1875, in Spavlj>ino, qp, eit, Appendiz, p. 98. 



34 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

payments npon the fírst loan.' There was but one ominous 
sign — the popular subscription under the management of 
the treasury department had not been an onqualifíed snccess. 
In the hope of stimolating the lagging subscríptions, the 
Boston banks had issued a card September 11, saying: 

The banks are meeting their engagements and fumishing the 
$50,000,000 with no practical inoonvenience to themselves or the 
mercantile oommunity; and if no more money was required no 

difficulty would be experíenoed But ivho ia to fumiah the 

next $50fi00y000í Are the banks expected to do soT If they are, 
the men of means, large and small, must take and pay for the fírst 
$50,000,000 during the present month or early in October — other- 
wise it cannot be accomplished.^ 

But, despite sueh appeals and the efforts of the secre- 
tary and the press, subscriptions became so slow, after about 
$45,000,000 of the first loan had been sold to the public, 
that the treasury agencies were closed and the banks under- 
took to dispose of the second $50,000,000 themselves without 
the aid of the govemment.* 

Changes in the accounts of the banks, similar to those 
resulting from the fírst loan, followed the taking of the sec- 
ond. On comparing the reports for September 28 and Octo- 
ber 12, one sees an increase of loans amounting to $30,000,- 
000 in New York, $3,300,000 in Boston, and $3,600,000 in 
Philadelphia. At the same time, the credit given the gov- 
emment upon the books of the banks created a corresponding 
increase of deposits amounting to $32,600,000, $5,500,- 

1 Cf. Banken' Magazine (New Tork), Yol. XVI, p. 997, and " Raport of the New 
Tork Loan Committee," ibid,. Yol. XVII, p. 140. 

s Bankert* Magcuiine (New Tork), Vol. XVI, pp. 306, 367. 

3 Chase's lettor to Trowbrídge, Waedbn , op. cit,^ p. 387. The banks oontinned, 
howevcr, to recoWe drafts from the treasury on aooonnt of the sales made to the 
pablic by the treasnry agencies on thcir aooonnt. The final canh reimbnrsement was 
not received in New Tork until Jannary 18, Wííl.—Execuiive Document No, 10, p. 128, 
37th Ck>n«., 3d Sess. Of the $45,000,000 sold, $34,700,000 were disposed of by prívate 
agcnts and the balance by department officials. It was by his snccess in obtaining 
subscriptions for over $5,000,000 of 7.308 that Jay Cooke attraeted Mr. Chaae*8 atten- 
tion.— Seo H. R. Kxecutive Document No, M, 88th Gong., Ist Sess. 



Suspensión of Speoie Payments 35 

000, and $4,600,000 respectively. But, instead of falling 
off as in August, the reserves of tbe banks increased, main- 
taining a high level throughout October, November, and the 
first half of December. Of conree, as successive $5,000,- 
000 instabnents were paid into the subtreasuríes by the 
banks, their deposits declined again after October 12, as they 
had after August 31, and the loans were reduced by con- 
tinued receipts from the proceeds of the popular subscrip- 
tion. By November 16 (the last report made before the 
taking of the third loan) the fall of deposits in New York 
was $18,000,000, and of loans $19,000,000. The corre- 
sponding figures for Philadelphia • were $1,300,000 and 
$2,700,000; and for Boston (October 12 to November 9) 
$1,100,000 and $2,300,000. 

AU this time, while supplying the federal treasury with 
specie on so large a scale, the banks had also to fumish the 
usual accommodations to the mercantile community. But 
they were able to serve both the govemment and the public 
with comparative ease. For, as the Massachusetts bank 
commissionere reported in October, 1861, " the prostration 
of business robbed them of their usual customere, and the 
operations of the govemment, which have given rise to a 
new activity exerted in the public service, have caused the 
making of very little business paper, such as banks are 
in the habit of discounting. Public contractore are usually 
paid in cash at intervals shorter than the average length of 
bank accommodations, and they have little occasion to bor- 
rowmoney."* .^ 

The last instalment of the first $50,000,000 was paid into 
the subtreasuríes by the banks October 24, and payment on 
the secpnd loan was begun five days later.' The operation 

1 Exeeutive Document No. 25^ S7th Ck>ngM 3d Sess., P> 56. 

. s ** Beport of the New York Loan Committee," Banken'' Magaxine (New York), 
Yol. XVn, pp. 139, 140. 



36 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

proceeded smoothly, the decline of the reserves being insig- 
nifícant, and the banks determined to take a third $50,000,- 
000 of govemment securities November 16, a month before 
the date set in the agreement of Angust. But, becaose of 
the difficalty experíenced in disposing of the three-year 
7.30 treasury notes to the public, they declined to accept 
more of these securities, and received instead twenty-year 
6 per cent, bonds at a rate eqoivalent to par for 7 per cent,* 
in the expectation that such bonds could be sold at a profít 
in Europe.' At the same time, the banks were given the 
option of taking on January 1, 1862, a foorth loan of 
$50,000,000 apon the same terms as the fírst and second.' 
In purBuance of this arrangement, the government was given 
credit apon the books of the banks for $45,795,478.48 — the 
proceeds of the $50,000,000 bonds at the given rate* — 
which increased once more the sum of loans and deposita^ 
For several weeks after the third loan was taken every- 
thing went well. The banks continued to pay regular instal- 
ments on the se(X)nd loan into the subtreasuries of New 
Tork, Bostón, ana Philadelphia, and did not make the fírst 
payment on the third until December 10.* Meanwhile the 
specie reserves increased slightly in each of the three cities, 
so that by December 7 New Tork banks held as much coin as 
at any time since August, and the Boston and Philadelphia 

1 This rate is WJSSZifíaBSÍ—Executive Document No. 25, p. 129, 87th Caag., Sd Sess. 
Thifl arranffement was made nnder authority of sec. 7 of the act of Au^nst 5, 1861, 12 
StattUe» at Large^ p. 31S. 

• Soc the letter f rom a New York'bauk president pablished in the New York 
Tribune. December 25, 1861, p. 7. 

3 Report of the Secretary of the Treamry, December, 1861, p. 10. 

• Ibid,, loe. cit. Cf. ExectUive Document No, 25, p. 129, 87th Gong., Sd Sess. 

& For Now York the gain f rom NoTember 16 to November SO was $25.510,000 in 
loans and $25,100,000 in deposits. For Philadelphia the correspondinff fijares are 
$2,400,000 and $S,400,000. The Boston bank» gained $3,600,000 in loans f rom the seoond 
to the fourth week in November and $3,500,000 in deposits. 

• *' Report of the New York Loan Committee," Banken' Maoagine^ VoL XVII, 
p.140. 



Suspensión of Specie Payments 37 

banks were actually stronger in specie iban at the time when 
the first govemment loan was made. 

Abont this time, however, two untoward events occurred. 
The first was the publication, December 10, of the annual 
report of the secretary of the treasury. In bis report to 
the extra session of Congress in the preceding Jnly, Mr. 
Chase bad estimated that receipts from cnstoms dues and 
sales of pablic land would yield during the current fiscal 
year (Jnly 1, 1861, to June 30, 1862), a revenue of $60,- 
000,000, while the expenditures of the govemment would 
probably reach $318,519,582.' Enormous as this budget 
seemed, the succeeding months proved its inadequacy. The 
Decqmber report showed that the estímate of expenses should 
be increased $214,000,000, while the estímate of revenue from 
customs and land sales should be reduced $25,000,000.^ But 
more than this, it bad been generally felt that the plan of 
borrowing from banks could be only a temporary makeshift 
to serve until a permanent policy was matured. It was hoped 
that the report of December would present a definite plan of 
fínance based upon adequate taxation. But Mr. Chase pro- 
posed taxes yielding only $50,000,000,' and put bis main 
reliance upon a scheme for reorganizing the banks of the 
country in such a way as to compel them to buy a large 
amount of govemment bonds.^ The disappointment caused 
by the report was keen.' 

The second event was the Trent affair. November 8, 
1861, Captain Wilkes, of the American warship San Jacinto, 
removed two commissioners of the Confedérate States — 

1 Senate Executive DocumerU No. 2, pp. 5 and 8, 37th Cong., Ist Sess. 

s Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1861, pp. 11, 12. 

»Jbid., p. 15. 

«/Md.,pp. 17-20. 

<^ Cy. " Federal Finances Examined" (anoD.) HurWs MeTrcharUa* Maoazine, "Vol. 
XLVII, December, 1862, p. 507 ; Appleton 's Annual Cyclopotdia^ 1881, p. 66; Blainb, 
Tu>etdy Year» of Congre», (Norwich, Coim., 1884), Vol. I, p. 407. 



HH üinroMr of thc Gkccsbacks 



Mf^mrn. Mññfm Httfl Slídell — br forcé from the Kitísh 
nítmmf^ Tffrnt, f'ljín^ between Harazia and SonthampIcMi. 
f n tbft TTniU9<l HiñUm lírelj mtisfactiofi was felt in this cap- 
tnrf9, and Wiikea waa dined bj ciaba and thanked by Con- 
lfTí'!tm, Bnt whcm the news reached England, Norember 27, 
ib^Tft wfta ffrefii indignation over what waa ielt to be a wan- 
Um I nmilt to the Brítiah flag ; and the govenunent dispatched 
a (\né:4m^n mcsaiienger to Washington to demand the snrren- 
(U^T (A th<) [niníineni and an apology. If this demand were 
not vA}m\}\UH\ with in seven daysthe English ambaaaador waa 
infitnir,t<Ml ** to repair immediately to London.^' This was a 
filnin thrcmt of war. Intelligence of the action taken by the 
Kfiglish cabínot was received in New York on December 16. 
A» thn níiM)rt had gone out that the Confederates woald not 
be rfloom^d it sec^med highiy probable that the federal gov- 
ernmont would l)e involved in a second war.' 

Tlio nM*oi[)t of the news on the 16th caused a panic in the 
Nf»w York nmrketii. On the stock exchange goyemmentseca- 
ritipN foll 2-2¿ ¡M^r cent Shares of all kinds participated iu 
\\w (hH'liiie/ nn<l sierling exchange rose two points.' Wall 
NÍnM«i wnH iilled wiih rumors of an agreement among the banks 
to Him|M«nd H|NH*ie pnyments, and mon with balances in banks 
lH«gnii to iurn ihem inio 8i)ecial deix^sits.^ Next day a meet- 
itig of th(^ AsmH*intod banks was called to consider the sitna- 
tion. A motion wns umdo to susiK>nd specie {>ayments at 
fUiot\ btii tht« pro|H)8iii failod of adoption. Instead, in the 
ho|H' of quoHing the ¡mnio, the l)anks unanimously adopted a 
nerivm of vigorouM n'Holutions, deolaring that there was 
*Mio1hing in the |HWÍtion of the Kmns to the govemment to 

« «r J. r. Hm>l^lt«. lltuMnr .\f tkr Vn,U\Í SU%t€; Yol. 111 (N>w York, 18»). pp. 
^ y^nitUrfii* V<«i>«»i«N iN>w \ork\ Yol. XYl. p|v. .\U and MI; «nd stock qnote- 

« /^fW . Y«%). \ Yl. p|v. m «mi VHÍk 



Suspensión of Speoie Patments 39 

cause nneasiness/' and that they saw ^' no reason, jastiñca- 
tion, or necessity for a suspensión of specie payments.'^ ' 

But these resolutions availed little. While the banks 
continued to pay specie into the subtreasury at the usual 
rate, the money paid out by the goverment to contractors . 

and others, owing to the alarmed state of the public mind L/ 
and the fear of a suspensión, did not flow back as bef ore into 
their reserves.* This cut ofE the chief source from which the 
reserves had been recruited. Meanwhile the banks of Boston 
and the West began to draw heavily upon their balances in 
New York, so that the deposits fell ofE $17,000,000 in three 
weeks.' To meet thisdouble drain — coming from the sub- 
treasury and the interior banks — the New York institu- 
tions had no available resource. Over $50,000,000 of their 
resources seem to have been locked up in govemment securi- 
ties,^ which could not be sold to obtain specie ; for the fall 
in the price of stocks made it impossible to dispose of 7.30 
treasury notes at home except at a heavy sacrifíce,^ and the 
danger of war with England cut ott all hope of negotiating 
the 6 per cent, bonds in Europe.' The result of the sitúa- 
tion was a rapid depletion of the reserves. The week that 
Mr. Chase's report on the fínances was published the New 
York banks lost $2,900,000 of specie. The next report — 
made after the receipt of warlike news from England — 

1 See copy of the resolntions in HurW» Merchanta^ Mctocutine^ Vol. XLVI, p. 101. 
QT. the oomment in the New York Trt&une, December 28, p. 8, and December SO, p. 8; 
New York Herald^ December 19, p. 6; and New York Timea^ December 90, p. 4. 

s Qf. letter from a New York bank president in New York Tribune^ December 25, 
1881, p. 7. 

* Cf. New York Tribune of December 2S, p. 8, and of December 30, p. 8. The 
table, p. 30, aboye, shows that the Boston banks increased their specie, while those 
of New York were losing rapidly. 

*Cf. Banker$' Magazine (New York), Vol. XVI, p. 560. 

& Most of the 7 JO notes sold by pnblic subscription had been taken by " small 
investors, and they were already again offeringthem in the market to an extent which 
rednoed the price to 96 for those that were indorsed and 96 for clean notes."— 
Awieriean Annual Cyclopcedia^ 1861, p. 299. 

* Letter fxom bank president in New York Tribune^ December 25, 1861, p. 7. 



40 HlSTOBT OF THE ObEENBACKS 



M^hihltml A further Iosb of $2«600,000. Duríng the next 
MMVMii claya the rale of depletíon was eren more rapid, and 
tha loHS for the week amonnted to $7,400,000. 

lUider Buch a drain the complete exhaostion of the 
reiiervea was evidentlv a qoeetion of only a ahort time. 
MHturclay, December 28, the banks held another meeting 
ti) ileoide what measurea shoold be taken. After a ^^ther 
ütoriiiy ^* seasion of aix or seven honis, the reaoliition to ana- 
peiul Bpec*ie payments npon the foUowing Monday, Decem- 
ber HO, was carried by a vote of 25 of the institntions 
repreutínted to 15.' 

uy. " R<tinark4 made by Mr. JaoMS GmlUUn at the HmCíb^ oT Baak Offiwn, 
. . . . nMN«mbpra^l»irBaiaert*Jr<vutne(XewTork).ToLXTI,pp.«3S^:H.W. 
DiiMKTT, HUiory i^ the Bamk cf Sor York. Sd cd. (New York, US4). i>. 97. and 
aooiHinU of the meetinc in the New York daily papen of DeeeiberaOL tKL 

It i« to be noted ihat sQspenskm was rather a aMasora of ptaeaotkNi to prevcnl 
furiher depleticMi of the i»»n e a than ooe of Deoessity: for on the day iriMo saspeD- 
•icm waii deoided opon the New York banks held H .< 00lO0O mor» speeie Ihan thej had 
al the oommenoement of the rear. Their attitnda was azpraaaad in Mr. Gallatin*s 
remarkn: ''The coTemment mnst snspend speeie pa j a im t» or w« niost, and it is 
only a QuasUon of a few more days* time as to who'snspends araland wiio shall hold 
Ihe H|ieole now in onr raults. If we h«Ud it, the people and the «oTereBMnt will be 
aliko Iw^iM^flted. If |^)remment take» it^ the whole will be expended and hoarded bf 
a fttw |ttHM>l<^<'*~lfai*Avr»* if<HKUtnr vNew York)« ToL XVI, p. 6S7. 

At the time t\f sus|ien«ion the accoont of the banks with the fovemment stood 
an ft»Ut«w« (*M(t., |x, SM» 






Raukuof New York • > • $ta*,aB«.!« lsa.Q5«J» SnjSSwOOO ISl^OOOuOOO 
Hanknof IVMttm > 9klS«.cm aasa.0» «.^SOlOOO «.OOOiOOO 

DaiikniirrhlUdelithu • < l07K.Mít ll.5;tL348 Xg^ím SXXXI.O0O 

$i4x;9&.i:s tii&.3&.4;» sak;súLO0D moñüooo 

Thft i^)vt»nlmelU made its la»t ca;^ pajment to the banks Jannary 13^ I96S. and 
ihe Imiika iMitd the U«t inMaloReut %^f mimej dne upon the wcond loan Jannary I&, 
«iitl tiii ihtt ihinl loa» Kehruary 4, Januarr SI the bank» «tUl owed the coremment 
|ll,ai.S,(iliV « y. ** KeiH^H New Ytxrk U^an l\vKmittee.*' ümOvy»* Jí^utac Yol. XYII. 
pp. l!ti, IMV «lid e^m^nuutt tut the m^^nex market» •^Kl.. V\U. XVL pp. S60 and 631.) 

Thent w«« a vexatit^ui» delay in thetWiiT^rr t«^ the banks of the seenrities they 
had iiurchaaed. The i.X> li>>a>ury iH>te« K\r the p^^rtion of the ñrst kmn which was 
nt»! mkUt l%» I he puhlie vl&*<KS9^iW^ ^eit» m^ reeeited bgr the banks till Jannary 24, 
1ÍA3. 1 he iHkteM K>r I he ««csuhI Utan were delirered in Knir in$talmeats between 
Jaiiiur) £* Mhd Fehrnary ^; ainl theil |>er eent. KmvU Kv the third loan in nine 
iukiahueuu between Jauuary rT aitsl MarehX— " Eei^^t of the New York Loan Odoeh 
mitlee," l»ii\ oif. 

" A« K^iiuuately a» uneipeetedly/' M^i^xrle^l the New York Loan CcMnmittae 
Juue l:\ 1««IS, in e(««ar%i lo ihe «n^^'ratHuí^ '^il ha» Te«itt)ted pr^4ltably for the aasoei- 
Mi«», aud ha> iu\4feably enabke^l Ihem u^ empk\y their means to nearly ns moch 



Suspensión of Specie Payments 41 

"The suspensión of thebanks [of New York] was received 
in commercial and monetary circles without surprise." * The 
banks of Philadelphia, which had lost nearly $2,000,000 of 
specie in a fortnight, foUowed suit; and so did those of 
Boston, although the latter had managed to increase their 
reserves $1,600,000 between December 7 and 21, and had 
then lost but $1,100,000 by the 28th, thus suspending with 
$2,300,000 more specie than on August 17, when the con- 
tract for the first govemment loan was taken. With the 
exception of the banks of Ohio, Indiana, and Kentacky, andi 
a few Bcattered institutions, the suspensión of specie payments\ 
immediately became general.' 

The suspensión of the national treasury f oUowed of neces- 
sity hard upon that of the banks. As Mr. Chase said, after 
the banks had ceased paying in specie, it was "certain that 
the govemment could no longer obtain coin on loans in any 
adequate amounts.'' ' Consequently the treasury was obliged / 
to cease redeeming in coin the demand treasury notes inj 
circulation.* 

The responsibility for the suspensión of the banks and 

adrastage as wonld have been done but for the political disturbances of the oountry. 
Most of the goyenunent securities which have been sold by the assooiates haye 
been sold bjr themselyes at different times, and it is not possible for your committee 
to State the amonnt of interest for the capital inyested which has been receiyed 
tbereon ; bat the assooiates still hold a large amount of them, the market yalue of 
which is much higher than the price at which they were taken."— JLoc. cit.^ p. 148. 
Moreoyer, the banks drew interest at 7.3 per cent, upon the entire ^,000,000 of the 
flrst loan from Angnst 19, apon the second from October 1, and upon the third 
from Noyember 18. As they paid up these loans at the rate of about $5,000,000 per 
week, not completing the payments on the flrst loan till October 24, 1861, on the 
seoond till Jannary 15, 1862, and on the third till Febroary 4, 1862, they were for a 
eonsiderable time paid interest on fonds that had not left their possession. On that 
portion of the flrst loan sold to the pnblic, the banks receiyed interest from August 
19, 1861, to the dates of sale, amounting altogether to $621,290.—*' Report of the New 
York Loan Committee,*^ Banken" Míigazine, pp. 139-42, and Report of the Secretary 
</ the Treaaury, 1861, p. 9. 

1 New York Tribune^ December 31, 1861, p. 3. 
s Cy. Part n, chap. ii, sec. ii, below. 
*Letter to Trowbridge, Wabden, Life of Chase, p. 388. 

^On the sabsequent history of these treasury notes soe Part II, chap. ii, sec. iii. 
and chap. iii, see. i i, below. 



42 HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBAOKS 

govemment has frequently been placed upon Mr. Chase for 
his issue of demand treasury notes and his ref usal to draw 
directly upon the banks in making payments.' Examination 
of the condítion of the banks, as shown in their weekly 
reports, however, hardly bears out this opinión. Doubtless 
the position of the banks would have been stronger had the 
secretary conformed his policy to their wishes. But, inas- 
much as no serious trouble had been experienced up to the 
second week of December, despite Mr. Chase^s refusal to do 
as the banks desired, it seems unreasonable to attribute the 
sudden loss of specie in the last three weeks of December, 
which caused suspensión, to the policy pursued by him 
throughout — especially when the result is so adequately 
accounted for by the depression due to the unfavorable 
treasury report and to the fear of a war with England. 
These events made clear the weakness inherent in the plan 
of the bank loan. Suspensión was jinevitable whenever any- 
thing occurred to check the re-deposit in the banks of money 
paid out by the treasury, or to prevent the banks from 
replenishing their reserves by selling the securities received 
from the govemment. A severe blow to the national credit 
would inevitably produce such eflfects. It so happened that 
the publication of the disappointing treasury report and the 
Trent affair were the first occurrences of this nature momen- 
tous enough to arouse general uneasiness. Had there been 
no threat of war with England, and had the condition of the 
federal finances revealed in the report of Deceml)er been less 
gloomy, the banks would probably have been able to carry 
out their program of taking a fourth $50,000,000 of treasury 
notes on January 1. Suspensión would then have been 
posti)oned, but, in all probability, not prevented. To 
assume that the banks could have continued indefínitely to 
carry their double burden — supplying both govemment and 

I For examines »ee the citations in note 1^ p. 26, and note 2, p* 27, aboye. 



Suspensión op Specie Patmbnts 43 

public with loans — is to assume that no serious reverse 
wonld have bef alien the national credit; for, as has been 
twice said, a disturbance of public confidence would have led 
to the withdrawal of deposits and the hoarding of specie ; 
the govemment securities held by the banks would have 
become unsalable and suspensión would have followed. 

As it was, the specie standard was abandoned within six 
months after the Civil War had fairly begun. The country 
was left at the beginning of the new year, 1862, with a 
mixed circulation of paper money which neither the issuing 
banks ñor the federal treasury were prepared to redeem in 
coin. How Congress met the situation thus created forms 
the subject of the foUowing chapter.* 

1 General aocounts of the $150,000,000 bank loan and the suspensión of specie pay- 
menta are to be found in Report of the Secretary of the Trea^iry, December, 1861, 
pp. 8-10; letter of Chase to Trowbridcce, in Wabden, Life of Chrtse, pp. 386-8; 
ScHüCSEBS, Life of Chíue, pp. 225-31 ; '' Report of the Loan Committce of the New 
York Banks/' Executive Document No. 25, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., PP. 125-42, and Barih' 
en" Magazine (New York), Vol. XVII, pp. 136-49 (details of the management of the 
loan by the New York banks) ; Geobob S. Coe, letter of October 8, 1875, to E. 6. 
Spanlding, in latter*s Hittory of the Legal-Tender Paper Money, 2d ed. (Buffalo, 
1875), Appendix, pp. 89-96; republished under title, ** Financial History of the War,'* 
in Banker»* Mcmcucine^ Vol. XXX, pp. 536-44 (writton f rom point of view of the banks, 
as is the next also) ; J. E. Williams, The War Loans of the Associated Banks to the 
Gooemment in 1861 (New York, 1876) ; American Annual Cyclop<Bdia, 1861, article 
"Finances of the United States," and pp. 61-6 (impartial); "Federal Finances 
Ezamined " (anón) ; Hunfs Merchants' Magazine, Vol. XLVII, pp. 506 ff. (críticism 
of Mr. Chase) ; Von Hock, Die Finanzen und die Finanzgeschichte der Vereinigten 
Staaten (Stntt^rt, 1867), pp. 442-6 (dcficient in information) ; W. A. Bebkey, The 
Money Question^ 4th ed., Orand Rapids (Mich.), 1878, pp. 154-8 (versión of the 
*'greenback** party); Bolles, Financial History of the United States, 1860-85, pp. 
20^ (loosely written) ; W. G. Sumnbr, History of Banking in the United States, 
(New York, 1896) (Vol. I of History of Banking in all Nations], pp. 4.S8-61. 



CHAPTER II 

THE FIRST LEGAL-TENDER ACT 

I. The Legal-Tender Bills: 

Spaulding*s Legal-Tender Bill — Discussion in Committee — The 
Bankers' Convention — Revisión oí Spaulding^s Bill. 

II. Debate in Conqress: 

Constitutional Argument — Argument from Experience — Eco- 
nomic, Moral, and Fiscal Objections — Argument from Necessity — 
Alternatives Proposed — A Temporary Measure. 

III. Attitude of Secretary Chase: 

Chase's Reluctant Assent to Legal-Tender Clause — Later Denial 
of Necessity for It — Opinions of Financial Critics. 

IV. Passage of the Act: 

Three Substitutes for Legal-Tender Bill — Vote in House — Senate 
Amendments — Votes in Senate — Conference Committee — Pro- 

visions of Law — Attitude of the Business Public and of the Press. 

• 

I. THE LEGAL-TENDEB BILLS 

On the very day that the New York banks suspended 
specie payments, a proposal was made in Congress that the 
United States resort to the issue of an irredeemable paper 
currency of legal-tender notes. This bilí, so promptly pre- 
sented, originated in the following manner: 

In his re|X)rt of December 9 Mr. Chase had estimated the 
probable déficit for the coming six months at $214,000,000. 
To secure this sum he proposed an increase of only 
$50,000,000 in taxation and for the remainder reliance upon 
loans. With the purpose of making it easier to borrow he 
suggested a national reorganization of the state banking 
systom requiring all banks to parchase United States stocks 
to hold as security for their circulating notes* — a proposal 

1 Report of the Secretary of the Treíuury, December, 1861, pp. 11-20; Note» 
Explanatory of Mr. Chase'» Plan of National Finance (Washington, 1861). p. 15. 

44 



The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Act 45 

out of which the national banking system developed some 
two years later. 

According to the usual course of business this report was 
read in the House of Representatives and referred to the 
Committee of Ways and Means. The large amount of 
work which devolved upon this committee had made neces- 
sary a división of labor among its members. The chairman, 
Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, whose radical anti- 
slavery opinions, imperious temper, and vigorous use of 
invective had made him the Republican leader of the House, 
devoted himself to pushing the appropriation bilis. To the 
remaining eight members fell the task of preparíng new 
measures. They organized in two subcommittees, one of 
which, presided over by the leading tarifif advócate of the 
day, Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont, undertook to frame a 
program of war taxation, leaving the other subcommittee to 
consider the loan bilis.' 

It was to this second subcommittee that Mr. Chascas 
national currency scheme was submitted. The chairman 
was Elbridge G. Spaulding, a Buffalo banker who had been 
state treasurer of New York and had served two terms in 
Ck)ngre8S. His coUeagues were a retired Boston merchant, 
Samuel Hooper, who had entered politics as a Republican 
after accumulating a fortune in business, and Erastus 
Corning, an Albany millionaire possessing executive ability 
but no talent for speech-making. These thre*e gentlemen 
immediately adopted the secretary^s plan and began to draft 
a bilí for a national currency secured by a pledge of govern- 
ment bonds. But on Saturday, December 2§, they learned 
that the New Tork banks had decided to suspend specie 
payments on the foUowing Monday. Suspensión would of 
course drive gold from circulation and leave the country 

1 K o. Spauldino, HUtory of the LegaUTender P^per Money luued During iKe 
Oreat RebeUion (Buffalo, 1860), pp. 7, 8. 



46 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 

with no other currency than the $33,000,000 demand notes 
issued by the treasury, the notes of the suspended state 
banks, and small change of silver and minor coins. Even 
when redeemable in specie the bank notes, issued by 
some 1,600 diíferent institutions according to no general 
plan and varying widely in valué, made a very unsatisf actory 
currency. Moreover, bank notes could not legally be 
accepted and paid out by the federal treasury under the 
provisions of the subtreasury law. Mr. Chase's plan for 
reorganizing the banking system would perhaps fumish a 
sounder circulation, but the banking bilí contained sixty 
sections and was certain to encounter opposition from the 
friends of state banks that would delay íts enactment sev- 
eral months. "So long a delay," thought Mr. Spaulding, 
"would be fatal to the unión cause." Accordingly, he 
"changed the legal tender section, intended originally to 
accompany the bank bilí, into a sepárate bilí, .... and on 
his own motion introduced it into the House by unanimous 
consent on the 30th of December."* 

After being twice read in the House of Representatives, 
this bilí was referred back to the Committee of Ways and 
Means. Upon its wisdom the members of the committee 
were equally divided. Of the subcommittee, Spaulding 
and Hooper favored the bilí, while Corning opposed it 
Thaddeus Stevens at first objected to the legal-tender clause 
as unconstitutional ; but he soon overéame his scruples and 
decided to vote for the bilí. Morrill, of Vermont, and 
Horton, of Ohio, joined Corning in opposition. Maynard, 
of Tennessee, and Stratton, of New York, took no part in 
the discussion; but the former was inclined to support the 
proposal, while Stratton was undecided. There was thus a 
deadlock in the committee — four members favored and four 

1 Spauldino. op. cit, p. 14. This was H. R. bilí No. 182. It authorized the iasne of 
$50,000,000 of legal-tender treasary notes. For text see Spaulding, pp. 14, IS. 



The Fibst Legal-Tendbb Aot 47 

opposed the bilí. The ninth member, John S. Phelps, of 
Mififiourí, was not in Washington at the time. But ñnally 
the wavering member, Stratton, consented to vote for the 
bilí in order that it might go before Congress for considera- 
tion.* Thus, after a narro w escape from defeat in the com- 
mittee, the legal-tender bilí was formally reported to the 
House by Mr. Spaulding, January 7, 1862.' 

Mr. Spaulding's reasons for urging a legal-tender bilí 
apon Congress at this juncture were given in a letter to a 
gentleman who ventured to suggest that heavy taxation was 
preferable to the issue of irredeemable paper as a method of 
securing revenue. Spanlding wrote : 

The treasury-note bilí . . . . is a measure of neceasity and not one 

of chotee We will be out of means to pay the daily expenses 

in aJbout thirty daya, and the committee do not see any other way 
to get along till we can get the tax bilis ready, except to issue tem- 

porarily Treasury notes We must have at least $100,000,000 

during the next three months, or the Govemment must stop 
payment. 

And the letter closed with an intimation that unless the 
gentleman could suggest some other plan for raising the 
said $100,000,000 it would best become him not to críticise 
the biU.» 

By the publication of copies of the legal-tender bilí in 
yariouB newspapers, the country was quickly informed of the 
radical step which Congress was considering. When the 
bankers of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia who had 
been supplying the govemment with funds heard of the 
proposal, a number of the most prominent went to Washing- 
ton to persuade Secretary Chase that the situation could be 

1 Spauldino, History, p. 16. 

SThis seoond bilí (H. R. bilí No. 187) differed from the flrst in increasing the 
issue of legal-tender notes from $50,000,000 to $100,000,000 and in making the demand 
notes authorised in Jnly, 1861, also a legal tender. For text see ibid.^ pp. 16, 17. 

'Letter of E. O. Spanlding to Isaac Sherman, January 8, 1862, Spauldino, 
HyOory, pp. 17, 18. 



48 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

met with a remedy lesa heroic than the issue oí an irredeem- 
able paper cmrency. Janaary 11, 1862, these gentlemen 
had an informal conference with Mr. Chase, the members of 
the Hoose Committee of Ways and Means, and of the Senate 
finance committee.* 

As spokesman for the banks, Mr. James Gallatin, presi- 
dent of the Gallatin Bank of New Tork, pointed out the evil 
consequences that would follow the emission of legal-tender 
paper money, and submitted an altemative plan for relieving 
the necessities of the treasory. The main features of his 
proposaU were: ñrst, heavy taxation; second, the sale of 
long-time bonds at their market valué. Adequate taxation, 
he argued, would give the long-needed assurance that the 
treasury had ampie revenue to pay interest on loans. Bonds 
could then be sold on better terms, especially after the 
futile attempt to ñx a mínimum valué for them by legislation 
forbidding sales below par should have been abandoned.' 

Simple and efficient as this plan seems, it did not meet 
with the approval of the secretary or the congressional 
committees. Mr. Spaulding, who replied to Oallatin, stated 
the grounds of their dissent as foUows: 

Mr. Spaulding objected to any and every form of ^' shinning " by 
govemment through Wall or State streets to b^gin with; objected 
to the knocking down of govemment stocks to 75 or 60 cents on the 

iSpauldino, op. cit., pp. lft-20.— The bankers who took part in this conference 
■eem to have had no official position as delega tes of the association of banks. However, 
they were men of snch prominence that mnch weight was attached to the opinions they 
expreMHcd on financial topics. Aocording to Spaolding, Coe, Vermilye, Martin, and 
Oallatin carne f rom New York ; Haven, Walley, and Bates f rom Boston ; and Rogers, 
Mercer, and Patterson from Philadelphia (tfrid., p. 19). Bnt that the yiews of theae 
gentlemen were not shared by all their associates appears from the letters received 
about this time by Mr. Spanlding from other bankers (t6td., p. 23-5). See alsothe 
New York Herald financial column dated Jannary 13, 1862. 

3Thero were four other points in Mr. Oallatin^s plan: (1) oessation of issne of 
demand notes beyond the $50,000,000 already authorized ; (2) the issue of $100,000,000 
of two-year treaHury notes receiyable for goTemment dues ezcept costoms; (3) sus- 
pensitm of the subtreasury act so as to allow banks to become goTemment deposi- 
tories; (4) authorisation of temporary loana secured by pledges of goyemment 
itoek.— /6td., p. 20. 



Thb Fibst Legal-Tendeb Act 49 

doUar, the inevitable result of throwing a new and large loan on 
the market, without Umitatton as to price; claimed for treasury 
notes as much virtue of par valué as the notes of banks which ha ve 
suspended specie payments, but which jet circuíate in the trade of 
the North; and finished with firmlj refusing to assent to anj 
scheme which should permit a speculation bj brokers, bankers, 
and others in govemment securíties, and particularly anj scheme 
which should double the public debt of the countr y, and double 
the expenses of the war by damaging the credit of the govemment 
to the extent of sending it to '^ shin " through the shaving shops of 
New Tork, Boston, and Philadelphia.* 

This reply of Mr. Spaulding to Mr. Gallatin is interesting 
because it shows plainly the curious inconsistency in the 
position taken by the promoters of the legal-tender bilí from 
beginning to end of the discussion. They professed to 
advócate the issue of paper money upon the ground of sheer 
necefisity. By this means alone, said Mr. Spaulding, in the 
letter quoted above, could the immediate wants of the 
treasnry be met. To substantiate this argument it was of 
coorse necessary to show that no other feasible method of 
obtaining funds existed. When, then, bankers declared that 
there was an altemative, that the govemment could secure 
means by adopting a policy of vigorous taxation and selling 
its bonds at their market valué, the only logical answer for 
the friends of the legal-tender bilí was to show that the 
bankers were mistaken. But such was not the answer that Mr. 
Spaulding made. He replied instead that selling bonds below 
par was more objectionable than issuing paper money. And in 
this view the committee of Congress apparently concurred. 
Thus, when the delegates of the banks called attention to 
the possibility of borrowing, the argument for the legal- 
tender bilí was shifted from the ground of necessity to that 
of expediency. The choice lay not between irredeemable 
paper money and federal bankruptcy, but between irredeem- 

1 Spauudino, p. 21. 



50 HlSTOBT OF THB ObEENBACKS 

able paper money and borrowing ai high ratea oí intereat. 
The financial leaders of the govemment deliberately pre- 
ferred the formar course. Whether their choice waa wise or 
not, even f rom the strictly financial point of view ; whether 
the increase of debt, which Mr. Spaulding saw would result 
from selling bonds below par, was avoided by the issue of 
paper money ; whether " the knocking down of govemment 
stocks to 75 or 60 cents on the doUar" was provented; are 
questions that must be left for the chapter on the effect of 
paper issues upon the cost of the war.* 

As has been said, Mr. Spaulding's reply convinced the 
congressional committees that the legal- tender bilí was a 
better method of relieving the embarrassment of the treasury 
than the bankers' proposal to sell bonds at their market 
valué. Subsequently, however, the delegates of the banks 
succeeded in formulating a plan which received the indorse- 
ment of the secretary of the treasury. New loans of $250,- 
000,000 or $300,000,000 and the enactment of the national 
banking bilí advocated in Mr. Chase^s report were its chief 
points. The issue of demand notes in excess of the $50,- 
000,000 already authorized, and the making those already 
issued a legal tender, was to be avoided as unnecessary.' 
But this plan also was rejected by the committees of Con- 
gress as inadequate to the crisis. Plainly, it would be of 
small avail to authorize bonds at par when capitalists would 
buy them only at a discount, and to sales below par the commit- 
tees would not agree. Consequently, the attempt of the repre- 
sentative bankers of New Tork, Boston, and Philadelphia to 
give the govemment the benefit of their advice came to 
nought. The plans suggested by them are of interest, how- 
ever, because they show that in the opinión of experienced 

1 Part II, chap. x, below. Cf, Hbnbt Aoamb, Hittorieal E$$ap$ (New York, 
1801), pp. 28MI3 and 63, 64 below. 

sSpadldixo, pp. 21, 22. 



The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Agt 51 

men the legal-tender act was not the only escape from the 
difficTilties into which the treasury had drifted. 

After the convention of bankers had broken up, Mr. 
Spaulding added another section to the legal-tender bilí, 
recast it in pursuance of soggestions from Secretary Chase/ 
and introduced it again into the House of Representatives, 
where it was made the special order for January 28, 1862. 
As it carne before Congress the measure provided for the 
issue of $100,000,000 of United States notes to be '' a legal 
tender in payment of all debts, public and prívate,'* and 
exchangeable for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds of which the 
secretary was authorized to issue $500,000,000.' Upon the 
appointed day the House resolved itself into a committee of 
the whole upon the state of the Union, and Mr. Spaulding 
made an elabórate introductory speech, ezplaining and rec- 
ommending the bilí.' But opposition to the mctking of 
treasury notes a legal tender developed at once, and it was 
not until after four weeks of eamest discussioiTiihat the fate 
of the bilí was decided. What motives actuated Congress 
in its final decisión can best be leamed by study of the 
debate. , •* 

II. DEBATE IN GONGBESS^ 

Logically, the first point in the case of the promoters 
of the treasury-note bilí was the proof that Congress had 
power under the constitution to make paper money a legal 
tender in the payment of debts. Foreseeing that this power 

1 Spauldimo, pp. 26, 27. 

2H. E. bilí No. 240, ibid., p. 27; fall text in Congremonal Globe, 97thCong.,2d 
Sess., p. 522. 

> OonffrettUmal Olobe, loe. ctt., pp. 523-6; Spaulding, pp. 28-42. 

* In the foUowing section I have attempted to give an analysis of the whole dis- 
cnssioii in both houses of Congress, ratherthan to show the attitude of prominent 
indiTidoals. Aooonnts of the debate from the latter point of view are numerons. 
See, e. g.: Spaüloimo, pp. 28-152; J. G. Blaine, Twenty Years of CoñngrtM (Nor- 
wich, Conn., 1884), Vol. I, chap. xix; J. J. Knox, United State» Note», 2d ed. 
(Loodon, 1885), pp. 11^-37; A. S. Bolles, Financial Hiatory of the United StateB, 
JStl-jaas (New York, 1886), Book I, chap. iy; J. F. Bhodbs, Hittory qf the United 



52 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBAGKS 

would be challenged, Mr. Spaulding read an unofficial 
opinión of the attomey-general, Edward Bates, which was 
interpreted, not quite fairly, to mean that Congress coald 
make treasury notes a legal tender since it was not f orbidden 
to do so by the constitation.' To this it was answered that 
under the tenth amendment Congress possessed no powers 
except those explicitly or implicitly granted it, and therefore 
that no authority for making paper money a legal tender coold 
be inferred from the silence of the constitution on the point.' 
So cónclusive was this reply that the supporters of the 
bilí found it necessary to seek other ground for their con- 
tention by deducing the right to make paper bilis legal 
tender from some of the powers expressly delegated to Con- 
gress. Appeal was made to the clause authorizing Congress 
"to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution " the powers specifically granted it. Mr. Spauld- 
ing coupled this clause with the authorization to levy war. 
"This bilí," he argued, "is a necessary means of cíurying 
into execution the powers granted in the constitution ' to 
raise and support armies ' and ' to provide and maintain a 
navy.' " * Thaddeus Stevens added the necessary clincher 
by saying: " Whether such necessity exists is solely for the 
decisión of Congress."* Two attempts were made to over- 

StaUt.from 1860 (New York, 1886), Yol. m, pp. 561-7; J. K. Uptox, Maney in PoU- 
tica, tá ed. (Boston, 1885), pp. 75-^; J. L. Lauohlin, Report qf the Manetary Com^ 
ntimion (Chicago, 1886), pp. 408-10; F. A. WaIíKER, lioney (New York, 1891), pp. 
968-73; F. A. Walkxb and Hbnbt Adams, "The Legal-Tender Aei," Norih American 
Rcüieto^ April, 1870; '*The Greenbacks in Congress,'* Scund Ourrency, Yol. III, No. 
4, Janaary, 1886. 

1 CongreuioncU Olobe, 97th Gong., 2d Sess., Part I, p. 525; Spaüldino, pp.15, 16. 
Bateü^s real meaning seems to bo that Congress is no more prohibited from making 
bilb of credit a legal tender than it is from issuing them, and the latter right no 
one oontests. 

> Ibid. See remarks of Messrs. Pendleton, p. 550; Cowan, p. 781 ; Sheffield, p. 640; 
Thomas, p. 681 ¡ Collamer, p. 768; Pearoo, p. 803; Crisfleld, Appendix, p. 48; Bayard, 
p. 785; Conkling, p. 635; Wright, p. 662. 

>/6id., p. 524. Similar arguments were made by Messrs. Blake, p. 686; Howe, 
Appendix, p. 54; Stevens, p. 688. 

*Ibid. 



The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Act 53 

throw this poBÍtion. Such an argument, said Mr. Crísfíeld, 
amounts to a claim of unlimited authority; for, if one 
granted it, by asserting that the act was necessary " to insore 
public safety," Congress could enact any law, no matter how 
injudicious, provided it were not expressly forbidden by the 
constitution.* Mr. Pendleton took dififerent gronnd. Granted, 
he argued, that Congress could make treasury notes a legal 
tender if this were necessary to pay the army, it still 
remained to prove that this necessity existed. He himself 
was nnable to see the necessity in the pending case. Thei;e- 
fore, to him the bilí was onconstitutional.' 

A second form of the "necessary means^' argument wasr 
made by Mr. Bingham, of Ohio. Congress, he said^has 
power to regúlate commerce, and the determination of what 
shall be lawful tender in discharge of debts is a necessary 
incident of this regulation.' But it was answered, fírst, that 
it was a mere subterfuge to pretend that regulation of com- 
merce was the object of the bilí;* second, that the power of 
Congress over commerce extended only to " commerce wiíh 
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes," while a legal-tender act affected only transac- 
tions between individuáis;' and third, that the substitution 
of a paper for a metallic standard, so far from "regulating 
and promoting" commerce, tended rather to "disturb and 
destroy" it.* 

Senators Howard and Sherman elaborated a third varia- 
tion of the argument. Making treasury notes a legal tender 
they held was one of the necessary and proper means for 
borrowing money.' Senator Collamer anticipated this con- 
tention, and replied that where power was granted to do a 

1 Congrestioncd Olobe^ 97th Cod^Tm 2d Sess., Appendiz, p. 48. 3 ibid.y p. 550. 

3/&Mf., p. 637; qA remarles of Mr. Kellogg, p. 079. 

« Mr. Crisfleld, Appendiz, p. 49. ^Mr. Collamer, p. 769. 

*Mr. Crisfield, Appendix, p. 49. ? Mr. Sherman, p. 790; Mr. Howard, p. 796. 



54 HlSTOBY OF THE GbBENBAOKS 

certain thing in a certain way it was not permissible to seek 
inferential authority to accomplish the same end in a díffer- 
ent manner. Now Congress was empowered to raise money 
fírst, by levying taxes, second, by negotiating loans. The 
issue of legal-tender notes, being neither a tax ñor a loan, 
carne under neither of these express grants; and not coming 
under the express grants, no authority could be inferred f or 
it as a means of raising money.' 

The last argument for the constitationality of the bilí — 
the one that found no adeqnate answer — was Charles Sum- 
ner^s. He called attention to the fact that Congress had 
long been conceded the right to issue treasury notes. Review- 
ing the fínancial history of the American colonies, he showed 
that ten of the thirteen had at difFerent times issued paper 
money, usually making it a legal tender. In America, he 
argued, *' the legal tender was a constant, though not insepa- 
rable incident of the bilí of credit." The conclusión was 
that the unquestioned power of issuing treasury notes carríed 
with it the right to make the notes a legal tender.' 

But, af ter spending much time and ingenuity in debating 
the constitutional questions raised by the legal-tender clause, 
the members of Congress apparently concluded that they had 
multiplied words to little purpose. While a few declared 
that constitutional scruples would prevent them from voting 
for the bilí,' the more general feeling was that it would be 
unreasonable to decide a question of such importance upon a 

1 Congrcaaional (ílobe, 37th Cod^m 2d Sess., p. 767. 

2 Ibid.^ pp. 797, 798. An amnsinfcly fantastic argument for the constitutional ity 
of the bilí was made by Senator McDoogall of California, who attempted to deduce 
the right to issue Icgal-teuder treasury notes from the power to coin money, by 
showing that the word *'coiu*' was etymologically equivalcut to the word ** stamp,** 
and therefore that the right of coinage must iucludo the right to stamp papcr notes. 
Unfortunatcly for the argument, the canon of interpretation which insista that 
words aro uscd in the constitution in strict acoordauce with thoír etymological 
signiflcance did not commend its4)lf to the lawycrs of the Senatc.— Ihid,^ Appendix, 
p. 60, for his argument; with which compare the remarles of Mr. Thomas, p. 681. 

3 E. g., Senators CoUamer, ibid.^ pp. 767, 770; Powell, p. 804; Sanlsbary, p. 804. 



The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Act 5o 

doubtful technicality which could be settl^d only by the 
courta If the measure was expedient there need be little 
hesitation at such a crisis in construing liberally the powers 
of Congress.' The fate of the bilí was aflfected, then, much 
leas by the inconclusive constitutional argument than by the 
debate apon the merits of the issue of legal-tender notes as 
a financial poliey. 

Consideríng the bilí thus upon its merits, the opposition 
called attention prominently to the lessons of experience. 
Could it be shown that the resort to an inconvertible paper 
currency had always been attended in the past with evil 
resnlts, a strong presumption would be created against 
the ¥risdom of a repetition of the experiment. Consequently 
rhetoric was employed to picture in vivid colors the nnhappy 
consequences that had foUowed the issue of paper money by 
France during the Revolution/ by England in the Napol- 
eonic wars,' by Austria,* and Turkey,* by Rhodelsland* in 
colonial days, by the Continental Congress in the War of Inde- 
pendence,^ and finally by the Confedérate States, then fairly 
launched upon the paper-money poliey.' 

To break the forcé of these historical parallels, which told 
so heavily against the bilí, its supporters sought to show that 
causes, which under different conditions had led to deprecia- 
tion, would not be operative in the case of the United States 
in 1862. Thus, it was said, the continental notes of the 
American Revolution depreciated because of the poverty of the 
country , which offered no security for their redemption ; the 
vastly greater wealth of the nation in 1862 would prevent a 
repetition of the experience.® The depreciation of the issues 

I Remarles of Fessenden, ConorettUmtüQlobe^VIth Gong., 2d Sess., p. 767; WUsoq, 
p; 788; Alley, p. 659; Sherman, p. 791; Pike, p. 658; Campbell, p. 686. 
3 Mr. Cowan, ibid.., p. 792; </. Samner, p. 796; Pike, p. 657. 
3 Mr. Monill, p. 631; cf. Spaolding, p. 526; SteveDs, p. 689. 

« Mr. Morrill, p. 6S1. & Mr. Simmons, p. 794. «Mr. Sheffield, p. 164. 

f Mr. CoUamer, pp. 767-8; Snmner, p. 796; </. Kellogg, p. 680; Pike, p. 666. 
• Mr. Horton, p. 665. • Mr. Kellogg, p. 680. 



\ 



56 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 

of Louis XIV was explained on the ground that France was 
then exhausted by heavy taxation to maintain a proflígate 
court.^ The cases of the French Bevolution and the Con- 
fedérate States were accounted for by the f act that these 
governments were revolutionary.' Some gentlemen even 
denied that depreciated currencies had proved evils. "It 
would be far from a blunder," said Senator Howe, " to say 
that the ^ golden age ' of England was during that long period 
when the only currency she knew was one of irredeemable 
paper;"* and Mr. Kellogg declared the paper issues of the 
Revolution had increased confidence, clothed the army, and 
revived commerce.* Another supporter of the bilí tried to 
evade the historical argument by maintaining that the true 
lesson of experíence was that of modérate issues.' But no 
one seems to have taken these ingenious pleas very seriously, 
for it was easy to show that one of the striking lessons of 
experiments with paper money is that such moderation, 
which the issuer at first intends to observe, has almost 
invariably been soon forgotten.* 

If the argument from experíence was.strongly against the 
bilí, the cognate economic argument was hardly less so. The 
opponents of paper issues assumed the offensive, declaríng 
emphatieally that the proposed legal-tender notes were cer- 
tain to deprecíate in valué. Mr. Lovejoy said: 

It is not in the power of this Congress . . . . to accomplish an 
impossibility in making something out of nothing. The piece of 
paper jou stamp as fíve dollars is not fíve dollars, and it never will 
be, unlcss it is convertible inte a fívedollar gold piece ; and to pro- 
fess that it is, is simply a delusion and a fallacj.^ 

1 Mr. Howo, Appondiz, p. 55, Congremional Olobe^ S7th Cong., 2d Sess. 

3 Mr. Kellogg, p. 680; Howe, Appendix, p. 55. 

3 Appendix, p. 55; c/. Spaulding, p. 526. 

« Ibid., p. 681. s Mr. Pike, p. 657. 

* Messrs. Tbomas, p. 682; Cowan, p. 793; Morrill, pp. 631, 886; Pomeroy, p. 884; 
Collamor, p. 770; Lovejoy, 691. 

^ Ihid., p. 691. 



The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Act 57 

Varíons shifts were tried to meet this attack. Mr. Kellogg 
boldlj asserted that the legal tender quality of the notes 
wonld prevent fiuctuation of their valué ;^ but more f aíth was 
put in the reply that the total wealth of the country was 
security for the notes, and this security being ampie the 
valué of the paper would not decline.' The rejoinder to this 
was first, that the security for the notes was not the total 
wealth of the people, but only such part of it as the govem- 
ment could obtain by taxation ; and second, that though the 
security for ultimate redemption might be ampie, the notes 
would nevertheless depreciate in valué if the holders were 
nnable to secure immediate payment.' 

A diflPerent argument to show the improbability of 
depreciation was based by Thaddeus Stevens upon the quan- 
tity theory of money as expounded by McCuUoch. " The 
valué of legal tender notes,^' said he, '^ depends on the 
amount issued compared with the business of the country. 
If a lesB quantity were issued than the usual and needed cir- 
culation, they would be more valuable than gold."* The 
opponents of the bilí i:eplied, not by attacking the quantity 
theory, but by insisting that all experience showed that, after 
ene issue of paper money had been made, other issues were 
Bure to foUow, until the currency became redundant and 
depreciated. "The experience of mankind,'' said Mr. 
Thomas, ^' shows the danger of entering upon this path ; that 
boundaries are fíxed only to be overrun ; promises made only 
to be broken."* "The samenecessity," added Mr. Pomeroy, 
" which now requires the amount of inconvertible paper now 
authorized, will require sixty days henee a similar issue, and 
then another, each one requiring a larger nominal amount to 

1 CongroBioncU Olobe^ 87th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 681 ; c/. the answor of Senator 
CoUamer, p. 767. 

> Mesara. Spaolding, p. 524; Howe, Appendix, p. 55; Kellogg, pp. 680, 681. 

s Qf, 11 r. Morrill. p. 630, Thomas, p. 682. 

« IlriiL^ p. 668. ft Ibid,, p. 682. 



58 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

represent the same intrinsic valué.' ^ ^ To snch assertions^ 
backed by the weight of historical evidence, the supporters 
of the bilí could respond only that the case of the United 
States would be an exception; the American govemment 
would not yield, as other govemments had done, to the 
temptation to make further issues.' 

Some of the more astute fríends of the bilí admitted the 
probability of a redundant currency, and relied, not on limi- 
. tation of issues, but on a funding scheme to prevent depre- 
ciation. Section one of the bilí provided that holders of 
legal-tender notes could at any time exchange them at par 
for 6 per cent, twenty-year bonds.* Under this arrange- 
ment, it was supposed, the valué of the notes could never be 
less than that of the bonds, and, as bonds could by law not 
be sold for less than par, it foUowed that the notes could not 
greatly deprecíate.* Unfortunately for the argument, even 
while Congress was debating the bilí, bonds were selling in 
New York at ninety cents upon the doUar in notes of the 
suspended banks.' Henee the forcé of Mr. Morrill's remark : 
'^ By making our notes a legal tender we make them better 
for a moment than we can make our bonds, and men might 
be willing to exchange bonds for the notes ^ but notes for 
bonds never."* 

Having proved to their satisfaction that the legal-tender 
notes would deprecíate, the opponents of the bilí pursued 
their advantage by dwelling u[X)n the evil consequences that 
would result. Coin would disappear from circulation, said 
they, prices would rise suddenly, fíxed incomes would decline, 

1 Con4prt$»ional Olobc, S7th Con^., 2d Sess., p. 884. Mr. Pomeroy, howeTor, snp- 
ported the bilí when amcnded to próvido for payment of int«re8t íd coin. Cf* aUo 
CoUamcr, p. 770; Lovejoy, p. 091; Hortou, p.6G4; Cowan, p. 793; Morrill, p. 6S1. 

3 Cf. tho remarles of Mesara. Pikc, p. G57 ; Hooper, p. 617 ; Stevcos, p. 688. 

*3ee text of bilí, i6iVÍ., p. 522, and Mr. Stevens^s explanation, p. 688. Cf, 
Spaulding, p. S36. 

« Mr. Hooper, ibid., p. 617. * Mr. Pendleton, p. 551. • i6id., p. 680. 



The Fibst Leqal-Tendeb Aot 59 

creditors be defranded, and the widows and orphans would 
soffer/ Senator CoUamer showed how depositors in savings 
banks wonld lose by deprecíation,^ and Senator Fessenden 
how labor would be injured by a rise of prices exceeding the 
rise of wages.* Finally, Mr. Crisfield represented forcibly 
the instability of a paper standard of valué and the conse- 
quent danger to business.* 

To all of this the promoters of the bilí found it hard to 
reply. On the other hand they sought support in the 
contention that the country needed more money/ and that 
the govemment should regúlate the paper currency fur- 
nished by the baiíks.* Of course the rejoinder was, first, 
that, granted the existence of the doubtful need of more 
money, the issue of a depreciated paper currency was a very 
bad method of supplying it ; and, second, that if the bank- 
note currency required regulation the proper means was a 
reorganization of the banking system, not a legal-tender act. 

Not content with showing the economic evils of a depre- 
ciated paper currency, the opponents of the bilí denounced 
it roundly as immoral. To pay contractors and soldiers in 
depreciated money, they declared, was dishonorable. "The 
bilí says to the world," asserted Mr. Horton, "that we are 
bankrupt, and we are not only weak, but we are not honest." ^ 
The injustice, however, extended not only to creditors of the 
govemment, but to all persons who would be compelled to 
accept in payment money of less valué than that which they 
had contracted to receive.* Ánd by thus encouraging the 

1 Cf. the remarles of Messrs. Pendleton, Congreasianal Olobe^ ."«Tth CoDg., 2d 
Sflss., P< 551; Morrill, p. 630; Horton, p. 064; Sheffield, p. 641; Fossenden, p. 765. 

2 Ibid.t p. 770. Qf. the reply of Senator McDougall, Appendix, p. 60. 
* Ibid,, p. 766. « Ibid., Appendix, p. SO. 

s Cf, the remarles of Ifessrs. Alley, p. 659; Hooper, p. 617 ; Kellogs, p. 681. 
«Senator Doolittle« Appendix p. 57. 

7/&ÚI., p. 664; cf, also Snmner, p. 798; Fessenden, p. 765; Crisfield, Appendix, 
pp. 49, 50; Pearce, p. 804. 

s Cf, Ifessrs. Pendleton, p. 5^; Thomas, p. 682. See Sherman's attempted reply, 
p. 790. 



60 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

debtor to def raud his creditor, urged Senator Fessenden, the 
bilí would lower the moral standards of the people.^ To these 
charges, also, the promoters of the bilí had little to say. 

Upon the fiscal aspect of the bilí the case of the opposition 
was hardly less clear. First, they declared, the resort to an 
irredeemable paper currency was a practical confession of 
bankruptcy, and would therefore injure the credit of the 
govemment, and make less favorable the conditions on 
which it could borrow. "We .... go out to the country," 
said Fessenden, *' with the declaration that we are unable to 
pay or borrow at the present time, and such a confession is 
not likely to increase our credit." ' Second, it was pointed 
out that the depreciation of the currency would cause the 
prices of everything which the govemment had to buy to rise, 
and thus would vastly increase the cost of the war. As Senator 
Cowan put it, the govemment "might as well lose 25 per cent, 
on the sale of her [sío] bonds, as to be obligad, in avoiding 
it, to pay 25 per cent, more for everything she buys." * 

This discussion of the economic, moral, and fiscal conse- 
quences of issuing a legal-tender paper currency produced 
in Congress the feeling that under ordinary circumstances 
such a proposal would be indefensibie. The vigor with 
which the opposition had presented the case against the bilí 
made a deep impression. On the other hand, the reasoning 
by which the supporters of the bilí had sought to establish 
the constitutional power of Congress to make treasury notes 
a legal tender was felt to be inconclusive. The forcé of the 
telling argument from experience had not been broken; the 
probability of depreciation had not been disproved; no ade- 
quate reply had been found to the indictment of the bilí on 

i Cof^jreuional Olohe, S7th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 765; cf. Messrs. Conkling, p. 635; 
Horton. i>. 664. 

'i Ibid., p. 765. Cf. Messrs. Vallandiogham, Appendiz, p. 44 ; Sheffield, p. 641 ¡ 
Collamrr, p. 769; IIortoD, p. 661 ; Crisflold, Appendix, p. 49; Willey, p. 796; Sumner, 
p. 798; Thoma.s, p. 6K2. 

>/6id., p. 798; *;/. the remarles of Sheffield, p. 641, and Morrill, p. 690. 



The First Legal-Tendeb Act 61 

moral gronnds; and, fínally, it had not been denied that 
resort to paper issues would injure the credit of the govem- 
ment and increase the cost of the war. So generall y was 
the objectionable character of the measure realized that 
Senator Fessenden could say: 

All the opinions that I have heard expressed agree m this: that 
only with extreme reluctance, only with fear and trembling as to 
the consequences, can we have recourse to a measure like this of 
making our paper a legal tender in payment of debts.^ 

And yet an argument was found that overcame the 
"extreme reluctance" of a majority of the members and 
induced them to vote for the bilL This argument was the plea 
of absoluto necessity. As has been seen, it was to necessity 
that Mr. Spaulding had appealed in justifícation of his fírst 
draft of the legal-tender bilL' In opening the debate in 
Congress he repeated the argument with emphasis. "The 
bilí before us/' said he, '4s a war measure, a measure of 
necessity and not of cholee, presented . . . . to meet the 
most pressing demands upon the Treasury." ' The cry of 
necessity was taken up by the other supporters of the bilí, 
who relied upon it to meet all the objections urged by the 
opposition.* How eflFective a plea it was is shown by the 
influence it had upon those who appreciated the ills of a 
paper currency. '^ Beneficent as this measure is, as one of 
relief," said Mr. AJley. " nothing could induce me to give it 
sanctionbutuncontroUable necessity. ^^^ "Ishall .... sup- 
port the bilí," said Mr. Doolittle, "as a measure of war neces- 
sity, witb more misgivings as to its effect at home and 
abroad, than of any other measure for which I have given 
my vote in this body."' 

1 Oonffrtsñonal Qlobe, 37th Coog., 2d Sess., p. 763. 

3 Mr. Spaolding^s lettor quoted, p. 44, above. 

* ConorenUmal Olobe, S7th Coq^m 2d Sess., p. 523. 

1 Qf. the remarks of Messrs. Campbell, p. 686; Walton, p. 692; Edwards, p. 684; 
Sterens, p. 687; and of Senators Sherman, p. 789; Howe, Áppendiz, p. 55 ; McDougall, 
AppendüCf p. 58. 

^IbifL^ p. 669. (/Md., Appendix, p. 58. 



62 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

That the assertion of necessity might carry the added 
forcé of official sanction, Secretary Chase was induced to 
send a note to the chairman of the Commíttee of Ways and 
Means to be read to the Hoose. He wrote: 

I have felt, ñor do I wish to oonoeal that I now feel, a great aver- 
sión to making anythmg but coin a legal tender in payment of 
debts. It has been my anxious wish to avoid the necessity of such 
legislation. It is, however, at present impossible, in oonsequence of 
the large expenditures entailed by the war, and the suspensión of 
the banks, to procure sufficient coin for disbursements, and it has 
therefore become indispensably neoessary that we should resort to 
the issue of United States notes.' 

This letter made the bilí an '^administration measure/' and 
f so was an important factor in its success. Desire to snpport 
j the government at all costa led members to whom an irre- 
deemable currency was very repngnant to vote for the bilí 
when the secretary of the treasnry declared it to be nec- 
essary. " I have .... had great doubt as to the propriety 
of voting for this bilí ....'* said Mr. Hickman, '^but, being 
assured .... that the Treasury, and perhaps the Admin- 
istration, regard this as a govemmental necessity, I am dis- 
posad to waive the question of propriety or expediency, and 
to vote for it as a necessity." ' 

1 Oonffre$$icnal Olobe^ 97th Coog., 2d Sess., p. 61S. Cf, Mr. Chase's letter to 
Spauldioff, in tho Utter's History, p. 59; and McCullooh, Men and MeoMurt» ofHaif 
a Century (New York, 1889), pp. 170, 171. 

^ Conffreuional Olcbe^ 87th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 090. Cf, 8nmner*s conolnsion: 
*^Sarely we must all be against papor money — we most all insist npon maintainin^ 
the intoffrity of the QoTemment— and we must all set our faoes against any proposi- 
tion like the present, exoept as a temporary expedlent, rendered imperatiTO by the 
exigency of the honr. If I vote for this proposition it will be only beoaiise I am 
onwilling to refuse to the Government, especially charged with this responslbility, 
that confidenoe which is hardly loss important to the pabilo interests than the 
moncy itself. Others may doubt if the ezigency is suflioiently imperatiTe, but the 
secretary of the treasury, whose duty it is to understand the oecasion, does not 

doubt. In his opinión the war requires this sacriíloe Yoor soldiers in the 

fleld must be paid and fed. Here there oan be no failure or postponement. A rem- 
edy which at another moment you would reject is now propoeed. Whatever may be 
the national resouroes, they are not now within reach, exoept by summary procesa. 
Reluctantly, painfuUy, I consent that the prooess should issue** (pp. 790, 800). See 
«Iso McDougall, Appendix, p. 58. 



The First Lboal-Tender Aot 63 

In repljing to the plea of necessity, the opposition can- , 
dídlj admitted it woald be better to issae a forced currency , 
than to stop payment, provided there were no altemative. 
''If the necessity exists/* said Senator Fessenden, ''I have no 
hesitation npon the sabject and shall have none. If there is 
nothing left for us to do but that, and that will effect the 
object, I am perfectly willing to do that." * But that such 
was the case was emphatically denied. *' It has been 
asserted .... with the utmost apparent sincerity," said 
Mr. Horton, ''that this is a measure not of choice, but of 
necessity. But Mr. Chairman, that assertion is only reiterated, 
not proved. Where is the proof that this is a matter of neces- 
sity? There may be proofia abundant, but they have not 
been produced." * 

Not only did the opposition deny the necessity, but they 
were ready also with suggestions of other means of securing 
the needed funds. One suggestion was adequate war taxa- 
tion. ''Not a dollar of tax has been raised," said Mr. 
Thomas, "and yet we are talking of national bankruptcy, 
and laonching upon a paper currency. I may be very duU, 
but I cannot see the necessity, or the wisdom, of such a 
course.'" It was by this time generally acknowledged that 
the omission to impose heavy taxes at the extra session of 
July, 1861, was a serious blunder which Congress should 
repair as soon as possible.^ But the supporters of the bilí 
argued* that the pending situation could not be met by taxa- 
tion, for the needs of the treasury were too pressing to wait 
imtil new taxes could be assessed and coUected. 

1 CtmoremUmad Olobe, 87th Coog., 2d Sess., p. 764. 

S/5ÚÍM V* MS; </• PP- 0^1 M!^* 

s JMd., IK 682; <^. the remarles ofBoscoeConkling, p. 63S; Wright, p. 663; Collamer, 
pp. T20, T71; Bayard, p. TfNI. 

^ A Joint reeolotion to raise $150,000,000 per annum by taza tion had been adopted 
by a Tote of 184 to 5 in the Hoose, Jannary 15, and 99 to 1 in the Senate on the 17th. 
—Itñd.^ pp. 349, 318. 

> JC g.., see remarks of Mr. Walton, tfrúl., p. 692. 



64 HlSTORT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

To this the rejoinder wasmade: If it wíU take too long to 
wait for the proceeds of taxes, let the govemment supplj its 
* immediate wants by selling bonds at their market valué, and 
in the meantime frame a permanent system of taxation that 
will yield an adequate revenue.' This plan was the same that 
the delegation of bankers had urged apon the secretary and 
the committees of Congress,' and it encountered the same 
opposition. Senator Howe was nnwilling, as Mr. Spaulding 
had been, that govemment bonds should be sold below par. 
'*The experience of half a century," said he, "has demon- 
strated that the use of money is not worth more than six 
per cent; that sum the GJovemment ought to pay."' 
Senator Fessenden replied: " Money in the market is always 
worth what it will sell for. It is an article of merchandise 
like anything else, and the Oovemment has no reason to 
suppose, unless it can offer much better secority, that it 
should get money at a better rate than anybody else." ^ 

But there were other men who, while apparently ready to 
admit that govemment need not always insist on receiving 
quite par for its bonds, still believed that under existing cir- 
cumstances the discount demanded by lenders would be 
ruinously high. "I maintain," said Thaddeus Stevens, " that 
the highest sums you could sell your bonds at would be 75 
per cent payable in currency, itself at a discount. That 
would produce a loss which no nation .... could stand a 
year." * 

Of course it was not possible without offering a loan to 
determine precisely at what rates the govemment could sell 
its bonds; but the opponents of the bilí believed that Mr. 

1 See the speeches of Mr. Lovejoy, p. 091 ; and Senatora Cowan, p. 793, and 
Bayard, p. 796. 

3 See p. 4S, above. 

1 Cangresnonal Olobe, 87th Con^., 2d Sess., Appendix, p. 56. 

4/6íd., p.763. 

> /6id., p. 689; </. tlie remarks of Mesan. Edwards, p. 68S, and Pike, p. 656w 



Thb Fibst Legal-Tendeb Agt 65 

Stevens and Mr. Spaulding exaggerated when they predicted 
that the price realizad would range between 50 and 80.* 
Should a plan of fínance based apon taxation heavy enough to 
inspire confídence in the management of the treasury be 
adopted, they were convinced that the govemment could 
secure loans without serious sacrifice.* And further, their 
fiscal argument showed that an increase in the cost of the war 
would not be avoided by the rival plan of issuing an incon- 
vertible paper currency.* 

Still a third altemative was proposed by the opposition — 
the issue of treasury notes without the legal-tender quality. 
This suggestion was embodied in the three rival plans intro- 
duced into the House as substitutes for the bili/ The dis- 
cussion of their merits naturally elicited debate upon the 
efficacy of the legal-tender clause. The supporters of the 
bilí, were ready enough with assertions of the importance of 
the clause to the success of the measure;^ but they found it 
difficnlt to explain precisely what its valué was. One said, 
"By making these notes a legal tender we prevent the 
money sharks from robbing our soldiers of their hard eam- 
ings."* Another argued that unless the United States notes 
were made a legal tender, the banks would seek to depré- 
date them in order to retain the fíeld of circulation for their 
own issues.' A third declared, **If wemake the govemment 
issues a legal tender, the demand for specie will be so limited 
that they will maintain their valué."' Finally, Senator 
Sherman argued that the banks would not receive the gov- 
emment notes unless compelled to do so by the legal-tender 
clause, and that if not received by the banks as current f unds 

1 Cf. Mr. SiMiildinff, Conoretrional GIo6e, S7th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 524. 
3 Cf, the remarles of Boscoe Coolding, p. 634, and of Senator Cowan, p. 793. 
3 P. 60, aboTO. « P. 75, below. 

^S, p., Mr. Pike, Cangreuional Globe^ 87th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 657. 
*Mr. Blake, p. 686; <^, the similar remarks of Messrs. Edwards, p. 683, and 
Shellabarger, p. 680; Gampbell, p. 687; and of Senator Henry Wilson, p. 788. 
7 Mr. KeUogg, p. 681. > Mr. Gampbell, p. 687. 



\ 



^ HlSTOBT OV THS GbBBXBACKS 

che ootes wonld become hopelesBlj depreciated.^ In response 
áBoator FeflBenden pointed to the oíanse aathorizm^ the sab- 
treannries to receive the aotes oa deposít at 5 per cent, 
interest. This oíanse woalii make discriminatíon against the 
notes impracticable, he argned; for ahonid the banks lefnae 
to receive notes as deposits ther wonld lose bnsinesBy becanse 
che holdeis wonld prefer to depueit with the snbtreasnries, 
which wonld pay 3 per cent interest msteod of with banksw' 

If theae attempta to prove the ntility of the legal-tender 
clanse seem rather weak» so do the criticisms niged by the 
opposition. The advocates of the rival büls proposing to 
Lssne treasnry notes withont the legal-tender qnality might 
have been expected to dwell npon the fact that their plana 
left the standard of valne nndistnrbed» and so avoided a 
depreciation that wonld nnsettle bnsinesa, lower real wages^ 
def rand creditora, and increase the cost of all snppUes gov- 
emment had to bny. Instead« they attempted only to show 
that the l^al-tender oíanse wonld impair faith in the paper 
cnrrency. ^^The fair inferenoe is in the mind of every man, 
however atupid/" said Senator Cowan» '^'that yon yonrselves 
firat donbted the validity of it» and that, therefóre, yon 
attempted to give it this qnaUty of paying debts perfórce, 
to CTimpensate it for the lack of essential valne/^' 

From this review it is olear that the positionof those who 
nrged the argnment of necessity for the l^al-tender bilí in 
Congress betrayed the lack of oonsistency noticed in Mr. 
Sfianlding^a reply to the bank delegates.* When the oppo- 
Mtiftií anggeated that the wants of the treasnry conld be met 
f/ither by borrowing or by íssning treasnry notes not a legal 
tf^ndfT, it was incnmbent on those who mantained the posi- 
tíon that the bilí was *^a measnre not of choioe bnt of neces- 

I f'^rmgrtmifmal Olohe, rith Coo«., 3d Seas., i>p. 790« iM. ' /Md.. p. 198. 

) fM4.. p.lK; cf. thñ remarks of Mewrs. Crisflald, Appendix. p.30: and of SeoA- 
Utf* ff*^^iíti^n, p. "t^; «od SimmoDS, pw TN. 



Thb Fibst Legal-Tendeb Agt 67 

BÍty" to deny the possibilíty of secoring fnnds bythese 
methods. But sach a denial was not attempted. Instead 
they tríed to show that the issne of an irredeemable paper [ 
cnrrency was a better method of secnring means than bor- 
rowing at a discount or issning treasury notes not a legal 
tender. It is curióos to note the nalveté with which the 
most strennoos promoters of the legal-tender bilí asserted in 
one breath that it was a measnre of sheer necessity, and in 
the next breath admitted the existence of altematives. Mr. 
Spaulding himself said after emphasizing the necessity: 
" We have this altemative, either to go into the market and 
sell oor bonds for what they will command, or to pass this 
bilL"* And Thaddeos Stevens, who began by asserting the 
necessity, shifted, before conclnding, to this position: ''Here, 
then, in a few words lies your choice. Throw bonds at 6 or 
7 per cent, on the market, . . . . or issne United States 
notes." ' Obvious as is the contradiction, the opposition f ailed 
to cali attention prominently to it. / By thns allowing the 
logic of the argoment from necessity to pass nnchallenged, 
they left room for the impression to aríse that the paper 
iasnes of the Civil War can hardly be made the subject of 
seríous críticism, becanse ^^ necessity knows no law." . 

But while Mr. Spaulding and his fellows were strenuous 
in protesting the necessity of the legal-tender act as a 
measure of immediate relief , they were caref ul to state that 
it was intended to be temporary, and not to inaugúrate a 
r^^ar paper-money policy. "When peace is secured," 
said Mr. Spaulding, ''I will be among the fírst to advócate a 
speedy retum to specie payments.^^' Fessenden dwelt on 
the point at length. He said : 

1 am0re$mcnai Oiobc, Slth Cong., 2d Sess., p. 524. 

*Hñd^ p. 688; (^. the remarles of Mr. Blake, p. 686, and the divergent Tiews as to 
the Datare of the alleged neoessity expressed by Mr. Hooper, p. 617, and by Senator 
Sherman,!». 791. 

>/btd.,p. 508. This promiBewas well kept. See the prefaoes of Spauloino's 
flúlory. 



68 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



The .... secretarj oí the treasury .... has declared that 
in his judgment [the bilí] is, and ought to be, but a temporary 
measure, not to be resorted to as a policy, but simply on this single 
occasion, because the oountry is dríven to the necessity oí resorting 
to it. I have not heard anybody express a oontrary opinión, or, at 
least, any man who has spoken on the subject in Congress. The 
chairman oí the oommittee oí Ways and Means, in advocating the 
measure, declared that it was not oontemplated, and he did not 
believe it wonld be necessary, to issue more than the $150,000,000 
of treasury notes made a legal tender provided by this bilí. AU the 
gentlemen who have spoken on the subject, and all pretty much 
who have wrítten on the subject, except some wild speculators in 
currency,have declared that as a policy, it would be ruinous to any 
people ; and it has been defended, as I have stated, simply and 
solely upon the ground that it is to be a single measure, standing 
by itself, and not to be repeated.' 

Similar and hardly lesa emphatic statements were made by 
other members of Congress.* If any one possessed such 
ideas of the beneficence of an irredeemable paper currency 
as af terward animated members of the Greenback party, he 
kept them to himself . 

III. ATTITUDE OF SEOBETABT OHASB 

In discussions of the fínancial policy pnrsued by the 
federal govemment the impression soon gained currency 
that the legal-tender acts were unavoidable necessities. This 
impression was deepened by the fact that when the unhappy 
consequences of the laws began to make themselves felt, 
members and friends of the administration took the ground 
that, however deplorable in its eflPects, such legislation had 
been inevitable from the beginning of the war.' After peace 

1 CongrestiotuU Olobe, 37th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 764. 

3 Cf, remarles of Morrill, t&id., p. 631 ; Pomeroy, p. 884. 

3 Cf, Lincoln *8 message to Congress, December 1, 1862, Oompleie Wbrks^ ed. 
NicoLAT AND Hat, Vol. II, p. 264; letters of Seward and Stanton in Spauldino*8 
Hiatory, introduction to 2d ed., pp. 27, 29. A number of letters of like tenor from 
other men of prominence are given in Spaolding's Introduction and Appendioes. 



The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Agt 69 

was restored this became the common doctrine of the Repnb- 
lican party. It is a very notable fact, however, that 
Secretary Chase — the one man most conversant with the 
financial situation of the govemment in the winter of 1861- 
62 — carne afterward to the conclusión that the passage of 
the legal-tender bilí was a blunder. His attitnde toward the 
measure is worthy of careful attention. 

Apparently the sndden suspensión of specie payments 
bewildered Mr. Chase for a time. It seemed to make neces- 
sary a recasting of his financial program/ and for the 
moment he was at a loss what to do. The only man in 
oflScial circles who had a defínite plan in mind was Spauld- 
ing, and while others hesitated, he pushed forward the simple 
though crude expedient of issuing legal-tender notes most 
yigorously. All Chase's traditions and all his official utter- 
anees committed him to opposition. But not knowing pre- 
cisely how to avoid the measure, he promoted the meet- 
ing between the bankers from New York, Boston, and 
Philadelphia, and the financial committees of House and 
Senate, in the hope that some feasible plan for raising f unds 
without resort to legal-tender notes might be agreed upon.' 
His hopes were destroyed by the unwillingness of the 
Congressmen to consent to the sale of bonds at their market 
pnce — an unwillingness shared in some measure by most 
of the opponents of the legal-tender bilí in Congress.' After 
this disappointment the secretary of the treasury appears'to 
have surrendered the lead tob the Committee of Ways and 
Means. He could formúlate no plan which commanded the 

1 Cf, Bepofi of th&8ecreUiry of ihe TreoMury^ December, 1862, p. 7. 

2 See sec i of the prosent chapter. 

s All of the subetitates for the legal-tender bilí proposed in the House proTided 
that tht bonds to be issued shoold not be sold below par. See p. 75 below. There 
were few men who sympathised with Senator Cowan's Tigorons declaration that he 
preferred a ** shaye of forty per cent.** npon bonds to an inconrertible paper car- 
reocj.— Cbn^rewional Olobe, 97th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 793. 



70 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

confídence of others, and so acquiesced nnwillingly in what 
the energetic Mr. Spanlding proposed.» 

When Spanlding sent him the legal-tender bilí f or revi- 
sión, Chase retomed it with a letter, dated Jannary 22, 
expressing his exceeding regret that it was fonnd necessary 
to resort to a legal-tender act, but expressing also his hearty 
desire " to co-operate with the committee [of Ways and 
Means]."' This letter was regarded by a majority of the 
committee as ''non-committal on the legal-tender oíanse/' 
So they songht and " after considerable delay '' obtained a 
more explicit approval of the bilí as a measnre of necessity, 
part of which was read to Congress.' 

Chase's feeling at this time is best indicated by the 
frank letter which he sent to Spanlding Febmary 3: 

Mr. Seward said to me on yesterday that you observed to 
him that my hesitation in ooming up to the legal-tender propo- 
sition embarrassed you, and I am very sorry to observe it, for my 
anxious wish is to support you in all respects. 

It is true that I carne with reluctance to the conclusión that the 
legal-tender clause is a necessity, but I came to it decidedly, and I 
support it eamestly. I do not hesitate when I have made up my 
mind, however much regret I may feel over the necessity of the 
conclusión to which I come.^ 

It is clear from these ietters that Spanlding and not 
Chase was the real fínancial leader in the critical months of 
Jannary and Febmary, 1862.'* Spanlding's position was 
recognized by a coUeague in the House, who ref erred to him 
as ^'the able and distinguished Representative who has 

1 1t shoald be noted that Chase was daily receiying letters from bosiness men 
whose yiews he was bonnd to consider, urging him to agree to the treasury-note bilí. 
But a small minoríty of his correspondents seem to have stood out against the legal- 
tender clause.— Cy. Habt, 8. P. ChoMc^ pp. 250, 251. 

aSPAULDINO, p. 27. 

s/&¿d., p. 45 and p. 62 above. 

« SPAULDiNOf Historjf^ p. 59. Cf. Chase's letter of similar tenor written the nezt 
day to Bryant.— Wardbn, Life of Chase^ p. 409. 

& Cf, Chase*8 report of Deoember, 1862, pp. 8, 9. 



Thb Fibst Lbgal-Tbndeb Act 71 

oríginated this measnre and camed it triumphantly over the 
Administration and through Ck^ngress.^^^ 

But while hamed by the nnaccustomed perplexities of his 
position, Chase yielded to Spaulding and gave an official 
sanction to the bilí, it did not commend itself to his calmer 
jndgment His later views are stated at length in a dissent- 
ing opinión which he rendered, as Chief Justice, upon the 
'* Legal Tender Cases," in December, 1870. Of his own 
coorse as secretary of the treasury, he said: 

He thought it indispensably neoessary that the authoríty to 
issue these notes should be granted by Congress. The passage of 
the bilí was delayed, if not jeoparded, by the difference of opinión 
which prevailed on the question of Tna,kíng them a legal tender. It 
was under these circumstanoes that he expressed the opinión, when 
called upon by the Committee on Ways and Means, that it was 

necessary Ezamination and refleetion under more propitious 

circumstanoes have satisfied him that this opinión was erroneous, 

and he does not hesitate to declare it Was the making of 

the notes a legal tender neoessary to the carrying on the war? 
In other words, was it necessary to the execution of the power to 
borrow money? . . . . If the notes would circuíate as well without 
as with this quality it is idle to urge the plea of such necessity. 
But the diculation of the notes was amply provided far by making 
them receivable for all national taxes, all dues to the govemment, 
and all loans. This was the provisión relied upon for the purpose 
by the secretary when the bilí was fírst prepared, and his reflec- 

tions since have convinced him that it was sufficient In their 

]^timate use the notes are hurt, not helped, by being made a legal 
tender. The legal-tender quality is only valuable for purposes of 
dishonesty. Every honest pulpóse is answered as well and better 
without it. 

We have no hesitation, therefore, in declaring our conviction 
that the making of these notes a legal tender, was not a necessary 
or premier means to the carrying on war or to the exercise of any 
express power of the govemment.^ 

1 Mr. Pomeroy .—Coniírrentanal Olobe^ 37 th Coug,^ 2á Sess., p. 8M. 
S12 Wax«IíACX, 5K^. 



72 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAGES 

Competent critics have usually been inclined to accept 
Chase^s later in preference to his earlier opinión. They 
have held that the treasnry crisis which rendered the argn- 
ment of necessity plausible need not have occurred had 
Congress adopted a more vigoróos policy of taxation at its 
extra session in July and August, 1861. Tax laws then 
enacted might not have added greatly to the revenue before 
the cióse of the year, but they wonld have strengthened the 
credit of the govemment and so enabled it to borrow more 
j freely and on better terms. 

But though thib failure to tax adequately was unfortu- 
nate, it was not unnatural. The secretary of the treasury, 
with whom the initiative rested, was inexperíenced and was 
devoting a large part of his attention to military matters.* 
Moreover, the Union leaders feared that the temper of the 
North was not firm enough to submit cheerfully to the 
onerous burden of a heavy federal income tax or high intemal 
duties. Such taxation had been unknown for more than a 
generation; the Republican party was young, composed of 
heterogenous elements not yet completely fused, and led by 
men not sustained by consciousness of unhesitating popular 
support. Realizing their dependence upon public opinión 
for success, it is not strange that Mr. Lincoln's administra- 
tion hesitated to take steps likely from all precedent to 
prove unpopular.* 

Perhaps even more important in explaining the failure 
to tax heavily at the outset of the war was the confídent 
expectation of its early end. Even in February, 1862, 
Justin Morrill, one of the fírmest opponents of the legal- 
tender clause, could say in rhetorical strain: 

The ice that now chokes up the Mississippi is not more sure t6 
melt and disappear with the approaching vernal season, than are 

1 Cy. Habt, 8, P. Chaae, pp. 211-14. 

2 Cf. M. B. FlBLD, Memorita of Many Men and of 8ome Women^ 1874, pp. 253, 278; 
Habt, op. ciL, p. 237. 



The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Agt 73 

the rebellious armies upon its banks when our westem army shall 
break fiom its moorings,and, rushing with the current to the Gulf, 

baptizo as it goes in blood the people to a fresher allegiance 

We can cióse this war by the SOth da j oí Jnl j next as well as in 
thirty years.' 

Had such optimistic expectations been realized, Chase^s plan 
of raisíng by taxation means sufficient only for ordinary 
expenditures, interest, and a sinking f und need have caused 
no serious disorder in the fínances.' 

But, grantíng that a mistake was made in not levying 
heavier taxes at the extra session of Congress, the question 
still remains: Was the issne of legal-tender treasury notes 
necessary to relieve the treasnry from the embarrassments 
existing in Jannary and February, 1862? Oertainly there 
was no snch pressing necessity as Spaulding, for example, 
asserted in the fírst panic. His letter of January 8, qnoted 
above, declares that the govemment '' will be out of means 
to pay the daily expenses in about thirty days^ ' Bat it 
was forty-eight days before the legal-tender act was passed, 
and over thirty-four days more before the fírst notes were 
issned. None of the legal-tender notes were paid oat until 
April/ three months after the treasury had suspended specie 
paymenta Whatever were the immediate needs of the 
treasury, then, they were supplied from other sources.* Had 
these three months been utilized energetically in passing a 

1 CoñQreuicnal Olofre, 87th CongM 2d Sess., p. 890. Cf. the similar remarles of 
FesBenden, íMd., p. 766, Chandler, p. T74, and Simmons, p. 794. The most impressive 
eridenoe of oonfldeooe ín an early peace, however, is the issue of Gheneral Order No. 
tt bj the adjntant general. April S, 1862, stopping the enlistment of f resh troope. — 
See BeoDB, HUtory cí ihe United SUUet, Yol. UI, p. 636. 

> Cy. Chaae*8 diaoossion of the question in his report of December, 186S, pp. 10-12. 

sSpavuxdto, p. 17; tf. his opening speech in the Hoose, OonoreiHoncU Globe^ 
ITth Gong., tá Sess., p. 524. 

*The New Tork Tima of April 7, 1862, reports that ^* the flrst instalmeat of 
United States notes .... was reoeived at the subtreasury in this city Satnrday 
moming (April 5).*' Cf, B. A. Batlet, National Loan» of the üm¿ed St<Ue» (Wash- 
ington, 1881), p. 157. 

BSee ohap. iii, seo. i, p. 88, below. 



\ 



74 HlSTOBT OF THB ÜBEENBA0K8 

few simple sections of an intemal revenae tax aci, impoeing 
daties on whiskey, beer, and tobáceo, and in organizing 
machinery for the sale of bonds, there seems to be slight 
reason for believing that the govemment would have failed 
to obtain sufficient f unds, particolarly when aocoont is taken 
of the ímprovement of credit caosed by the military suc- 
cesses of the winter and spring.' 

After all, discussion of the ''necessity" of the legal- 
tender act is rather beside the point. For no one, not even 
Stevens and Spaulding, denied the possibiUty of borrow- 
ing, provided the govemment was ready to sell its bonds at 
their market pnce. The real qnestion is, was the making 
of United States notes a legal tender preferable to selling 
bonds at a disconnt? Upon this qnestion the foUowing 
chapters will throw some light by showing what were the 
oonseqnences of the coorse pursaed, both for the people and 
for the govemment.' 

IV. PASSAGE OF THB AGT 

The debate apon the legal-tender act, a logical analysis 
of which has been presented in a preceding section, began 
in the House of Bepresentatives Jannary 28, 1862. Mr. 
Stevens and Mr. 'Spaulding pushed the measure vigor- 
ice. Part ii, chap. lu, sec iii, below. 

3 On the qnestion of neoessity see SiMOH Nkwookb, Critieal Examinaron of (htr 
Fitiancial Policy (New York, 1865), ehap. vii; J. K. Upton, Money in Politic9, 2d 
ed. (Boston, 1895), p. 108; W. Q, Suiínbb, HUtory of American OKrrency (New York, 
1875), pp. 197-aOO; S. T. Spbas, The LegálrTender AcU (New York, 1875), ohap. xii; F. 
W. Taubsio, p. 537 of The United State» of America^ ed. N. S. Sluüer, VoL n (New 
York, 1804) ; C. F. Doré, Die Papier-wáhrungtunrthmíkaft der Union, Berlin, 1877; C. 
TON HocK, Die Finamen nnd die FinantgetekiclUe der Vereinifften Sttaaten (Stntt- 
gart, 1867), pp. 471, 472; Charles A. Mamn, Paper Money ihe Root <tf Evil (New 
York, 1872), pp. 147, 148; Nioolat and Hat, A. ZAncoln: A HUtory (New York, 1880), 
Vol. VI, chap. zi; Obobob B. Butlbr, The Currency QítetUon, New York, 1864; J. 
F. Bhodbii, Huiory of the United State»^ Vol. III, pp. 556, 567; HuoH McCulloch, 
Men and Meaaureg of Ha¡f a Centwry (New York, 1888), p. 175; Hast, 8, P, Chate^ 
1860, pp. 248-51; Henbt C. Adams, Public DehU (New York, 1887), pp. 126-33; Hknbt 
Adamb, " The Le«al Tender Act,*' HUtorical Emay, New York, 1891 ; and especially 
Don C. Babbbtt, ''The Supposed Neoessity of the Legal Ténder Paper,** Qiiarter||f 
Jommal qT iCconomics, VoL XVI, pp. 828^. 



Thb Fibst Legal-Tbndeb Act 75 

ously. Three bilis were propoeed as snbstítutes by the ^ 
opposition. One, introduced by Mr. Vallandíngham, pro- 
vided (1) for the issne of $150,000,000 of treasnry notes, 
receivable for govemment dnes, bearing no interest, 
exchangeable for bonds, but not a legal tender; (2) for the 
sale of $200,000,000 of 6 per cent., twenty-year bonds — at 
rates not less than par.' A second, offered by Roscoe 
Conkling, proposed (1) to sell $500,000,000 of 6 per cent, 
twenty-year bonds at rates not less than the eqnivalent of 
par for 7 per cent stocks; (2) to allow the secretary of the 
treasnry at his discretion to issne $200,000,000 of one-year 
treasnry notes, either bearing no interest or interest at 2¿ 
per cent, and not legal tender, in place of an equivalent 
amonnt of bonds.' Finally, Mr. Horton's and Mr. Morrill's 
snbstitnte, favored by one-half of the Committee of Ways 
and Means, anthorized (1) the issne of $100,000,000 treasnry 
notes, bearing interest at 3.65 per cent., receivable for gov- 
emment dnes except dnties on imports, exchangeable at par 
for all bonds issned, and not a legal tender; (2) the sale of 
$200,000,000 of 7.3 per cent, ten-year bonds, and of 
$300,000,000 of 6 per cent, twenty-fonr-year bonds at 
prices not less than par; (3) the payment of interest on the 
bonds in coin.' 

Nine days after the debate began a vote was taken on the 
snbstitntion of the third of these measnres for the legal- 
tender bilí. It resnlted 55 yeas to 95 nays.* Then the 
vote was taken on the legal-tender bilí itself, and it was 
passed by 93 to 59 — a majority of 34.* An analysis of the 
vote npon the legal-tender clause shows that it was not a 
strict party división. Of the 95 votes for the legal-tender 

1 Congrenional Olobe^ 87th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 614. 

2 Jbúf.« p. 615. s/btd., p. 693; Spauldino, pp. 92-4. 
* Congre$tíonai Qíobc, 87th Cong,, 2d Sess., p. 696; Spauldino, p. 94. 
s Congre$úonal Olobe^ loe. ciL ; Spauij>ino, pp. 95, 96. 



76 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAGES 

clause 8 were cast by Democrats and 3 by " oíd Une Whígs." 
With the 25 Democrats who voted against the clanse were 7 
** oíd line Whigs " and 23 Repablicans. Ñor is a marked 
sectional división of the vote apparent. Of the members 
from New England States 16 voted for and 11 against the 
legal-tender clause; of the delegations from the Middle 
States the corresponding votes were 36 and 18; of the 
Southern States 7 and 10 ; of the Central States 27 and 13 ; 
and of the Western States 9 and 3. The most noticeable 
f eature of the vote was the number and standing of the regalar 
supporters of the administration who on this occasion sided 
with the opposition. Among them were Roscoe Conkling, 
Justin S. Morrill, Valentine B. Horton, Edward H. RoUins, 
Benjamin F. Thomas, and Owen Lovejoy. 

As the bilí went to the Senate, it provided for the issae 
of $150,000,000 of United States legal-tender notes; but 
of this sum $50,000,000 were intended to take the place 
of the like sum of ''oíd demand notes" anthorized at the 
extra session of Congress in July, 1861.' A very import- 
ant amendment was made by the Senate finance committee. 
In order to '' raiseand support the credit of the govemment 
obligations," they proposed to pay the interest on the pnblic 
debt in coin. The committee had considered the advisa- 
bility of making customs daties payable in specie to 
obtain the coin necessary for interest; but they fínally pre- 
ferred to set aside the proceeds of sales of public lands, 
confíscations of rebel property and import duties as a fund 
to be used for the purpose. To provide for the possible 
case when this fund would be insufficient, the secretary of 
the treasury was authorized to sell bonds at their market 
price to get coin.* 

1 For the test of the blll as it passed the Houm> soe Spauldino, pp. <X^-8. 

s Se« Senator Fensenden*! speech ezplaininff the Hoiue bilí and the ooiniiiitte6*t 
amendmeotH, Conoreasional Olobe^ S7th CodCm 2ci Seas., p. 78S. 



The First Lbgal-Tendeb Act 77 

In this modifíed form the bilí passed the Senate by a 
vote as devoid of partisan or of sectional character as had 
been the vote in the House. A motion to strike out the 
legal-tender clause failed by a majority of 5 — 17 yeas to 
22 nays.* Of the yeas nine were Republicans — Senators 
Anthony of Rhode Island, CoUamer and Foot of Vermont, 
Fessenden of Maine, King of New York, Cowan of Pennsyl- 
vania, Foster of Connecticut, and Willey of Virginia. On 
the other hand, three Democrats — Senators McDougall of 
California, Rice of Minnesota, and Wilson of Missouri — 
voted for the clause. But when it was seen that the bilí 
would pass, legal-tender clause and all, the final vote was 
30 for and 7 against it.* Of the seven, three were Republi- 
cans, three Democrats, and one an "oíd line Whig." 

The House refused to concur in the Senate amendment 
for the payment of interest on the public debt in coin. Mr. 
Spaulding declared that such an arrangement would créate 
intolerable discrimination between different classes of govern- 
ment creditors. To pay the army in depieciated paper 
money and the money lender in coin was unjust to the sol- 
dier risking his Ufe on the field of battle.* "It makes," 
said Mr. Stevens, " two classes of money — one for the banks 
and brokers, and another for the people." * Further, argued 
Mr. Hooper, the refusal to use United States notes for 
interest wotdd be an admission in advance of a difference in 
valué between paper and coin, the eSeci of which would be 
to discredit the govemment's issues.* Mr. Pomeroy replied 
first, that so far from exaggerating the depreciation of paper 
currency, the amendment would diminish it ; for coin inter- 
est would tend to increase the valué of bonds and so indi- 
rectly of the notes which were to be exchangeable for bonds 

1 Ihidí, p. 800. 2 ihid,, p. 804. 

s Ibid,, pp. 881-3. « Ibid., p. 900. 

>/Md.,p.8e9. 



78 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

at par ; and second, that only by paying interest in coin cotdd 
the govemment borrow on favorable terms/ 

To termínate the disagreement conference committeee 
were appointed — f or the Senate, Fessenden, Sherman, and 
Carlisle f f or the Hoose, Stevens, Horton, and Sedgwick ' — 
and a compromise was agreed upon. Intereet was to be paid 
in coin, bat the method of obtaining the coin was changed. 
Instead of pledging receipts from costoms, sales of public 
lands and conñscations, with an oltimate resort to selling 
bonds at the market price, it was decided to make import 
duties payable in specie/ Both Senate and Honse con- 
cnrred in this change,* and the bilí received the approval of 
President Lincohi, February 25, 1862.* 

In its final form the act authorized the issue of $160,000,- 
000 of United States notes in denominations not less than 
five doUars. Fifty millions of this sum was in place of the 
''oíd demand notes,^^ which were to be withdrawn as rapidly as 
practicable. The notes were declared to be '' lawfol money 
and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and pri- 

1 Conore$»ional Qlobe^ S7th Cong., 2d Seas., p. 884; <^, similar argumenta of 
Messrs. MorriU« p. 886, and C. B. Calvert, p. 888. 

3 Ibid., p. 800. > Ihid,, p. 900. 

« Test of report, ihid.^ p. 088. * /6úi., pp. 089 and 090 rospectiTely. 

• 12 SUUuUt at Largc p. 845. In the versión of the flnaneial history of the war 
later carrent with the greenback party« this limitation of the legal-tender qnality of 
United States notes, hf using coin for interest on the pnblio debt and for enstoms 
dnes, was represented as a serions blnnder, marring the otherwise perfectly sxmmetri- 
cal paper-money system. E,g.<t see O. F. Wilson, A Practieal ConMideraUcn of the 
Currency of the United 8tate§, 1874, p. 5; Plint Freeman, Corre^pondettce on 
National Finance, 1875; H. C. Baibd, Money and Itt SubitihUet, 1876, p. 14; Pbtbb 
CooPER, Political and Financial Opinión»^ 1877, p. 9. Indeed, the charge was often 
more sorions. It was said that the '* conspiracy " of bank delegates who Tisited 
Washington in January, 1H62, '' cormptly or not " used their inflnence to induce the 
secrotary of the treasury and the Senate to ** mutilate '* the Honse bilí by insorting 
the *' exception elanso '* limiting the full legal -tender power of the United States 
notos. See,e.g., J. O. Dbew, Our Money Muu, 1874; W. A. Bebket, 7^ Money 
Quettion, 1876, pp. 176-9; Nevah, The *' Legal-Temler '' Acta, [date T], pp. 8-7; Jbmsb 
Habprb, Thirty Year$' Con/lid, 1M81, p. 1.1; Henbt S. Fttch, Speech in the State 
Üonvcntion of the National Currency Party of California^ 1877, pp. 9-21 ; If BS. S. E. V. 
Bmbbt, Sei*en Financial Contpiraciet^ 1^7, chap. ii. Thaddous Stevens in a 
mcMisurr connt^^nanced such riews. See his speech of Jone 23, 1864, Conff r t mi onai 
Gio6e, 38th Gong., Ist Sess., pp. 8212 ff. 



The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Agt 79 

vate, within the United States, except daties on importa and 
interest on the public debt/' which were expressly made 
payable in coin. Fnrther, tiie notes were exchangeable at 
any time in sums of fífty doUars or múltiples of fífty for 6 
per cent, five-twenty bonds, $500,000,000 of which were 
authorized by the second section. Sec. 4 provided that 
holders of the notes might deposit them with any designated 
depository of the United States, and receive 5 per cent 
interest Bnt such deposits coold not be made for less than 
thirty days and ten days' notice was required for withdrawaL 
The snm of these temporary deposits was limited to $25,000,- 
000. By sec. 5 the coin received from daties on imports was 
set apart as a special fund to be applied, first, to the pajrment 
in specie of interest on the public debt ; second, to the par- 
chase of 1 per cent of the entire debt yearly to be set aside 
as a sinking fund ; third, to the general expenses of the 
govemment, if any residne remained. 

The attitude of the general public toward the legal- tender 
act was divided between donbt and hesitation on the part of 
a few who appreciated clearly the evils of an irredeemable 
paper currency, and cheerful acceptance on the part of those 
who felt that scruples, jastifiable under ordinary circum- 
stances should not be allowed to interfere with decisive 
action in the face of such a crisis. Organized opposition to 
the bilí by the business commanity ceased with the failure 
of the bankers^ convention. The opinions expressed by 
practical fínanciers showed marked diversity — a f act that 
was not without inflaence upon the fate of the bilí in Con- 
gress. Senator Sumner said of the advice given by business 
men : ''Some tell us that the legal tender will be most bene- 
ficent ; others insist that it will be dishonorable and pemi- 
cious. Which shall we follow?"* On the other hand, 

^ OtmgretHonal Olo6e, 87th Coag., 2d Seas., P* 798; </. remarles of Senator 
Feaieiiden, iind,, p. 168. 



80 HlSTOKT OF THE GkEEXBACKS 

Senator Henrr Wübod nw e i ied m ktter signed br seienl 
liaaBachnsetíB fiíms ot high sUnding, s*yú^ ^^J ^^ ^wA 
know m meichant in tbe citj ot Boston engaged in actiTe 
bosinees** vfao vas Dot in farcrct tbe legal-tendo- clanse.' 
Of greater weigfat was tbe resolntion adopled br tbe New 
York Chamber of OcMnmeroe tbat ^tbe present financial 
oondition of tbe govemment and of tbe coontiT T>eqiiireB 
tbe immediate paasage of tbe [legal-tendo-] MIL*'* Mr. 
Stevens and Mr. Spanlding said tbat ¿nmilar encooragement 
was received h\ tbe promoteis of tbe ImU from tbe boaids of 
trade in Boston. Pbiladelpbia, Bollalo. Cincinnati, Lonis- 
ville, St. Loui^ Cbicago. and Milvaakee.' "* I baTe never 
known any measnrv/* aaid Mr. SpanUing, ** leoeiTe a more 
bearty approval from tbe people.*** 

Kew8pa{ier8 sbowed 8imilar d iffere nces of opinión. Wben 
tbe propoaal was made to iasne legal-tender treasnrj notes, 
tbe New York TWbujie said, ^^ We ponder and besitate.'** * 
Mr. Greeley believed tbat ^^beaTj taxing« ligbt stealing, and 
bard figbting/^ would remove tbe alleged neceesity for tbe 
bilí/ and advoeated **a stirríng appeal to tbe people for a 
Patríotic Loan of Two or Tbiee Hnndred Milliona''' Bnt 
by the middie of Febmary be conelnded tbat, ^'tbere bas 
been so mucb delay and besitation and Tacillati<Mi, tbat it is 
possible tbat no otber means of giving immediate relief to 
tbe Treasnry now remains.** * He finally acqniesced witb an 
ill grace in tbe enactment of tbe bilí, and snpported Tery 
TÍgoronsly tbe amendments of tbe Senate making interest 
payable in coin.* More decided opposition to tbe legal- 



1 /6«d^ p. T80; </. Sen«U>r Simmoos, pw 7M. 

^ ProctaUno» cf the CkamUfer of Ommterrt of tk€ Staie<^ yew Tark for the Tear 
Mmdtmíf I/ecemtjer 3L JM2, p. 12. 

*Omffrttmamal Globc. 37th Cooc Sd Se«s.. ppc 900 and 882. «I6td., p. ttS. 

^ Sew York Tribume. Janoary IS, 18GS. • Ibid., Janoary SL IMS. 

7 Ibid^ Febraary 1. 186. •IbUL, Febmary la 186: 

• /6td., Febmary 18« 1862; </. tlM iasiMs of Febraaiy 1» and SBw 



The Fibst Legal-Tendeb Aot 81 

tender clauBe was made hj the New Tork World ^ and 
Journal of Commercey^ ihe Springfíeld (MaBs.) Bepublican* 
and the Bofiton Daily Advertiser^ On the other hand the 
New York Herald espoused the cause of the bilí. With ' 
heavy taxation and the provisión for exchanging notes for 
bonds, it thoüght the greatest depreciation could '* not 
exceed 10 per cent and that not before a lapse of two 
years'' — especially not after the interest had been made 
payable in coin.^ Somewhat similar was the attitude of thej 
New York Timea^ which thonght the legal-tender claose was 
necessary to protect the notes from bank competition and 
hostility;* of the Philadelphia Fress^ which regarded the 
issue of irredeemable paper as an onavoidable evil which it 
was "not manly to bemoan;'*' of the New York Commercial 
Advertiserj which acquiesced " in the measure, as the best 
on the whole that could be done under the existing circum- 
stances;"* offthe National Intelligencer of Washington, 
which thought the measure would be of great assistance to 
the govemment provided the notes were fundable in bonds 
bearing interest [in coin;' of the Boston Post^ which advo- 
cated *'a national issue of paper, legal-tender^ as the best 
thing to be done under the circumstances;'^*^ and of the 
Boston Joumály which declared that people who feared the 
bilí would be a step toward an irredeemable currency were 
"too timid for the times."" 

1 E, o,t see the issnes of Janoary 6 and 10. 

2 Extnet fxom the New York Journal of Commere4í, reprinted in the Baltimoie 
Skat^ Janoary 16, 1862. 

' See the issoes of Janoary 7* 8* 15i 16, 21, 29, and of Febmary 5, 6, and 18, 1862. 

* See the issoes of Janoary 24, 28, and 81, and of Febmary 5, 6, 11, 18, 17, and 22, 1862. 

6 See the issoes of Janoary 11, 20, 21, 23, 30, 31, and of Febmary 5, 10, 13, and 15, 1862. 
•See the issoes of Janoary 13, 16, 18, 22, 23, 27, 29, and of Febmary 8, 5, 7, 10, 12, 

and 14, 1862. 

7 See the issoes of Janoary 18, Febmary 8, 14, and 21, 1862. 
< See the issoes of Febmary 7 and Janoary 29, 1862. 

* See the issoes of Janoary 11, 25, and of Febmary 1 and 10, 1862. 
i<>See the issoes of Janoary 14, 21, 28, and of Febmary 1, 1862. 

11 See the issoes of Janoary 8 and of Febmary 3 and 7, 1862. 



CHAPTER III 
THE SECOND LEGAL-TENDER ACT 

I. Oovemment Finances January to June, 1862: 

Déficit in the Revenues — Existing Authority to Borrow — Second 
Issue of Oíd Demand Notes -:-Temporary Loan — Certificates of 
Indebtedness — Receipts, January to March — Relief Afforded by 
Issues of Greenbacks — Small Amount of **Conversion8** — Receipts 
Apríl to June — Position of Treasury, June 90, 1862. 

II. T?ie Second Legal-Tender Act: 

Chase*8 Request for Second Issue of Greenbacks — Chandler*s 
Attempt to Forestal! its Consideration — Debate in House and 
Senate — Provisions of the Act. 

III. T?ie Postage-Currency Act: 

Embarrassment of Treasury from Disappearance of Small Change 
— Remedies Proposed by Chase — Passage of Postage Currency Act. 

I. QOVEBNMENT FINANCES JANUABY TO JUNE, 1862 

** WiTHiN sixty days," Justin Momll had prophesied in 
discossing the fírst legal-tender act, *' we must have at least 
twice the amount of notes which is proposed now." * His 
prophecy was fulfílled, but not until double the time set had 
elapsed. 

During this interval between the fírst and second legal- 
tender acts, Secretary Chase perforce depended mainly upon 
loans. At the time of suspensión " expenditures had 
already reached an average of nearly a million and a quar- 
ter of dollars each secular day ; while the revenue from all 
sources hardly exceeded one-tenth of that sum." ' In the 

1 Conoremonal Olobe^ 37th Coog., 2d Sess., p. 886. Qf, the similar predictions 
oited in note 1, p. 58, abo ve. 

3 Repori of the Secretary of the Tretuury^ December, 1802, p. 7. The adTooates of 
the legal-tender bilí in thelr anziety to prove the necessity of the measuro soem to 
haTO exaggerated the expenses of goTemment. January 28 Spauldlng set the amount 
at ''more than $1,800,000** per áaLj^Conffrestional Qlobe, S7th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 524), and 
bj February 6 Stevens deolared daily expenditures had reached '* about |2,üü0,000 " 
(i6td., p. 687). But on June 7 Chase still pnt the sum at $1,000,000, with the admis- 

82 



The Second Legal-Tender Aot 83 

quarter January to March the ordinary income of the govem- 
ment from customs, sales of public lands, and miscellaneons 
soarces was hardiy $15,000,000. Though in the next quarter 
the income from these sources increased $4,000,000 and was 
supplemented by the first receipts from the direct tax 
imposed the summer preceding, the total carne to but 
$21, 000,000 J This made total receipts for the six months 
of $36,000,000 from ordinary sources, while expenditures 
were probably between $325,000,000 and $350,000,000.* 
Of course the difference between these sums had to be 
borrowed. 

When the banks and the treasury ceased paying in specie 
Chase found that his authority to borrow was confined 
practically to the loan acts passed at the summer session of 
Congress. These acts, it will be remembered, permitted 
the secretary to borrow $250,000,000 and to issue a variety 
of bonds and treasury notes as security.' Under this 
authority Mr. Chase had already arranged with the asso- 
ciat«d banks for three loans amounting to $150,000,000. 
$30,000,000 of the bank subscriptions, however, had not yet 
been paid into the treasury/ This balance formad his first 
immediate resource. His second was found in the fact that 
of the $50,000,000 of demand notes authorized, but $33,- 
500,000 had been isBued.*^ This left a sum of $16,500,000 
which he could pay out at once. Finally, after the f unds 

sion, howerer, that this amonnt woald probably be exoeeded in the near futnre 
(H. R. Mi9céUaneou9 Document No. 81^ p. 2, S7th Gong., 2d Sess.). In fact, the daily 
expenses did not reach quite two millions a day eren for the fiscal year of 18d2-S. 
{Cf, Repart of the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1863, p. 29.) 

1 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Decembor, 1862, p. 37. 

^Ezpenditares— onlike receipts — are not givon by qnarters in the reports of 
the secretary of the treasury, except for the three months, July to September. The 
above figures are Uie reenlt of a rongh estímate made after considering the expendí* 
torea from Jnly to September, 1861, the total for the fiscal year 1862, and the ratio of 
increase from 1862 to 1868. 

sSee chap. i, p. 17, above. * Ibid., p. 40, note. 

s Report of the Secretary cf the Treasury, Decembor, 1862, p. 9. 



84 HlSTOBY OF THB ObEENBACKS 

obtained from the $150,000,000 bank loan and the $50,000,- 
000 of demand notes had been exhaosted, there still 
remained $50,000,000 of the $250,000,000 which the secre- 
tary had been anthorized to borrow. Bat this $50,000,000 
was not for the moment available. For, though it coold be 
borrowed on either 7.30 three-year notes at par, or on 6 
per cent bonds at 89.3+, the equivalent of par for 7 per 
cent stocks, the sixes already issned were selling in the 
market at 89 and the seven-thirties at 98.^ 

Under these circumstances Mr. Chase continned to draw 
npon the banks from week to week until their last instahnent 
npon the $150,000,000 loan was paid on Febmary 4.' At 
the same time he issned demand notes freely, and also 
persnaded a few govemment creditors mnch in need of 
fnnds to accept 7.30 notes at par in satisfaction of their 
claims.' Bnt these resonrces were not adeqnate for the 
needs of the treasnry, and on Febmary 7, the day after 
the legal-tender bilí had passed the Honse of Repreeenta- 
tives, Chase was obliged to reqnest anthority to issue 
another $10,000,000 of the demand notes to tide over the 
time nntil the Senate conld act npon the pending measnre.^ 
The short bilí which he sent vdth his letter was passed at 
once by the Senate without debate or even reference to 
committee, and on the foUowing Monday it was acted npon 
by the Honse with similar dispatch.* 

Ten millions, however, was a small snm compared vdth 
the needs of the treasnry, and Chase found it neceesary to 
resort to varíons new devices to obtain additional means. 

1 See the table of pnces of goTemment stocks in the American Annutü Cyclo* 
pcBdia, U62, p. 474. 

3 Chap. i, p. 40, note, aboTe. 

sThaddoos SteTens said in the Honse on Febraary 6 that snch issnes of aeren* 
ihirties had then reached ubont $10,000,000.— Coti^restionaf Globe, S7th Coüg,^ tá Seas., 
p,W¡, 

* See his letter to Fessenden, tMd., p* 706. 

ft/M(i.,|>.726; VÍ8tatute9atLarge,p,9S&. 



The Segond Legal-Tendeb Aot 85 

One plan that oltimately had marked success was suggested 
by Mr. John J. CÍ8Co, the chief of the New York Bub- 
treasury.' Febmary 8 he published a notice stating that he 
had been " anthorized by the Secretary of the Treasury to 
receive on depoeit United States notes as a temporary loan^^ 
at 5 per cent, interest, with the condition that snms 
deposited coold be withdrawn at any time after ten days' 
notice.' Aboat $2,000,000 were deposited in this fashion 
within a fortnight; bnt Secretary Chase seems to have 
entertained some doabts of his anthority to make such an 
arrangement, and accordingly he requested the Senate 
finance committee to insert an amendment in the legal- 
tender bilí then in their hands granting him power to 
accept such deposits to an amonnt not exceeding $25,000,- 
000.' Senator Sherman and others demnrred on the gronnd 
that if men coold draw 5 per cent, interest on notes 
deposited but temporarily vdth the subtreasnríes they wonld 
be slow to lock up their capital by fnnding notes in 6 per 
cent bonds.^ Bnt after Fessenden and Chandler had 
explained that the secretary believed that the plan would 
induce banks to accept the notes more freely and that 
whatever snms were deposited would constitute a loan 
to the government at 5 per cent., the measure was fínally 
passed by a vote of 21 to 18.^ No objection was raised 
to the plan in the House, and with some minor changes the 
amendment was incorporated into the legal-tender act as 

1 SCHDOKEBS, lÁft €i CJkOM, p. 260. 

sSee flnati^^l oolamns of the New York x>apers and the ArvMud American 
CfifclopiEdiay 1862, p. 454, for text of the notice. The object of this plan was at flrst 
rather to secare a leadier aooeptance of the oíd demand notes by the banks than to 
raise a loan at 5 per cent. Cf. Part n, ohap. ii, sec. iii, below. 

> Con4rre$tionai Olobe^ 87th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 772. 

«See the discnssion of the amendment, t&id., pp. 772, 778, 802, 808. 

»/&id.,p.808. 

*í28tatut€t at Large^ p. 346. 



86 HlRTOBf OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

The opportunity afforded by this measure oí obtaining 5 
per cent, interest on current funds proved very attractive to 
the banks. March 7 a meeting of the New York Clearing 
Hoose Association voted to employ such certifícates of 
depoBÍt in payment of balances at the clearing hoose, and 
their agents arranged with Mr. Cisco to issue for the pur- 
pose certifícates payable to the order of any bank in the 
association.* As the New Tork banks wished to take out 
$20,000,000 of these certifícates, Mr. Chase saw that the 
$25,000,000 limit imposed by the act of February 25 would 
not allow him sufficient margin for similar issues in other 
cities. Consequently he asked the fínance committee of the 
Senate to add an amendment raising the limit to $50,000,000 
to the bilí that had just been sent up by the House providing 
for the parchase of coin for interest on the public debt. This 
request was acceded to, though not without further objec- 
tions f rom Senator Sherman, and the new limit was proyided 
for by sec. 3 of the act which was approved March 17.' By 
the end of the month the treasury had received over 
$20,000,000 on account of the "temporary loan," as it was 
called, and had redeemed less than $1,500,000.' 

Another shift for obtaining means was the issue of 
"certifícates of indebtedness.'^ During the winter a floating 
debt had been gradually accumnlating, variously estimated 

I Banken' Magazinc, Yol. XVI, pp. 809-11. 

212 Statute» at Large^ p. 370; CongrettUmal Olobe, 37th Coni;., 2d Sess., pp. lloG, 
1182-4,1235. 

< Batlet, National Loan» of the United State», p. 158. The table compiled by Pro- 
fessor D. C. Barrctt f rom Senator Chandler's specch of Jane 17, 1862, and publishcd in 
the Quarterly Journal of Economic», Yol. XYI, p. 327, does not agree with Bayley's 
flinircs. According to Bayley*8 table tho amount of the temporary loan ontstandiug 
March 31 vfña $18,876,404.43; according to Barrett the amoont on April 1 was $12,227,- 
1^5. Chandler*8 figures, on which Barrett relies, are inccmsistcnt — the totals do not 
agree with the several items. Perhaps the n^asoii is that he includes in the totals 
the deposits received under Cisco*» notico of Fobruary 8, bofore congrossional 
authorisation had been given to the temporary loan. Moreover, if his figures are 
for the end of tho day they would includo the notes deposited April 1, but these 
deposits could not ha ve b«<m a large sum, for the net increase that week was, accord- 
ing to Barrett, only $746,691. 



Thb Seoond Legal-Tendeb Agt 87 

at from $80,000,000 to $180,000,000.* Mr. Chase did not 
have Bufficient ready money to pay even those creditors 
whose claims had been audited. As a measure oí relief he 
requested authority to issue to creditors who might desire 
to receive them, certifícates of indebtedness bearing 6 per 
cent, interest and payable in one year or earlier at the 
option of the govemment.' This request was granted by 
the prompt passage of the act of March 1.' March 17 
authority was granted to iflsue such certifícates in payment 
of disbursing officers' checks as well as in payment of 
audited accounts.^ Army contractors and similar creditors 
foond great relief in these provisions, for the delay in 
obtaining payment for supplies had interfered with their 
operations serionsly, the more so because banks showed a 
disinclination to lend on their claims even after the claims 
had been approved by the treasury. Under the new system 
contractors conld at any time obtain 6 per cent, obligations of 
govemment which conld be sold in the market at a slight 
discount, or used as first-class coUateral in securing loans 
from a banL' 

By these various shifts Mr. Chase obtained means suffi- 
cient to tide the treasury over the trying quarter between 
suspensión of specie payments and the time when the 
resources provided by the legal-tender act became available. 
The following brief recapitulation may give a clearer idea 
of the situation. Against expenses of perhaps $112,500,000 
to $137,500,000 the ordinary receipts were: 

1 Jaxniarj 16 the flnwnciwl oolnmn of the New York Herald gave $80,000,000 as the 
enrrait estímate. Jannarj 28, Sx>aalding pnt the floating debt at $100,000,000 (Conr 
vremUmtü Olobe^ S7th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 523) ; Febroary 6 Stevens declared it to be 
$180,000,000 (¿Md., p. 687). 

> Congrearional Olobe^ S7th Gong., 2d Sess., pp. 945, 964, 055. 

*128taiut€KULarffe,p, 352. 

«/Md., p. 870. 

& Cf. Ammai American Cyclopcedia^ 1862, p. 456. 



90 HlSTOBY OF THB ObEENBACKS 

Instead of its being necessary, as Mr. Stevens foreca3t in 
February, to issue more bonds to take up the legal-tender 
notes constantly offered for conversión, it became necessary 
to issue more greenbacks to compénsate for the small demand 
for bonds.' 

The treasury operations for the quarter April to June 
may best be presented in a summary like the one given 
above for January to March. 

RBCEIPTS FROM ORDINART SOUBGES 

Fromcustoms $18,930,170.16 

From sales of public lands 49,658.54 

From miscellaneous sources (estimated) 232,946.91 

From direct tax 1,795,331.73 

t21,008,(X)7.34 

ISSUES OF GOVERNMENT SBCÜRITIES 

Oregon war debt S 198,850.00 

6 per cent, twenty-year bonds - . - - 

7.30 three-year notes 13,997,936.64 

Oíd demand notes 30,000.00 

Temporary loan (less withdrawals) - - - 39,049,712.14 

Certificates of indebtedness 44,252,979.73 

$97,529,478.51 
Legal-tender notes (greenbacks) - - - - 98,620,000.00 
Five-twenties of 1862 13,845,500.00 

' $209,994,978.51 

The free issue of greenbacks put the treasury by the end 
of the quarter in a very much better position than it had 
been in at the beginning. The floating debt that had accu- 
mulated during the preceding three months was all cleared 
away and current expenses were paid promptly. On July 
1, said Mr. Chase in his December report: 

1 For the subseqnont hLstoir of the ''oooTenion " Beheme, aee ohap. ít, pp. 104, 
107, 106, 115, 116, bclow. 

>For anthoiities aee aboTe, p. 88, note. 



Thb Seoond Legal-Tendeb Act 91 

Not a single requisition from any department upon the treasury 
remained unanswered. Everj audited and settled claim on the 
govemment, and every quartermaster's check for supplies f ur- 
nished, which Lad reached the treasury, had been met. And there 
remained in the treasury a balance oí S13,0á3,5á6.81.* 

II. THE SEGOND LEGAL-TENDEB ACT 

While it Í8 true, as has just been shown, that the treas- 
ury worked into comfortable condition during the quarter 
April to June, 1862, and possessed abundant funds to meet 
all current demands, Mr. Chase foresaw that this pleasant 
situation could not continué long without further grants 
from Congress. The credit was due in large measure to the 
rapid issues of greenbacks, and when the whole amount of 
these notes authorized by the act of February, 1865, had 
been put into circulation stringency would recur. This 
matter he called to the attention of Congress by a letter 
written June 7 to Thaddeus Stevens, chairman of the Com- 
mittee of Ways and Means.^ 

According to the terms of the fírst legal-tender act, he 
reminded Congress, $150,000,000 of United States notes 
might be issued, but $60,000,000 of this sum must be used 
to replace the oíd demand notes authorized by the acts of 
July 17, 1861, and February 12, 1862. The new issues, 
therefore, were confíned to $90,000,000. This limit, he said, 
had already been reached, and accordingly further issues 
could be made only as equal sums of the oíd notes were 
retired. Moreover, no more temporary deposits could be 
received, because the amount on hand had reached $50,000,- 
000 — the full sum authorized by Congress — despite a 
reduction in the rate of interest from 5 to 4 per cent. Thus 
the only available resources were receipts from customs, and 

1 Beport cf the Secretary of the Tre€Uitir¡/y December, 1862, p. 10. 

3i7. R. MitceUantou» Document No, 81^ 37th Cong., 2d Sess. The date ofthe 
letter as giren by this docament is April 7, but this is an error of the press. Seo the 
remarles of Mr. Stevens, Congretñonal Globe, 37 th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 2768. 



02 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS 

sales of five-twenty bonds for greenbacks, or '^conversions.'' 
But these resonrces were far from adequate to meet the 
expenditures. 

No safe relianoe [said Mr. Chase] can be placed on oonversions 
so far as experience has afforded an j grounds of estímate, for more 
than $150,000 dailj; and the daily aveiage revenue from customs, 
during the past month, has been about $230,000. 

The aggregate daily receipts from both these souroes, theref ore, 
cannot be estimated at more than $380,000, and may very possibly 
fall short of that sum; while the average daily exjienditure cannot 
be estimated at less than $1,000,000, and will, probably, unless very 
considerable retrenchments are made, exceed that sum. 

To meet the déficit the secretary proposed two measures: 
first, the ''removal of the restriction apon temporary 
deposita ;'' second, the issae of another $150,000,000 of legal- 
tender notes. The first measore woald enable him to take 
f ull advantage of the disposition of business men to lend their 
means to the govemment temporarily at a low rate of interest. 
Mr. Chase thonght that not less than $30,000,000 would be 
addcd at 4 per cent, to the $50,000,000 of depoeits already 
received. To provide for the prompt redemption of such 
of these depoeits as were withdrawn, he proposed that a 
reserve of 83¿ per cent, be provided out of the new issaes of 
greenbacks. 

Another soggestion, indicative of the state into which 
the circulating médium of the country had already fallen, 
was that $25,000,000 of the new United States notes should 
be of denominations less than five doUars. 

Payments to public creditors, and especially to soldiers [Mr. 
Chase said in explanation], now require large amounts of coin to 
satisfy fractional demands less than five dollars. Oieat inconveni- 
ences in payment of the troops are thus occasioned. With every 
effort on the part of the treasury to provide the necessary amount 
of coin, it is found impracticable always to satisfy the demand. 
Wheu the amount required is f umished, the temptation to disburs- 
ing officers to exchangeit for anysmall bank notes that the soldiers 



Thb Seoond Legal-Tendeb Act 93 

or the public crediiors will take, is too great to be alwajs resisted. 
And even when the ooin reaches the creditors it is seldom held, but 
pasees, in general, immediatelymtothe hands oí sutlers and others, 
and disappears at once from circulation.' 

With this letter Mr. Chase sent a bilí embodying his 
recommendations. ''The condition of the treasury/' he 
said, in conclusión, " renders prompt action highly desirable." 

This communication was laid before the House June 11. 
The reqnest for a second issue of legal-tender notes imme- 
diately alarmed the opponents of paper money. With the 
hope of preventing its consideration, Senator Chandler, of 
Michigan, introduced a resolution: "That the amount of 
legal tender treasnry notes already authorized by law, shall 
never be increased.^' ' Speaking in support of this resolu- 
tion he said that the effect which the passage of a second 
legal-tender bilí would have was shown by the fact that the 
mere publication of Secretary Chase's request, '' without any 
action of Congress on the subject, has created such a panic, 
and has so convinced the money center of the world that we 
are to be flooded with this paper, that gold has risen in price 
from 2| to 7 per cent premium." If full use were made of 
other reeources, he continuad, the disastrous consequences 
of fresh paper money emissions could be avoided. By pay- 
ing 5 per cent, interest an indefínitely large sum could be 
obtained on temporary deposit and the lagging conversions 
of greenbacks into bonds could be stimulated by an appeal 
to the patriotism of the people.* 

Senator Fessenden, chairman of the finance committee, 
replied in a modérate vein. Reliance upon temporary 
deposita, he pointed out, would be very hazardous, because 
if any severe shocks occurred to the credit of the govem- 
ment, large sums might be withdrawn within a few days, 

1 Cf. Part n, ehap. ii, sec. ít, below. 

s (kmaremional Gtobe, 87th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 2740. > Ibid,, pp. 2774, 2775. 



94 HlSTOBY OF THE ObEENBAGKS 

and Mr. Chase be left without funds. He regretted that 
the secretary had found it necessary to request the issue of 
more notes, and he was not convinced that such a course 
would be wise. But until the secretary's reasons were fully 
known he thought it would be wrong to resolve not to grant 
his request. Therefore, he moved that the resolution be 
referred to his committee for consideration. This was done, 
and nothing more was heard of the matter by the Senate.* 
Meanwhile Mr. Chase^s bilí was introduced into the 
House.' As before, Mr. Spaulding fathered the measure. 
The tone of the debate was quite different from that upon 
the ñrst legal-tender act. The advocates of paper money 
spoke in a less apologetic tone, boldly assuming the 
offensive. The fírst ezperíment, they held, had demon- 
strated the wisdom of their policy. Mr. Spaulding declared 
that the act of February 25 had " worked well," and had 
'^exceeded the most sanguine expectations of its warmest 
advocates.'* ' Some members who had voted against the 
first bilí were won over by such claims to vote for the 
second. Senator Simmons, for instance, said the fírst issue 
" has given great practical relief to the country, and inas- 
much as it has done so, I ... . give my consent to author- 
ize a further issue."* Other members agreed to the bilí 
because of the hopelessness of opposition. Owen Lovejoy, 
who had spoken vigorously against the bilí in February, 
explained that he still thought the policy pemicious but that 
he would not '^persist in any factious opposition to what is 
a foregone conclusión."* On the other hand, there were 
members who had voted for the fírst bilí as a measure of 

1 Omffremonal Olobe^ 37th Cod^., 2d Sess., PP' 2774, 2T75. 

ilbid.^ p. 2665. The bilí as roported from the Committee of Ways and MeaoA 
differed from the bilí submitted by Chase in not authoriaing the isane of notes less 
than five doUars. See the text, p. 2766. 

s Ibid., p. 2766. Cf. on the othor side Mr. Shoffield, p. 2888. 

«/6td., p. aon. ft/bjd., p. 2885. 



The Seoond Legal-Tendeb Aot 95 

temporary necessity, but who opposed the second on the 
groiind that it inaugurated a regalar policy of depending 
on inconvertible paper/ Thus the character both of the 
Bupport and of the opposition shifted somewhat. 

In the debate one point especially received relatively 
more attention than in February. Mr. Hooper based his 
argument for the bilí on the country's need of a currency of 
uniform valué. It was a question, said he, between bank 
notes and govemment notes, and he preferred the latter.' 
"If anybody," said Mr. Lovejoy, "is to have the advantage 
of a depreciated currency — the advantage, in other words, of 
not paying interest on what they [sic] owe — I say let the 
govemment have that advantage ; and let the bankers share 
with the rest of us.'" In order to secare this advantage to 
the govemment, Senator Sherman proposed an amendment 
to the bilí imposing a taz apon bank notes.^ 

But it was again the argument of necessity that did duty I 
as the chief reason for the bilí. In opening the debate Mr. 
Spaulding reiterated it explicitly. "The ground upon 
which the secretary of the treasury, and upon which the 
Committee of Ways and Means, rest this issue of notes,^' he 
said, "is the necessity of the case." * By the opposition the 
alleged necessity was once again emphatically denied. Mr. 
Pomeroy made an elabórate attempt to show that Secretary 
Chase had underestimated the probable receipts of the gov- 
emment, and that the daily deñcit instead of being $620,- 
000 was only $166, 166.* Mr. Pike, who had voted for the 

I Cf, the remarles of Mr. Pike, ¿Md., p. 2798, and Senator Davis, p. 9078. 

*Ibid., p. 2882. s Jbid., p. 2885. 

*/&úi., pp. 9071, 8072. This proposition was opposed by Senators Collamer, p. 
8078; Simmons, pp. 8076, 8077; and DavLs, p. 8078. 

6/6ÚÍ., p. 2768. Cf. remarks of Messrs. Baily, ibid,, Appendix, p. 296; and 
Edwards, ibid,, p. 2888. 

*Mr. Pomeroy estimated '* conyersions '* at $275,000 instead of $150,000 daily, and 
fnrther added $383,000 per day as the ezpected receipts f rom the iotemal revenue 
act then Jost enacted.— /6¿d., p. 2797. As a matter of fact this act yielded abcut 
$108,000 instead of $838,000 daily in the fiscal year, 1863.— ISeport of the Secretary o/ 
the Treamry, 1868, p. 28. 



96 HlSTOBT OF THB GbSBNBACKS 

first bilí on the groond of neceflsity, refnsed to vote for 
the pending measnrey which could be advocated only apon 
<<the mere groond of conyenienoe." ' And Mr. Morrill 
declared that after the recent yictoríes of the federal armiea 
and the passage of the tax bilí there was not only no necee- 
aity, bnt no excnse^ for the isene of more paper.* 

Ñor were these gentlemen who denied the neceeaity at a 
loes for an altematiye. ^The trae policy/* said Mr. Morrill, 
*'is to pat apon the market the amall amoant which will be 
reqaired . . . . in the bonds of the Gh>Temment, at what- 
ever they woald bring.'^' Mr. Sheffield concladed his 
speech by saying : ''I am persaaded that it woald be far 
better for the people of the coantry to sell bonds at a large 
discoant than to farther distarb the relation between price 
and valae by a farther iasae of these notes.'' ^ Mr. Horton 
pat these saggestions into formal shape by presenting, as a 
snbstitate for the bilí, a measare aathorizing the secretary 
of the treasary to borrow $100,000,000 on 6 per cent., 
twenty-five year bonds.^ 

As in the ñrst debate, the sapporters of the bilí implicitly 
gave away the argoment of necessity in the answer made to 
the proposal of borrowing. Instead of showing that it was 
impracticable to sell bonds, they responded that, as a method 
of secaring revenne, it was better to issae inconvertible paper 
money than to borrow below par. "When money can be 
obtained at par on six per cent, bonds,'' said Mr. Spaalding, 
"I woald prefer to have that done to the issaing a very 
large amoimt of legal tender notes."* Mr. Edwards fol- 
lowedsait, "I woald gladlygivemy consent," said he, **to 
.... the sale of bonds . . . . if I were assared those 
bonds coald be sold at par." ^ 

1 ConQre$$ional Olobe^ S7th Cod^m 2d Sess., p. 2796. 

3 Ibid., i>. 2885. See also Mr. Baker, ibid., i>. 2881. 

> Ibid., p. 2885. « Ihid,, p. 2888. « Ibid,, p. 2791. • Ihid,, p. 2767. 

T /6(d., p. 288S. Cf. on the other úde Mr. Pomeroy, ihid.^ p. 2798. 



The Sbcond Lsoal-Tendeb Act 97 

The legal-tender debate in Jnne and Jnly was by no 
means so exhaostive as had been the debate in Janoary and 
Febroary. Apparently membeis felt it woold be a fmitless 
waste of time to discoss again the qnestions debated ai snch 
length fiye months before. An attempt was made, however, 
to leam whether this was the last issne that woold be asked 
for. Mr. SteTens, the chairman of the Committee of Ways 
and Means, to whom the qnestion was put, replied frankly 
that he did not know where the issnes woold stop.' To 
offset this damaging admission the sopporteis of the bilí 
praised the paper coirency/ and asserted that theie was no 
reason why a new issoe shoold inciease depreciation.' 

The measore carne to a vote in the Hoose Jone 24. It 
passed by 76 yeas to 47 nays. Of those who yoted in the 
aflSbrmatiYe five had opposed the legal-tender claose in the 
first act. On the contrary, of the nays, seven had sop- 
ported the legal-tender claose in Febroary. The large 
majority of membeis, however, Toted opon the second act as 
they had opon the first. The yeas incloded f oor Demócrata 
and the nays fifteen Bepoblicans, so that the división was 
not a party vote.* 

In the Senate the vote was 22 to 13. Foor senators 
voted for the bilí who had opposed the legal-tender claose 
of the first act, and three senators — John Sherman among 
them — who had sopported the first act opposed the second. 
Twenty-one Bepoblicans voted in the affirmative and nine 
in the negative. Of the foor democratic votes one was in 
favor of the bilí. As in the case of the first act the vote was 
devoid of sectional and of party character.' 

1 /Md., iK 2888. 

2 Mr. Siianldiiis, e. 9., said the aist of Febroary 25, 1862, " had giTen the country a 
9oaiid national eunency, in which the people have had entire confldenoe/*— /6¿d., p. 
tWl, 

> Mr. Hooper said he had '* no apprehension of any depreciation of the cnrreney 
being prodnoed by the passa^e of the bill."~/&id., p. 2SBZ. 

«/Md., p.2908. s/&td.,p.9079. 



98 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEESBACKS 

Presideiit Lincoln approred the second legml-tender act 
Jaly 11, 1862. The Uw mothoiized the isiie of 9130,> 
000,000 United StatM notes. In additicMi the Umit apon 
the amoont oi temporarj depoñts that might be receiTed 
waB raised fiom $50,000,000 to $100,000.000. In oider to 
provide for the prompt pajment oi these deposíts the 
secretarj was directed to retain as a reseire fnnd nol leas 
than $50,000,000 of the newlj anthorized notes.* 

III. THE F06TAGB CUBEEKCT ACT 

It has been seen that Secretarj Chase'^s letter leqnesting 
aathoñty for a Becond issne of greenbacks lefened to the 
difficulty ex[jeríenoed bj disborsiiig officeis in making 
change for sums of less than $5. To relieve this difficolty 
it was provided in the act of Jnly 11 that $35,000,000 of 
the new issues shonld be of lower denominations than $5, 
^t it was abo provided that no note shonld *^be issned for 
the fractional part of a dollar.^' 

Hardly had this act been approved by President Lincoln 
when Mr. Chase fonnd it necessary to request anthoríty to 
nse lOíjHiT money, not only in payments of one and two dol- 
lars, bnt abo in payments of 50, 25, and even 10 centa 
Jnly 14 he wrote a letter to Thaddeos Stevens, saying: 

The depreciation of the currency, lesulting, in great measuie, 
from the iinrestrícted issues of non-specie-paying banks and 
unauthorízed associations and persons, causes the rapid disappear- 
ance from circulation of small coins. To supply the want of these 
coins, tokens and checks for sums less than one dollar are being 
isKui^ by hotel», business houses, and dealers generally; and the 
most serious inoonveniences and evils are apprehended unless 
theHe isHUinf can be checked and the small coins of the Gk>vemment 
kept in circulation, or a substitute provided.' 

1 12 HUituUa (U I^rge, p. 582. > IMd,, loe. eiL 

'i ('ongrrȤional Olotte, S7th Come., 2d Sens., p. S405. On the disappearanoe of 
«abnidianr HiWor from circuUtioD Me Part II, chap. ii, sec. ít, below. 



The Seoond Legal-Tendeb Act 99 

Chase proposed two methods of meeting this situatioiL 
One was to diminish the weight of the subsidiary coins to \ 
SQch a point , that as bullion they would be worth less than 
their face valué as money ; the other was to authorize the 
use of postage and other stamps in payments of fractional 
parts of a doUar. For the convenience df the Committee of 
Ways and Means the secretary submitted two bilis embody- 
ing these suggestions. The second expedient seemed . 
preferable to the committee, and accordingly the bilí 
providing for the use of stamps as currency was introduced,^; 
by Mr. Hooper July 17 and passed at once by a vote of 62 
to 40, with no debate aside from an objection raised on 
constitutional grounds against the clause forbidding the 
issue of small notes by state banks.* The Senate passed the 
bilí the same day without debate or división,* and President 
Lincoln signed it before night. 

The act directed the secretary of the treasury "to fumish 
to the Assistant Treasurers, and such designated depositaries 
of the United States as may be by him selected, in such 
sums as he may deem expedient, the postage and other 
stamps of the United States, to be exchanged by them, on 
application, for United States notes." 

Such stamps were not made a legal tender between indi- 
viduáis, but their currency was assured by providing that 
they should be receivable in payment of all dues to the 
United States less than $5, and that they should be 
redeemed in greenbacks on demand by the treasury officials. 
The second section forbade any "prívate Corporation, bank- 
ing association, firm, or individual" to put in circulation 
notes or tokens of any character for sums less than a dollar.* 

1 Oonoreuional Olobe^ S7th Gong., 2d Seas., pp. 3405, 8406. 

>J6td.,p.S402. 

112 Staiutet at Larffe^ p. 592. On the authorization of fractional oorrenoy to 
take the place of i>ostago cnrrency, see Part I, chap. iv, p. 118, below. On the cixoala- 
tion of both these forms of small chango see Part II, chap. ii, seo. íy. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE THIRD LEGAL-TENDER ACT 

I. The Finances fram July to December, 1862: 

KeceiptB and Ezpensee July to September— Increase of Déficit in 
October and November — Proposals of the Finance Beport; No 
Further Issues of Greenbacks, But Reliance Upon Loans. 

II. The Joint Resolution o/January Í7, 1863: 

Arrears in Pay of Army — Cong^ressional Inquines and Chase's 
Bejoinders — Resolution for Additional Issues of Greenbacks. 

IIL The Third Legal-Tender Act: 

Provisions of Ways and Means Bill — Character of Debate — 
Bepeal of Funding Provisions — Substitutos Proposed — Senate 
Amendments — Provisions of the Act. 

I. THE FINANCES FBOM JUNE TO DECEMBEB, 1862 

On July 1, 1862, the beginning of the new fiscal year, 
the treasury was in easy circumstances, as has been shown. 
All audited claims had been met, and there was a balance 
of $13,000,000 on hand.^ But in the next quarter the 
treasury began to ron behind again. The futile ending 
of McClellan's campaign in the Peninsula, from which so 
mnch had been hoped, showed that the end of the war was 
not at hand, and on July 1 President Lincoln issued a 
oall for 800,000 additional troopa' Enlarging the army of 
conrse promised an increase of demands on the treasury. 
Dnring the quarter July to September, however, the war- 
rants drawn against the treasurer for other purposes than 
payment of the public debt were slightly less than the 
quarterly average for the fiscal year 1862 had been — viz., 
$111,000,000 as compared with $119,000,000.' But at the 

1 Pp. 90, 91, aboye. 

2 CompleU Work»^ ed. Nioolat and Hat, Yol. n, pp. 194, 195. 

3See the statements of expenditnres in the Report of the Secretary of the 
TnecMury, Deoember, 1862, pp. 41, 43. 

100 



The Thibd Legal-Tendbb Agt 101 

same time some $45,500,000 more had to be osed ín redeem- 
ing oíd demand notes, greenbacks, certiñcates of indebted- 
ness and certiñcates of deposita^ 

To help in meeting these total expenditures of $156,- 
500,000 there was a slight increase in the receipts from taza- 
tion and miscellaneoos soarces. This revenue rose from 
abont $21,000,000 in the preceding qnarter, to $24,000,- 
000.' For the rest Mr. Chase had to borrow. As conver- 
sions of greenbacks into ñve-twenty bonds amonnted to bat 
$2,500,000, he relied mainly on issues of greenbacks and 
varióos short-time obligations.' Altogether he sncceeded in 
obtaining $114,500,000 from loans, bnt the necessity of pay- 
ing $45,500,000 of the principal of the debt rednced the net 
increase of means from loans to $69,000,000. This sum, 
with the receipts from ordinary sources, gave the secretary 
$93,000,000 to meet warrants of $111,000,000.* The dif- 
ference between these snms swallowed np the balance of 
$13,000,000 on hand July 1 and left an accumnlation of 
onpaid warrants amounting to $5,000,000. 

Unpromising as the sitnation of the treasury was at the 
end of September, it became worse dnring October and 
November. The increase of the army began to be felt by 
the treasury. The expenditures dnring these two months 
other than those for payment of debt were almost as great as 
the total for the three months preceding — viz., $109,000,000 
as compared with $111,000,000.^ Mr. Chase was not able to 
raise money f ast enongh to meet these expenses, and though 
he borrowed $85,500,000,* the accnmulation of nnpaid 
reqnisitions at the end of November reached $48,000,000.^ 

i/Md., p.43. 

>/bidMpp.37, 4S. 

> $S,500,000 of soTen-thirtj notes, $72,500,000 of groenbaoks, $12,000,000 of oertifloates 
of indebtedness and $23,000,000 of oertiflcates of depoeit were issoed.— /Md., p. 4S. 

«SzdosiTe of paymentfi of the principal of the debt. 

>/Md.,p.ia «iMd., P.3. ^Ibid,,V'tO, 



102 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

When the secretary prepared his annual report to Con- 
gress early in December, he estimated that the expenditureB 
for the remainder of the fiscal year wotdd be $485,000,000. 

. The addition of the $48,000,000 of accumolated floatíng 
debt made the total to be provided $533,000,000. Against 
this sum Mr. Ohase expected to receive $125,000,000 from 
taxes of all kindB and miBcellaneous Bourcee. This left 
$408,000,000 to be raised from loans. Under existing laws 
the secretary expected to secure $27,000,000 from issnes of 
greenbacks, $36,000,000 from postage currency, $13,000,000 
from certificates of indebtedness, and $20,000,000 from 

^ temporary deposita These sums, with an estimated sale of 
five-twenty bonds amonnting to $35,000,000, made a total of 
$131,000,000; which, subtracted from the $408,000,000 to 
be borrowed, left loans of $277,000,000 to be provided for 
by new legislation.* 

In discussing how this sum should be procnred Secretary 
Chase took emphatic ground against any considerable 
increase in the emission of greenbacks: 

1 Report of the Secretary of the Treatury, December, 1882, pp. S-5, 11, 12. The 
fignres in the report giye estimated receipts and ezpenditures for the whole 
fiscal year, while the ñgnres above are conflned to the months December, 1862, 
to Jaly, 186S. In obtaining the latter ñgnres from the former it is necessary 
to cast out the expenses actually paid from July to NoTember. This can be done 
with certainty for the months Jnly to September becanse a foll statement is 
given of the receipts and ezpenditures of that quarter. Bnt for October and 
NoYember the statements show only receipts from loans ($86,000,000), and ezpendi- 
tures for objects other than payment of the principal of the debt (|109,000,- 
000). It is, therefore, necessary to estímate the receipts from ordinary sources and 
the amount paid on the principal of the debt. Such an estímate is not difficult to 
make, bocause the flores actually given show that the latter sum ezceeded the 
former by $20,000,000. The difference between the stated ezpenditures and receipts 
is $23,000,000. Bnt it is also stated that the accnmulation of onpaid reqnisitions rose 
from $5,000,000 at the end of September to $48,000,000 at the end of Noyember. Since 
the treasury thus fell bohind $43,000,000 on all ezpenditures and only $23,000,000 on 
stated ezpenditures it must have been because ezpenditures not stated ezceeded 
receipts not stated by $20,000,000. With this guide and that afforded by the figures 
for the quarter July to September, I ha ve estimated tho receipts from customs, etc., 
during October and November at $18,000,000 and the paymeuts on the principal of the 
debt at $38,000,000. The figures for the amounts to be borrowed given in the tezt, 
however, agree with those in the secretary'» report and are not afiPocted by any 
inaccuracy of these guesses, for, if the estimated receipts from taxation aro too 
small thcy are compensated for by correspondingly deficient estimates of expendí- 
ture on the principal of the debt. 



The Thibd Legal-Tbndeb Agt 103 

The easiest mode [oí obtaining the $277,000,000] doubtless 
would be an issue oí the required amount in United States 
notes; but such an issue, especially in the absence oí proper 
restríctions on corporate cireulation, would, in the judgment of the 
Secretary, be as injuríous as it would be easy. The addition of so 
vast a volume to the existing cireulation would convert a curreney, 
of which the benefíts have thus far greatly outweighed the inoon- 
veniences, into a positive calamity. Its consequenoes would be 
inflation of prioes, inciease of expenditures, augmentation of debt, 
and ultimately, disastrous defeat of the very purposes sought to 
be attained by iV 

While the secretary thus opposed further issues of 
greenbacks, he had no suggestions to make of increased 
taxatíon. Instead, he proposed to secura the additional 
$277,000,000 solely by borrowing. In order to facilítate 
the negotiation of loans as well as to provide a better 
curreney, he urged again upon Congress the plan proposed 
in his report of the year bef ore f or reorganizing the banking 
system. Banks that desired to issue circulating notes were 
to be required to purchase United States bonds to be held 
as security. This plan, he thought, would make a market 
for not less than $250,000,000 of bonds " within a very few 
years."' Moreover, the steady sale of bonds to banks would 
strengthen the credit of the govemment and enable it to 
borro w from others on better terms.' 

If reliance were to be placed upon loans, the question as to 
what f orm of security had best be offered became important. 
Mr. Chase opposed any increase beyond five years in the length 
of time that bonds should run bef ore they became redeem- 
able, and any increase in the rate of interest beyond 6 per 
cent. As an altemative he preferred the issue of 7.30 three- 
year notes, "convertible into five-twenty sixes at or before 
maturity, and of smaller notes bearing an interest of 3.65 
per cent" * 

1 Ibid., p. 12. 2 IbidU, p.l8. 

ti6úl., pp. 18, 24, 26. «/bid., p.25. 



II 



H * 



1-3HC the gold in tbe 
^^^Lus- A Taar. and interesa 
.. .■ «i^vüi lo impose on the 

r<a of 6 per cent, on a 
^e -t«rsís.iT is far more ui^nt 



» \ 



^.-.u i»." cLange in the law 

^ xacs '>rTond the necessarv 

- «.^Ku .*k *v*o i'lanses which in 

i^ I'. -- : «caries airead j antfaor- 

.,. .^... -i- T^iirT Mr. Chase's ínter- 

\ . .V- -i: S\oniarT25, 1S62, as will 

;v..^o "¡S/ issue of 8500,000,(h:K) 

VviUfií. *>.ÍK*h the secretary was 

.V u^c-ívm \Alue thereof.-' The law 

v..%'»^ -'V acrv^'V-K^oks might exchange 

V.. . «.^.vj.^i.'íi. oí $r>0 for theae bonds at 

ív....,**v¿í '.>.;* Avretary had been ahle 

..*..^v.^ .V* of the five-twenty bonds. 

*vv^**. s« .\v,i\x*rsions" amoonted to less 

V» \*vt,^* «ow declared that these 

... V K s'*'.i«^ rostrioting sales to the 

» s'.iJs luJ. |vriuilting "conversious*' 

i«^ \%^ :ii \v» a! {vir. 

'í . xvC.i'.iuxl] an* st»ldom takeu. exoept 
« ^«uwíii, a:ul rt's:!]!^ at any profit are 
\ v,\'^ui\Nuis Ivlow uiarket valué are not 
.«•«\.si ^'ix* i.4'\ov of the* Ixnuis can expect no 
. .\, . *.»..K' v\»uMdorahlr Ix'low par shall 
I ii .. b ui.«K\\« .«\l\.uuv aUwe |)ar impossible, 
V iiUxl Siaios noti»s into Uinds at 



\ ■ 



I < i 



• . • lVvi'-.iiN»»r. I*V.'. I*. -*■*». 

' \: SI i'k.Vjt iif /.iiivr. PP. M5, SM. 
. I. • l\xviiiN*r. Ixv.'. |«. rj. ^/6id., p*S3. 



The Thibd Leoal-Tendeb Aot 105 

What this peculiar explanation meant Congress did not 
understand, and, as will soon appear, the secretaiy was asked 
to interpret it. 

II. THE JOINT BESOLUTION OP JAXÜABT 17, 1883 

This report was laid before the House of Represen- 
tatives December 5 and referred to the Committee of Ways 
and Means, which at once set about drafting finance bilis 
along the general Unes indicated by the secretary.* Bnt 
this was a task that necessarily required some time. It was 
not until the 8th of Jannary that Mr. Stevens was able to 
report the loan bilí and the bilí for reorganizing the banks 
of issue.^ 

Meanwhile the treasury continned to ron behind as it 
had done in October and November, and the accnmulation 
of requisitions which conld not be paid for lack of funds 
became larger. This state of affairs attracted much atten- 
tion in Congress because the pay of the army fell into 
arrears. Members began to receive letters from constitnents 
who were serving in the field, complaining that their 
families at home were snffering from lack of the money 
which the govemment owed but did not pay them.' Snch 
complaints fonnd a ready response. December 11 the 
House adopted a resolution asking the secretary of war to 
report '' what regiments remain nnpaid and how long have 
the soldiers of such regiments remained without pay." " As 
Mr. Stanton did not reply promptly, • the House adopted 
another resolution December 15, directed to the secretary of 
the treasury: 

1 Canffrettional Oiobe, S7th Gong., Sd Sess., p. 15. 

3/&id., pp. 2S&-7. It was the Senate banking bilí introdaced by Sherman 
Janoary 26, ** a little different from the bilí introduced in the House of Bepreseata- 
tires ** (p. 506), that was finally passed. Cf, Spauldinq, op, ctí., P* 186. 

sSee, e, g,^ the remarles of Mr. Ourley, CongreMsiantU Olobey S7th Gong., 8d Sess., 
P.3M. 

^ iMd.. pp. 75, 76. & No aoswer had been receiTod ap to Jannary 12.— iMd., p. 2St» 



106 HlSTOBT OF THE GbBBNBACKS 

Whereas grievoiis delays happen in the payment oí money due 
soldiers: Therefore, in order to ascertain if any and what legisla- 
tion may be necessary to lemedy sucb delays, 

Beaolvedy Tbat tbe Secretary oí tbe Treasury be requeeted to 
fumisb to tbis House tbe reasons wby lequisitions oí paymasters 
in tbe Army are not promptly filled.^ 

Mr. Cbase answered tbat tbe nnpaid army requisitions 
tben in tbe treasury amounted to $28,700,000. Payments 
of requisitions designated by tbe war and navy departments 
as most urgent were being made at tbe rate of about 
$1,000,000 daily from tbe proceeds of customs, intemal 
revenue taxes, conversions, temporary deposit loans, and 
new issues of greenbacks. Tbese resources, be concluded 
were insufficient, but be could not obtain more funds until 
Congress sbould adopt tbe measures recommended in bis 
report.' 

Tbe House replied to tbis communication tbe day before 
adjouming for tbe bolidays by passing a joint resolution 
declaring tbat in tbe opinión of Congress *' immediate steps 
ougbt to be taken by tbe Treasury Department to pay tbe 
sums due tbe soldiers .... and tbat to tbis end a prefer- 
ence be given to tbis class of Govemment creditors over 
every otber.'"* After tbe recess Henry Wilson, of tbe 
Committee on Military Affairs, reported tbis resolution to 
tbe Senate witb an amendment wbicb autborized tbe issue of 
an additional $50,000,000 of greenbacks to enable tbe 
secretary to carry out its directions. Senator Fessendeu, 
bowever, pointed out tbat before sucb a measure was 
adopted Mr. Chase ougbt to be consulted, and for tbis 
pur{)ose be requested and tbe Senate consented tbat tbe 
matter be referred to tbe Committee on Finance.* 

1 Conoret9ional Olobe^ 37th Cod^m Sd Sess., p. M. 

3 H, R. KxecuUve Document No Wy S7th CongM Sd Sess.^DAtod Deoember 18, 1862. 
* Adopted Deoember 22, 1882.— Otm^remonal 6<o6e, S7th Gong., 3d Sess., p. 187. 
For tho tGzt see p. 199. 
«iMd.,pp. 199,200. 



The Thibd Legal-Tendeb Aot 107 

When the resolution was sent to Chase he declared that 
the means provided by it wotdd be insufficient. The exist- 
ing resonrces of $1,000,000 a day did not cover current 
expenditures, and the addition of $50,000,000 of greenbacks 
would not snffice for the arrears in the pay of the army and 
navy, which probably approached $60,000,000. Therefore, 
as a snbstitnte for the joint resolution, he sent ín a bilí 
providing for the sale at the best rates obtainable of $100,- 
000,000 of 6 per cent, ten-year bonds, the issue of $50,000,- 
000 of United States notes, and of a like stun of two-year 
4 per cent, treasury notes. ^ On recommendation of the 
Committee on Finance the Senate postponed indeñnitely the 
resolntion adopted by the Honse and passed in its place the 
bilí prepared by Chase.^ 

While the joint resolution was pending in the Senate, 
the House foUowed up its inquiry into the non-payment of 
the soldiers by requiring Secretary Chase to explain why he 
had not availed himself of the authority conf erred upon him 
by the act of February 25, 1862, to sell $500,000,000 of 6 
per cent five-twenty bonds.' In replying, Chase laid the 
blame for the f ailure to use this authority, as he had done in 
his annual report, upon the clause specifying that the bonds 
should be sold at "the market valué thereof." *'The market 
valué," he said, "can only be ascertained by the daily quo- 
tations of sales in New YorL" But he could not sell large 
amounts of securities at these market quotations, for heavy 
purchasers as a rule bought to sell again, and resales at a 
profit were impossible unless bonds could be bought from the 
govemment at prices less than those ruling in the market.^ 

The question whether Chase or Congress was respon- 

1 The text of his letter is published ibid., p. 270. 

sjbtdM P> 270; January 12. 

3 Resolation adopted January 8.— /&<d., p. 237. 

< J7. R. ExecíUive I>ocument No, 29^ 37th Coog., 3d Sess. 



108 HlSTOBT OF THE GbBENBAOKS 

sible for the emptiness of the treasury thus tumed apon 
the meaning of the phrase ^^market valué ^^ of bondB. Chase, 
who construed it to mean the quotations of the New 
York stock market, was no doabt right in saying that sales 
of large amonnts at these quotations were impossíble. His 
critics in Congress, however, regarded his interpretation as 
a legal qxdbble which onght not to stand in the way of 
snpplying the pressing needs of soldiers. '^Everybody 
knowB,^' said Mr. Gurley, impatiently, that the market 
valué of bonds ** is the price they will bring when placed upon 
the market; .... no far fetched construction of this sort 
should prevent their sale." ' 

Though the majority of congressmen probably shared 
Mr. Gurley's feeling that in his fear of exceeding the powers 
conferred upon him the secretary had been over-nice, the 
needs of the hour were too urgent to permit of further fen- 
cing. The great Ways and Means bilí which had been 
reported from the committee while this dispute about the 
pay of soldiers was going on, contained a section which 
authorized the issue of $300,000,000 additional greenbacks 
" if required by the exigencíes of the public service, for the 
payment of the army and navy and other creditors of the 
Government"^ Debate upon it began January 12 with an 
elabórate speech by Mr. Spaulding.' The same day the 
joint resolution giving soldiers preference over all other 
govemment creditors which the House had passed December 
22 was rejected by the Senate in favor of Chase 's substitute.* 
Just before adjoumment, still on this same day, the latter 
bilí was referred to the Committee of Ways and Means in 
the House.^ Though this committee felt that steps should 
be taken at once for the relief of the soldiers, they did not 
approve of Secretary Chascas proposals. The Ways and 

1 Conffrctñonal Olote, S7th Coii«m Sd Sess. p. 348. Cf. pp. 380, 380, MI. 

3 Ibid., p. 2K4. t Ibid,, p. 284-9. « Pp. 108, 107, abore. 

• Oongremamal Globc, 31th Cooff., 8d Sets., p. '¿U. 



The Thibd Leoal-Tendbb Aot 109 

Means bilí which they had framed would grant abundant 
power to borrow money, bnt they knew that it could not be 
passed mnch before the end of the session. Consequently 
they determined to pnt the simplest of the propoeals of the 
Ways and Means bilí into a sepárate measnre and ask for 
immediate action. With this view, on the 14th of January, 
Thaddeus Stevens introdnced a *' Joint Resolution to provide 
for the ünmediate payment of the Army and Navy of the 
United States." It was very brief, merely anthorizing the 
issue of $50,000,000 additional greenbacks to be inclnded in 
the issue provided for by the pending bilí. On Lovejoy's 
motion the amount was donbled. Then without any discus- 
sion the resolution was passed.' The next day the Senate 
acted upon it with similar expedition,^ and President Lincoln 
signed it on the 17th.' In notifying the House of his approval 
of the measure the president expressed his *^ sincere regret 
that it has been f ound necessary to authorize so large an ad- 
ditional issue of United States notes," and urged prompt 
enactment of Chase's plan for a national banking system.^ 

A third issue of greenbacks was thus determined upon 
with much less discussion than had been bestowed upon the 
fírst and second issues. The opening for it was made by ! 
Secretary Chase's peculiar interpretation of the loan sections I 
of the first legal- tender act. Had he taken the ''market/ 
valué" of bonds to mean what Congress seems to have 
intended — the price which they would briug when sold on 
the market — it is probable that he could have negotiated a 
much larger amount of the fíve-twenties in the summer and 
autumn of 1862. Then the pay of the army would not have 
fallen into arrears and the occasion for the joint resolution 
of January 17 would not have presented itself. 

1 Oonarettional Glo6e, 87th Codcm Sd Seas., p. 814. 

s/Md.,p.823. * 12 8tattUe§atLarffe, p.822. 

* Oonorcuwnal Olo6e, 87th Cong., 8d Seas., pp. 392, 393. 



lio HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBAOKS 

III. THE THIBD LEGAL>TENDEB AOT 

The greenbacks authorized by the joint resolntion, how- 
ever, formed but a third of the issues propoeed by the Ways 
and Means bilí reported by the committee. This bilí author- 
ized the secretary of the treasury to borrow $900,000,000, 
intended partly to supply the wants of the current fiscal year 
and partly of the year that woold begin July 1, 1863. To 
secare this snm the secretary might sell ^'npon the best 
terms he can obtain, not less than par," twenty-year bonds, 
bearing interest at 6 per cent., in coin. He might also issne 
$300,000,000 of three-year treasury notes bearing coin 
interest at 5.47¿ per cent.; i. e., a cent and a half per day 
on $100. Further, " if required by the exigencies of the 
public service," he might issue $300,000,000 of green- 
backs. To prevent the avenues of circulation from being 
closed against govemment paper money by enlarged issues 
of bank notes, a tax of 2 per cent, per annum was pro- 
posed on the circulation of banks beyond certain limits, 
which varied from 25 per cent, of the capital in the case 
/ of institutions with a capital of over $2,000,000 to 90 per 
cent, of the capital of banks with capitals of $100,000 or 
less.^ 

Rather curiously, the discussion of this sweeping measure 
centered not in the question how best to borrow the 
$900,000,000 needed, ñor in the policy of issuing more legal- 
tender notes, but in the proposed tax on bank notes. Con- 
gressmen acquiesced with little dispute in the recommenda- 
tions conceming the loans f but they discussed at much length 
and with much warmth the alleged attack upon the banks. 
Of strenuous opposition to the increase of the irredeemable 
currency there was none. It was clearly enough seen that 

1 The text of the bilí is giyen OongrasUnuU Olobe, S7th CongM Sd Sess., pp. 28S, 284. 

2See, e. g.^ the speeohes of Messrs. Spaulding, ibid,^ p. 287; Morrill, p. 296; Shef- 
fleld, p. 367; Hooper, p. 884; Riddle, p. 883; Loyejoy, p. 845; Qurley, p. 842; Walker, 
p. 339. 



The Thibd Legal-Tendbb Aot 111 

the bilí wonld cause further depreciation,' injure the govem- 
ment^s credit,' increase the cost of the war, work injury to 
recipients of fixed wages — particularly soldiers — to savíngs 
bank depositors and all creditors, and that it wotdd still 
further excite the "spirit of speculation,"' But this recital 
of the ill eflPects which would foUow the bilí apparently had 
little influence. Even Amasa Walker — then serving his 
short term in the Honse — who saw these evils most clearly, 
could lightly waive them aside. "One thing is certain,'' 
said he, " we are in such an emergency at the present time 
that it is not worth while for us to be very particular."* He 
frankly admitted that he could see no altemative.' Simi- 
larly Justin S. Morrill, who had opposed the first and second 
legal-tender acts, felt constrained to vote for the bilí because 
he knew of no better way of securing funds. "The patient 
has got accustomed to opiates," said he, "and the dose can- 
not now be withheld without peril." * Mr. Horton took the 
same stand. He had opposed the whole paper-money sys- 
tem, but now that the country was "launched . . . . on 
this current of paper money," there seemed to him to be 
no tuming back.^ While even these staunch opponents of 
irredeemable currency admitted the necessity of the bilí, 
Mr. Spaulding and his associates proclaimed it as they had 
done in the case of the first and second issues. "I have an 
aversión," said Mr. Spaulding, "to any considerable further 
issue of legal tender notes, and can only consent to it as an 
imperative necessity. I think too large an issue will tend 
to Ínflate prices; but I do not see how it can be avoided."* 
In the recognition of the ill eflPects of an irredeemable 
paper currency and the assertion of necessity the discussion 

1 Senator Sherman, ibid., p. Sil. 

s Amasa Walker, ibid.^ p. 339. 

s See remarles of Mossñ. Walker, loe. ci<. /Ward, ibid., p. 337; and Pike, p. 347. 

« Ibid., p. 392. 6 Ibid., p. 339. • Ibid., p. 294. 

"f Comyreuional Globc, S7th Gong., 3d Sess., p. 3S7. s ibid,, p. 280. 



/ 



112 HlSTOBT OF THB GbEENBACKS 

of the third legal-tender act was bnt a repetítion of the two 
former debates. One new topic, however — whether or no 
the corrency was ^^inflated" — attracted much attention. 
The apologista of the legal-tender system were anxioos to 
minimize the evils incident to it, and especially to show that 
the gOYemment notes were not redondant and had not 
depreciated. Mr. Chase had set the example by attríbuting 
the premiam on gold to the anxiety of timid investors, for- 
eign and native, to sell American secnrities even at heavy 
sacrífice for coin which coold be exported or hoarded. 
Specolators, he said, had made the most of this sitnation to 
effect a great rise of gold. That the high premiam was 
**not due whoUy, or even in greatest part, to the increase of 
the currency/' he songht to show by estimates of the mone- 
tary circulation before and after suspensión. According to 
his figures the circulation of the loyal states had increased 
between November 1, 1861, and November 1, 1862, but from 
1355,000,000 to $377,000,000. Nearly or quite all of this 
modérate gain of $22,000,000 he thought was required by 
the greater activity of business and the greater govemment 
transactions. That this was the case seemed to him suf- 
ficiently well attested by the fact that the prices of various 
staple products such as wheat, mess pork, com, hay, beef, etc., 
had risen little if at all. Moreover, he showed that the fluctu- 
ations in the premium had not coincided with changes in the 
volume of the circulation. Finally, he argued, "if there be 
a considerable real depreciation of the circulation — which 
is by no means admitted — " it is due not to redundancy of 
greenbacks, but to the needless increase in the note and 
deposit currency of banks.' 

Mr. Chascas argumenta reappeared during the debate in 
a number of variations. One gentleman declared that a 

1 Repart cf the Secretary cf the Treatury, December, 1862, pp. 12-15. Cf, Part 
n, chaps. iif iii and iy, below, on the ciroulating mediam, the premium on gold and 
the prioee of oommodities. 



Thb Thibd Lbgal-Tbndbb Act 113 

bushel of wheat eold f or a gold doUar in Eorope and a paper 
dollar in America, and that as the wheat had everywhere 
the same intxinsic valué there cotdd be in reality no such 
difference between the valne of paper money and coin as 
the preminm on gold indicated.» Another member pro- 
pounded the doctrine that the rate of interest is an inf allible 
test of the adeqnacy of the money supply. Since the rate 
of interest in the money market was high he refosed to 
believe that the currency was undtdy expanded.' Mr. 
Edwards declared that ''a more fallacions idea was never 
put forth'' than that 'Hhe difference between gold and the 
currency issued by the Government is the measure of 
depreciation.'^ In his opinión the difference was due to 
the fact that gold was and greenbacks were not receivable 
at the customs houses. Gold had become *' an article of 
merchandise.^' The supply of it was not equal to the 
demand, and in the scramble it had become '*a monopoly in 
the hands of a f ew who hoard it because they know they 
can get a good price f or it from the customer who is obliged 
tobuyit.''» 

To refute such proofs that the currency was not redun-' 
dant, Amasa Walker declared, on the authority of Calhoun, 
that the amount of currency required by the community was 
just one dollar for every twenty-five dollars of property. He 
estimated the property of the loyal states at $12,500,000,000. 
The proper amount of currency was therefore one-twenty- 
fifth of this sum, or $500,000,000. But there was in circu- 
lation some $850,000,000 of currency. That is, by his 
estímate, there was a redundancy of $350,000,000.^ 

1 Mr. Shellabarger, Congrettional Olobe, 87th Gong., Sd Sess., p. 407. 

a Mr. Watts, iMd., p. 991. s Ihid,, p. 409. 

^ Ibid,t p. 889. Mr. Walker Indnded bank deposita in his estímate of the Tolama 
of the onrrenoy. Calhoim*s statement of the theory is not quite so bold and dogma- 
tic as Mr. Walker represented it. See Workt cf John C, Calhoun (New York, 1858), 
Vol. n, p. 847. 



T 



114 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEBNBAOES 

Beplying to Walker, Mr. Biddle raised no objection to 
the method oí his argnment, bnt declarad that an important 
element had been omitted in the calculation — the govem- 
ment required much more currency in time of war than in 
time of peace. *'So far from there being a redondancy of 
the currency," he concluded, "I believe there is a defici- 
ency."^ The commonest rejoinder to the etatement of 
rednndancy, however, was the assertion that prices of com- 
modities had not risen materially.' 

But the matter was carried f arther. Not satisfied with 
denying the depreciation of the paper corrency, some mem- 
bers asserted that forther inflation was necessary to facili- 
tate borrowing. This argnment, too, seems to have been 
derived from a passage in Mr. Chase's report: 

The govemment can resort to boirowing only when the issue 
[of United States notes] has become snfficiently large to warrant 
a jnst ezpectation that loans of the notes can be had from those 
who hold or can obtain them at rates not less adyantageous than 
those of com loans before siispension.' 

This langnage can hardly mean anything else than that the 
govemment should continué to issue its notes until their valué 
had been so depressed that holders would be ready to 
exchange $100 of currency for an annual gold payment of 
$6. Congressmen at least took this view. Mr. Horton 
declared a further issue of currency necessary "in order to 
fund a large amount of debt.''* Similarly Mr. Hooper 
opposed selling bonds below par and preferred to adhere to 
the policy of previous legislation, which, according to him, had 
been "to issue legal-tender notes in sufficient amount .... 
to float .... bonds and keep them at par." ' Mr. Spaulding 

1 Oongrettionál Olobe, 87th Ckmg., Sd Seas., P* 3821. 

s Cf, ibid,t lemarks of Messrs. Hooper, p. 886, Watts, p. 991, Biddle, p. S8S, and 
Walker^s rather feeble reply, p. 407. 

s Repoti of the Secretary cfihe Treatttry, December, 1862, p. 14. 

4 Ccngremonal (?lo&e,87th Gong., 8d Sess., p. 887. s/bid., p. 412. 



The Thibd Leoal-Tendeb Agt 115 

urged the same argnment. The treasury found difficulty, 
said he, in borrowing currency to pay for the necessary 
loans; consequently more currency should be issued/ 
Finally, Mr. Watts declared that he would issue legal-tender 
notes, "nntil the rate of interest should come down to such 
a reasonable notch that the govemment could afford to go 
with Bome prospect of ultimately paying the amoont of íts 
indebtedness and interest.' ' ' 

Such talk marks the extreme length to which the idea 
that govemment should not sell bonds below par was carried. 
When the treasury was unable to get f unds by selling bonds 
at par there were three possible courses: (1) to make the 
securities oflFered more attractive to investors by raising the 
rate of interest or lengthening the time for which they would 
run ; (2) to make no change in the terms of the bonds but to 
accept the market price for them ; (3) to decrease the valué 
of the currency to a point where $100 in greenbacks was 
worth less in the minds of the public than the promise of a 
gold income of $6 for a term of years and final repayment 
in coin. The third course necessarily involved all the disor- 
ders caused by a depreciation of the money that served the 
community in its economic relations as a stcmdard of valué. 
But the demand for fresh issues to facilítate borrowing was 
virtually a recommendation of this third course. 

One amendment to the bilí, destined in later years to be 
the subject of much criticism was made during the discus- 
sion in committee of the whole. Despite Secretary Chase's 
urgent recommendation, the ^'conversión'' clause. permitting 
holders of greenbacks to exchange them at par for 6 per 
cent bonds was retaíned in the bilí as reported by the Com- 
mittee of Ways and Means.^ Near the end of the debate, 
however, Mr. Horton moved to strike out this clause. *'It 
simply leaves the option in the hands of the secretary of the 

i/&mÍmP.287. 2/&id., p.391. s Sec. 3, /6id., p. 284. 



116 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 



treasurj/^ he saíd in explaining the propoeed amendment, 
** instead of the holdere of the currency." * Very little atten- 
tion WEB paid to the cbange. Shellabarger and Stevena 
sbowed a dispoeition to question its wisdom, bnt it was 
acce[)ted in committee of the whole without a división,' and 
when Shellabarger cialled for the yeas and naya upon it in 
the House they were not ordered.' 

Three Bubatitutes were propoeed for the bilí bronght in 
by the Committee of Waye and Means. Thaddens Stevena 
pro[K)ged one, of which the characteristic featores were the 
iiwue of $800,000,000 in United States notes, payment of 
iriÍ4)roiit on b(3nds in ''lawful money '' instead of in ooin, and 
ri4|Nml of tho Ic^gislation authorizing the acceptance of deposit 
lofirm/ When this substituto was rejected by a vote of 39 to 
(MI/ Mr. Htevens imperturbably proposed a second* As the 
lloiiiNi wnii disiKMed to insist npon payment of interest in 
iMfln n inoAsure which seemed to Mr. Stevens to destroy 
♦MliM Nliiiplicity andharmony " of the paper-money system^ — 
hi« fM'('««pt4Mt thifi |)rinciple and proposed that any part of 
|IHHMHM),(NM) iiii^ht Ih) borrowed on treasury notes bearing 
II. hn |Mir roiit. liitoroHt in coin, a legal tender to the same 
HKinni AM Knmtilmrkfi nnd redeemable at the pleasore of the 
IfiivnififiMitil/ TIiIm pro[x>8Ítion was defeated by a yea and 
imj/ VMhi of Ii7 i<) IM.* The third substituto, introduced by 
Mi lliKi|Hir, n«pr(>(lu(MMl wiih a few modificationsof wording 
H Iflll NMliifilliod hy HiHirotary Chase at their request to the 
()ffiiiiii)flMM of Wii^M niid Moans, but not accepted by them.^ 
Aii (Mmimi olfiHirvtMl In his lotter to the committee, ^the pro- 
yMi*h iit nm\HH^i !<} loniiH is very general"' " In order to 
mii-Müi 1(100,000,000 tlin bilí authorized the secretary of the 
U'isiitoury in ÍMMfMi O |Hir ooni. lx>nds running twenty years or 

f (!*tnyiuMiutml Uhhp, WliU (*4inif., Sel HaniIm p. 455. ^Ibid^ loe. ett. 

* iLt4. , (i ffktít 4 |ror Í4tMÍ M4Mt ibid., p. 284. s IbidL, p. 4gL 

ft /í#444 , t^ IM< « /Mil, |i, 145. «For test M#t*é^l».3aOL 

c ilikin M- bitt' *" M»ii lf(Ni|Mir*H ttipUDations, ¿Md., p^ 485w uikié^ Im*. ctl. 



The Thibd Legal-Tendeb Act 117 

less, or 6 per cent, treasuiy notes ronning not more than 
three years, or United States notes, without specif ying any 
limit to the amount of these varióos secorities to be issued 
beyond the provisión that the aggregate of bonds, treasury 
notes, and United States notes should not exceed $900,000,- 
000.* This bilí met a fate similar to Stevens's by an equally 
emphatic majority — 32 to 67.* After these substitutes had 
been rejected the bilí of the committee was passed without a 
división and sent to the Senate.' 

In the Senate the finance committee proposed several 
amendments, of which the most important was the rednction 
of the issne of greenbacks from $300,000,000 to $150,000,- 
000.* Why the House Committee of Ways and Means had 
set the issue at $300,000,000 is not clear. Mr. Hooper, 
after a conference with Chase, told the Honse that the secre- 
tary seemed not to consider so large an issue necessary.' Yet 
the amount was not reduced, ñor was there any discussion of 
the subject However, no objection was raised to the Sen- 
ate's amendment reducing the issue by one-half. Appar- 
ently, the House was proceeding on Amasa Walker's maxim 
that in such an emergency it was "not worth while . . . . 
to be very particular."' Had it not been for the action of 
Senator Fessenden's committee the amount of greenbacks 
authorized during the war would have been $600,000,000 
instead of $450,000,000. 

The debate in the Senate was brief , and even more largely 
devoted to the clause taxing bank notes than had been the 
case in the House. The final vote was yeas 32, nays 4.^ 
March 3, 1863, the bilí received President Lincoln^s 
approvaL 

This law authorized the secretary of the treasury to bor- 



^ For the text see ibid.^ p. 484. 

a Ibid., p. 487. » Ibid., p. 522. 



* ífcíd., p. 927. 
s Ihid,, p. 366. • Ibid., p. 892. ^ Jbid., p. 945. 



118 HlBTOBT OF THB GbEENBACKB 

row on tbe credit oí the United Statee $900,000,000. He 
could Bell 6 per cent coin-interest, ten-forty bonds on snch 
terms as he might ''deem moet advisable.'^ Of this som 
$400,000,000 might be in three-year treasory notes bearing 
not more than 6 per cent interest payable in "^ lawful money." 
These notes were to be a legal tender for their face valué, 
exclnding interest, of denominations not less than ten dollars 
and conld be sold '* on the best terms that can be obtained," 
or paid to creditors willing to accept them at par. Forther, 
the secretary was empowered '*if reqoired by the exigencies 
of the public Service, for the payment of the army and navy, 
and other creditors of the govemment, to issne .... the 
sum of $150,000,000 of United States notes, inclnding the 
amount of such notes [$100,000,000] heretofore anthorized 
by the joint resolntion approved January 17, 1863." The 
claoses in the first and second legal-tender acts restríct- 
ing **the negotiation of bonds to market valne" were 
repealed ; and holders of United States notes who desired to 
"convert" them into five-twenty bonds were required to 
present their notes for this parpóse on or before July 1, 1863, 
after which date the right to exchange should " cease and 
determine." Finally, to take the place of the nnsatisfactory 
postal currency, the secretary was anthorized to issue notes 
for f ractional parts of a dollar to an amonnt not exceeding 
$50,000,000, and a tax of 5 per cent each half-year was 
imposed on f ractional notes issned by any bank, Corporation 
or individual.' 

1 12 St€Uute» at LargCy p. 70a 



CHAPTER V 

HOW FURTHER ISSUES OP GREENBACKS WERE AVOIDED 

IN 1864 AND 1865 

I. The CongresHonaX Pledge to Issue no More ü. 8, Notes: 

Avoidance of Qreenback Issues in Latter Part of War — Due 
Chiefly to Increase of Tazation — Success of 5-20 Loan in 1863 — 
BHnance Report of 1863 — Oreen backs in First Session of Thirty- 
eighth Congress. 

II. The Financial Dxfflculties of 1864: 

Chase's Difficulties f rom January to June — Change of Secretaries 
— Financial Straits During the Sunimer — Fessenden's Report in 
December — Improvement in the Situation. 

III. Secretary McCulloch and the Alley Resolution : 

7-dO Loan of 1865— Finance Report— The Alley Resolution. 

IV. Recapitulation: 

Government Receipts of 1861-66 — Decreasing Relative Importance 
of Loans — Financial Role of the Greenbacks. 

I. THE GONGBESSIONAL PLEDGB TO ISSUB NO MORE 

U. S. NOTES 

SiNOB no further issues of greenbacks were authorized 
after March 8, 1863, it may seem that discussion of the war 
legislation regarding them shonld end with the last chapter. 
Bnt in passing upon the paper-money policy it is quite as 
necessary to understand how the issue of more greenbacks 
was avoided in the latter half of the war as it is to discover 
why such issues were made in 1862 and 1863. For thüi 
purpose a brief review of the treasury policy in 1864 and 
1865 must be added. 

Of course, the demands made upon the treasury in these 
later years were much heavier than they had been during 
the first half of the war. The expenditures other than pay- 
ments of principal of the debt rose from $470,000,000 in 
1862 and $719,000,000 in 1863 to $865,000,000 in 1864 and 

119 



120 HlSTOBT OF THB GbEENBACKS 

$1,297,000,000 in 1865.' U recourse to United States notes 
was avoided in the second half of the stmggle despite these 
enormously increased disborsements, the chief reason must be 
found in the more efficient revenue system. The slowness of 
the secretaiy to recommend and of Congress to enact heavy 
taxes in the earlier stages of the war has been commented 
upon.' There was no great hesitation in raising the costoms 
dues on imported articles, but the results from the ñscal point 
of view were not of great moment, because Congress seemed 
more inclined to strengthen the protective than the revenue 
features of the tariff. The direct tax imposed by the snmmer 
session in 1861 was of slight avail. In no year during the war 
did the receipts from this source reach $2,000,000. Intemal 
taxes were not levied until July 1, 1862, when a very elabórate 
system was created, according to which almost everything 
that seemed to Congress susceptible of yielding a revenue 
was Bubjected to a duty.' This system was amended and 
extended by the acts of June 30, 1864, and March 3, 1865.* 
At first the results of this system did not meet expectations. 
Chase estimated for the first year of its operation that the 
receipts would be $85,500,000, and they proved to be but 
$37,500,000 — less than half the anticipated sum.* But 
as the tax officials became more familiar with their duties 
and the imperfections shown by experience to exist in the 
first legislation were remedied, receipts increased very 
rapidly. In 1864 they were $110,000,000, in 1865 $209,- 
000,000, and in 1866 $309,000,000. 

Such large receipts from taxation not only provided an 
increasing proportion of the sums needed to meet expendi- 
tures, but also improved the credit of the govemment as a 

1 For these aod similar figures g^iyen below see the table of receipts and ezpeodi* 
tures for past years published in every Report of the Secrctary of the Treatury, 

^Cf. Part I, chap. i, p. 18, and chap. ii, p. 72, abovn. 

8 12 SUittdca at Large, p. 432. * 13 Statute» at Large^ pp. 223, 400. 

^Report of the Seeretary qf the Trctuury, Decembor, 1863, p. 3. 



HOW FUBTHEB ISSUES WEBE AVOIDBD 121 

borrower. At the same time more efficient methods of 
negotiating loans were devised. The happiest of Mr. Chase'e 
fínancial expedienta was the arrangement into which he 
entered with Jay Cooke in October, 1862, for selling the 
five-twenties authorized by the first legal-tender act. The 
system of agencies which Mr. Cooke organized was so suc- 
cessful in obtaining snbscriptions that the fiscal year, 1863, 
which had opened badly, ended most fortunately, despite 
the untoward military events of May and June, when Grant 
seemed to the public to be making little advance against 
Vicksburg, and Lee and Bragg were invading the North. 
The accumolation of unpaid requisitions that was abeady a 
cause of solicitude when Chase sent his report to Congress 
in December, 1862, had mounted by the cióse of the session 
to $72,000,000. But when the third legal-tender act, with 
its ampie provisión for loans and repeal of the fuadiflg.^ 
clause, had become a law, the lagging sale of bonds became 
so rapid that "within two months after the adjournment of 
Congress the whole mass of suspended requisitions had been 
satisfied,, all current demanda promptly met, and fuU provi- 
sión maHe for the pay of the army and navy." At the end 
of the fiscal year there was a balance of over $5,000,000 
in the treasury.' 

Encouraged by Cooke^s continued success, Mr. Chase in 
his report of 1863 took ground against further issues of 
greenbacks. " The limit prescribed by law to the issue of 
United States notes,'' said he, "has been reached, and the 
Secretary thinks it clearly inexpedient to increase the 
amounf ' Instead, he recommended such modifications of 
the intemal revenue system as should increase the receipts 
to $150,000,000.' If this recommendation should be fol- 
io wed he entertained "little doubt of being able to obtain 

1 Report of iht Secretary of the TVeewurtf, December, 1863, p. 2. On the arrange- 
ment with Jay Cooke see H. It, ExectUive Document JVo.69,37th Con^., Ist Sess. 

3 B^wrt of the Secretary of the Trea$ury, December, 1868, p. 17. 3 /6¿d., p. la 



122 HlSTOBT OP THE GbBBNBACKS 

whatever fonds will be needed, throagh loans. al reasonable 
ratee of intereet, for bonds or treasuy notea*' ' 

Apparentlj Congreae concurred in the secietaiy's belief 
that fnrther issues of United States notes wonld be detri- 
mental. Jnstin S. Morrill seems to haré expreesed the 
general feeling: 

To fon» ibe Treasory io tsane legal tender nolea in an j wa j 
bejond tbe preeent limita — tboagfa tbe wages tít bibor, tbough 
the pay of salaried men and of the scJdier, shonld be increased — 

would result in disappointment and disaster Leí us ha^e 

taxes; let us have loans; someihing, at all events^ which will 
reduce the amount of legal tenders now oatatanding.' 

Not only did the thirty-eighth Congreea decline to 
increase the issnes of United States notes, bnt it inserted 
in the '^ act to próvido ways and means for the snpport of 
the Government," approved June 30, 1864, the following 
proviso: 

. . . . ñor shall the total anKxmt of United States notes, issued 
or to be issued, ever exoeed foor hundred millions of doUars, and 
such additional sum, not exoeedin^ fíf t v millioas of doUars, as mav 
be temporarily requiíed for the redemption of temporary loan [sicy 

This im[x)rtantclanse, pledging that no more United States 
notes would be issued, attracted slight attention. But one 
feature of the debate is of interest- Thaddeus Stevens, con- 
sistent to the last, made '^ one more efiFort to save the national 
credit/^ as he put it, by proposing to pay the interest on the 
new loans in paper money instead of in coin/ Again he 
failed. 

II. FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF 1891 

The pledge thus given by the fírst sessiou of the thirty- 
eighth Congress was kept despite the fínancial embarrass- 
menta of the summer of 1S64, and the enormous expen- 

1 Report of tke Secrttary of the Treagury, December, 188S. p. IS. 

- Conf/roBioHol (JU>b€^ 3Mh Coo^;.. Isl Se:»., P. 1T16. 

3 S«>c. Z, 13 Statute» at Larffc, {>. 219. 

« CwHrrta^tmal GloU, 38th Coii«., Ut S«ss., pi». 302 ff. 



HOW FUBTHEB ISSUES WEBE AVOIDED 123 

ditures of 1865. During the year ending June 30, 1864, the 
expenditures exceeded Mr. Chase's anticipations by $116,- 
000,000.' Though there was a similar excess of the actual 
over the estimated receipts f rom taxation and miscellaneous 
sources of $104,000,000,' it was still necessary to borrow 
immense sums. Over $320,000,000 of the five-twenties were 
sold by Mr. Cooke and the treasury agencies, but the sub- 
seríption books closed January 21. In arranging for a new 
loan Mr. Chase made three changes. He offered bonds that 
would run twice the time of the five-twenties, but he reduced 
the rate of interest from 6 to 5 per cent, and instead of 
employing Jay Cooke again as general agent he tried to sell 
the bonds through national banks and other agencies under 
supervisión of the treasury department.' In consequence 
of these changes and the slow progress of the northem armies 
inthe winterand spring of 1864 the '*ten-forty loan," as it 
was c€dled, was as marked a failure as the five-twenty loan 
had been a success. By the end of the fiscal year only $73,- 
000,000 had been sold.* 

This failure lef t a déficit which Mr. Chase could find no 
better way of filling than by issuing more legal-tender notes. 
The new ÍBSues, however, were of a type different from thel 
greenbacks in that they ran for definite terms and boref 
interest which it was hoped would lead holders to retai^ 
them as an investment instead of putting them into circula- 
tion as money. During the half year January to June, 
1864, issues of such interest-bearing legal-tender notes in 

1 Compare ReporU of the Secretary of the Treaaury, Deoember, 1863, p. 5, and 
1964, p. 6. 

2/6idM 1864, /oc. cit 

3See Cha8e*sletter to Fessendeo, Schückkrs, op. cit, p. 416. In expía inin^ this 
change of plan Chase wrote : ** I haya not forgotten tho calumnies for which my 
employment of a general agent was made the occasion, and I confess it was priiioi« 
pally with a yiew of avoiding these calamnies that I abandoned the general ageney 
system/* 

* Batlst, op, cit.t p. 164. 



124 HlSTOBY OF THE UbEENBACKS 

exceee of redemptions veré made to the amount of |163,- 
000,000." Despite all Chaae's efforts to obtain funda, how- 
ever. demanda ujíon the treasury piled up more rapidly than 
tliey could be met Though on the Ist of July there waa a 
nominal balance of S19,000,0IX) on hand, there were also 
unpaid requiaitions that on the 5lh amounted to $72,000,000,^ 

At this uneaBj juncture a change of Becretaries occurred. 
In May, John J. Cisco, the experienced chieí of the New 
York Bubtreasury, had sent in his resignatioii to take effect 
June 30, Chase and Senator Morgan, of New York, came 
into conflict over the appointment of his successor. Though 
the canse of diaagreement waa finally removed bj Cisco'e 
consenting to remain in office, Chase could not reaist the 
temptation to impresa upon the president the necessity of 
cleferringto the wishea of his secretary of the treasury by 
sending him a note of resignation. Three or four times 
before when Mr. Chase had tried similar táctica to carry a 
point, Mr. Lincoln had begged hini to reconsider the atep. 
Consequently, Chase was disagreeably aurprised when, on 
June 30, he received a note from the preaident acce[»tiag his 
resignation.' After the vacont poaition had been refuaed by 
Qovernor David Tod, of Ohio, W. P. Fessenden, of Maine, 
chairman o£ the Senate tinance committee, reluctantly con- 
sented to asaume its reíí[)onfiÍbilÍtÍes. 

The new eecretary fonnd himself in a very diffioult posi- 
tion. Beaide the $72,000,000 of unpaid requiaitions, there 
were outstanding $162,000,000 of certificates of indebted- 
neas. Receipts from customs were hardly more than enough 
to [)ay interest on the debt, and from iutemal revenue dnties 

ariKa.aiidUieooDipouiid ial«r»t nnU». Sre Batlbt, op. eit., pp. ISl-Si Btport af 
OxSecrttaryt^ tht rmuuiv. Dwwmber, 1851, p. 3. Onlhrlr oircnlation ■> mgim 
aet Fart U, ehap. ii. tac. vi, beluw. 

^¡teporltifUteStvrtíaryo/ltteTrtaimry. Dmpmbcir, INM. p. ¡V. 

'See tbe latUra pablished la WARpKS.op. cit.. p.ni; c/. SrncrKBU, op. eit., 
obap. ilf , uid pp. ÍOJ-ID; Hakt. np. cil.. pp. 315- IB. 




HOW FUBTHEB ISSUBS WBBE AVOIDED 125 

not more than $750,000 a day was expected. Meanwhile the 
daily expenses were estimated at not less than $2,250,000.' 
Ñor was the prospect bright for securing funds by borrow- 
ing. Three days before Fessenden carne into office a loan 
on seventeen year 6 per cent, bonds offered by Chase at 
104 or above was withdrawn from lack of takers.' A promis- 
ing attempt to secnre $50,000,000 from the banks of New 
Tork, Boston, and Philadelphia, was blocked by the sub- 
treasury law which was held to prevent the secretary from 
dra¥ring npon any but national banks.' Fessenden then 
decided apon a popular subscription for seven-thirty notes 
authorized by the act of Jnne 80, 1864. Althongh he 
incnrred considerable expense in advertising this loan the 
sums realized were not large.* The unpaid reqmsitions 
now amoimted to more than $130,000,000, and the secretary 
*' resolved to use all the means at hís command to pay so 
much, at least, as was due to . . . . soldiers, who were suf* 
fering from the long delay in satisfying their just claima'' 
For this parpóse he was compelled, mach against his will, 
to issae over $80,000,000 of legal-tender compoand-interest 
notes. He also ased over $20,000,000 of seven-thirties in. 
paying the army, and raised $33,000,000 more on the sev- 
enteen-year bonds which Mr. Chase hadbeen anable to selL^i 
Bat all these shifts did not bring in sufficient means, and 
the qaarter ending with September showed a déficit of 
$130,000,000.* 

Still, when Secretary Fessenden prepared his report to 
Congress he did not recommend an increase in the issues of 
greenbacks. To pash the circalation of government notes 

1 Report of the Secretary qf the Treaeury^ December, 1S64, pp. 19, 20. 

3 See Chase^s letter to Fessenden, Schuckebs, op. ctt., p. 415 ; cf, Hunt's Mer- 
ehanW lía^cwtne, YoL LI, pp. 42 and 129. 

s Report of the Secretary of the Treamry^ December, 1864, p. 20 ; Hunt 'a Merchants^ 
Magazine^ Yol. U, pp. 129, 130. 

4 Revcrt cited in preceding note, p. 20. ^ 75id., p. 21. « Ibid,y p. 39. 



126 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

"far, if at all, beyond its present limit," he said, "could 
only be justifíed by absolute necessity." * The operations 
of the treasury doring hi8 bríef incambency had satisfied 
him *^ not only of the abillty of the people to fumish, at a 
short notice, Buch sums as may be required, but [also] of 
the entire confídence felt in the national securitíes/^' 
What Bort of loans should be offered he left f or Congress to 
decide, but he felt that as an aid in negotiations the secre- 
tary should be granted a discretionary power to increase the 
curreney.' For the rest, he recommended that the intemal 
revenue duties be increased and extended to a point where 
they would yield $300,000,000 a year.* 

Even before this report was sent to Congress the financial 
situation seems to have improved. This improvement was 
doubtless due in large measure to the successes of the Union 
armies that began to hold out an increasingly definite promise 
of peace. Under such circumstances borrowing became easier. 
During the quarter October to December Fessenden secured 
$20,000,000 from compound interest notes, $36,000,000 
from ten-forties, $54,000,000 from seven-thirtíes, and $77,- 
000,000 from five-twenties. In the next three months he 
raised $56,000,000 on ten-forties and $185,000,000 on 
seven-thirties. Meanwhile the redemptions of greenbacks 
were slightly, and of certifícates of indebtedness largely, in 
excess of issues, and while considerable amounts of compound 
interest notes were paid out they were more than ofifset by 
redemptions of one and two-year notes of 1863.* 

III. 8ECBETABT McGULLOCH AND THE ALLEY BE80LUTI0N 

When President Lincoln entered upon his second term 
Fessenden was allowed to lay down his uncongenial burden. 
His successor, Hugh McCulloch, was strongly recommended 

> Report of thr Sccrttary of the Treasury, Deoember, 1854, p. 17. 

2//m/., p. 21. s /6í(í.. p. 2Z. 

* Ibúi.. p. 14. t Cy. Batlet« op. cíIm pp. 157-63. 



HOW FüBTHEB ISSUES WERB AVOIDED 127 

by hi8 Buccess as presídent of the Bank of the State of 
Indiana and his Bervices as the fírst comptroUer of the 
treasury in organizing the national banking sjstem. 

Thongh the war was obviously nearing its end, the task of 
the new secretary was by no means easy. The armies could 
not well be disbanded until the govemment was provided 
with funds sufficient to meet all arrears of pay, íncludíng 
bounties and cost of transportation. To secure means, Mr. 
McCulIoch arranged for a popular subscription for seven- 
thirty notes, and employed Jay Cooke as general agent. As 
before, Cooke was eminently successful. By the end of 
July $530,000,000 of seven-thirties had been sold, and 
McCulloch had, in his own words, " the unexpected satis- 
faction of being able, with the receipts from customs and 
intemal revenue and a small inerease of the temporary loan, 
to meet all the requisitions npon the treasury.'^ ^ 

The war over, McCulloch set himself to reducing the 
govemment fínances to more manageable shape. In his 
annual report for 1865 he estimated that at the cióse of the 
current fiscal year the national debt would amount to about 
$3,000,000,000.' To reduce this sum, the secretary 
proposed that $200,000,000 be spent each year in payment 
of interest and principal.' Such payments, he showed, would 
extinguish the debt, if funded at 5¿ per cent., in thirty- 
two years.* But he laid chief stress upon the desirability of 
reducing the volume of currency as a preliminary to resum- 
ing specie payments at an early date. 

The present legal-tender acts [he said] were war measures, and 
while the repeal of those provisions which made the United States 
notes lawful money is not now recommended, the Secretary is of 
the opinión that they ought not to remain in forcé one day longer 
than shall be necessary to enable the people to prepare for a 
retum to the constitutional curreucy.^ 

> Report of the Secretary ofthe Treatury^ Decembor, 1865, pp. 36, 37. 
3/b¿d.,p.22. s/¿>td.,p.25. «/búí.,p.23. &/&td.,p.4. 



128 HlSTOBT OF THE GbBBNBAOKS 

He therefore recommended that he be empowered to sell 
bonds '^for the purpose oí retiring not only componnd 
interest notes, bnt [also] the United States notes/' ' 

That Congress shared the secretary's desire to resume 
specie payments speedily seemed to be snfSciently shown by 
the prompt action of the Honse oí Representatives apon a 
resolution introduced by John B. Alley, of Massachosetta 
It ran as follows: 

Eesolvedj That this House oordially ooncnrs m the views of the 
Secretary of the Treasury m relation to the neoessity of a contrae- 
tion of the currency with a view to as early a resumption of specie 
payments as the business interests of the country will permit; and 
we hereby pledge co-operative action to this end as speedily as 
practicable. 

This resolution waa adopted without debate on December 
18, by a vote of 144 to 6.* The story of how the f ulñlment 
of the promise of resumption was delayed for thirteen years 
does not belong to the war history of the greenbacks. 

IV. RECAPITÜLATION 

The rOle played by the greenbacks as a fínancial resource 
at different stages of the Civil War can best be shown by a 
tabular recapitulation of the receipts of the treasury from 
different sources during the fiscal years 1861-^6. 

The "net ordinary receipts '^ shown in this table are taken 
from the reports of the secretary of the treasury. They 
include, besides import duties and intemal-revenue tazes, 
proceeds of sales of public lands and all miscellaneous itema 
The notable fact conceming them is the rapid increase from 
year to year — an increase for which the intemal-revenue 
system deserves the lionas share of credit. From a tenth 
in 1862, the proportion of ordinary to total receipts rose 

1 Report of the Secretary of the Tretuury^ Deoember, 1865, p. 14. 

>Thirty-two membera did not Tote.— ConirreMional Olobe^ 30th Cong., lut Seas., 
p.15. 



HOW FUBTHEB ISSOBS WEBB AVOIDED 



129 



? 



i 

I 

S 

9 
S 



8 



s 



s 



i 



s 















¿ 






& 


















o o<e<« o<« Mee» 



»4 OkOe^ MM c->w« 



8 s*-?; sa 5 I 



o ookio oca «Hf<-7 



8 asá ¿5 ú^¿ 



3 iií ii i^i 



• «•• •• ••■ 

8 «••« SeS a«S 






8 SS 



^ ¡39 



O «9^ 



i 9» 



I 



O, ** 
o «en 



«9«9 «9t-^ 



IO«D -^lOfO 



• • 



9» S3£ 



c*e9 lo 

• • • 



aa I 



i a 

I é 

sil! 




1^ 






o 
2 



130 HlSTOBT OF THB GbEENBAOKS 

to a qnarter in 1864, and it wonld have been considerably 
instead of slightly larger in 1865 had not customs duties 
fallen off so largely in consequence of the taríff act of June 
30, 1864, which discouraged legal importations and stimu- 
lated smnggling/ 

By ^' net receipts from loans'^ is meant the receipts minus 
sums employed in payíng principal of the public debt. 
These receipts are divided into three classes, according to 
the kind of security upon which money was borrowed. Each 
class is charged with all redemptions of securities falling 
within it and credited with all new issues, including 
premiums realized on sales.' When the redemptions exceed 
the issues the fact is indicated by placinír a minus sicrn 
before the figures. 

Two matters of interest are brought out by the exhibit 
The fírst is the correlative of the point already noticed; 
as the revenue system became more efficient, a smaller pro- 
portion of the means necessary to carry on the war had to 
be borrowed. From nine-tenths in 1862 the proix)rtion 
fell to three-quarters in 1864 and 1865. The second matter 
concems the method of borrowing. At first reliance was 
placed rather on issues of circulating currency than on sales 
of bonds ; but with increasing experience the secretarias used 
bonds and interest-bearing treasury notes more and green- 
backs less. To make this clearer a supplementary table is 
added giving the proportions of the net roceipts from loans 
obtained from the three classes of securities. 

From this table it appears that the greenbacks were not an 
important fínancial resource after June, 1863. In the fiscal 
year, 1862, more than a fífth, and in 1863 nearly half of the 

1 Cf, Report <;f the Secretary of the Treasury, December, 1864, pp. IS, 28. 

> Issues and redemptions of the principal of the debt are compiled from Batlbt, 
op, cit. Premiums are as Rrivon by De Knioht, Hintory of the Currency of the 
Country and of the LoanM of the United State», Treasury Department Dccumcnt Xa. 
1M3, pp. 121, 122. 



HOW FUBTHEB ISSUES WEBE AVOIDED 



131 



TABLE in 

PBOPOBTION OF THB NBT BBC1EIPT8 FBOM LOANS DERIVED FBOM BOND8, BHOBT- 
TUCB INTBBBST-BKABINa OBLIQATIONS, AND FBOM NON-INTEBBST BBAB- 
INQ OBI^IQATIONS FOB THB FISCAIi TBABS 1861-66 



1866 



Net receipts f rom loans 



Bonds 

Shoit-time interest-bear- 

ing obligations 

Non-interest-bearing obli- 

gations 

[ uniied States notes] 



1861 


1862 


1863 


1864 


1865 


100% 


100% 


100% 


100% 


100% 


101.8 


13.8 


28.9 


67.1 


99.8 


"1.8 


49.6 


28.6 


26.7 


60.4 


[*:*.**] 


86.6 
[22.8] 


42.5 
[48.5] 


6.2 
[6.8] 


.8 
[-.2] 



100% 



119.9 

7.2 

-27.1 
[-28.6] 



loans were representad by issnes of United States notes, bnt 
in 1864 the proportion fell to a sixteenth, and thereafter the 
redemptions were greater than the issuea This statement, 
however, does not by any means show the real financial 
effect of the greenback policy. More important than the 
nominal amonnt of the issues was the influence of the paper 
money apon the price of supplies bought by the govemment. 
But this Í8 a large subject that most be reserved f or a f ature 
chapter.* 



1 See Part II, chap. x, below. 



PART II 

ECX)NOHIO CONSBQDBNOBS OF THB LbOAL-TbNDEB AOTS 



OHAPTER I 

PRELIMINARY SKETCH 

Thb preceding chapters have shown that the policy of 
issoing irredeemable paper money was adopted because of the 
fínancial embarrassments of the federal govemment. But the 
policy thns adopted for purely fiscal reasons had seríous 
consequences of qtdte other than a fiscal nature. It caused 
a grave distnrbance of established economic relations and 
affected for good or ill the economic circumstances of 
almost every person in the country. The parpóse of the 
present part is to trace out these consequences in as clear a 
fashion as the available materials permit. Of necessity the 
analysis must be intricate and tedions, because to be faith- 
ful it must deal with a bewildering complexity of conditions 
and must attempt to distinguish between the effects of a mul- 
tiplicity of economic causes. Perhaps the best way to give 
a degree of coherence to the details will be to preface the 
analysis with a sketch of the general nat ure of the e conomic 
dist urbances that c haracterized the period. 

In the first place, then, suspensión of specie payments\ 
threw the monetary circulation of the loyal states into dis- 
order by causing the withdrawal of gold and silver coin f rom 
common use as money. The inconveniences that attended 
this withdrawal and the various substitutes that were 
employed to take the place of specie as media of exchange ' 
form the subject of the next chapter. 

But, though the inconveniences caused by these changes 
in the médium of exchange were not slight, they were less 
serious than were the results produced by the change in tjie 
standard of valué. For about nine years before suspensión 
~ " 135 



136 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEBNBAOKS 

the money unit of the United States in which all pnces 
were reckoned and debts discharged, had been, in fact, if 
not in legal theory, the gold doUar.* The legal-tender 
acts substituted the greenback for the gold doUar as this 
unit. Now the gold dollar had contained 23.2 grains of 
puré metal, but the greenback dollar that took its place was 
at no time during the war worth so much as this. A year 
after the passage of the fírst legal-tender act a greenback 
dollar would purchase but 14.5 grains of gold. Though 
from this point its valué advanced until in August, 1863, it 
was worth 18.4 grains, the rally was foUowed by a serious 
relapso that culminated in July, 1864, when the paper 
dollar was worth but 9.0 grains. Another advance carried 
the valué to 17.1 grains in May, 1865, and another relapso 
reduced it to 15.9 grains at the end of the year. The course 
and causes of these fluctuations in the gold valué of the 
standeurd money are dealt with in chap. iii. 

It was this depreciation of the money unit that gave rise 
to the most complicated and interesting economic develop- 
ments of the war períod. Of course, in exchanging com- 
modities for money men were unwilling to give as much for 
a dollar worth 9 grains of gold as they had given for the dol- 
lar worth 23.2 grains. What is tantamount to giving less 
goods for the dollar, they demanded more dollars for the 
goods. The decline in the specie valué of the greenbacks, 
therefore, produced an extraordinary rise of prices, which is 
investigated in chap. iv. 

From the very organization of a modem industrial 
society, such a rise of pnces must produce far-reaching dis- 
turbances. The complex process of producing and distríbut- 
ing wealth is carried on by a succession of money payments. 
Business-men buy materials for money prices,lease land for 
money rents, borrow c apital expressed in money for the pay- 

> es. Lauohlin, History of Bimetallitm in the Uniteil Statea (4th ed., 1897), p. 88. 



Pbeliminabt Sketch 137 

ment of money inter est, hire labor for money wages, sell 
their producís for money, and in money reckon their profítB. 
At bottom, of coorse, this highly developed system of money 
payments Í8 only a mechanism for dístributing among the 
members of society the economic Batísfactíons which are the 
real goal of efifort. But nnder the present régime the eco- 
nomic satisfactions wMch any individual can obtain — what 
may be called his "real income" — depend próxima tely on 
the purchasing power of his money income. The rise of 
prices that resulted from depreciation decreased, of course, 
the purchasing power of a given money income. As a result 
the economic satisf actions received by all those whose money 
incomes did not rise as quickly and in as great degree as 
prices, were diminished. 

But the matter could not rest there. Men did not long 
remain content with the same money retum, when the 
economic satisfactions it enabled them to command had 
declined so considerably. As prices rose, then, all classes 
in the community which contributed of their property or 
their Services to the process of production insistently 
demanded a larger sum of money for their co-operation. 
The economic situation apparently favored their success. 
For depreciation of the currency of itself did not decrease 
the amount of commodities produced and services oflFered^ 
the source from which the real income of all classes in the 
community is drawn — ñor did it affect directly the relative 
supply of and demand for the various factors of production ; 
it altered only the división of these commodities and'l 
services among the various classes that shared in them. 
Those persons whose money incomes had not advanced pari 
pcí88U with prices received a less proportion than before, 
and those whose money incomes had increased more rapidly 
than prices commanded a larger proportion. But it was the 
former distríbution of wealth that was the outcome of the 



existing economic conditions. The cbange in the distríbu- 
tioD, caused by depreciation of tbe standard of valúes, was 
frota the standpoint of the Bituation before Busj)enBÍon ao 
artificial disturbance. Under the o[)eration of free eompeti- 
tion, a readjustiuent of the nominal amounta of money pay- 
ments — tbe mechanism by which real iucome íb dÍBÍributod 
— was therefore to be especial, in the direction of restoring 
the relative distribntion of wealtb between different claBses 
prevailing before the dÍBturbauoe had occurred. 

A turther consequesce of depreciation, therefore, was to 
Btart a readjustment of money incomes, whether derived from 
rentB, interest, or wages. But thia procesB of readjuating the 
whole BjBtem of mouey payments so as to reatore real incomes 
was certain to ent-ounter aeriouB obstacleB. 

1. At any given time businesB men are bound to a con- 
siderable estent by legaloontracts calling for the payment 
or receipt of specified suma for sjiecified goods or servicea. 
They are onder engagement to j)ay set amounts for rent 
and interest; tbey owe others and othera owe them accounts 
payable in legal money; they have agreed to buy materials 
at ñxed priceB, or to aupply ctbers with their own products; 
they have borrowed and lent money; when due the loaos 
are to be paíd in the standard currency ; they have contracted 
with others to give or receive their Bervices at certaia 
salaries, etc. Whether the purchasing power of dollars 
rises or falle, Bueh contracta are fnlfilled by the payment of 
the ei)ecified nnmber of dollars. Until the termínation of 
tbe contracta there is no alteration in the nominal amonnt 
of the money to be paid. In this way the acale of money 
payments exiating before depreciation is legally petritied 
and enforced for a while in the new situation where the aame 
Bum of money meaua lesa economic eatisfactioiiB. 

2. Bapid readjustment íb further hindered by the fact 
that the nominal amount of many money payments is a con- 
VBDtioDal eum, not aubject as a rulo to bargaining between 



Pbeliminabt Sebtoh 139 

the partíes. The fee of the bootblack, the barber, the notary, 
the physician ; the price of a newspaper, a cigar, a ride in 
the street-car, in Bome places the monthly wage of a farm 
hand — these and many other payments are not easily changed 
in amoimt. 

3. Even where legal contracta are not in the way, and the 
prices paid are mostly the Bubject of bargaining, the ohange 
in the amount of payments produces ¿ictíon. The complez 
system of money payments, by which the distribution of 
wealth is effected, is an organic whole, and a change in one 
part enconnters serióos opposition nnless all the other parts 
are similarly altered. A change in the scale of money pay- 
ments that aff ects all simultaneously and in the same propor- 
tion wonld proceed smoothly and work hardship to no one. 
Bnt changes do not occnr in this manner. They always start 
somewhere, and eztend spasmodically over the rest of the 
fíeld. Persons whose products or services do not at once 
rise in price, oppose, so f ar as they can, changes which 
increase their money expenditures. Laborers may demand 
an increase of wages becanse the price of f ood has risen. Bnt 
the employer cannot accede to the request, without injuring 
himself, until the price of his products has advanced. If he 
sell to other dealers, they object strenuously to paying 
higher prices unless sure the increase can be shifted onto 
othera And consumers exceedingly dislike paying more 
for their goods especially if their own money incomes have 
not risen. So at every step the advance in the scale of 
money payments is impeded. 

4. The readjustment in the scale of money payments, 
then, that is necessitated by an alteration in the standard 
money works itself out in a period of economic stress and 
strain. Dnring the Civil War the tenseness of the situation 
was increased by the constantly varying degrees of deprecia- 
tion. There was not a single shift from a higher to a lower 
level; the standard of valué was fluctuating all the time. 



140 



HI8TOBT OF THE GbEESBACKS 



Before a readjnstineiit oí monej payments to a scale that, at 
the exÍBting Talae of a dollar, would restore real incomea 
appToziniatelj to wfaat tbej had been conld be woii^ed oot, 
the Talae of tbe dollar had changed again and a new adjost- 
ment on a new basis began.' The pnce level was constantly 
changing, and each new change nnsettled real incomea afresh 
and pt9cipitated a new stmggle for a readjostnient of money 
pajrmenta. While the war continoed no adjnstment conld 
be eren tolerabl j atable, for the next week^s war news might 
raiae or lower the yaloe of the goyemment^s notes which 
senred aa the commnnity^s money seyeral per cent., and so 
prodoce new confusión. 

Astody of the economic conseqnences of the issne of legal- 
tender paper carrency as a measore of ''war necessity^' 
becomes, then, primarily an examination of the intrícate 
effects of the changes in the pnrchasing power of the standard 
money npon the distribntion of what Marshall calis the 
''national diyidend.^^ The most important problem is to dis- 
coyer how the real incomes of laborers, landlords, capitalists, 
and activo business managers were affected. Beyond this 
problem lies the question what effect these changes in real 
income had apon the consumption and production of wealth. 
Soch in brief are the snbjects discussed in chaps. v-ix. 



iTlu» rapidiiy and Tiolenoo of these flnctaaiions may best be seen from the 
foUowinir tabular statement of the peroentage of altemating depreciation and 
appreciation io the Hpeeie Taino of the flrraenback dollar : 



Month 



Deoember, IMl 
Febmary, INSS 
April, 1IW2 

Febmary, 1M63 
Au«UNt, IWM 
JuTy, IWU 

llar. IW» 

December, 1805 



ÁTeraffe 




Gold Vnloe 


RUe (+). 


of $1 in 


or 


Paper 


Fall (-) 


Monejr 




$1.00 




CMA 


-0.034 


.985 


-f .019 


.623 


- .382 


.795 


4- .172 


.SK7 


- .408 


.737 


-f .330 


.6M 


- .063 



Per Cent, of Appreciation or Depre- 
ciation in Gold Valué of the Cor- 
rency 



Fall 
Rím 
Fall 
Rím 
Fall 



of 3 
of 1 
of36 
of27 
of51 



Rise of 90 
FaU of 7 



.40 per cent, in 2 months 
.97 per cent, in 2 months 
.75 per cent, in 10 months 
.61 per cent, in 6 months 
.32 per cent, in 11 months 
44 per cent, in 10 months 
. 19 per cent, in 7 months 



CHAPTER II 

THE CIRCULATING MÉDIUM 

I. Oold and Silver Coin: 

Money in Use Before Suspensión — Disappearance of Gold After 
Suspensión in fjast — Continued Use in California. 

II. Bank Notes: 

Exceptions to Rule of Suspensión— Obstadas to Free Circulation 
of Bank Notes — Bedemption in Greenbacks — Increase of Note 
Issues. 

III. Oíd Demand Notes: 

Attitude of Banks — Demand Notes at a Discount — Temporary 
Loan Scheme — Effect of Legal-Tender Act. 

IV. ^Shinplasters'* and Fractional Currency: 

Disappearance of Silver Coin — Issues of ''Shinplasters" — Postage 
Currency — Fractional Currency. 

V. Minar Coins: 

The Premium on Nickel Cents — Its Cause — New Bronze Cents 
— Other Minor Coins. 

VI. Treasury Notes: 

Greenbacks — One and Two Year Notes of 1863 — Compound 
Interest Notes — Use of Certifícates of Indebtedness and Seven- 
thirtieB as Currency. 

VII. Recapitulation: 

Chaotic Condition of Circulating Médium — Uncertainty Regard- 
ing Volume. 

I. OOLD AND SILVEB OOIN 

Befobb the banks and the treasnry suspended specie pay- 
ments, December 80, 1861/ the monetary circulation of the 
United States consisted of (1) gold coin, (2) subsidiary sil- 
ver coins for fractional parts of a doUar, (3) one-cent pieces 
of acopper and nickel alloy, (4) treasnry notes of the gov- 
emment payable on demand, and (5) circulating notes issued 

1 See Part I, chap. i, pp. 40, 41. 

141 



142 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 

by banks chartered nnder state laws.^ The specie in ciroa- 
lation was estimated by the director of the mint in October, 
1861, at from $275,000,000 to $300,000,000, of which he 
thonght not more than $20,000,000 was at the South ;' the 
demand notes ootstanding were $83,500,000,' and the bank 
notes reported as issued by the 1,289 institutions in the 
loyal States amoonted to about $129,000,000/ 

Suspensión threw this whole system into disorder. Gold 
coin, the only f ull legal-tender money in use, was withdrawn 
from general circulation as soon as the banks and the treasury 
ceased paying it out, and the country was left dependent upon 
a currency of paper money which the issuers were not pre- 
pared to redeem in specie. 

It is not quite accurate to say that gold coin ceased to 
circuíate. The banks continued to hold large amounts of 
specie in their reserves,^ while the govemment paid interest 
on a large portion of its debt in gold and required the use 
of gold by importers in payment at the customs houses. 
More than this, there was a section of the country where the 
greenbacks did not succeed in displacing coin even in com- 
mon business transactions. 

In 1862 there were but very few banks in states west of 
Kansas and Nebraska.^ Indeed, in California, the wealthiest 
and most populous of the far westem states, the existence 
of banks of issue was expressly prohibited by the state 

1 SUver dollara had not been in common ose for mñnj jrears, becanse thejr were 
worth more as boíl ion than as monejr. See the table showin^ the average ralne of 
an American siWer dollar each year from 1834 to 1862 in H. R. Lindkbican*8 Money 
and Legal Tender in the United StaUt (New York, 1879), p. 161, and compare 
Lauohlin, Hi$tary of BimeAaXli&m in the United 8tatc»^ chape. ít, t. 

^Finance Reporta 1861, p. 62. > i6id., 1862, p. 9. 

4 Compiled from the ** Sinopsis of the Retnms of the Banks in the Differsnt 
States," pnblished in the Finance Report for 1862, pp. 189 ff. 

& Aocording to the **Annual Reports on the Condition of the Banks,** the amonni 
of specie held bj institntions in the loyal states increased from |76,400,0U0 at the 
beginninffof 1862 to $81,500,000 at the beginning of 186S.— H. R. Exccutive Documcnl 
Na, 15, 87th Con«., 8d Sess., p. 200; and No, 30, S8th Ck>n«., Ist Sess., p. 211. 

*See the bank reports cited in preoeding notes. 



The Ciboulating Médium 143 

constitution.^ '' Suspensión'' was, therefore, a mnch less 
momentons occorrence f or these commonities than for thoee 
of the East, where business centered aronnd highly developed 
banking systems. West of the Rocky Monntains men con- 
tinned to bny and sell for coin, giving little thonght to the 
fact that bank notes in circxdation elsewhere were no longer 
redeemed in specie. 

But when Congress, by the act of Febmary 25, 1862, 
provided for the issue of $150,000,000 of United States 
notes and made them a legal tender between individuáis, the 
currency troubles of the rest of the country were brought 
home even to Califomians. Under this law it was techni- 
cally possible for a person who had bought goods from a San 
Francisco jobbing merchant to compel his creditor to accept 
in payment greenbacks worth considerably less than the 
expected gold. Elsewhere this situation had been prepared 
for by the use of notes of suspended banks for three months 
before the ñrst United States notes were issued, and men 
adjusted their business transactions to suit the currency. 
But on the Pacific coast people had been accustomed to a 
circxdation of specie only and were very loath to surrender 
it BüBiness men consequently caflt aronnd for some means 
by which they could maintain the circulation of gold and 
prevent debtors from forcing them to accept greenbacks. 
One means to this end was the formation among the mer- 
chants of San Francisco in November of an agreement ''not 
to receive or pay out legal-tender notes at any but the mar- 
ket valué, gold being adhered to as the standard." Firms 
that refused to enter into this agreement, or to abide by it, 
were to be listed in a black book and required in f uture deal- 
ings to pay cash gold for goods which they purchased. 

Loyal observance of such a voluntary agreement, how- 
ever, was difficult to maintcdn, and vigorous efforts were 

' Article IV, seca. S4, 95. There were, howoTer, a few deposit banks. See J. J. 
Ksoz, A HiMtary <^ Bcmkino in the United StaUs (New York, 1900), pp. 843-6. 



f 



114 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

accordingly made to secnre sach actíon from tbe state 
Utore 88 wonld secare tbe same end by legal means. After 
sereral otber propoeals bad been rejected, a ^^specific con- 
tract act^^ was finally passed and approved Apríl 27, 1S63. 
It provided in sobstance tbat contracta for tbe pajment of 
specific kinds of money sboold be enforceable by legal 
process. After tbe constítntionality of tbis law bad been 
affirmed by tbe state conrts, bnsiness-men were able to 
protect tbemselves against tenders of greenbacks effectively 
by inserting in all tbeir contracta claoses specifying tbat 
payment sboold be made in gold coin. Tbis became tbe 
general practice, and conseqnently tbe people of California 
maintained a large circnlation of specie doring all tbe seven- 
teen years tbat tbe rest of tbe United States were using 
paper money. Greenbacks were not prevented from circn- 
lating, bnt wben tbey were passed it was nsnally at tbeir 
gold, not at tbeir nominal, valué.' 

II. BAKK NOTES 

As bas been said, tbe withdrawal of gold from circnlation 
in otber parts of tbe United States left tbe notes of tbe state 
banks and tbe federal treasury tbe only monetary circnlation, 
aside from **deposit cnrrency," available for use in large 
transactions. But neitber tbe bank ñor tbe treasury notes 
were at tbat time a legal tender, and conseqnently tbe circn- 
lation of both was for a time beset with difficnlties that 
require díscussion in some detaiL 

Thongh all tbe banks, witb tbe exception of tbe banks of 
tbe states of Obio, Kentucky, and Indiana, and a few scatter- 
ing institutions elsewhore like tbe Chemical Bank of New 
York, had followed tbe example of tbe New York banks very 

iHrrmardMohkm, ** Lniral tender Notes in California/* Quarterly Journal of 
Kcanomira, Yol. VII, |>p. 1-23; J. A. Febeib, The Financial Econamp of the United 
Htatet illnatratetl (San FranoiiMM>, 1867), Nos. V, XV. 



The Ciboulating Médium 145 

promptly in snspending specie payments/ the suspensión 
was perhaps nowhere complete. Banks very generally con- 
tinaed for some time to supply coin to their customers who 
reqnired it for the payment of duties or any other necessary 
parpóse.' Indeed, in those states where the banking laws 
imposed penalties for refnsal to pay notes in coin the banks 
were obliged to redeem their notes whenever the holder 
insisted npon their so doing. Sach was the case in New 
York. The state snperintendent of banking was reqnired 
by law to cióse any institution that f ailed to redeem its notes 
in coin within fífteen days af ter the notes had been pro- 
tested.' As the snperintendent had no discretion in the 
matter, the banks were at the mercy of any note holder who 
chose to insist apon redemption in gold. Certain specalators 
in carrency took advantage of the sitaation to coUect bank 
notes systematically and send them in to the issuing institn- 
tions for payment in coin, which they then sold at a preminm.* 
Fear of sach operations made the banks nnwilling to pay out 
their notes freely. Instead of notes they issued many certi- 
fíed checks, which for a time f ormed a prominent part of the 
circnlating mediom.» 

For sach reasons there was a marked contraction in the 
bank-note circalation in the fírst months of 1862. Janaary 
4, the New York city banks had oatstanding $8,600,000 of 
notes; by March 1 this circalation had fallen to $5,400,000. 
The hesitation of the banks ceased, however, when the 
treasury notes in circalation were made legal tender, for this 
measnre provided fands other than coin which note holders 

1 Banhen* Magatint (New York), Yol. XYI, p. 650. 

s/bid., YoL XYI, p. 648 (Rbode Island) ; p. 649 (Philadelphia) ; Yol. XYII, p. 760 
(Boston); H,R» BxecuUve DocumetU No, 25, 87th 0>Dg., 8d Sess., p. 80 (Con- 
nflotient) ; p. 28 (New Hampehire) ; New York Heraldy January 5, 1862. This and the 
sabseqnent referenoes to newspapers gÍTe the date of the **financial column.*' 

> See test of the law, Banken? Magazine, Yol. XYI, p. 811. 

« New York HeraJld, Janaary 20, 1862. 

ftffiMU'f MerckanU' Magazine, Yol. XLYI, p. 300. 



146 HlSTOBY OF THB GbBBNBAOKS 

pressing for redemption could be compelled to accept. 
Accordingly, the banks began to pay out their notes again, 
and by May 8 their circolation was practically as large as it 
had been January 4.^ 

The sitaation in Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana where the 
state banks did not sospend specie payments immediately, 
did not long maintain its peculiarity. These banks were 
deterred from foUowing the example of eastem institations 
by clauses in their charters which forbade the redemption 
of their notes in anything but coin. In Ohio, however, 
the legislature enacted a law January 16, which granted 
immonity from the penalties for suspensión to such banks 
as should advance coin to be used in paying the interest on 
the state^s foreign debt.' Similarly in Kentucky, *Hhe banks 
of issue having consented to loan to the citizens of the state 
$1,000,000 .... the legislature passed an act on March 8, 
1862, relieving the banks from the penalties for suspensión 
of specie payments and authorizing them to pay out United 
States legal-tender notes."' 

The Bank of the State of Indiana and its branches, under 
the presidency of Hugh McCulloch, held out somewhat 
longer. December 81 McCulloch issued a statement that 
under no circumstances would the bank fail to redeem the 
pledge it had given to pay its notes in coin/ In pursuance 
of this policy the managers of the branches were instructed 
" to redeem promptly in coin all notes that might be pre- 
sented ; to anticípate and prevent their retum, as f ar as might 
be practicable, by taking them up at commercial points with 
other cash means; [and] to make arrangoments with deposi- 
tors by which deposits of gold should be paid in gold, 

iSeethe Nfw York city bank statements, tfrid., p. 550; compare Reporicftke 
Secretar^ of the Treatury, December, 1862, p. 15. 

2 Bankcn' Maoaxine, Yol. XYII, pp. 163, and 798, 794. 

> Kkox, Hutoryof BnnkitHfin íKe CTnited Stotet (New York, 1900), p. 612. 

« Banken' Matfoxine, Yol. XYI, p. 68a 



The Ciboulating Médium 147 

deposita of bank notes . . . . in bank notes/'' By this 
course ''in a few weeks the larger part of the circulating 
notes of the branches were at rest in their vanlts, and the 
bosiness of the branches was reduced to what coold be safely 
done upon their capitals and deposits.'^ When, however, 
the legal-tender act had been passed the question aróse 
whether the bank might not legally nse United States notes 
in discharge of its notes. Af ter ascertaining that the conrts 
wonld give prompt trial to a case involving this important 
qaestion, Mr. McCuUoch, in order to make a test case, 
directed that greenbacks be tendered in payment of a note. 
The supreme court of Indiana decided that the legal-tender 
act was constitational, and that the bank might redeem its 
notes in notes of the govemment. When this decisión was 
rendered, the bank at once commenced paying out its notes 
again.' 

The same question regarding the availability of green- 
backs for redemption of bank notes that under state laws 
were payable only in coin, had to be faced in other states. 
In New York the question was peculiarly pressing because 
the legislature was powerless under the constitution to pass 
such measures of relief as were enacted in Ohio and Ken- 
tucky.' To determine whether banks could avail themselves 
of the act of Congress making treasury notes a legal tender, 
test cases were arranged by the superintendent of the bank- 
ing department and a decisión obtained in June, 1863, from 
the court of appeals maintaining the constitutionality of the 
law.^ This and similar decisions rendered in other states 

1 H. McCuuLOCH, Menand Metuure» of HaHf a Century^ p. 196. s/Md., pp. 196-^ 

* Artíde VJLLL, sec. 5 of the conatitation provided that "the legislature shall have 
no imwer to pass any law sanctioning in any manner .... the suspensión of specie 
pajrments bj any person, association, or Corporation issning bank notes of any 
description."— BofOrert* Magazint, Yol. XYIII, p. 811. 

« See AwnMol R^pori of the Superintendent of the Banking Department of the 
State of New York, Janoary 7, 1864 ; Bankers' Magazine^ Yol. XYUI, pp. 811-13. The 
foli test of the coartas opinión is pablished ibid,, pp. 345 ff. 






r?i c 



TJ 



tbe 






•_• 



r •-■ >••.;. -I. 



1 i-.'r "»^ 



i M > (Hl 



:■?- •t-'^ 



■I I 



•i*^* 



I ^»-« 



4? 






— -• x-^U 



ii- uir»\ LV^;;. A3» 
.L ii. Ccs- 5:r ü* 



'■* * ■ 5- 



---*^ 









i". r>a .Vc^p. ]¿ 



' 1^ — 



' '/."• é^^ ■ .'. .:v./.i,v* -j: .-^-. 









-• j, -•«r-i^í ,/• iw 



The Cibculating Médium 149 

iii. old demand notes 

The circulation of the demand treasnry notes was for a 
time beset by more difficulties even than was the circulation 
of bank notes. The fírst issaes of these notes by Secretary 
Chase in the late summer and aatumn of 1861 was opposed 
by the banks which subscribed to the $150,000,000 loan. 
When the secretary in3isted on making the issnes, however, 
they yielded, and with few exceptions made no difficxdty 
abont receiving such of the notes as were bronght to them 
by depositors.* The situation changed, however, when the 
treasnry, by suspending specie payments, gave notice that 
these notes would not be redeemed in coin.' At this time 
there were $33,460,000 in circulation.* Early in January 
the New York banks held a meeting to discuss what policy 
should be pursued with regard to them. Opinión was 
divided, and the meeting ended with the adoption of a 
vague resolution: 

That before we oonsent to receive such notes, we must require 
that such legal provisión be made by Congress as shall insure their 
speedy redemption, and that a committee of this association be 
appointed to oonsider that subject and report to an adjoumed 
meeting.* 

1 Cf, Part I, ehap. i, pp. 26, 27, above. 

s It has been ttated in an oficial docament that ** the demand notes were paid in 
gold when preaented for redemption," and that such payment with their receivability 
for all pablio dnes, ** prevented their depreciation."— /rv^ormafion Regpecting United 
State» BandM^ Paper Ourrency^ Ootn, etc., revised ed., United State» TreoMury Depart- 
ment Circular No. 128^ Jaly 1, 1896, p. 7. This has been the oommon riew and is found, 
e. g,t eren in the work of so recent a writer as Professor A. B. Habt (Li/e of Ctuue^ p. 
212). Bnt none the lesa it is oertainly an error. Mr. Chase himself said : '' The banks 

of New York suspended on the SOth of December, 1861 and the gOTemment 

yielded to the same neeessity in respect to the United States notes then in circulation.*' 
—Report of the Secretary of the Trecuury^ 1862, p. 7 : cf. American AnntuU Cyclopcedia^ 
1861, p. 300, and Hunf» Merchants* Magaxine^ Vol. XLVII, p. 509. More than this, 
the ** oíd demand notes,** as the issue carne to be called, did deprecíate in valne, 
which conld hardly have happened had they been ** paid in gold when presented for 
redemption;** cf. Part 11, chap. iii, sec. ii, below. 

> Bepori of the Secretary of the Trecuury^ December, 1862, p. 9. 

«BanJterf* Maotuine, Vol. XVI, p. 647. 




150 HlSTOBY OP THB GREENBACKS 

Of couree, this reaolution procured no action by Congrese, 
and the coniraittee wae unable to frame a policy acceptable 
to all the banks. Some institations took the notes withont 
question aa current fuuds, while othere did not' The Ameri- 
can Exchange Bank, for esample, issned a circular dated 
January 1, 1862, informing its doalers and correspondents 
that it would not accept treasury notea from them, unlesa 
they vould si^ a contract to accept payment ia the same 
DoteB at par.' 

But 8o long as a portion of the Bnbscríptions to the 
$150,000,000 loan remained unpaid, almost all of the banks 
were ready to receive demand notes at least in emall quanti- 
ties, because they could be used in making payments Ínto 
the subtreasury,' 

After the laat instalment ot the loan had been paid on 
the moming of February 4, the disincUnation to receive the 
notes as current fuuds becanie muL'h stronger. Banks coald 
no longer find an outlet for them at the subtreasury, and 
they could not be certain that depoeitors would nccept sach 
notes in payment ot checks, sinco the notes were not yet 
legal-tender, The metropolitau banks eeem to have been 
rather more liberal than those of Boston, Philadelphia, aad 
other citiee.' But even in New York there waa apparently a 
considerable number of large institutiona that discriminated 
against the treasury notes aud accepted them only as 

> No» Yoik Beratií. Jaoiury 2, S, uid «. ms. 



Vol. XLVI, p. 28!. 

<New Vork Berald. Fabrnarjr <. IM3, aud Hiih( 
XLYI. p.aOR. Thu Imnksur Bosloa actfld in üimilar ti 

wu adoptfld, JtDtUktj VI, tbat banks canDorniKl ia the «i 

fabK^^lptionB lo Hid loa&.itiBludiae «uch n< 
Maeatttte. Val. XVI, p. Mx. 

» Sr» Vork HeruW. Januarr 2t and 2ft. 



The Cibgulating Médium 151 

''special deposits/' repayable in kind.^ Refusal to take the 
notes on the part of even a few banks in the clearing-house 
association made seríous trouble for the other institutions 
that desired to receive them without question. For, if one of 
the more liberal banks accepted demand notes on deposit as 
carrent f ands, it had to make provisión for meeting checks 
drawn against this deposit and presented at the clearing- 
house by other institutions. At the clearing-honse, however, 
the demand notes would not be accepted in payment of a 
balance, and the bank that had taken such notes from its 
costomers had therefore to provide other funds for meeting 
the checks, or, if it did not have sufficient cnrrency of other 
kinds, to take out loan certifícates on which 7 per cent 
interest was charged.' 

This situation seems to have given much concern to the 
treasury authorities. Though the treasury notes were com- 
monly accepted in bosiness transactions between individuáis 
without question,' men could not use them freely at the 
banks, and consequently persons who received large quanti- 
ties were compelled to sell them at a slight discount^ It 
was the desire to prevent such discrimination against the 
treasury notes that Mr. Chase gave as his reasoii for urging 
the retention of the legal-tender clause in the bilí introduced 
by Mr. Spaulding.* 

While the bilí was still pending, another scheme for the 
same purpose was devised. Mr. Cisco, the head of the New 

1 Ibid.y Fdbmary 4 and 5, 1862. HurU'§ MerchanU* M(Ma€uine states that this 
oonrse was pursned bjr a majoríty of the banks.— Vol, XLVI, p. a09. 

^HwWb MerchanU* Magazine^ Vol. XLVI, p. 909. Cf, the remarles of Senator 
Simmons in the Congrtttional Olobe, 37th Gong., 2d sess., p. 794. 

3 New York Heraldo Febmary 9; Shipping and Commerctal Litt, Febmary 19, 
1862. 

* Acoording to the New York Trihune, Febraary 13, 1862, the sellingr price was 
one-fifth of one per cent, below par, while notes could be bought of the street brokers 
at half this disconnt. 

^Letter of Jannary 29, 1862, to Thaddens Stevens.— Ocm^restional GIo&e,S7th 
Con«., 8d Sess., p. 618; cf, remarks of Mr. Bingham, íMd., p. 689. 



152 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 

York Bubtreasury, snggested, and Chase authorized, the 
acceptance of the treasnry notes on deposit at the sab- 
treasories at 6 per cent interest.^ It was apparently their 
expectation that the banks would now accept the notes with 
the intention of depositing them at the subtreasury and so 
drawing interest apon a part of their cnrrent fimds.' But 
the plan was received less kindly than had been hoped. On 
Febroary 8 about half a million was deposited with Mr. 
Cisco, and by the llth another million had been added.' 
But these deposits seem to have come mainly from savings 
banks and ont-of -town institutions/ Most of the city banks 
looked apon the plan as a bid to indace the pablic to deposit 
with the sabtreasury instead of with themselve&^ 

For the time, theref ore, this plan accomplished little, and 
the demand notes continaed to rale at a slight discoant antil 
the passage of the legal-tender act.* The fírst reports of 
the law that reached New York indicated that the treasury 
notes already in circalation, as well as the new issaes, had 
been made a legal tender/ An amendment to this effect 
had, indeed, been made by the Senate on motion of John 
Sherman;' bat it had not been agreed to by the Hoase of 
Bepresentatives,* and at the recommendation of the com- 
mittee of conference the Senate receded from ii" Thoagh 
the report was f alse, it changed the attitade of the hesitating 
banks toward the notea The new law provided that castoms 
shoald be paid, not in paper money, but in coin. From this 

1 Cf, ScHUCKSSfl, Lift Qf CKaae^ p. 269. 

s Qf. HunV§ MtrchanU' MagaMint. VoL XLVI, p. 810; New York Herald^ Febrn- 
«rj9,1862. 

> New York Herald, Febniary 8 and 11, 1882. « i6fld., Febniarj 14. 

^HunZ'9 McrchanU' MoQCuinc Yol. XLYI, p. 810. 

o New York Trilmne, Febroary 13, and Shipping and Commereial Litt, Febroary 
19,1882. 

7 New York Timet, Febraarj 26; HercUd, March 3. 

s Conffrtañonal Qlobe^ 87tb Cooff., 2d Sess., p. 771. 

9Ibid„ p. 888. 10 ibid,, p. 92». 



The Ciboulating Médium 153 

rule, however, an exception was made in favor of the oíd 
demand notes, because the act under which tbey were issued 
declared them " receivable in payment of public dues." ' If 
made legal tender, then, the oíd notes wonld differ from the 
new only in possessing a virtue lacked by the latter — availa- 
bility for use at the customs house in place of coin. As but 
$60,000,000 of the demand notes had been authorized, and 
as they were to be replaced as rapidly as feasible by the new 
issues, it seemed likely that there would be a strong demand 
for them from importers who had duties to pay. Conse- 
quently even the banks that had hitherto refused to receive 
the notes as current funds now refused to pay them out, and 
instead of being at a discount of ^ to | they rose to a pre- 
mium of -I to ^.* This advance to a premium, however, 
proved premature. When after three or four days it was 
found that the retirement of the oíd notes could not com- 
mence until the new notes were printed, that printing would 
require at least a month, and that in the meantime the treas- 
ury must continué to pay out the oíd notes, they fell again 
to par.' And when on the 4th of March the f uU text of the 
legal-tender act was received, and it was found that the 
legal-tender clause included only the new issues, some of the 
banks reverted to their former policy and began again to 
discriminate against the govemment notes. Accordingly 
the notes fell once more to a discount.* 

The discovery that the oíd demand notes had not been 
made legal tender seems to have been as much of a surprise 
to many members of Congress as it was to business men in 
New York. Steps were taken at once to remedy the omis- 

1 Act of Angost 5, 1861, Seo. 5, 12 Statutes at Large^ p. 313. 

2 N«w York Timet, Febnianr 26 and 27, 1862; Herald^ Febnxarj 27 and 28; Oom- 
mercicd AdoertUer^ Febmary 26, 27, 28, and March 1 ; Shipping and Commercial Litt^ 
March 1. 

> New York Herald^ March 1 and 8; Timea, March S. 

^ New York Herald, March 4; CommercicU AdveriUer and Shipping and Com- 
vMTciaU List^ March 5. 



154 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEBHBACKS 

8ÍOIL A clanse making the treasory notee already in circn- 
Utíon a legal tender was inserted íb the bilí to aothorize the 
pmcbase of coin for the pajment of interest on the public 
debt, which ThaddenB Stevens introdoced into the Honse 
Maich 6.' When this bilí received President Lincoln's 
signature, March 17,' there was no longer any reason for 
diacriminating against the demand notee, and they retnmed 
for a short time to par.' 

Meanwhile the New York banks had taken action that 
pat an end to all oppoaition on their part to the nse of the 
treaaory notes. At a meeting held March 7, 1862, they 
determined to make their clearings in certificates issued by 
the aseistant treasurer for deposit of the demand notes with 
him at 5 per cent, interest.* This arrangement, which went 
into effect March 10, made treasory notes the standard for 
all banking operations in corrent fnnds.' Foreseeing that 
when the new notes were ready for issue the oíd notes receiv- 
able for costoms woxdd be more valuable, Mr. Cisco pub- 
lished a notice March 14, that all certificates of deposit 
iasoed in the fntnre would be paid in any notes that were 
legal t<mder.* The new respect in which the oíd demand 
notes were coming to be held was shown by the fact that 
this notice caosed a falling off in the daily deposits. The 
check was only temporary, however, for the new notes 
became themselves available for deposit early in Apríl. 

From the 7th of March, then, the oíd demand notes were 
cnrrent funds in New York and passed withont questiou at 
¡lar. But soon after the appearance of the greenbacks their 

I Conffrenional Globe^ S7ih Coog., 2d Sess., PP. 1108 and 1116. 

^íZHUitutea at lAirtfe, p. 37U. 

> la fact, the oot«« retnrned to par as soon as it was known that the claiise had 
bttn introdoced, becaose it was a foregone conclosion that the measoro wonld 
bMome a law.— New York Commercial AdveriiacTy March 8. 

4 Bankcrt' MaoosinCy Yol. XVI, pp. 800-11. 

ft Cf. New York Time$, March 10. 

• See the test in Armual Ameriecm Cyelopigdic^ 1862, p. 456. 



Thb Ciboulatino Médium 166 

poBÍtion changed agaín. The fírst greenbacks in New York 
carne in a remittance of $4,000,000 received by the assistant 
treasurer April 5.^ A large sum was paid out the same day, 
and from this time on issues were so rapid that $90,000,000 
was outstanding before the 7th of June." All through April 
the oíd demand notes circulated side by side with the new 
notes at par.' But, as the supplies of the latter currency 
became snfficient for the wants of bnsiness, a difFerence 
became apparent between the treatment of the two issues. 
Owing to their receivability for customs, the oíd demand 
notes were preferred, and as early as the second week in May 
they began to be quoted regularly at a premium which, 
slight at fírst, gradually rose as the volume in circulation 
became smaller and the premium on gold for which they 
served as a substituto at the customs-house became higher. 
The possibility of obtaining this premium caused holders of 
oíd demand notes to hoard them just as they had hoarded 
gold in January. When Mr. Chase wrote his letter of June 
7 requesting authority for a second issue of greenbacks, he 
said that the $56,500,000 of the oíd demand notes then 
outstanding were '^held by banks and capitalists, and not 
used as circulation.'^^ They were sold from time to time to 
importers and used in the payment of duties. As they 
came into the treasury through the customs-houses, the oíd 
demand notes were canceled and replaced by greenbacks. 
By this process the amount outstanding had been reduced 
to $3,300,000 by June 80, 1863.'^ This withdrawal from 
circulation in May, 1862, closed the brief but eventful 
history of the oíd demand notes as a part of the oirculating 
médium. 

I See the flnanoial oolonms of the New York papera nnder this date. 

> H.R, MiacéUameou» Document No, 81^ 37th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 1. 

> HunT» Merchantt' Magazine, Yol. XLVU, p. 3S. 

4 H.R, Mi»cellaneou8 Document No. 81, S7th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 1. 
* Bepofi of the Secretary of ihe Treatury^ Deoember, 1868, p. 45. 



156 HlSTOBY OF THB GbBBNBAOKS 

From what has been said it is clear that the business 
public rnust have snffered considerable ínoonyenience from 
the oncertainty regarding the currency between the time of 
suspensión and of abundant issues of the greenbacks, Gold 
had ceased to be used in ordinary transactions; notes of 
state banks, always inconvenient, were in many cases not 
issued freely for pmdential reasons and had to be replaced 
in considerable measnre by certifíed checks, and theireasury 
notes were most of the time discriminated against by many 
banks. The appearance of the greenbacks in large amonnts 
afforded relief from such difficulties, though the wide and 
rapid fluctuations in their valué gave rise to other embarrass- 
ments of a more serious character. 

IV. *'8HINPLA8TBB8" AND FBAOTIONAL OÜBBBNCY 

One diflSculty with the currency, however, the greenbacks 
oould not meet While they served as a convenient médium 
of exchange in large transactions, they did not supply the 
want of small change, for the fírst legal-tender act had for- 
bidden the issue of notes of less than fíve doUars.^ Hardly 
had the perplexities of business men who handled currency 
in large amounts been relieved by the free issues of the 
greenbacks, when yet greater inconveniences began to be 
felt by everyone from the lack of fractional coins. 

When specie payments were suspended the subsidiary 
silver coins did not disappear from circulation at once, as did 
gold, for reasons found in existing coinage laws. While a 
doUar contained 371.25 grains of puré silver, only 345.6 
grains were put into two half-dollars, four quarters, or ten 
dimes.' In January, 1862, one grain of gold was selling for 
15.35 grains of silver.' At this ratio a silver dollar was worth 

1 Sec. 1, 12 SUUutea (U Large, p. 345. 

2 Aot of Febraary 21, 1853, 10 8t€Uute» cU Large, p. 100; cf. ItAVQKLDt, Hiitory of 
BimetallUm in the ürUted 8taUs$, chap. ▼, sec. 4. 

3 See the table in Laüohlin, pp. ciL, Appendiz n, F. 



The Ciboülatino Médium 157 

$1.04 in gold, while two halves, fonr quarters, or ten dimes 
were worth but 97.05 cents. While, therefore, there was a' 
profít in treating gold coin as bullion instead of as money, 
the moment a f ractional premium appeared upon it in paper, 
there was no profít in exportíng or in melting subsidiary 
silver coins ontil the premium on gold had risen sufficiently 
above 3.1 per cent to give brokers compensation for coUect- 
ing the coins and shipping them to Canadá. For, when gold 
stood at 103^, a paper doUar was worth 97 cents in gold — 
just as much as ten dimes. It was therefore a matter of 
indifference to the possessor of subsidiary silver coins whether 
he paid it over as current funds in purchasing commodities 
or sold it for paper money. But when gold rose above 
103^, a paper doUar became worth less than ten dimes, and 
a person who had the latter could make them go farther in 
the payment of debts by selling them for paper money and 
giving it to his creditor than by handing him the silver 
itself. Since, however, some trouble and expense were 
involved in melting or exporting coins of small denomina- 
tions, it was a nice question how high the premium on gold 
must rise above 3-j^ before the silver would disappear from 
circulation. 

For the fírst week after payments in specie had been 
stopped the premium on gold varied from 1 to 3 per cent.^ 
But on the 8th of January it rose to 3^ and on the 9th to 
4¿. At the latter premium a paper dollar was worth 95.92 
cents in gold, or 1.13 cents less than ten dimes. According 
to the money column of the New York Herald, this slight 
difference sufficed to induce brokers to begin the purchase 
of silver coins. **An inquiry has sprung up for silver," 
reports the fínancial writer on the 9th, ''which has been 
held at 1 per cent, premium." It is not improbable, how- 

iFor thi8 and subsequent references to premiam oa gold see tables in Appendix 
Afbelow. 



168 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

ever, that parchases of silver on so slight a margin were 
prompted rather by anticipations of the profít that ooold be 
made if the premiom on gold continued to advance, than bj 
the opportunity f or immediate profit If so, the buyers of 
silver were disappointed, for after rising to 5 on the lOth of 
January, the premiom fell again bélow 4. Dnring Febmary 
the average premium was 3.5, dnring March L8, dnring 
April 1.5, and dnring May 3.3. At snch low prices for 
gold, or, more accurately, at snch high prices for paper 
mouey, there was no profít in bnying snbsidiary silver 
coins for export or melting, and consequently they oontinned 
to oiroulate as money. Bnt in Jnne, when the hopes of a 
ipeedy eud of the war were being dispelled, the paper 
money fell in valne, that is, the preminm took an upward 
tum. Froiñ S|% on the fírst Monday of the month, the 
premium rose to 4^% on the second Monday, 6| on the third, 
7| on the fourth, and 9yV on the fifth.' With gold at the 
last-named premium, a paper dollar was worth 91.69 cents 
lii gold — a priee which afForded an ampie margin of profit 
(uf tht) punchase for export of silver coins worth 97.05 
i)entB. 

Aiíconliugly, the newspapers late in June and early in 
July bi^gHU to remark a rapid disappearance of small change 
(rum cúrculfttion. For example, the Springfield Repuhlican 
uf July 2, 1802, said: "The ruling premium of 5 to 6 per 
iítiut. iia silvor coin, as compared with the paper cnrrency in 
UMM, ifci fttbt driviug it out of circulation. Laboring people 
muí tiume uf small means are constantly to be seen at 
lUHíkuib' (irtlcea selling $10 to $50 of silver change at 2^ per 
\\\\\\\. |irtuiüum, whioh the brokers ship to Europe where they 
\\^\\ riíulizü Ü or 7 jH^r tn^nt, in comparison with our irredeem- 
xM^ l»m»or cuirrem'y.'' Similarly, the New York Times 

\ l'Uutttí Atfur«« «re «fer«4i«ii of the highett and lowest prioes of gold reoorded 



The Ciboülatino Médium 159 

*■ 

of July 18 declared that ** the annoyances sufFered in this 
city and throughout the country dnring the last two or 
three weeks, on account of the scarcity of specie, have been 
unspeakable, and in many linea of bnsiness the loss of 
custom and profit has been heavy."* Though over $45,- 
000,000 of snbsidiary coins had been struck under the act of 
1853,^ of which perhaps three-fifths circulated in the loyal 
states,^ nearly the whole amount seems to have been with- 
drawn from use as currency between the middle of June and 
the middle of July. Apparently , the brokers who purchased 
the coin exported a large portion of it. Over $3,750,000 
were camed to Canadá in 1862 by a single express com- 
pany/ Ameiácan coin became a drug in the Canadian mar- 
ket and was accepted only at a discount.^ Considerable 
amounts were shipped also to South Americcf and a sum 
large in the aggregate was no doubt kept for a long time 
in small hoards/ 

Of course, the disappearance of the silver coins from 
circulation caused serious inconvenience in retail trade. 
Various shifts were tried to supply their place. In 
Philadelphia, and perhaps elsewhere, oíd Spanish quarter- 
doUars were brought again into use. These coins had f ormed 
a considerable portion of the small change before an abun- 
dant supply of American silver was fumished under the act 
of 1853. From long wear they had become light in weight. 
The act of February 21, 1857, provided that they should be 
accepted by the govemment offices for 20 instead of 25 cents.' 

1 Comi>are New Tork Tribune^ July 9 and 16; Commercial Adveriiter^ July 10 and 
16; Chicago Poff, Jaly 15; and other referenoes in the following notes. 

2 £epor¿ of the Director of the Mint^ October, 1862, p. 49. 

3 Cf. HunrM MerchanU' Magazine, Vol. XLVU, p. 155. 
*Annual American Cyclopcedia^ 1862, p. 468. 

'^ Cf. Bankent' Magazine, Vol. XVIII, pp. 83, 482; Vol. XIX, p. 699. 

« Knox, United Statet Note$y p. 100. ' - 

^ 11 8tatute§ at Large, p. 163, and Lindebman, Money and Legal Tender, p. 32. 



160 HlSTOBY OF THB QbEENBAOKS 

When the American silver was withdrawn a few of these oíd 
coins, because of the less amount of silver left in them, 
carne out of retirement and passed current again as quarters 
of a doUar.' 

Another method of meeting the situation was to decline 
to make change for paper bilis at all, or else to charge a 
premium for the silver retnmed. This plan is said to have 
been adopted for a time by transportatíon companies and 
many retail shops in New York city.' A third device was to 
cut doUar bank bilis into halves or quarters and pass these 
pieces for 50 and 25 cents. In Hartford, Conn., it was said 
that some $20,000 of the bilis of the ^tna Bank were 
floating about cut in two.' A more ingenious scheme was 
hit upon by the Farmers' Bank of Mount HoUy, N. J., 
which paid out notes for $1.25, $1.50, and $1.75 to enable 
people to make change within 25 cents by retuming a 
doUar bill.^ Much commoner, however, was the issue of 
notes for fractional parts of a doUar, coUoquially called 
"shinplasters." Though the laws of many states forbade 
any bank to put into circulation notes less than one doUar, 
a few^institutions adopted this plan, relying on the obvious 
need of fractional currency to secure immunity from 
prosecution.* But most of the "shinplasters" seem to have 
been issued by individuáis or fírms not engaged in banking. 
In Chicago, for instance, the city railway company supplied 
25-cent tickets which the conductors gave in exchange for 
paper bilis and accepted for fares.* In Boston, Young's 
Hotel started a system of checks for 15, 25, and 50 cents 

1 Spríngfleld Republican, July 15, 1862. 

3 New York Tribune, July 9 and 16. 

s Banken' Magazine^ Vol. XVII, p. 404. On similar praotioes elsewhere see i6td., 
p. 821. 

^Ihid.^ p. 816. 

&For ezample of siich illegal issues by a banker of Beading, Pa., see ibid.^ 
p. 475. 

• Chicago Poft, July 15, 1862. 



Thb Ciboülatino Mbdium 161 

with tbe propríetor's signature attached-r^an example that 
saloons, reBÍanrants, and retail shops were quiok to foUow.^ 
Many of these issues were made by irresponsible persons 
and consequently resulted in losa to those who accepted 
tbem.' Partly to protect the public from such loases and 
partly to obtain a '4oan without interest/' several towns and 
cities provided for municipal issues of small notes. The 
city council of Newark, N. J., for instance, voted July 11, 
'Ho issue promissory notes to the amount of $50,000 in 
denominations ranging from ten cents to fífty cents ^^ and 
redeemable by the city in sums of $10 or more.' This 
example was foUowed by Jersey City, Wilmington, and 
Albany, and a proposition of similar character was dropped 
in Philadelphia only because it was found to be contrary to 
state law.* 

These various substitutes for the silver coins fumished a 
fractional currency that, although unsatisfactory, had to be 
tolerated for a time as a makeshift. Secretary Chase, 
however, took steps promptly to relieve the general 
embarrassment He called the attention of Congress to the 
matter in a letter written July 14, and Congress responded 
by authorizing the use of '* the postage and other stamps of 
the United States" as currency.* 

Though this act was approved by the presídent only 
three days after Chascas letter was written, some time 
elapsed before it aCForded sabstantial relief. The chief 
immediate effect was to cause the use of ordinary letter 
postage stamps for small change. In New Tork where as a 
rule about $3,000 of stamps were sold daily, the sales ran up 

1 Springfleld BepúbUcan^ Joly 15, U62. 

2 Cf. qnotatíons from the Philadelphia Ledger in the Bankert^ MagazinCy VoL 
XVn, p. 82S. 

> New Tork Time», Joly IS, 1862. 

«See Bandeen' Maoaxine, Vol. JLYll, pp. 82S, 506, 816, and 161 respectiTely. 

» Aot of Jolj 17, 1M2, 12 Statutet at Larffe, p. 502. Sae Part I, ehap. iU, see. ÜL 



162 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

to $10,000 on the day after the bilí was approved, and next 
day to $16,000.* Such stamps, however, were exceedingly 
inconvenient for xise as currency because of their small size 
and their propensity for sticking together and getting 
cmmpled. To take their place Secretary Chase cansed a 
series of special stamps in denominations of 5, 10, 25, and 
50 cents to be prepared.' They were about 2| by 8§ inches 
in size, printed on both sides and not gummed.* The fírst 
issues were made late in Augusta 

In order to forcé the withdrawal of the "shinplasters," 
attomeys of the national and local govemments in some 
districts published notices waming the pnblic that the 
penalties imposed by federal and state laws apon the issne of 
small notes by unauthorized persons would be vigoronsly 
enforced by prosecutions.* Municipal "shinplasters," how- 
ever, were not affected by the Postage Currency Act, which 
forbade such issues only to ** prívate corporations," fírms, 
and individuáis.* Town and city notes continued therefore 
to circuíate unhindered for a considerable time. 

The difficulties with the fractional currency do not seem 
to have come to an end even by the cióse of 1862. The vari- 
ous substitutes for coin could not be dispensed with until the 
"postage currency" became abundant enough to supply the 
demand for small change, and at fírst the issues were rather 
slow. By the end of September but $787,700 had been 
placed in circulation, and in the next two months the total 

1 Banken' Magaxine^ Vol. XVII, p. 150. 

2 Report of the Secretary of the Treatury, Deoember 1862, p. 28. 

s Representations of this ** postage currenoy ** are ffiyen by Khox, ünUed State» 
Note», pp 10&-8. 

« Knox, ibid,, p. 104; Bankerg' Moffcuine^ Vol. XVII, p. 289. 

BForezample, see the notioe given in New York city, Banken* Maffaxine^ Vol. 
XVIl, p. 2r)6, and compare the action taken by the bank commissionera of Illinois, 
i6td., p. 567. 

* Scc. 2, 12 Statute» at Large, p. 592. See also the oorrespondepce between the 
ehairman of tho flnanco commíttee of Wilmington and the oommissiooer of intemal 
reyenae.— BanJbers* Magaxinc, Vol. XVII, p. 566. 



Thb CiBOüLATiNa Médium 168 

reached less than $4,000,000.^ In December Mr. Chase 
reported that it had been '^ foand impossible to keep pace 
with the pnblic demand f or this currency,^' and that, althoogh 
the daily issae had " been rapidly increased to $100,000," 
and was then being '^ extended as f ast as practicable to twice 
that amount," the supply was still " largely deficient." ^ 

In the West the St. Louis Repuhlican of December 10 
stated that '' there is still much complaint of the scarcity of 
small change," ' and in the East the Springfíeld Repuhlican 
of the same date reported that " shinplasters " were still in 
circnlation. In the same month the city council of New York 
passed an ordinance providing for the issne of 5, 10, 25, and 
50-cent notes, which the Bankers* Magazine declared to be 
'^ a necessity growing out of the scarcity of chango in this 
city." ^ Ordinary postage stamps also continued in use side 
by side with the defícient " postage currency " despite the 
efForts of the post-office department to prevent it. The post- 
master-general in his report dated December 1, 1862, said : 

Postmasters were specially instructed to discontinué sales of 
stamps to persons evidently designing them for use as cmrency; 
but, notwithstanding the precaution taken and the checks adopted, 
.... the demand has until quite reoently been largely in advanoe 
of the daily manufacture .... the majority of applications .... 
from postmasters were only partially fíUed, generally but one-half the 

number asked for having been sent The aggregate valué of 

the postage stamps and stamped envelopes sold at 29 of the larger 
post-offices during the third quarter of 1862 was {1,400,937.48, and 
during the corresponding quarter of 1861 was $606,597.40, showing 

an excess in favor of 1862 of $794,340.08 Nearly the entire 

excess .... has been or is now in use as currency.^ 

1 Report cf the Secretary of the Treatury, December, 1862, pp. 43 and 12. 

si&ídMPP. 28, 29. 

«Qnoted in Banhen' Magazine, Vol. XVII, p. 568. 

* VoL XVn, p. 562. Mayor Opdyke, however, did not agree with this TÍew, and 
Tetoed the measnre.— New York Tribune^ December 22. 1862. 

&H. R. Kxeeutive DocumerU No. i, 37th Gong., 3d Sess., Vol. IV, pp. 131, 132. 



164 HlSTOBT OF THB GbBENBAOKS 

! In the winter months, however, the supply of '' postage 
currency '^ became more adequate to the needs of retail trade. 
Nearly $7,000,000 had been issued by the end of December, 

1 1862, and $12,000,000 more were added in the next three 
months.^ When people could obtain this federal currency, 
they manif ested a strong disposition to reject postage stamps 
and " shinplasters" — even those issned by the towns. The 
Springñeld Republican of January 29 said : 

There is a general agreement throughout the comitry to banish 
all prívate and oorporate shinplasters and use only the govemment 
postage ciurency for change af ter the fírst of February. In Boston, 
already, none but those of the Parker House remain in circulation, 
and these are refused at many stores, and are beinfif íast letired. 
. . . . A few choioe shinplasJrs may be temporarüy r»tained in 
special localities, till sufficient of the postal currency works in to 

aocommodate public wants There are laige amounts of the 

postal currency in circulation, and much is hoarded that will come 
out as soon as the other sort is banished.' 

As late as March the Philadelphia Ledger said : 

Now Philadelphia is tolerably well supplied with small cur- 
rency authorízed by the government, while at New York and other 
eastem points they are suffering great inconvenience and much loss 

by an immense circulation of all sorts of trash So intolerable 

has the nuisance become, eyerybody is denying them, causing quite 
a panic among the poorer classes — those least able to bear the loss. 

.... Nobody but the brokers will deal in them now The 

Corporation issues of Newark and Jersey City .... more popular 
than others .... are included in the general decree of banish- 

ment The people will takenothing but govermnent postage 

currency for small change. There appears to be no lack of it now.' 

To protect holders of postage stamps that had been used 
as currency from losses similar to those suffered by holders 

1 Batlet, National Loana of the United States^ p. 159. 

2 Compare the notice published by the same newspaper at the head of its 
editorial seotion January 23, that '' no shinplasters or postage stamps ^except in the 
sheet" woold be received in remittances after that date. See also notioe of 
January 27. 

8 Quoted in Banken' Magatiney Yol. XYII, p. 828. 



Thb CiBOüLATiNa Mbdium 165 

of shinplasters the postmaster-general was obliged to order 
the redemption of such stamps as were evidently uncanceled.' 
May 27, 1863, issues of the postage currency ceased, af ter 
$20,000,000 had been placed in circulation. Its place was 
taken by the " fractional currency" authorized by the act of 
March 3, 1863.* The new notes were made of thinner but / 
stronger paper, could not be coonterfeited easily, and were 
not injnred by wetting.' But aside from the technical 
superiority of the new issues as currency, the change was one 
only in ñame. The title " postage currency " had been a 
misnomer, for the notes were not like ordinary postage 
stamps. Issues of the new notes commenced October 10, 
1863. By the 30th of June, 1864, about $7,750,000 of the 
fractional currency had been put in circulation, while $5,000,- 
000 of the postage currency had been withdrawn, so that the 
whole amount outstanding was not quite $23,000,000.* The 
same process of withdrawal of the oíd and substitution of 
the new notes was continued during the next year. The 
amount of postage currency decreased from $15,000,000 to 
$10,000,000, while the amount of the fractional currency 
increased from $7,750,000 to $15,000,000. Thus at the end 
of the war the aggregate fractional currency of both kinds in 
use was $25,000,000.* 

V. MINOB COINS 

The difficulties with the circulating médium did not stop 
with the subsidiary coins of silver, but extended even to the 
minor coins of base metate. The act of February 21, 1857, 
had provided for replacing the oíd copper cents of 168 
grains by coins weighing 72 grains and composed of 88 

^Reporto/ the Poitmcuter-Oeneral^ cited ahoye, p. 183, and Annual American 
CVeiapcedto, 1862, p. 468. 

2 12 StcUuUt at Large, p. 711. 3 Barüeen' Maffaxine, Yol. XVm, p. 864. 

^ Beport of the Secretary of the Treaaury, December, 1864, p. 45. 

& Beport uf iht Secretary of the Treatury, December, 1865, p. 53. 



166 HlSTOBT OP THB GbBBSBACES 

parts eopper and 13 puts nickeL^ Of theae new oeots theie 
had beea ismed ll&06d.000 hj Jone 30, 1862.' The woA 
oi «ixchaiigiii^ tke new fw the oíd ooins was still going on, 
bot the director of the mint repoited in October, 1862, that 
the uumber of oíd cents was rapidly diminiflhing and that 
they woold soca disappear altogether from ciicolaticMi.' The 
new cents» together with soch of the oíd as still lemained in 
nae^ were the onlj minor ooins, for the making of half -cents 
had been stopped by the act of 1857, and two, thiee, and 
fi^e-cent píeces were not anthorized ontil 1861, 1865, and 
1866, respecÜTely.* 

The withdrawai of the silTer ooins from circolation in 
June and Joly caosed a marked extensión in the ose of the 
nickel cents as snbstitntes. To make them senre more 
conveniently in the place of sÜTer, cents were sometimes 
done up in rolls of twenty-fíve and passed from hand to 
hand, frequently without opening/ The demand for these 
coins at the mint snddeidy became very great As many as 
8,600,000 pieces were strock at Philadelphia in Jnly, and 
there was a great msh to procure them.* ** Large amoonts,'^ 
said the director of the mint in October, ** have been sent to 
every part of the country, and orders beyond onr ability to 
fiU are constantly forwarded to the mint'^ ^ The nomber of 
cents coined increased from 10,000,000 in the ñscal year 
1861 and 12,000,000 in 1862, to 48,000,000 in 1863.* 

It is a curióos but well-attested fact that the nickel cents 
went to a premium almost as soon as the subsidiary silver 
coina The New York Commercial Advertiser oí July 10 

iSec 4, 11 Staiutet ai Large, p. 163. 

iReparU cf the Director of tke Miní, Oetober, 1857 and 188S, pp. 49 aod 75 
rMpectively. Here and in other eiiations of the Iteport» of the Director of the Mint 
ihm pa#M refer to the flnanoe reports. 

• /6td., p. 46. « Coinage Laum of the United StateB, nn to J89é, 4th ed., p. 80. 
ft8prín«fleld Rejmblican, Joly 15, 1862. 

• Banker§' Magazine, Yol. XVII, p. 800. 

^Beport,^,^ *BepoHef the Director <^ the Mint, Oeioher,í3M,p,an. 



The Ciboulating Mbdium 167 

reported that while gold was at 17 per cent, premium in 
paper, silver was at 10 and nickel at 4 per cent. A similar 
oondition was noted by the Springfield Repvblican July 15, 
and the director of the mint in his annual report for 1863 
said that '* for the past two years'^ cents had '^ commanded a 
premium " and were then " scarcely to be had." * 

The canse for this premium on cents in 1862 must [ 
have been different from the cause for the premium on gold • 
and silver coins. The latter were at a premium because the ' 
buUion in them was of more valué than the corresponding 
sums of paper money. According to the director of the 
mint, however, the cent in 1862 cost "the govemment 
scarcely half a cent/' ' and again in 1863 he reported that 
nickel cents contained a " half cent's worth of metal, more 
or less, according to market fluctuations." ' These state- 
ments of cost to the govemment, however, do not necessarily 
show the market valué of cents as bullion, because a large 
part of the metal used in their manufacture was imported,^ 
and the duties which prívate men would have to pay were 
remitted to the mint. But these duties were not heavy 
enough to make a very great difference. Under the tariff 
act of July 14, 1862, imported nickel paid a tax of but 10 
per cent od váloremy and tmder the act of June 30, 1864, 
this rate was increased to but 15 per cent.^ Meanwhile 
copper in pigs, bars, or ingots paid two cents a pound 
according to the act of March 2, 1861, and 2^ cents accord- 
ing to the act of June 30, 1864.* 

Consequently, even if the director's estimates of cost be 
taken to mean cost on a specie basis and 10 per cent, be 
added for the duties, 100 of the 1-cent coins would have had 

1 P. 189. ^Report, p. 49. 9 Report, p. 188. 

*Ibid,t p. 180, and latter of the director of the mint to Chase, Maroh 16, 1864, in 
(kmffremanal Olobe^ S8th Gong., Ist sess., p. 1228. 

^Í28tatuíe» at Large, p. 550, and 13 Statutes, p. 211. 

•12 Ataltttet at Large, p. 182, and 13 Stotutet, p. 206. 



168 HlSTOBT OP THB GbKKSBACKS 

B msrket rmlve as boIHoa of not more thmn 55 cents in gokL 
On ÚÓB estínuile cents ipoold iio4 bBTe gooe to m ¡vemiiim in 
pBper correncj f or tke ssme reBson thal gold miid síIt«' did, 
antfl the specie TBlne of b psper dollar was leas than 55 cents 
— that iSy ontil goid was at a preminm of almost S2 per cent. 
Bot 8o high a premhim was not reBched nntil A{»il, 1864. ' 
In Jnlj, 1862, when a premiom is said to haré been paid for 
oents, the average Taloe of paper doUars was S6.6 cents in 
gfA¿Lf and the metal in lO) nickel cents was worth at most 
aboot 63| cents in paper. If men were ready to pnj a pre- 
minm for cents, then, it most hsTe been becanse of their 
anziet j to procure a part of the insofficient sopply for nse 
as SQUiU change — not becanse thej coold make a profit by 
melting or exporting the coin& 

This need for 1-cent pieces continoed to be felt even 
after the issne of the postage and fractional cnrrency, for 
the lowest denominaüons of the Utter were 5 and 3 cents 
respectively.' That the snpply of cents was not snfficient to 
flM^t the demand is clear. Before suspensión they were 
^^ef/nñidered redondant in qnantity,*^ according to the 
difhf^UjT of the mint, and it *^was part of the hoorly finesse 
tA bayem and aellers to get rid of them.*^ ' Although IIG,- 
(KKl/KKi of the nickel coins had been issued by Jone 30, 
18^/2, and 48,(XX),000 more were added doring the next 
y^ar, the snpply was still so short in comparison with the 
demand that not less than three hondred varíeties of illegal 
cent Ujlkfnñ of the same size, bnt less weight than the mint 
cent, and containing no nickel, were issaed by private 
imriu'H ín direct violation of the law and '* nntil suppressed 
wero f n-ely nsed as coin by the public." * Since the supply was 
thas d^rfícient, it is perhaps not sorprising that basiness honses 
were willing to pay a slight premiom for their small change. 

1 Knot, Uniíed átate» Nota, pp. 108 and 104. 

1 Heport of íhu, p. 180. * Ihid, 



Thb Ciboulatino Médium 169 

■* 

As the amount of cents called for continued to be bo 
great, and as nickel was a costly ingredient, the director of 
the mint proposed in October, 1863, to substitute bronze for 
the alloy of nickel and oopper.' No action was taken upon 
this recommendation at the time, and on March 2, 1864, the 
director wrote a letter to Secretary Chase, calling attention 
again to the subject: 

This change in the material of the cent .... has become 
a necessity from the advanoe[d] prioe of nickel (for a supply 
of which we are at present entirely dependent upon the foreign 
market, paying for it in gold or its equivalent), and the great 
uncertainty of procuring an adequate supply for the futuro from 
any souree at a prioe within the legal limit, . . . . if nickel is 
retained it will be impossible to meet the enormous demand for 
cents, and the increasing cost of production may compel a cessa- 
tion of that ooinage. The demand for cents is now far beyond our 
ability to supply it." 

Chase sent this letter with one of his own, supporting the 
director's recommendations, to Fessenden.* When the pro- í 
posal to drop nickel as an ingredient in the coinage became < 
known, it encountered serious opposition from the friends of 
Mr. Joseph Wharton, from whose works in Pennsylvania and ; 
New Jersey came the entire domestic supply.* To remo ve '• 
their objections Mr. PoUock, the director, wrote a second 
letter March 16, recommending as a compromiso that the oíd 
alloy of 88 per cent, oopper and 12 per cent, nickel be 
retained, but that the weight of the cent be reduced from 72 
to 48 grains.^ Mr. Clark, from the Senate fínance committee, 

2 CofngremontU Glóbe^ SSth Con«rM Ist Sess., p. 1228. > /Md., p. 1227. 

* Mr. Whartoo himaelf preparad a little pamphlet, Project for ReorgarUMing tke 
Small Coinage of the United StaieB of America^ in which he offered to proyide all the 
nickel tíiat wonld be necessary for making not only one- and two-cent pieces, bat also 
other ooins lesa than twenty-flTe cents at $2.50 per ponnd. At this price he estimated 
Uiat one- and two-cent pieces conld be made at a profit of 33H per cent, to the gOT- 
emxnent. The pamphlet bears the date April 15, 1864, 

& ConQreuiofníit Olobe^ S8th Gong., Ist Sess., p. 1228. 



170 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

however, brought ín a bilí for a bronze cent of 48 grains 
and a 2-cent piece of the same compositíon, but twice the 
weight.' This measure was at once passed by the Senate' 
and a month later by the Honse after very bríef discuBsion.' 
In October the director of the mint reported that the new 
coinage law had been ^'highly saccesafaL^^ **The demand 
for the one and two-cent pieces/^ he added, ^'has been nnpre- 
cedented, and every effort has been made to meet it.'^ In 
explaining why the demand continued greater than the 
supply, despite daily issues largely in excess of any former 
period, he said: 

Large quantities are hoarded and thus kept from circulation. 
They have also been bought and sold by small brokers at a 
premiiun. This has induced individuáis to collect them for the 
purpose of sale, thus producing a scarcity and inconvenience tothe 
public that ought not to exist/ 

The letters of Mr. PoUock to Secretary Chase and these 
remarks in the October report indícate that the time had at 
last come when the buUion valué of nickel cents was approxi- 
mating their nominal valué as currency. Indeed, as early as 
March, 1864, Lyman Trumbull, of Illinois, remarked in the 
Senate: 

The cent as a general thing does not circuíate in the oountry 
now, I think. We see some few of them here, but in my travels I 
very seldom see a cent. I do not know how it may be in other por- 
tions of the country.' 

At this time, March 21, gold was at 162 and paper was 
accórdingly worth 61.7 in specie. If cents were being 
hoarded, it must have been because the advance in the price 
of nickel, of which Mr. PoUock complained, had carried the 
bullion valué of 100 coins above 62 cents in gold. But 

1 OM^reMionaí G(o6e, 88th CoDff., iBt Sess., p. 1227. i/6id., p. 1228. 

>/&id., p. 1763; act of AprU 22« 1851 ; IZ Stat^te» at Lmve, p. U, 

* Report, October, 1864, p. 218. 

& Congretñanal Olobc, 88th Gong., Ist Seas., p. 1227. 



The Cibgulating Médium 171 

whether there was a profit in melting or exporting the minor 
coins in March, 1864, there apparently was one in Jone and 
the following months. The monthly average price of gold 
was aboye 200 from Jnne ontil February of the next year, 
inclusive. During this period the average specie valué of 
paper doUars varíed from 38.7 cents in July to 48.7 cents in 
February. Even had there been no advance in the gold 
price of nickel, there would have been a margin of profit in 
collecting coins which would pass current as money at a gold 
equivalence of considerably less than 50 cents, but could be 
sold as bullion for perhaps 55 or more. Consequently, it is 
not improbable that some of the brokers who bought nickel 
cents at a premium in the summer of 1864 purchased them 
to melt or export, not to sell again for chango. On the other 
hand, it should be pointed out that the expense of collecting 
and handling one-cent pieces would be much greater in 
proportion to their bullion valué than in the case of silver 

coins. 

The situation was, of course, somewhat different with the 
cents struck under the new coinage law. These coins con- 
tained no nickel and weighed but two-thirds as much as the 
previous issues. During the fiscal year 1865 the government 
made a profit of about $400,000 from their manufacture.' If 
any premium was paid for them, it must consequently have 
been from the desire to obtain change. As the nickel cents 
appear, from what Senator TrumbuU and the director say, to 
have gone out of circulation in large measure, the scarcity of 
change less than three cents — the smallest fractional note — 
must have been severe. Of the bronze cents 5,874,000 were 
struck before July 1 and of the two-cent pieces 1,822,500.* 

1 Beport €f tke Director of tht Mint, September, 1865, p. 282. 

3 No sepárate statement is made by the director of the mint of the ooinage of 
nickel and bronce cents in the fiscal year of 1864, bnt the above fijares are obtained 
by snbtraetins from the total coinage of cents np to Jnne SO, 1864, the total nnmber 
of copper and nickel cents stnick as giyen in Coinage Law of the United StaUt^ 1791 
-18M, 4th ed., p. 80. 



172 HlSTOBY OF THE GbESNBAGKS 

Though the coinage doring the fiscal year 1865 was very 
rapid — an average of 2,250,000 two-cent pieces and 4,500,- 
000 cents each month' — the supply could not have been 
sufficient to meet the demand. 

One more change was made in the circnlation of minor 
coins before the end of the war. From a pnce of 226 the 
last day of 1864 gold fell to 200 by the Ist of March, and 
the rapid progresa of the northem armies then promised a 
still f urther fall, which was realized in April and May, when 
the average price was 148.5 and 135.6 respectively. This 
fall in gold or rise of paper money seemed to show that the 
day was cióse at hand when minor coins wonld remain in 
circulation without difficulty.' Accordingly a bilí was passed 
withont discnssion by Congress,' authorizing the issue of a 
three-cent piece, made of copper and nickel, in the propor- 
tion of 75 parts of the first and 25 parts of the second. 
This coin was to be legal tender in payments of sixty cents, 
and the one and two-cent pieces in payments of four cents. 
At the same time it was provided that thereafter no frac- 
tional notes should be issued of denominations less than five 
cents, and that any such notes outstanding should be 
destroyed when paid into the treasury.* 

When the director of the mint prepared his report at the 
end of September, 1865, he made no further complaints 
about the premium on minor coins. Paper doUars had then 
a valué of more than sixty-nine cents in gold, and even the 
three-cent pieces, containing 25 per cent, of nickel, seemed to 
have been worth more as currency than as buUion. " The 
coinage of the cent and the two-cent piece from the bronze 
alloy," the director said, "has been very large, but not in 

1 Report of ttie Director of the Mint, 1865, p. 235. 

2 Hunt'a MerchanU" Magazine for May, 1865, includes ''coppers" in its statement 
of ^' the active circulation of the country,^* Vol. LII, p. 381. 

8 Ckmoreuional Globe, 38th Gong., 2d Sess., pp. 1301 and 1408. 
« Act of March 3, 1865; 13 Statutea at Large, p. 517. 



The Cibgulating Médium 173 

excess of the demand. They have been distributed to ahnost 
everj part of the United States, and many into states, west 
and Bouth, that heretofore refosed to use such coin as cor- 
rency."* He closed by suggesting that the policy porsued 
in issuing a three-cent piece be foUowed further by making 
fíve-cent coins also of 25 per cent, nickel, and that, to make 
room for their circulation, all fractional notes below ten cents 
be withdrawn. 

VI. TBEASUBT NOTES 

As was said above, the first greenbacks were issued early 
in April, 1862. From this time on until specie payments 
were resomed, January 1, 1879, they served as the standard 
of valué in all business transactions and also as an impor- 
tant part of the circulating médium. United States notes to 
the amount of $98,600,000 were issued before July 1, 1862. 
From this time on for two years the treasury was paying out 
large sums in these notes, but was also redeeming those paid 
in to it and then reissuing them. During the toext fiscal year 
the issues were $291,300,000 as compared with the redemp- 
tions of $2,100,000; during 1864, $86,400,000, as compared 
with $42,600,000, and during 1865, $4,200,000, as compared 
with $4,300,000. Thus $431,000,000 were left outstanding 
at the cióse of the war.^ The greenbacks served as a 
médium of exchange, not only in large, but also in small 
transactions, for while the first act provided that $5 should 
be the lowest denomination, the second and third acts per- 
mitted any denomination not less than a doUar. The amount 
of the several denominations in use is indicated by the fol- 
io wing table: 

IP. 232. 

'Batuet, NcUional Loan» of the United StcUea^ p. 157. These statements di£Fer 
sli^htly from those given year by year in the contemporaneons reports of the seore- 
tary of the treasury. 



174 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 



TABLE lY 

PNlTaO tTATM NOTM OT THB tBVBBAL DBNOMXMATIONB OUTSTANDINO AT THS CLOSB 

Or BAOH FXtOAL TBAB FBOM 1862 TO 1866 1 



(Id millions of doUars) 



()n«t (loUlir 

Twd (lolUní 

Klvt) (lolUní 

Tmi (lolUní 

Twfinty dolUrH 

Kirty UolUrH 

()m> hundrml dolUrn. 
1^1 V0 hundi^d clolUm. 
Oiiii ihuuMinílílonArH. 

TmUI 

llttiMiiiilniiilon un- 
kmiwn, In f^üürvtt... 

N»i 



1868 


1868 


1864 


1865 


• • • • 


16.0 


16.8 


17.8 


• • • • 


17.0 


17.7 


19.6 


17.1 


79.9 


95.5 


96.0 


15.4 


90.0 


108.7 


109.5 


15.0 


74.9 


86.6 


86.1 


13.0 


23.0 


29.9 


29.7 


13.0 


30.8 


34.2 


33.8 


13.0 


26.5 


25.4 


24.8 


10.0 


29.5 


37.1 


35.8 


96.6 


387.6 


451.9 


453.1 


« • « • 

96.6 


• • • • 


4.6 


22.0 


387.6 


447.3 


431.1 



1866 



17.2 
18.8 
95.4 
109.0 
85.1 
29.3 
33.3 
35.4 
57.1 

480.7 



79.9 



400.8 



hut Ihu ^rt^t^nbaokfi were by no means the only form of 
IfovoniiiMMil obll^ntionfi omployed as currency. Three other 
HdiU nf tnianury iiotoH woro made a legal tender to the same 
iiitinnl tiM IhiitiMl BtatoH notes, but differed from the latter 
Im IIimI IIm7 Ixm^ interest. The third legal-tender act, 
ii|i|troyo<l MhpoIi l\, 18((8, authorized the issue of $400,000,- 
{H\{\ IrniiMury ludt^H, In^ring not more than 6 per cent. ínter- 
iimI, iiMlnniimblo iii not more than three years, and a legal 
ImioImt fnr Iludir fnoo valué, excluding interest.* Under this 
M(l Mi ilmuo Umu^l $166,500,000 of two-year 5 per cent. 
«miImn |ir(wo«iii July 1, 1863, and June 30, 1864, and 
I i l,h(M>,(HM> nf ouo-yonr 5 jx^r cent notes between January 
I ihhI «IumoIIO. 1S(U.' 

IIhw fitr tlioMo iiotoH wort^ omployed as currency is alto- 
||i«lln»( uiimM'Inln. It whh apjtarently the expectation of the 

I Ifti'iM I li/ «M«i Mm iWdi y (i/ Ihifi Titiitury, Dooomber, 1896, p. 62. 



. Thb Cibgulating Médium 175 

treasnry that banks and capitalista into whose hands they 
carne wotdd retain the notes to secare the interest. This 
would probably have happened very generally had the inter- 
est been paid only at matnrity. But when, in the autumn 
of 1863, Mr. Chase borrowed money for paying the troops 
from the banks, to be repaid in 5 per cent, notes, the banks 
stipolated that the notes given them shonld bear half-yearly 
interest coupons.' One hundred and fifty millions of the 
$166,500,000 of two-year notes issued were of this form.' 
They were f ound in practice to be a most unsatisf actory f orm 
of cnrrency. After Secretary Chase had mled that the interest 
coupons mnst be detached in the presence of an officer of 
the treasnry or of a national bank,' the notes were nsually 
paid ont with no regard to the interest until the date on 
which the next conpon was payable approached, then hoarded 
for a time, and as soon as the interest had been collected, 
once more thrown into circulation.* This tended, of conrse, 
to cause periodical expansions and contractions of the cnr- 
rency embarrassing alike to the bnsiness public and to the 
treasnry. The circulation was also rendered irregular by 
fluctuations in the current rates of interest on short-time 
loans in the New Tork market. When money was at 5 per 
cent, or less, men found it advantageous to retain the gov- 
emment notes in their own hands ; but when the rates rose 
to 7 or 8, few would choose to keep their funds in a short- 
time 5 per cent, security.* 

Appreciating these evüs, Mr. Chase and Mr. Fessenden, 
who succeeded him as secretary of the treasnry on July 5, 
1864, determined to withdraw the coupon notes as rapidly 

1 Huwt^e MerchanU* If oocurine. Yol. L, p. 455. 

> Report of the Treaturer^ November, 1864, p. 75. 

*HutW9 MerckantM' Magazine^ Yol. L, p. 455. 

4 Report of the Secretary of the TreoMwry^ 1864, p. 18 ; Hunta MerchawW* Magazinet 
Vol. L« pp. 215, 216, and Yol. U, p. 447. 

^Himfa MerehanW* Magazine^ Yol. L, pp. 215 and 455. 



176 HI8TOBT OF THB 6bBBSBACK8 

as poasible. Befbre Deoember, Secretaiy FesBenden le- 
poried, abcmt $90.000^000 of tke $150,000,000 iasoed had 
been retired.' Their place w«s occnpied faj anoüier form 
of interest-bearíng, kgal>tmder treasury notes issaed nnder 
the anthoríty of the acts of Maich 3, 1863, and June 30, 
1861.' The new notes lan thiee yeais and boie interest 
at 6 per cent, compoonded half-jearlj bat pajable only at 
mahuitr. Some $17,000,000 were iasoed befcHe the cióse of 
the fiscal year 1S64, and $180,000,000 dming the next year.' 
These issues weie called compoond-inteiest notes. They were 
commonlT regarded as the least injnrions form of treasorr 
notes derised doring the war becanse of the indocement which 
the compound interest gave fór keeping them as an invest- 
ment.* Of conrse, this inducement became stronger the longer 
the note had been issued. Thns a $10 note — the smaUest de- 
nomination — was worth $10.60 at the end of the first year, 
$11.25 at the end of the second, and $1L94 at the end of 
the third. Anyone who paid the note away at the end of 
the first year wonld therefore lose 60 cents, at the end of the 
second $1.25, and at the end of the third $1.94. 

Nevertheless the componnd-interest notes senred to in- 
erease the cnrrency inflation to an nncertain extent, both 
directly and indirectly. The comptroUer of the cnrrency 
thought that in October, 1865, perhaps $10,000,000 of these 
notes were in actual circnlation as money,* and in December 
the secretary of the treasury thought it was "safe to esti- 
mate" that $30,000,000 of the one- and two-year notes of 
1868 and the componnd-interest notes together were so 
used.* Perhaps the indirect use was really more important. 

> Repori, p. 18. Cf. Chase's letter of April 17. 1865, to Colonel J. D. Van Barco 
in 8cMUCKKRii*8 Li/c^ p. 413. 

2 12 HtatuU» at Large, p. 710, and IS 8tatute$, p. 218; cf. Batlet, p. 8t. 

3 Batlet, p. 163. The form of these notes is irÍTen by Knox, p. 111. 

* Report of the Secretar^ of tke Trtaturyy 1864, p. 18. 

* H. R. Exeeutivt Docun%ent No, 4, aoth Gong., Ist. Sess., p. 5. • Report, p. 9. 



Thb Cibculatinq Médium 177 

Tbis was foond in practice of banks of holding compoond- 
interest notes as reserves in place of greenbacks that bore no 
interest. The comptroUer of the currency stated that the 
amonnt held by national banks October 2, 1865, was $74,- 
250,000.* Similar use was made of the one- and two-year 5 
per cent notes left outstanding.^ In so far as interest- 
bearing, legal-tender notes were kept in this fashion, they 
set free greenbacks for circnlation among individuáis. 

The list of govemment obligations employed as cur- 
rency is not yet complete. Two other forms, although not a 
legal tender, were used as a circulating médium. The issue 
of certificates of indebtedness, bearing interest at 6 per cent, 
and payable in one year, had been authorized without lim- 
itation of amount by the act of March 1, 1862.' This 
method of postponing claims which they had not the funds 
to meet at once was availed of on a large scale by the secre- 
taries of the treasury during the entire war. Fifty millions 
of such certificates were issued in the fiscal year of 1862, 
$157,000,000 in 1863, $169,000,000 in 1864, and $131,- 
000,000 in 1865.^ Most of these notes were paid out to con- 
tractors and by them used either as coUateral for procuring 
bank loans or directly as currency. Much of the time certifi- 
cates of indebtedness were at a small discount, but despite 
this they passed freely from hand to hand as current funds.^ 

Similar use was made of the ''seven-thirties.'' This was 
the ñame given to the three-year treasury notes bearing 7.3 
per cent, interest issued under the acts of July 17, 1861, 
June 30, 1864, and March 3, 1865." Interest on notes 

1 See referenoe in note 5 on preoeding page. They were not, however, a legal 
tender in payment of bank notes.— 13 StaitUea <U Large^ p. 219. 

SBofitert* Magfuine^ Vol. XVIII, p. 827; Hunfa MerchanU' Magazine, VoL 
lLIX,p.8M. 

> 12 Siatute» <U Large^ p. 352. « Batlet, p. 159. 

& Qf, Hunt'a MerchanU' Magazine, Vol. LII, p. 382. 

« 12 Statviea at Large, p. 259 ; 13 Statutea, pp. 218 and 408. 



178 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBAGKS 

/ iflsued onder the first of these laws was paid in gold, but the 

I second and third issues were payable, principal and interest, 

I in lawful money. In the summer and antomn of 1864 Sec- 

retarj Fessenden offered 7.30 notes of the second issne in 

small denominations to army officers and soldiers in pay- 

ment of their wages. Over $20,000,000 were thus paid 

'^nt in place of greenbacka' In December, 1865, Secretary 

McCuUoch reported that many seven-thirties of these small 

. denominations were in circnlation as money.' 

VII. BBOAPITULATION 

Perhaps the clearest view of the confused state of the 
monetary circnlation of the United States during the Civil 
War can be obtained from a summary statement of the 
various coins, govemment obligations used as currency, and 
bank notes ontstanding at the cióse of the several fiscal 
years, so far as the amoonts can be ascertained. Such a 
statement is presented on the foUowing page, with a few 
explanatory notes. 

This table is intended rather as an indication of the vari- 
ous kinds of currency in use than as a quantitative statement 
of the circulating médium. Few of the items can be regarded 
as showing with any degree of definiteness amounts in use 
as money. The specie circnlation, for example, is computed 
on the basis of the statistics of coinage and the director of 
the minf s estímate that in 1861 there were from $275,000,- 
000 to $300,000,000 of specie in the country and that in 
1862 there were $45,000,000 of silver coinage.' A different 

1 Report of the Secretary of the Trecuury, IMi, p. 21. 

1 Reporta 1M5, p. 9. ünder the act of Jane 90, 1864« it was prorided that such of 
the notes as should be made iMyable principal and interest at matnrity shonld be a 
legal tender (IS Statute» cU Laroe^ p. 218). As, howerer, the secretary preferred to 
attach interest conpons of which only the last was payable with !the note at matnr- 
ity, they did not possess this property. Cf. W. F. De Knioht, Hittory cf ihe Cur- 
rency of the Oo/untry and of the Loana of the United 8tate$ (Treasnry Department 
Doc. No. 1M3), 1897, p. 96, and form of the 7-4X)*s as giren on the following pages. 

3 Report of 1861, p. 62 ; Report, 1862, p. 49. 



The Cibgulating Médium 



179 



TABLE V 

CÜSBXNCT OF THB LOTAL BTATB8 AT THS CLOBB OF KACH FISCAL TSAX FBOM 1860 

T01866 





(In millions of dolían) 










1860 


1861 


1862 


1863 


1864 


1865 


1866 


T. Specie:^ 
















1. Gold coins 


184.6 


245.3 


22.0 


22.0 


22.0 


22.0 


22.0 


2.Silyerdollars... 


• • • • • 


• • • • • 












3. Subsidiary silver 


39.6 


42.2 


3.Ó 


3.0 


3.Ó 


3.Ó 


3.0 


4. Minor coins. — 


.9 


1.0 


1.2 


1.6 


2.1 


3.3 


3.9 


II. Postage and/rae- 
















tional currency :' 
















1. Poetare currency 








20.2 


15.2 


9.9 


7.0 


2. Fractional curr. 










7.7 


15.1 


20.0 


III. Non-inierest bear- 
















ing, legal'tendery 
















treaaury notes: 
l.Old aemand 






























notes' 






53.0 
96.6 


3.4 

387.6 


.8 
447.3 


.5 
481.1 


.3 


2.Qreeñbacks' 


•• 


!!V. ! 


400.8 


IV. Bank notes:* 
















1. Notes, State b*ks 


207.1 


202.0 


183.8 


238.7 


179.2 


142.9 


20.0 


2. Notes, natl b*ks 










31.2 


146.1 


281.5 


V. Interest-bearing^ 
















legal'tender, 
trecuury notes :^ 






























1.0ne-year, 5 per 
















cent., treasury 
















notes of 1863.... 










44.5 


•V 




2.Two-year, 5 per 












'42 3 


3 5 


cent., treasury 
















notes of 1863 










109.0 


J 




3. Ck>mpound inter- 
















est notes 










15.0 


193.8 


159.0 


VI. Oovemment obli- 
















gations not a 
legal tender:^ 






























L Certificatesof in- 
















debtedness. 






49.9 


156.8 


ieo.7 


115.8 


26.4 


2.7-30 treasury 
















notes of 1864.... 












234.4 


' 


3.7-^30 treasury 














[8063 


notes of 1866 












437.2 




VIL Coin, buUion, and 
















paper money tn 
















the Treasury \. . 


6.7 


3.6 


23.8 


79.5 


35.9 


55.4 


80.8 



1 See ezplanations in text below. 

s Gompiled from the azmual Beportt of the Secretary of the Treatury, 

1 See Table lY above. 

^StatitticaiAbetractof the United Statet, ISIS, p, ti, 

K '* Information Respeetincr V, S. Bonds, Paper Cnrrency, Coin,** etc. (roTised ed., 
Trúanurff Dq^rtmení Circuiar No, 128, Jnly 1, 1866) , p. 52. 



180 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

result would have been reached had Mr. Chase^s guess at the 
amount of coin been taken in place of the directoras.' Of 
course, the coins put down as circulating after 1862 were 
nsed only on the Pacific coast. The common guess is that 
about $25,000,000 were employed there, and this sum has 
been divided between gold and subsidiary silver again by 
guesswork.' The figures for the minor coins show the 
amounts struck onder the acts of 1857 and the laws of 1864, 
1865, and 1866, as given in the current reports of the 
director of the mint. But, as has been shown, it is probable 
that a considerable part of these coins were withdrawn from 
circulation at least during the summer, antomn, and winter 
of 1864. On the other hand, some of the oíd copper cents 
made before 1857 remained still in circulation in 1862 and 
large amounts of cent tokens were privately issued in 1863. 

The figures for the postage and fractional currency are 
drawn from the public debt statements of the annual reports 
of the secretary of the treasury. They are subject to a con- 
siderable but indefinite error, particularly in the later years, 
on account of the large number of these little notes lost and 
destroyed. It must also be remembered that the place in 
the currency which they were intended to fiU was largely 
occupied from July, 1862, to perhaps Pebruary or March, 
1863, by shinplasters and postage stamps. 

The next four items in the table are less uncertain. It 
is well ascertained that the oíd demand notes were not com- 
monly used as currency after May, 1862. From that time 
on they were seldom paid out except as a substitute for gold 
at the customs-houses. The circulation of greenbacks during 
the war is subject to small doubt, although different official 

1 Chase made the coin of the loyal states November 1, 1861, not less than $210,000,- 
000 (Reporta 1862, p. 13). The director of the mint made this same sam somewhere 
between $255,000,000 and $280,000,000. See note 3, p. 178, above. 

^Cf, ^'Information Respecting United States Bonds, Paper Currency, Coins, 
etc.'' (reyised ed., Trecuury Department Circular No, 128^ Jnly 1, 1896), p. 52, note 1. 



The Ciboulating Médium 181 

docoments do not give precisely identical figures, and the 
same is true regarding the notes of state and national banks. 

In the next two divisions — interest-bearing govemment 
obligations which were and which were not a legal tender — 
the amonnt outstanding is stated with accuracy by the regis- 
ter of the treasury, but no reliable estímate can be made 
of the amount that was in actual use as currency at the 
different dates. 

Statements of the volume of the monetary circulation of 
the United States during the Civil War have been published 
from time to time in official documents ' and frequently 
accepted uncritically as the basis of argument in currency 
discussions. The preceding review of the situation, indefi- 
nite and tedious as it is, has at least the negative merit of 
showing that such statements are subject to a much wider 
margin of error than is commonly the case — and few would 
be found to claim a high degree of accuracy for statements 
of this sort under the most favorable circumstances. To cast 
up the totals of the above table would be not only useless, 
but positively misleading, because several of the items are 
mere guesses, and in the case of others where the amounts 
are reasonably certain, not all of the sums set down were in 
use at any time as currency. Ñor could any estimate be 
made on the basis of the totals that would command confi- 
dence. But, while the amount of currency in circulation is 
not and cannot be known, it is evident from the discussion 
that not least among the unhappy consequences of the legal- 
tender acts was the disorder into which the circulating 
médium was thrown — a disorder that caused much incon- 
venience to the business public. The more serious effects 
produced by the disturbance of the standard of valué remain 
to be discussed in other chapters. 

1 See for example the StatUUeai Abttrcíci for 1878, p. 14, and the circular of the 
Treasnry Department referred to above. 



/ 



CHAPTEK ni 

THE SPECIE VALUÉ OF THE PAPER CUBRENCT 

L TkeMarkeUfarGold: 

FliBt DealingB in Qold— The Stock Ezchange — The Gold Ex- 
change— The '^Open Bcwrd**— The ETening Ezchange— Natue 
of the BusinesB in Qold — Tablee of the Premiam. 

IL Factart which Afected ihe Gold Price of the Cwrrtney: 

V^aríous TheoríeB of the Premiiim — The Suppl j of and Demand 
for Gold — Effect of BeoeÍTability fór Tares, Convertilnlity into 
Bonda and of the Legal-Tender Clanae on the Valué of Greenbacks 
~ Effect of Additional Ifisnee— Of Finance Reports— Of *«War 
XetTs"*— Of Political Events— Of Foreign Affairs— The Preminm 
and the Quantity Theory — Specolation. 

IIL The Ckmne of Depreeiatüm, January, 1962, to Deeewiber, 1965: 
L Jannary to April, 1862—2. The Fall from Maj, 1862, to Febni- 
arj, 1863— a The Rise from Maich to Aogiist, 1863—4. The Fall 
from September, 1863, to Jolj, 186á — Chase^s Campaign against 
the Qold Specolators— &. The Rise from Augost, 1861, to May, 1866 
— 6. The Decline from June to December, 1865. 

THE MABKET8 FOB QOLD' 

A PBEMIUM appeared apon gold as soon as it became known 
tbat the treasury and the New Tork banks had determined 
to snspend specie payments. This premium represented the 
difference between the commnnity^s valoation of gold ooin, 
on the one hand, and of the paper cnrrency, on the other. 
In Jannary, 1862, the latter consisted of bank and treasury 
notes that had been put into circnlation as tacit or explicit 
promises to pay gold coin. Of course, men did not esteem 
snch promises as eqnivalent to gold itself after the promisors 
had given public notice that they were unable to redeem 

1 Seo K. Ck>BinrALLl8, The Gold Room and the New Tork Stock Kxekanoe and 
CMearing House (''Atlas Serios/' No. 8), New York, 1879; Jahss K. Mkdbbrrt, Men 
amd Myterieaof Wall Street (Boston, 1870), chapters xii, xiii ; Horacb Whitk, Moñty 

Banking (Boston, 1886), pp. 174-90; and fnrther rsferenoes in footnotoa below. 

182 



Speoib Valüb op THE Papbb Cübbenoy 183 

their promises f or the present, and when no one knew how long 
snch redemption would be postponed. Henee, when men who 
reqnired gold eoin for any pnrpose songbt to procure it in 
exchange for paper money, they had to pay more than 
SlOO of paper for $100 of gold. Whatever excess they paid 
was, of conrse, a premiom on gold. 

For abont a fortnight after suspensión there was no 
organized market for gold in New Tork. People desiring 
to buy gold natnrally went to the dealers in foreign coin 
who displayed the precious metáis in their shop windows, 
and people who had specie to sell took it to the same places. 
Bnt very soon the business became too large to be con- 
dncted in this fashion. The small offices of the money 
brokers were overcrowded, and traders blocked the sidewalks 
of narrow Wall street to snch an extent that the pólice were 
given special orders to keep the crowds moving. This state 
of affairs led to an organization of the traffic and the forma- 
tion of gold exchanges. 

From the pnblished tables of the premium it appears 
that regalar dealing in gold began on the New Tork stock 
exchange January 13, 1862. Here it was regarded as the 
gentlemanly and patriotic thing to sell gold, and the majority 
of members of the exchange who engaged in the traffic at 
all were on the ''bear^' side of the market. A second and 
less decorous market was formed in a dingy cellar in William 
street, dnbbed the "coal hole." A namber of men who 
were devoting themselves exclnsively to dealing in gold took 
refuge in this place when their bnsiness grew too large to be 
conducted in their prívate offices or in the street. As the 
number of brokers increased, the ''coal hole'' was found too 
small and the company moved to more commodious qnarters, 
first in Gilpin's News Boom at the comer of William street 
and Exchange place; later in the rooms of the oíd stock 
board at No. 24 Beaver street; and fínally in New street. 



184 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

next door to the stock exchange. For some time the mem- 
bers of this exchange, that carne to be known as the '' Gold 
Room/^ contented themselves with a very loóse organization. 
It was not until October, 1864, that a constitution and by- 
lawB were adopted and regalar officers elected. 

Besides the stock exchange and the " Gold Room,^' there 
were two other markets for gold in New York — the "open 
board'' and Gallagher^s evening exchange. The ^'open 
board *^ of stock brokers was a more popular organization, 
mnning as a rival of the "regular board" — í. e., the stock 
exchange — with which it was amalgamated in 1869. The 
"evening exchange ^^ was a characteristic excrescence of the 
times. Speculation was carried to an unprecedented extent 
in New Tork during the winter and spring of 1864. 
Though the regular exchange was kept open long hours, 
crowds of men thronged the corridors of the Fifth Avenue 
hotel speculating at night. A certain Mr. Gallagher seized 
upon the opportunity in March, 1864, to open a luxuriously 
appointed room opposite the hotel, where gold and railway 
and petroleum stocks could be bought and sold tul mid- 
night. So injurious was this continual round of feverish 
business deemed that after the disclosure of the Ketchum 
gold-certifícate forgeries' in August, 1866, the city banks, the 
stock exchange, the "open board,'' and the gold exchange 
united in an effort to suppress the evening exchange by 
forbidding their members to frequent it. As a result Gal- 
lagher was forced to cióse his rooms.' 

The volume of transactions in these markets became very 
great. Importers came to buy gold, not only for payment of 
customs dues and for making payments to foreigners, but 
also for protection against fluctuations in the valué of the 
currency between the time goods were bought and sold. 

1 See, e. g.^ HurWa lierchanU^ Magcuine^ Vol. Lin, p. 228. 

^Cf. New York Herald of An^nst 20, and the money artiole of Angost 24, 1865; 
Tribune, news oolumns of March 22, 1864. 



Specib Valüb of THE Papeb Cubbenot 185 

Bankers doing bnsiness in f oreign exchange had to purchase 
gold f or remittances. Exporters and apparently many men 
engaged in domestic trade or manof actores bought or sold 
like importers to gnard against changes in the vaíue of the 
currency. But the volume of speculative dealings probably 
far exceeded these transactions growing out of the needs 
of bnsiness. Indeed, gold became as favoríte an article to 
specnlate in as petrolenm stocks or railway shares. Many 
persons whose occnpations presented no need f or such opera- 
tions bought and sold gold — clergymen, physicians, law- 
yers, small merchants, anyone who had sufficient fands to 
provide the necessary 10 per cent, margina Members of 
Congress, clerks in the govemment departments, and news- 
paper reporters frequently tried to obtain pecnniary advan- 
tage from their positions by operating through gold brokers 
on the information that carne to them before it was given to 
the pnblic. Most large operators in gold had correspondents 
in Washington, Baltimore, or Louisville — the centers of 
war news — charged with sending them early dispatches con- 
ceming any event that could affect the credit of the govem- 
ment In the ''gold room" itself the stmggle between oppo- 
site parties of speculators partook largely of the sectional 
f eeling of the time ; and when the air was foll of exciting 
war news, the "bnlls" would of ten sing "Dixie," and the 
"bears" try to drown their voices by chanting "John 
Brown" in choms.* 

The price of gold in currency, as determined by transac- 
tions in these New York markets, was regularly reported by 
telegraph in all considerable towns of the United States, and 
everywhere accepted as authoritative. There is no necessity 
for taking account of the premium on gold in other places, 
because local markets were dominated by the New Tork 
quotations. The money columns of the daily newspapers 

I See CoEKWAiiLis, op. ctt., pp. 4-7. 



f 



186 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 

and the weekly or monthly issues of the ñnancial joumals 
gave fuU reporta of current fluctuations, and more permanent 
records were made by the compilation of a nomber of tablea 
showing the highest and lowest prices each day for a series 
of years. Such tablea may be fonnd in Hunfs Merchante* 
Magaziney the Commercial and Financial Chroniclcj the 
Bankers* Magazine^ and the annual Reports of the Chamber 
of Commerce of the State of New York} 

All of these tablea appear to be constructed in the same 
general manner from the recorded transactions of the most 
important of the New York markets. From January 13, 
1862, to Jnne 20, 1864, they are based upon sales at the 
stock exchange. On June 21 the "gold bilí" went into 
eflFect and stopped all dealing in gold outside the private 
offices of brokers.' From this time until the repeal of the 
"gold bilí" by the act of July 2, there was no organized 
market, and the quotations are those ruling on the street. 
Af ter the repeal, transactions in gold on the stock exchange 
were infrequent, and most of the business was done in the 
**gold room." From July, 1864, on, therefore, the tablea 
are based upon the latter market.' 

In studying the fluctuations in the gold valué of the paper 
currency it is necessary to go back to these records of the daily 
premium. As the differences between the tablea mentioned 
are slight, it matters little which set is accepted as a basis for 
the investigation. I have decided to use the tablea published 
in the chamber of commerce reports, not only because of the 
official character of the source from which they are taken, 
but also because they #>ntain fewer obvious errors of the 
press than some of the others. To adapt them better to the 

I ScHUCKEBS, op. ctt., pp. 6S1-4, pnblishes similar tablea for the years 1862-65 pre- 
pared by Messrs. B. K. Jamison & Co., bankers, of Philadelphia. 

3 See p. 231, below. 

s Compare the explanations made regarding the Commercial and FinancicU 
Chronicle tables; e. g.y YoL I, p. 168. 



Spegib Valué of thb Papbb Cubbency 187 

purposes of the present ohapter I have altered their form. 
As published, the tablea show the highest and lowest pnce 
paid each day in cnrrency for $100 in gold. This fonn of 
statement gives the impression that the flnctuations were dne 
to extraordínary changes ín the valoation at which gold was 
held by the commnníty, whereas in fact they were dne mainly 
to changes in the commnnity's valnation of the notes of the 
govemment When the market quotation was 200 the ex- 
planation, of conrse, was not that men esteemed gold twice 
as highly as they had done in 1861, bnt rather that they 
esteemed the paper cnrrency but half as highly as they had 
when it was redeemable in specie. A mnch jnster impression 
of the significance of the chango in the relativo valúes of gold 
and paper money is therefore given by quoting cnrrency at a 
disconnt in gold than by quoting gold at a premium in paper ; , 
by saying, to use a numerical example, that $100 in green- 
backs was worth $50 in gold, than by saying that $100 in 
gold was worth $200 in greenbacka For this reason the 
chamber of commerce tables for the years 1862 to 1865 have 
been converted into tables showing the highest and lowest 
daily prices of cnrrency in gold. These tables, given in full 
inthe Appendix,' fumish a basis for studying the remarkable 
changes in the gold valué of the cnrrency during the Civil 
War. 

II. FACTOBS WHICH AFFECTED THB GOLD PBICE OF THB 

CUBBENCY 

So rapid and so violent were the flnctuations in the gold 
markets that, despite the absorbing interest of military 
events, they attracted mnch attention from the treasury offi- 
cials and the general public. Various attempts were made 
to account for the changes. Perhaps the simplest theory 
was that a nominal advance of gold had been produced by 

P]>. 42&-«, below. 



188 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

the nefaríous acta of disloyal specnlators, who took advan- 
tage of the fact that '^gold had become a mere commodity^* 
to monopolize the supply and raise the price. This theory 
logically involved the conclusión that the corrency had not 
depreciated, but that gold had risen in valué — a conclusión 
that was commonly accepted and defended by instancing the 
case of yaríous commodities that had not advanced ín príce.^ 
One buoyant adherent of this view went so f ar as to con- 
gratúlate the country upon the increase in its wealth pro- 
duced by the advance of gold.' 

The plausibiUty of such views diminished in proportion 
as the rise in the price of commodities progressed, and af ter 
the winter of 1862-63 few were found to deny that the 
paper money had depreciated. It then became common 
to ascribe depreciation to inflation of the currency, which 
some charged on the banks, some on the treasury, and some 
on both. In view of the dominance of the quantity theory of 
the valué of money among economists of the time, inflation 
was the most natural explanation of the rise of prices. But 
the fluctuations in the premium on gold were so much more 
rapid and violent than the changes in the volume of the cir- 
culating médium that not even academic economists could 
regard the quantity theory as an adequate explanation of all 
the phenomena.' Sometimes they charged the fluctuations 
that did not accompany changes in the quantity of money 
to mere speculation, sometimes to a variety of other causes. 
Indeed, in discussing the question, it was common to begin 
by demonstrating that the premium and the volume of the 

I Comi>are the oon^ressional speeches cited aboTe, pp. 113, 114 ; and Bepori of the 
Secretary of the TVecuury, December, 1862, pp. 12-15. 

3 S. P. TowvsKKD, The OrecU Speech of the Late Political Campaign^ etc. (New 
York : J. A. Hoostoo. 1862), p. 10. 

s PsBSiDBNT J. T. Champlin of Colby Uniyersity. for example, who enunoiated a 
stiff form of the quantity theory in his little text-book, Le$9ona on Political Economy^ 
1868, admitted that the valué of a paper dollar depends *^ partly upon the prospect 
of ita being ultimately redeemed in real yalnea ** (p. 125). 



Spegib Valüb op thb Papeb Cübbengy 189 

currency did not vary concomitantly, as they legitimately 
^ould have done, and then to launch into a tirade against 
the nnpatriotic gold gamblers.^ 

Men who observed the transactions of the gold markets 
with care and did not allow their conclnsions to be controlled 
by preconceived theories, as a rale gave less simple explana- 
tions of the changes. The momentary credit of the govem- 
ment, the course of military events, the policy of the banks, 
the export of specie, the demand for gold f rom importen, 
the probability of fresh issues of legal-tender paper, treasury 
sales of gold, speculative manipulation of the markets, the 
chance of resumption of specie payments — these and similar 
matters were declared to affect the premium. Some writers 
jumbled such matters together indiscriminately and implied 
that the price of gold depended in the same manner on all; 
others attempted to show the logical connection between 
one set of factors and another; but perhaps no one who 
studied the situation with care f ailed to see that the oscilla- 
tions of the indicator in the gold room generally foUowed 
the news dispatches f rom Washington and the front.' 

Anyone who undertakes nowadays to investigate the 
grounds for these divergent opinions regarding the premium 
on gold must make a patient study of the transactions in 
the gold market from day to day in order to discover what 
considerations inflnenced those who bought and sold. For 

> Cy., c g,., FxssmrDBM and McCulloch in the Finance Report of 1864, pp. 22, 23 
and 52, 53, respectiyely. Perhaps as near an approach as any to a strict quantity 
theoiy of the premium is fonnd in HuíWb MerchanU* Mtzgcuine^ Yol. L, p. 299. 

2 See as examples A. B. Johnson, The Advanced Vcdue of Gold, Suspended Specie 
Pe^mewUt eU, (Utica, N. Y., 1862); Alexandbb Delmar, Gold Money and 
Paper Money (New York, 1863) ; Henkt C. Carey, The Way to Outdo England 
wUhaiU Fighting Her, 1865, Letters XII-XYI, and other of Careyes pamphlets on the 
currency ; Cabl yon Hock, Die Finanxen und die Finanzge»chichte der Vereinigten 
Staaten (Stuttgart, 1867), pp. 585-90; H. M. Fitzhuoh, Cash and Credit (Baltimore, 
1868); Chaxlks A. Mann, Paper Money the Root of Euil (New York, 1872), pp. 
166-79; Cbaelbs Moean, Money, Cwrrencie» and Banking (New York, 1875), p. 21; 
B. S. Thompson, Social Science and National Economy (Philadelphia, 1875), p. 206; 
Cael Schubz, Honeti Money and Labor: An Addrets (New York, 1879). p. SS; Gboeob 
M. Wbston, Money (New York, 1882), pp. 77-80. 



I N K .^\ v'b' ruis Greenbacks 



■ \ \ 



V • V ■ i 






t " 



v-.-cKit \ to Imv» recourse ío the financial 

^-.j-ui^is, til wliirh the fluctuatioDB of the 

VA* liul attt'iiipts made to acconnt for 

;^. "í.^wrxrr, iiH'rely supplies a mass of 

» lino and rontradictory meaning that 

..\ iv.i l»i'l\in» iiiuch can be made of it. 

.1 .;au»i is foro'd to admit that his con- 

i..í:»\ of thi* íliictuations are oi)en to 

V i'iiio ol' (ht» fíictors afiFecting the situa- 

1 íu. iii hrt'anso it is difficult to assign 

%• ii» Iht» tüíFeiviit factors that wore 

riio cÜíHcuIties arise mainlv iu 

»i iM» rlfrcls of given causes; one often 

í.^ kiiiiwM a ('(Ttaiii event niight have 

¡« ill t»i tl»>ul)N» the actual eífect. Biit, 

» I. .•iHiiiiic (|uestioiLS, the qualitative 

MU I mío mu H(H» whv the known factors 

i » « i'i Imiii Hi>rt of coiisequences, thou^^h 

■ • • \\ whv lhos<' ct)iisc(]uence8 were of 

'i.Ki. iii i«í« ihal made themselves felt on 

"I 11» Mu- ^old room, after this fashion, 

• \ il» •liuí^nishin*^ two broad classes. 

' 1 -li.íwi il \\\r ratio Ix'twei»!! ¿rold and 

í !. m.id wliriu'ViT anvthiiiír occurred 

» ' •'• tlu» deiiiand for, either, the 

i»mI ft iiiMv ho raui'ed under these 

»• ••MI. Mi«» \ Mliifiiii^ii of gold, ('2) factors 

■» • . I • « iil»;it'ks. 

.. .....I li,' .MM'ii ti> \ho tírst catecrorv. 

• «I..! ilt.' lu.-'h prniiiuin was due, iiot 
•'• »i. \. lint to aii ailvance iii tlie 

'•• • 'I l'x í|Mi ulatioii. coinmaiids scaiit 
ti<l. M. . |t.Mni> h\ i'X|H)rts of pn»cious 



Spboib Valüb op THE Papeb Cübbengy 191 

metáis and by the price tablea. Gold has a world-market per- 
haps more truly than any other commodity, and the fact is 
well ascertained that in the early sixties its valué in Euro- 
pean markets was declining. If , then, the valué of gold 
had been notably augmented in the United States by 
"speculation " or any other cause, the export of the precious 
metáis would inevitably have declined and imports might 
have begun. But such was by no means the case. In the 
fiscal year 1861 imports of gold exceeded exports by $14,900,- 
000, but after specie payments had been suspended in 1862 
exports exceeded imports by $21,500,000, in 1863 by 
$56,600,000, in 1864 by $89,500,000, in 1865 by $51,900,- 
000, and in 1866 by $63,000,000.' As was remarked at the 
time, gold really became redundant in the United States 
when it had been withdrawn from current circulation as 
money, and when bankers were asked for exchange they 
could "find no commodity so cheap as gold to ship and 
draw against."* 

Equally decisive is the testimony of the price tables. If 
the **gold-room gambling" actually caused a rise of gold, 
prices of commodities reckoned in gold must have fallen. 
But, as will be shown at length in the next chapter, this did 
not happen. On the contrary, the price of gold in currency, 
momentary fluctuations apart, rose less than the currency 
prices of most commodities. This evidence of the price- 
tables accords perfectly with the evidence of the gold-export 
tables and eflFectually disprovés the theory which explains 
the premium as a consequence of an advance of gold engin- 
eered by mercenary speculators. 

The demonstration, however, that gold did not appreciate 
in valué in the United States during the war, does not exelude 
the possibility of temporary fluctuations in the premium 

1 StaUsticcU Ab8tr<ict of the United Statea, 1901, p. 73. 
^HunVB Merchanta' Magazine, Vol. XLVm, p. 224. 



192 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

caused by changes in the snpply and demand f or gold in the 
local market Indeed, it is oertain that snch changes exercised 
a perceptible influence upon the gold quotations, especíally in 
quiet times. New Tork^s snpply of gold carne mainly from 
inland towns and from California. Beceipts reported from the 
latter sonrce, it is true, fell from $32,600,000 in 1861 to 
$10,400,000 in 1863, becanse of danger of captnre by Con- 
fedérate croisers that hannted the track of the Aspinwall 
steamers. But this simply meant that gold destined f or export 
was shipped directly from California nnder a f oreign flag, 
instead of being bronght throngh New Tork as heretofore. 
While the shipments from California to New York declined 
$22,200,000 between 1861 and 1863, the shipments to Eng- 
land increased $24,400,000.' 

Demand f or gold in New Tork was mainly either f or pay- 
ment of cnstoms duties or f or export. According to the official 
tables, the monthly cnstoms receipts varied dnring the war 
from $2,500,000 in December, 1862, to nearly $14,000,000 
in April, 1864, while the exports of specie and bullion 
varied from less than $500,000 in March, 1865, to nearly 
$10,000,000 in June, 1862.' If the flnctnations in the 
amount of gold used for these two pnrposes each month 
from January, 1862, to December, 1865, be compared with 
the corresponding changes in the average valué of the 
premium each month, only twenty-two of the forty-seven 
cases are found to present concomitant variations. But while 
this comparison shows that the demand for gold for such 
purposes was not the dominant factor in the market, it does 
not show that this demand had no effect On the contrary, 
there can be little doubt that when the market was free 

1 See tables of exports of si>ecie from San Francisco in Commereial and FHnan- 
eUU Chroniele, Yol. II, p. 135; and compare HutU^B MerchanU^ MaooMine^ Yol. UY, 
p.96. 

2 See the tables pnbllshed in the Oommerciál and Financial CKronicle^ Yol. 11, 
pp. 290, 231. 



Speoib Valué op the Papbb Cübbency 193 

from more powerfnl influences, purchases of gold for the 
payment of duties sometimes cansed relatively slight 
increases of the premium ; and that the export demand had 
similar efiPects is sufficiently shown by the fact that news 
that the Bank of England had raised its discount rate could 
send up the premium becanse it made probable larger 
exporta to London.^ 

It was a fact noted at the time that what influence this 
market demand and snpply had upon the premium was often 
in the direction of moderating instead of increasing the 
fluctuations. When the premium rose sharply, gold that 
had been hoarded would be sent to be sold on the stock 
exchange in order to benefit by the high price. At this 
high price, however, importers would find it unprofitable to 
buy the gold they required to pay customs duties or remit 
abroad. Thus, demand would decrease while the supply 
increased. Precisely the opposite results were noticed 
when the price fell rapidly. To an extent, therefore, the 
supply and demand for gold, instead of controUing, were 
themselves controUed by the fluctuations of the premium.' 

Aside from fluctuations caused by changes in the 
actual supply of and demand for gold, it was possible for 
a strong clique of dealers to produce fluctuations by 
"comering" the local supply at a time when many men had 
entered into contracts that required the purchase of gold in 
large amounts within a limited time. Such attempts at 
"manipulating" the market appear to have been frequent, 
but their efiPect was necessarily temporary. Unless the 
clique could persuade the public that there was some real 
reason for a low valuation of the govemment^s notes in 
comparison with gold, they could not long maintain an 

1 Seo, e. a*« rnoney articles of New York Time$^ Febmary S, 1864 ; May 17, 1864. 

>See HunfB MerehemW Magazine, Yol. LTV, pp. 96, 97; money articles of New 
York Time» for Jone 16, 17, and Jaly 24, 1862. 



194 HlSTOBT OP THE GbEENBAOKS 



^ 



artificial rise, Black Fridny itself — the culminatiou o£ the 
greatest of these raída upon the market — was foUowed by a 
fall more rapid than the rise had been. While, then, specn- 
lative manipiilation of the gold supply vras at times the domi- 
nant índnence íd the market, the abiding forcea that govemed 
the premium are to be looked for elsBwhere. They are tonnd 
in the second-mentioned category of influences, viz., the con- 
BideratiouB which entered luto the community'a valuation of 
the paper cturency. 

What, thea, were these conaideratione? Obvioualy, the 
otility of the material of which the currency waa made waa 
not one of them; for the bita of engraved paper were them- 
selves nearly worthless. Congrese, however, attempted by 
iDserting certain provisioua in the legal-tender acta to give 
theBe bita of paper a higli valué in exchange, United States 
notes were made receivable for all taxes exeept duties on 
importe; they were exchangeable at par for bonda beartng 
an intereat of 6 per cent, in gold; and they were dectared a 
legal tender in the payment of debta.' 

Had the iBaiiea of greenbacka not exceeded the sums 
required for the payment of intemal revenue tcLxes, etc., the 
6rst of these proviaions might have been efficacions, at least in 
Bome meaaure. Bnt the volume of paper money available for 
8uch usea was many timea too great to be absorbed by them,' 
After the war, wrítera of the greenback party fell into tha 
habit of declaring that the failure of the clauae making green- 
backa receivable for taxes to prevent their depreciation, was 
due to the exception of cuatoms dnes, which continned to be 
payable in gold.' Tbia con te nt ion waa supported by 
referring to the case of the oíd de m and notes that 

■AotorFsbruai7 2S, 186:. BM. 1; 12 Slaliála al Large, p. SU. 

I tt bns alntadr b»D shown that asTeral otbor Forma of paper issnei «ore rnada 
legal laadoi to IboBamaeitoDtutbevrHObiieliM, SeuPartU.chap. 11, seo. (i.abots. 

*Thb eicaptioD wu made, It will be rememberod, In ordir to obtcin ODÍn for 
tba parment of iularMt oo tb> dsbt. 8e« Part I, shap. U. leo. i>, p. 76. abors. 



J 



Specib Valué of the Papeb Cubbency 195 

commanded a premium in greenbacks from early in May, 
1862, because they were receivable for all dues to the 
goyemment withont exception.' Had the greenbacks been 
unlimited legal tender like the oíd demand notes, ran the 
argnment, they wonld have maintained as high a valué.* It 
is not true, however, as was so frequently asserted, that the 
oíd demand notes did not deprecíate after suspensión. 
Their availability for customs, in conjunction with their 
relatively small amount, caused them to be pref erred above 
greenbacks, but the premium which they bore was not equal 
to the premium upon gold, until practically all had been 
withdrawn from circulation. The degree of their deprecia- 
tion as compared with that of greenbacks is shown by the 
foUowing table, based upon the weekly quotations given in 
HunVs Merchants* Magazine. 

While this table shows that receivability for customs 
limited the máximum depreciation of the oíd demand notes 
to less than 10 per cent, in gold, it does not at all follow 
that the greenbacks would have remained as near par had 
they been endowed with the same property. Indeed, this 
property had so powerful an effect in buoying up the demand 
notes precisely because it was not shared with other forms 
of paper money. Only $60,000,000 of the demand notes 
were issued, and the first legal-tender act provided that they 
should be canceled and replaced by United States notes as 
rapidly as feasible. In contrast, more than seven times this 
amount of greenbacks were issued and they were paid out 
again about as rapidly as they were paid in. 

The second congressional provisión for sustaining the 
valué of the greenbacks — the privilege of exchanging them 
at par for bonds bearing 6 per cent, interest in coin, redeem- 

> See Part II, chap. ii, seo. iii, above. 

>See citations from greenbaok literatnre given by B. M. BRBOKnrBiDOB, "The 
Demand Notes of 1861/* 8ound Ourrency^ Vol. V, p. Sa. 



\w 



BUTOBT OF THE QbBEHBACKS 



TABLKTl 



■ ue An>ua> 





Zvs:::; 


OOLD 




CCUX>CT 


OOLD 




T*i,OK or 


Da» 


TucBor 


Valcxot 


tMlt> 






















OMIV 




01dl>«- 






OIdDB- 


Cnr. 


OldD» 




ihiM 


tí 


naej 


Ñmm 




Gold 


ssá 


-S 


IMÜ 








1862 










AiT. IV 


IKII 


Kll 


0§.l 


98.1 


Oct. 4 


12S1 


1101 


81.5 


97.3 


' líl 


luí A 


l(JU 


B8 4 


96.1 


11 


128i 


1^1 


79.1 


96.6 


sa 


uní 
iwl 


lu» 


«8.1 


98.4 


19 


130J 


129 


76.8 


99-1 


Mnv U 


Itll 


B7.Í 


97.4 


25 


lao 


127 


76.6 


07.2 


lit 


i'"fl 


KK) 


W-S 


07.0 


NoT. 1 


LTO^ 


1281 


76.7 


97.0 


IT 


m/. 


lili 


07.0 


97.6 


9 


132Í 


126 


75.6 


95.3 


ül 


lili 


1UI 


Oflfi 


97.2 


15 


131 


1361 


75.8 


05.9 


:ii 


im;. 


1(11 


t*0 a 


07.2 


22 


1301 


1241 


76.6 


05.1 


■-"■M 


IIM , 
l(^ 


1(11 


08 1 


97.1 


2S 


1291 


1241 


77.5 


06.1 


KII 


M.Ú 


97,5 


Dec. 6 


131i 


125* 


76.2 


05.3 


-i;) 


KfJ 


KÜI 


H't 1 


je.9 


13 


131 A 


1281 


76.0 


06.2 


M 


U» 


HUÍ 


m 7 


95.8 


ao 


isap 


1271 


75.5 


96,3 


jHl) f. 


Uu 1 
111% 


l(ft¡ 


lll.J 


Oli.O 


27 


120 


75.6 


ff7,5 


I-J 


H>7¡ 


n.tl 


ono 


1SB3 










IQ 


II» 


uw' 


M,r> 


01 .s 


Jan. 3 


1341 


Í29' 


ii'.a 


96% 


311 


in 


Km 


Kr..i 


OiVB 


10 


137 ¡ 


135 


72.6 


98.0 


4uu -J 


n¡^ 


Ii6 


Mva 


91 4 


17 


147 * 


143 


CT.9 


97,1 


u 


113 1 


hft 


N8,7 


va.ü 


24 


110 ", 


144J 


G7.0 


97.0 


lll 


un 


1(1 


87 :i 


Wt.fl 


3t 


150 " 


153 


62.5 


95.7 


á!l 


lif. 


KM 


Mt il 


»;i.R 


Feb. 7 


157 


1^ 


63-6 


986 


:ii> 


115 ( 


uwi 


MI i 


oa.tt 


14 


155 


151 


61.3 


97.0 


ho\A. « 


11» 


uw 


(U (1 


wt.a 


21 


162 


162 


61.5 


99.5 


IH 


ll«| 


UWI 


H4 7 


W.l 


23 


173 


ITl 


58.1 


99.4 


-Jll 


nuil 


mi 


Kfi .% 


ai, a 


Mm. 7 


155J 


153 


«1.5 


96.6 


aii 


lau 


mi 


lU.l 


Ht.tl 


U 


I58i 


153 


63.2 


96.7 



aillo iii tivi» awl )i«yahli> iu Iwpnty Twurs — waa never very 
effiHilivtt KU() wwa tvih>»UhI nfler « vear and a half s trial. 
Tlieni tiHU ali^ady l^otni o(H-aaÍi>u to ivinark that the right of 
uuikv»i'tii»u waa liltltt t>xt«n'iat<d io lStí2, and that, íd the hope 

< ga.iiatiuui •'! «olJ *n> ln>M Ib* N«* Y«rk Cha^htr tf Commtrre Rrpart* 

M.t,.....». VmI. \UVn, H..U.1»; \\J.\LVlU.pr^*t.3n. n« ítalrnPDU s( th* 
|>t<'iiiiitiii im inilil lu Iba Uilví >>>aim ililTpt >Jict«<T tnvB Ibns* oimI; thrj ■» not 
tal'ii U'caun' vi iuniuii-lkMiviei nuil nbv u>ux ■iiii'riiiu.— Shl. <. p.. lasl retman. 
gu.'Uii.>u...r.ajariu>uau.>1<uonkwLuH>>ittVl((TvkdB»' JrapaxiM artrr llirrh 
U. hU.'U lU bul aUiui i'>,nVi^U hiiil Uvu n4((*J. TVritailT Faprr*. boncTat. coo- 



Specib Valub op thb Papeb Cubbbngt 197 



of getting better terms for bonds, discretionary power was 
granted Secretary Chase to abrógate the right after July 1, 
1863.' Duxing the continuance of the war, however, this 
repeal of the funding provisión made little difference in the 
valne of the currency, becanse holders of greenbacks who 
desired to invest them in govemment secnrities could still get 
five-twenty bonds at rates not far from par. Up to the 
cióse of subscriptions for the five-twenties of 1862 nnder the 
agency of Jay Cooke these bonds could be bought at par from 
the govemment. After this date, January 21, 1864, they 
could be bought in the New York stock market at the fol- 
io wing rates: 

TABLE vn 

mOVTBJ/t HZOHS8T AHD IX>WK8T PBICB8 OF FIVB-TWBNTT CX>UPOir BONDS IN 

NXW TOSE STOCK MARKET IN 1864 AND 1865 2 



Month 



1864 



Liowest 



January. . . 
Pebruary. . 
March. . . . . 

Apríl 

May 

June 

July 

August. . . . 
September. 
October... 
November. 
December. 



101 J< 

103M 

107 

106 

106JÍ 

101 

lOiH 

106H 
106 
106 Jí 
100 J¿ 
106^ 



H|ghest 



lOáJg 
107 
llOJÍ 
114 



1065Í 



74 

109 
113 

108H 
107JÍ 
110 



1865 



Liowest 



loejé 
108:% 

lOáM 

105J? 

102)í 

102 

103?g 

106^ 

106% 

lOlá 

100 



Highest 



110 
112 

lUM 

10932 

107 

104JÍ 

106 

106% 

108^ 

106JÍ 

103 

106JÍ 



This table shows that, after allowance is made for accumu- 
lated interest, the five-twenties at no time in 1864 or 1865 
rose more than a few per cent, above par in the paper cur- 
rency. This few per cent marks the máximum difference 
which continuation of the right of exchanging United StateB 

1 Seo Part I, chap. ít, pp. 104, 107, 115, aboye. 

s From the Financial Beoiew^ 1873, p. 17 (rapplement of the Oommerical and 
Financial Chronicle). 



198 HiSTomT OF THK Gmeesbacks 

noteaat par forfiTe-tvcntieseoiild poasiUTliaTeaddedto the 
valué of tbe former. OC oomae, the maon vIit the coBTenioii 
acheme was iiot more eHectire* while it laated, im {■eicntiu g 
depreeiatioii oC the carreocj ís fovnd in the tmcL, that while 
the goTemiDent vas wagiiig a war ct enonaoos cost and 
uncertain isBiie, inTeslan díd not pul a high Tahíe opoo ita 
bonda. To attempt to maintam the ciedit oC ooe aet <rf 
pvooiisea to paj br meaiía of a aeoond aet eonld axail little 
when the abílitj fA the promiflar to keep eith«r aet was 
legaided as dauhtíüL^ 

As for the legal-tender clanae — the thiid pforiaiQn agamat 
depreciatkni — it coold compel a creditor to leoeiTe paper 
moDej as the eqniralent of goM oolj for debts alreadj con- 
tracted. It ooold not control contracts to be made in the 
fatme. Sellers were free to charge higher prices for their 
goods when thej knew the payment woold be in greenbacks; 
and thej did ao. Not only did the legal-tender clanae fadl 
to prerent depreeiation, bot; had it been the onlj sapport 
of the valué of the greenbacks, the depreciation might haye 
been as great as was the depreciation, for example, of the 
Bnasian legal-tender paper money in the first qnarter of 
last centnry. 

Bul» tboogb tbese artificial provisions prored fntile, one 
imfxjrtaDt consideration remained. Greenbacks were notes 
of the govenunent of the United States, and as snch their 
Talne — like the valne of the notes of a private person — 
depended npon the credit of the íasner. If confidence in the 
govemment^s ability nltimately to redeem its notes had been 
entirely destroyed, the paper money woold have depreciated 
to the level finally reached by the Confedérate cnrrency. 
On the other hand, if the credit of the govemment had 
saffercHl no diminntion, its notes would have depreciated 

I Wturth^'r thf! abroipatioD of the ri^t of fandiac irnwnlMicks in boods delaTMl 
maintAúio of upecie panneoto aft«r Uie wmr is a fartber qnestioo, dbeasaioo of 
wbicb u noi in pUoe bere. 



Spegib Valué of thb Papeb Cübbengt 199 

little, if at alL Fluctuations between these two limita — par 
and zero — foUowed the varying estimates which the com- 
mnnity was all the time making of the goyemment^s present 
and prospective ability to meet its obligations. It is there- 
fore necessary to analyze the elementa that entered into 
these varying estimates. 

First, it is plain that an increase in the amount of 
the demand debt made speedy repayment more doubtful. 
Henee the effect of every snggestion of an increase in the 
amount of the paper currency was to decrease the valué of 
the greenbacks already in circulation. This is clearly 
shown by the influence of the second and third legal-tender 
acts. 

June 11, 1862, the gold valué of $100 in paper currency 
was $96.22.' The next day it was officially announced that 
the secretary of the treasury had requested Congress to 
authorize a second issue of United States notes.' Immedi- 
ately the valué of the currency declined to $94.96. As the 
probability increased that the request would be complied 
with, the f all continued, until, on the day when the final vote 
was taken on the second legal-tender act, July 8, the cur- 
rency price was $89.79.' 

Even more striking was the f all caused by the third legal- 
tender act December 1, 1862, just before Congress con- 
vened, currency was worth $76.94. Three days later a fall 
to $74.63 was caused by a rumor that the annual finance 
report would recommend another issue of United States 
notes.^ A denial produced a reaction to $76.63. But on 
the 8th Thaddeus Stevens introduced a bilí providing for 

1 See the tablea of daily prioes in the Appendix, pp. 425-8. The figures in the 
text for certain days are sometimes the highest or lowest prices, sometimes (as here) 
the average of the two. 

9 See the New York Time», Jone 12, 1862. 

s Congrettional Globe, S7th Gong., 2d Sess., p. S182. 

^BankenT Magazine^ New Tork, Vol. XVn, p. SOa 



200 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

an issue of $200,000,000/ which brought about a relapee 
the next day to $75.19. When he admitted, a few days 
later, that there was no chance of his measure passing, a 
slight rise foUowed.' But Jannary 8 the Committee of 
Ways and Means snbmitted a measure anthorizing the iBSue 
of $300,000,000 of United States notes.» The cnrrency fell 
to $72.99. Six days later the House of Representatives 
passed a joint resolntion for the issue of $100,000,000 to 
secure the immediate payment of the army and navy.^ The 
fall reached $67.57. The acquiescence of the Senate caused 
a slight further decline. 

Meanwhile the Ways and Means biU was under discussion 
in the House. When it was passed and sent to the Senate, 
the notes were depressed to $65.90.^ Three weeks later the 
measure came back with the Senate amendments, one of 
which reduced the new issue of legal-tender notes from 
$300,000,000 to $150,000,000. A drop of $1.46 foUowed 
the House^s refusal to agree to the change. During the 
next two days it was thought in New Tork that the Senate 
would yield, and the decline of the currency continued to 
$60.98. When this idea was dissipated there was another 
reaction. But February 26 the House yielded and passed 
the bilí.* This action made the increase of notes certain, and 
their valué fell to $57.97. After this extreme depression 
came a slight reaction to $58.48 on the day the bilí beoame 
a law.^ 

1 C(mffre$8u¡nal Olobe^ 87th Cong., Sd Sess., PP. 23, 145; New York 7«me», Deoem- 
ber 9, 1862. The references to the daily papero are, uniese otherwise specifled, to the 
date of the money artides. 

2 ConífrtBsUmal Olobe^ loe, ctt., P> 146. 

3 Ibid,, p. 235. See sec. 8 of the bilí, p. 284. 

* Ibid,t p. 314. K Jannary 26.— /6id., p. 522. 

< For Senate amendments see ibid,, pp. 026, 027 ; for aotion of the Hoose, ppw 
1089,1312. 

7March 3, 1863. The probability of fnrther issnes of ffreenbacks was, howeyer, 
by no means the only depressing inflnenoe affectin^r the yalne of the onrrency while 
either the seoond or third legal'tender bilis was pending in Congress. See pp. 213, 
216, below. 



Spegie Valué op the Papeb Cubbenct 201 

Not only the amoant of notes which the govemment 
íssued, but also the condition of the resoorces at its dis- 
posal for meeting obligations, affected the probability of a 
speedy redemption of the paper ctirrency. This explains 
why ahnost every important public event was reflected in the 
fluctuations of the gold market. Few things could happen 
to the govemment that would not directly or indirectly 
influence its credit, and therefore the valué of its notes. 
Consequently notice mnst be taken of the effect of fínancial, 
military, political, and diplomatic events apon the conn^ of 
the depreciation. 

Since the fírst condition of redeeming the paper cnrrency 
was financial strength, the condition of the treasury was 
narrowly watched by the gold markei For example, the 
annual reports of the secretary of the treasury were anxiously 
awaited each December and their appearance caused a rise 
or fall of the currency according as the condition of the 
fínances presented seemed hopeful or gloomy. In Decem- 
ber, 1862, the day before the report was published, a rumor 
was circulated in New Tork that another issue of greenbacks 
would be propoeed. The currency fell from $76.34 to 
$74.63, but rose again to $76.63, when the report appeared 
recommending a national bank currency as preferable to 
govemment notes. Next year the report was responsible 
for a slight decline; for, though Secretary Chase declared 
specifically against an increase of the greenbacks, the esti- 
mated expenditures so far exceeded receipts that he was 
obliged to ask for a loan of $900,000,000. Again in 1864 
the report caused a fall, for even the New York Trtbune 
admitted that it was disappointing.' By December, 1865, 
the gold market had become much steadier, but Secretary 
McCulloch^s report recommending a speedy resumption of 

1 See the editorial article in the issne of December 8, 1864, and the money artiole 
for December 7. 



202 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKB 

specie payments was warmly received and caosed a rise of 
the cnrrency from $67.34 on the 6th to $68.14 on the 6th.^ 

Ability of the govemment to borrow also inflnenced the 
valne of the currency ; f or the f ate of a loan indicated pnb- 
Uc confídence or distruBt, and snccess provided means for 
oontinuing the war withont the issue of more legal-tender 
notes. Thns, in the spring of 1863, Mr. Jay Cooke^s snc- 
cess as agent of the govemment in obtaining snbscriptions 
for five-twenty bonds at the rate of $2,000,000 a day cansed 
the cnrrency to rise from a level of about $65, prior to 
March 23, to $71.68 on the 25th, when the favorable 
resnlt of his operations seemed assnred.' In October, 1863, 
the report that a foreign loan had been obtained cansed a 
rise from $68.49 on the 21st to $70.05 on the 22d. Next 
day the report was discredited, and the cnrrency fell back to 
$68.26.' Again, in September, 1864, a loan of some $32,- 
600,000 was subscribed twice over and the snm advertised 
awarded at a preminm of 4 per cent, and npwards. This news 
cansed a rise from $42.37 on the 9th to $45.87 on the lOth.* 

Changes in the oflScials of the Treasury Department con- 
stitnted another important factor. The resignation of the 
assistant treasnrer in New Tork cansed a fall June 2, 1864, 
from $53.05 to $52.63. Jnly 1, of the same year, Secretary 
Chase's resignation depressed the currency to $40. A few 
hours later, upon the receipt of a dispatch announcing Sen- 
ator Fessenden^s appointment to the vacant post, there was 
a reaction to $45.05. Mr. McCullocVs nomination the fol- 
lowing March occasioned an advance from $50.25 on the 7th 
to $51.05 on the 8th. 

iSee oomments of New York papers of December 6; and Hunf» Merehanti^ 
Magtuine^ Vol. LTV, p. 77. 

s New York Times, money article for March 24, 1868. 

> New York Time», money artioles for October 22 and 28,' 1868. 

*HurU'8 MerchanU* Magazine, Vol. LI, p. 292; Report af the Secretary cf the 
Treasury, December, 1864, p. 21. 



Specie Valub of thb Papeb Cubbenct 203 

Even more striking than the inflnence of financial events 
apon the currency was the effect of the " war news." While 
the war continued there cotild be no thooght of redeem- 
ing the govemmenf 8 notes. Henee every victory that 
made the end of hostilities seem nearer raised the valne of 
the cnrrency, and every defeat depressed it. The failures 
and snccesses of the Union armies were recorded by the 
indicator in the gold room more rapidly than by the daily 
pre88« / A few instances may be cited. 

Chancellorsville, fought May 3, 1863, was one of the most 
disastroiLB battles of the war. Bnt the fírst reports that 
reached New York were favorable, and cansed a rise of the 
currency to $67.45. Next day, however, adverse rumora 
began to arrive, and the quotations were lower. On the 
6th a partial confirmation of the bad news continued the 
falL When all uncertainty about the disaster was removed 
on the 7th, the currency dropped to $64.62.^ 

Following up the advantage gained at Chancellorsville, 
General Lee crossed the Potomao and invaded the North. 
With the progress of his movement the currency fell from 
$71.17 on the lOth of June, 1863, to $67.40 on the 16th. 

Similarly the battle of Chickamauga caused a decline 
from $74.77 on the 19th of September, 1863, to $71.81 on 
the 21st; in April, 1864, the currency fell from $57.43 on 
the 23d to $54.79 on the 25th, because of the report that 
the Confederates had captured Plymouth, N. C. ; General 
Butler^s failure to take Fort Fisher was the occasion of a 
drop from $46.24 to $44.64, December 28, 1864: the knowl- 
edge of the ill success of the Tazoo river expedition brought 
a fall of over $4, from $67.34 March 31 to $63.34 April 1, 
1863.' 

The power of victories to raise the valué of the currency 

1 See oonflictixiff reports from the battles in the New York papers of May 4 to 8^ 
IMS. 

3See the news colamns of the papers of April 2, 1868. 



204 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

) was moet strikingly illustrated by the series of tríumphs in 
July , 1863. On the first three days of that month the battle of 
G^ttysburg was being f oughi The 4th was the national holi- 
day ; the 6th Sunday. When the gold market opened on the 
6th, CTirrency, which on the Ist had been at $68.97, rose to 
$72.46. Next day news carne of the capture of Yicksburg; 
cnrrency reached $75.47. Despite the draft riots in New 
Tork city, the reaction was small, and when the captare of 
Port Hudson was announced, Jnly 15, there was a forther 
advance to $77.59. With the increase of confidence the 
cnrrency continned to appreciate, nntil npon the 20th it was 
worth $81.14. Thus the gain was $12.17 in twenty days, dne 
to favorable war news. 

Orantes seríes of victoríes at Chattanooga cansed a rise of 
$4.99 in foar days. The victory of Sherídan over Early at 
Opeqnan Creek and two days later at Fisher^s Hill led to an 
advance from $44. 10 to $46.30. j Sherman^s capture of Atlanta, 
announced in New York September 3, 1864, occasioned a 
rise from $39.29 on the preceding day to $42.37. Later, 
af ter Sherman had started north from Georgia, no news carne 
from his army for some time, and fears were entertained for 
his safety until March 14, 1865, when a dispatch was received 
stating that he had reached Laurel Hill, N. C, and that all 
was well. This news caused the cnrrency to appreciate from 
$52.22 to $56.26. More examples might readily be given. 

Many of the fluctuations of the cnrrency were due to mis- 
taken reports of military events. Thus, September 3, 1862, 
an absurd story that Stonewall Jackson was marching on 
Baltimore with 40,000 men caused a fall from $85.84 — the 
price of the previous day — to $84.75.' A rumor that Atlanta 
had been evacuated by the Confederates produced a rise from 
$38.80 to $39.92 on July 22, 1864.' Another false report of 

1 New York Tt'mes, money article, September, 3, 1862. 

2 Ibid.^ money article for July 22, 1864. 



Speoie Valué of the Papeb Cübbenoy 205 

the fall of Petersburg led to an advance from $48.78 to 
$51.28/ A similar story of the evacnation of Kichmond was 
the occasion of the change from $56.54 to $58.74 on the 16th 
of March, 1865.' Peace rumora were especially freqnent. The 
"peace mission^' of the two Blairs was followed with much 
anxiety. A report that the eider Blair was in Richmond 
cansed a rise from $46.54 to $48.08 January 19, 1865.' On 
the last day of the month news came that three Confedérate 
commissioners were within the Union lines.^ Currency rose 
from $47.39 to $49.50; bnt fell back again to $46.62 on the 
announcement, a few days later, that the conference wotdd 
accomplish nothing. 

Being of less freqnent occorrence, political changes 
played a less prominent rOle in the gold market than finan- 
cial and military affairs. The best example of their influence 
is shown by the events attending the presidential election of 
1864. Mr. Lincoln was the Kepublican nominee. The 
Democratic party, which did not hold its convention until 
Angust 31, finally nominated General McClellan. News 
of this cholee cansed the currency to fall from $42.73 to 
$41.15. The canvass that followed was spirited, and for a 
time the result seemed doubtful to many. The Pennsylvania 
state election in October was looked to for an indication of 
the probable outcome. Por a day or two after the votes had 
been cast it was uncertain which party had won. October 
11 the New York World claimed that the Demócrata had 
made large gains and would carry the state. Because of 
this report the currency fell from $50.41 to $49.17. 
Curiously, the Kepublican triumph in November had the 
same effect upon the currency as this promise of Democratic 
success had exercised. It seems to have been argued that 

1 September 28, 1864; see New York Heraldt money artiole. 

3 New York J7era2d, money article, Maroh 18, 1865. 

* lidd,^ January 19, 1865. « /6id., January 81, 1865. 



800 HlSTOBT OF THB ObEENBACKS 



Preaident Linooln^s le-dection meant an indefinite prolonga- 
tioQ of the wmr, and henee destroyed any chance ot a speedj 
nMiamption ot the paper money.* On the atrength <¿ thia 
view there waa a fáll on the 9th from $10.65 to $38.48. 
However» a reaction qnickly foUowed. 

Preaident Lincohi^B aasaasination occorred after the legn- 
lar gold market had closed on the eveningof April 14^ 186S. 
Curi^uoT had ranged between $67.97 and ^S.49. The 
new)» waa received, hoirever, at the '^evening exchange.^ At 
ihe fin»t ahook there was a fáll to $60.61. This fall was 
ftJlowtH) bv a quiok reaction. so that the mai^et doaed aboat 
$(id.lHV* N«OKt day the gold exchanges ranained cksed, and 
Ih^ f\41owuig dar was Sondar. The inteimission gave an 
i\p|HxrtuuitY ^>r ihe pank to snbside. On Monday the 
o)^MUi^ )\rk^ waa $65.S6^ bnt it soon losi^ to $67.5L and the 
u^t da Y ih^ curretncy wmutIt negained the levi^ which it had 
h^\) l^vMT^ th0 aaMáaination. 

Thv^U^h th^ counlrv^s 6>reign relations were orashadorod 
Uuvu^ iht^ war hv dv>uM>ti4io aüaiis. ih^y ^xeivised some infln- 
tvuw ujKxw ibt^ \a^u^^ v>f Ihe pajvr mooey. There w^re two 
Uu)KKriHUl mall^r» v>f di|4oiiiatio oolKiera: the chance of toT" 
%\\^\\ iultsrwMÜvxu U^wv^^n the fi^leial and confedérate 
g\x\ \H uu\^Ml:i au\l tht> FWach oocnpatioQ of Mexko. Fe^rs on 
lUo (wruuvr ^>.>i^ wvre in a iM^^nn^ pat lo ivisl on Jnly 30« 
)SOil\ bv ih^ arrival of a steanaier frvnn England bHnging 
f^l^wu v\f a ^v^'h v>f the iwune nua¿>cer« Loird Pahnefston, 
whUK \^a;i iuieq>r^t\l Iv^ m^sui ihat the British goTera- 
mout b^vl uv^ iuCt'utJüOiu of iotcerferio^ in the American 
wuv.* iVrr^\ttv\Y rvHíe f?v>«tt $<\S4 — th^ k>we5l prioí on the 
Ü\Hh K^$S7.iS. i>u the UHh of the &¿Iowing Febraarr 
a U'(Kui ihal tht" Kreuoh eutt^vrvr w^ts:^ acseoipcizx^ to bring 

t \v\ik \v<k ^«»\Mjk 'j*o>av*> i'^iiÑt» JiUt^i V;m¿ 3tiv 12M8L 



«muí» 



Speoie Valué op thb Papeb Cübbency 207 

about a conference between the North and South cansed the 
paper money to appreciate from $63.90 to $65.57/ The 
news of the withdrawal by England of the recognition which 
it had accorded the Confederacy as a belligerent occasioned 
a rise from $68.91 to $71.43 on the 19th of June, 1865.' 

May 3, 1864, the publication in Le Moniteur of the con- 
vention assuring the stay of French troops in México cansed 
the currency to depreciate from $56.50 to $55.63.' At the 
cióse of the war the administration attacked the Mexican 
question with vigor. June 5, 1865, word carne that Napoleón 
had been urged to withdraw his troops. This news showed the 
possibility of trouble with France, and caused a slight decline 
— from $73.94 to $73.13.* During the summer many con- 
flicting reports were circulated conceming complications on 
the Kio Grande, causing considerable fluctuations in the 
gold markei^ But the beginning of the end carne November 
7, with the report that the cabinet had decided to notify the 
French govemment that the sending of further troops to 
México would meet with the disapprobation of the United 
States. That little fear of a serious complication was enter- 
tained is shown by the slight extent of the fall caused by 
this news— $68.03 on the 6th to $67.91 on the 7th.' 

Perhaps some explanation should be given why two mat- 
ters of which much was made by contemporary commenta- 
tors on the premium have been passed over so lightly in the 
preceding analysis, viz., the quantity of money in circula- 
tion and speculation. Statistical attempts to demónstrate or 
disprove the validity of the quantity theory of the valué of 
money must always be inconclusive so long as there are no 

1 New York 7«met, money artiole, February 10, 1868. 
3 New York Herald^ money article. Jone 19, 1865. 
SNew York Timf^ money artide, May 3, 1864. 
« New York Herald, money article. Jone 5, 1865. 
& Hunff» MfrchanU' Magnzine^ Vol. UII, p. 133. 
* New York Herald^ money article, November 7, 1865. 



208 HlSTOBT OF THE ObEENBACKS 

accnrate data regarding the volnme of exchanges to be per- 
formed by the use of money and the rapidity of circula- 
tíoiL* Of coaise, no Buch data are to be had far the years 
of the Civil War, and besides there is the added embarrass- 
ment that the qoantity of money in use is involved in even 
more obecnrity than common.' A rigorons comparison 
between the qoantity and the gold valué of the currency 
or between quantity and prices ia therefore ont of the ques- 
tion. But at least this much may be said with confidence : 
the fluctoations of the gold premiam cannot be aocoonted 
for by actual issues and redemptions of govemment notes. 
Ab the above remarks upon the second and third legal-tender 
acts show, additional issues of United States notes affected 
the valué of the notes already in circulation as soon as their 
probability was known and long before they were actually 
made or even authorized. Indeed, in the six months foUow- 
ing the passage of the third legal-tender act, when notes 
were being issued in accordance with its provisions, the valué 
of tho currency appreciated in a marked degree.' That is, 
the quantity of the greenbacks influenced their specie valué 
rather by affecting the credit of the govemment than by 
altering the volume of the circulating médium. 

Ñor is the case of the quantity theorist improved by tak- 
ing account of all forms of money in circulation instead of 
the greenbacks alone. Most discussions of the valué of an 
inconvertible paper currency proceed on the assumption 
that its quantity is arbitrarily determined by govemment, 
and that the business community must adapt itself to the 
situation. But such an assumption is hardly more true of 
the North during the war than of the whole country before 
8U8{x^n8Íon. In both periods free use was made of bank 

1 1 feel nono the less oonyinoed of the soandness of this proposition beoauM I 
ODoe made 8Uoh an attempt.— Jouma¿ cf PolUiccU Economy^ Vol. rV« pp. 159-65. 

sSee Part II, ohap. ii, seo. yii, abore. *See pp. 217-30, below. 



Spegib Valub of THE Papeb Cubbenoy 209 

notes and bank deposits as currency, and of course the vol- 
ume of these elements in the circalating médium foUowed 
the needs of the public. More than this, the amount of gov- 
emment currency in use as money was in neither case deter- 
mined solely by treasury policy. Before suspensión, free 
coinage and free export provided for an automatic regulation 
of the supply of specie ; af ter suspensión a somewhat similar 
element of elasticity was found in the presence of legal- 
tender, interest-bearing treasury notes which could be treated 
as an investment or used as money at the convenience of the 
holder.^ It would be difficult, indeed, to show that the vol- 
ume of a currency comprising elements so elastic as these 
interest-bearing legal tenders and the notes and deposits of 
banks was the ultímate fact that regulated the valué of the 
whole circulating médium. 

As for speculation, there seems to be more danger of 
exaggerating than of minimizing its importance as an inde- 
pendent factor in the gold market. No doubt, as has been 
suggested, the formation of highly organized markets, where 
engagements were entered into to receive or deliver large 
amounts of gold within stipulated times, gave opportunity 
for artificial manipulation. No doubt, also, many of the 
false rumors so industriously circulated were concocted by 
operators with special intent to affect the premium.' But it 
must be remembered that there were two partios in the mar- 
ket, and the arts of '' bulls " were set off against the arts of 

1 See Part 11, ehap. ii, seo. ri, abore. 

>The most notable instanoe of this eharaoter was the frandiilent pioolamation 
of President Lincoln, taken by nnknown persona to the offices of all the New York 
papers except the TrUmne abont 8:30 o*clockon the moming of May 19, 1864. It 
stated that Grant*s campaign was rirtoally at an end ; that the Red Biver expedition 
was a f ailnre, that 400,000 additional men would be raised by draf t if the state qnotas 
were not fllled by Jone 15, and that May 26 would be obserred as a day of f asting and 
prayer. Thongh the Wcrld and Journal cf Commerce alone were duped into pub- 
lishing the docoment, it eansed a rapid rise in the premium before the opening of 
the exchanges. As the World at once denounced the forgery on its bulletin board, 
the fright snbsided quiokly and the transactions on the stock exchange were at a 
very slight adrance OTor the preoeding day. See the newspapers of May 18 and 19. 



210 Hlstobt of THE Gbebnbacks 

''bears/^ Which party carríed the day depended in the 
long run on matters over which neither had control — prima- 
lily the condition of the fínancee and the war news. Yiewed 
in a broad way, it is therefore a seríons mistake to look on 
the gold market as a place where a few gambleis were toes- 
ing the premium aboat to snit their selfish achemee; amnch 
saner view la that it was the place where the community's 
eetimate of the govemment^s credit was visibly reoorded. 
Here, as in other markets, those operators sncoeeded who 
forecast the fntore correctly, and men who tried to advanoe 
the price of gold when public confidence was increasing, or 
to depress it when confidence was on the wane» leamed to 
their cost that they were not masters of the sitnation. 

III. THB OOUBSB OF DEPBEOIATION, JAKUABT, 1862, TO 

DECEMBEB, 1865 

In order to facilítate stady of the progress of depreciation 
dnring the war, the híghest, average and lowest gold valué 
of the cnrrency for each month from 1862 to 1865 is shown 
apon the accompanying chart. From this graphic repre- 
sentation it is readily seen that there were six strongly 
marked periods in the general course of the ñacfnations : 
(1) January to April, 1862, the depreciation was slight and 
almost constant. (2) After April there occnrred an almost 
unbroken fall until Pebruary, 1863, when the average valué 
of the currency for the month was but $62.30. (3) This fall 
was succeeded by an appreciation, which culminated in the 
following August, when the average price reached to $79.50. 
(4) A second and more serious decline foUowed, until, in 
July, 1864, the lowest valué of the war was reached — $38.70 
for the month. (5) August, 1864, to May, 1865, an upward 
movement, interrupted by a reaction in November, carried 
the currency to $73.70. (6) After May there was a slow 
decline till the end of the year. 



Spboib Valub of thb Papbb Cdbeenot 211 







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212 HlSTOBT OF THB GbEBNBACKS 

1. January io April^ 1862. — ^Prom a gold valué of 
$00.50 on the Ist of January the currency fell as low as 
$05.24 on the lOth, but from this point there was a rally, 
so that the average valué for the month was $07.60. The 
perplexities of the fínancial situation, particularly the slow- 
ness of Congress in framíng tax bilis, exercised a depressing 
influence in the first half of February, that was counteracted 
in the latter half by Grant^s capture of Fort Donelson and 
the provisión made for the treasury by the fírst legal-tender 
act. Despite this rally, the average for the month was $1 
less than in January. March, however, more than restored 
this loss. Curtis defeated the Confederates decisively at 
Pea Ridge, the ^^ Monitor'' proved itself more than a match 
for the "Merrimac," McClellan advanced into Western 
Virginia, and Shields defeated Stonewall Jackson at Win- 
chester on the 23rd.' Confidence in the speedy end of the 
war was high, and consequently the valué of the currency 
was but 1.8 per cent, below par in gold. 

During April the depreciation was even less. So confí- 
dent was the administration that peace was at hand that 
the adjutant-general issued an order stopping recruiting. 
While Grant suffered a severe check at Pittsburgh Landing 
on the 6th, he more than recovered the lost ground on the 
7th. Island No. 10 surrendered, Halleck telegraphed that 
Pope had captured 6,000 prisoners in Missouri ; on the 15th 
news came to New Tork that Fort Pulaski, guarding the 
entrance to Savannah, had been taken ; and to crown the 
month, New Orleans fell into ünion hands, in its closing 
week. Moreover, the greenbacks, which now, for the first 

1 As mo«t of the erents referred to in the following roTiew of the oonrae of depre- 
eimtioD are Tory well known, I haTO Dot oonsidered it Decessary to insert refereDces 
to war histories. The newspapers have been my main reliance, becanse the promium 
was affeoted rather by what was reported conceming battlos, etc., than by what 
really happenod ; but I h&re also used the diarios in Harper's Mimthly Magazine^ 
and MooEB*8 Record of the Rehcllion, hnsides Deapkb*8 Civil War in America^ and 
J. F. Bhodb8*8 History of Vie United StaUt, 



Specib Valub of thb Papeb Cubbenct 213 

time, began to come into general circulation, were most 
favorably received, for it was considered highly patriotic to 
accept the govemment^s notes as nearly the equivalent of 
gold Thus, under the stimolus of victories and universal 
confidence, the paper money reached the highest valué of 
the war — $98.50, a depreciation of but $1.50. 

2. ITie fall from May, 1862, to Fébruary, 1863.— Tu 
May military operations tumed against the North. The 
Confederates quietly slipped out of Yorktown after Mc- 
Clellan had made elabórate preparations for a siege, and 
McClellan f ollowed so slowly as to lose his advantage. Far- 
ragut took Natchez on the 13th, but all the successes of the 
month were overshadowed by Jackson^s brilliant operations 
iu the Shenandoah valley, where he defeated the Union 
forces at Front Royal, drove Banks across the Potomac, 
eluded the attempts of McDowell and Fremont to cut oñ 
his retreat, repulsed their attacks at Cross Keys and Port 
Republic, and fínally effected a junction with Lee. So 
great was the constemation at Washington that the gover- 
nors were called upon by Stanton to f orward all their militia 
and volunteers for the defense of the capital. From $97.92 
on the Ist of the month the currency declined to $96.04 on 
the 27th, when the fright in Washington was at its height 
and the average for the month was $1.70 less than it had 
been in April. 

A further fall of $2.90 carne in June. Hanover Court- 
House, Seven Pines, and Fair Oaks caused a slight rise in the 
last days of May and the fírst days of June ; Fort Pillow was 
taken on the 4th and Memphis two days later. But on the 
12th Chase^s request for a second issue of greenbacks was an- 
nounced. Meanwhile McClellan lay inactive while Stuart^s 
cavalry rodé around his army, capturing prisoners and bum- 
ing supplies. 

July brought yet greater disasters. McClellan^s peninsu- 



214 HlSTOBT OF THB ObBENBACKS 

lar campaign, which was to have ended with the capture of 
Bichmond, ended instead with the desperate retreat to Hani- 
son's Landing, where he remained quiescent f or the reet of the 
month. The dream of a prompt cióse of hoetilities was 
mdely dispelled, and the presídent issued a cali for 800,000 
volunteers. Meanwhile Morgan was raiding in Kentncky, and 
Congress passed the second legal-tender act. Under sach 
depressing influences the cnrrency fell rapídly, and the 
average for the month was $7.80 less than in June. 

After the 22d of Joly there was a rally from the extreme 
depression that lasted doring the fírst part of Angnsi Hal- 
leck's appointment as general-in-chief had a good effect. 
Beports were received of a debate in the Honse of Commons 
that was interpreted to mean that the English govemment 
had no intention of interveuing in favor of the South. 
Such news more than offset the draft of 800,000 nine- 
months' militia ordered on the 4th. But after the llth of 
August the current set in the opposite direction. Lee fórced 
Pope into the defenses before Washington, and opened the 
way into Maryland, while Bragg was executing a similar 
northward movement in Kentucky. About the same time 
the Sioux Indians suddenly commenced their outragee in 
Minnesota. 

During September the depreciation continued. Lee^s 
advance causad grave fears for the safety of Baltimore, Har- 
risburg, and Philadelphia. The publio archives of Pennsyl- 
vania were sent to New York for safekeeping, and Gk)vemor 
Curtin called for 50,000 men to repel the invasión. Similar 
fears were entertained for Louisville and Cincinnati, which 
Bragg and Kirby Smith were threatening. The fall was 
stopped for a week in the middle of the month by the battles 
of South Mountain on the 14th and Antietam on the 17th, 
but the latter was too dearly bought a victory to compénsate 
for Jackson's capture of Harper^s Ferry with its immense 



Speoib Yalub of thb Papeb Cubbenot 215 

stores and garrison of over 11,000 men. When it was fonnd 
that McClellan had failed to foUow up his advantage and 
that Lee had recrossed the Potomac in safety, the disap- 
pointment was keen, and despite Bosecrans^s victory at loka 
the fall of the currency recommenced, and the lowest príce 
was that of the last day of the month. 

In October McClellan remained inactive, despite the org- 
ing of the president and the impatience of the pnblic. Lee 
had time to recover in a measure from the losses of his sortie 
into the free states, and he caused great exasperation by 
sending Stuart on another raid entirely aronnd McClellan^s 
idle army. In the West military operations favored the 
North. The desperate attempt to recapture Corinth was 
foiled by Bosecrans; and Bragg, after his failnre to capture 
Louisville, retreated from Kentucky, suffering rather greater 
loss than he inflicted at the battle of Perryville on the way. 
While these successes tended to offset Stnart^s raid and 
McClellan's inactiyity, the antnmn elections had a very 
depressing influence. Almost every where the administration 
lost ground. In Maine and Michigan the Bepublican majorí- 
ties were greatly reduced; Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, 
Pennsylvania, and New York went Democratic. A majoríty 
for the opposition was predicted in the House of Bepresen- 
tatives.^ The net effect of these various influences was an 
average price of the currency $6.60 below that of September. 

November was a qnieter month, with a much narrower 
range of fluctnations, although the average valne of the 
cnrrency was somewhat less. Military events were not of 
great consequence, and the market was dull awaiting the 
convening of Congress in December. The lowest quotation 
of the month occnrred on the lOth, when the order relieving 
General McClellan was pnblished.^ 

1 Cf, Blainb, THoenty Ytan of Congrest, Yol. I, pp. 441-8. 
s Cf. monej article in New Tork Times, NoTomber 10, 1M2. 



216 HiiBir<^BT or xss Gbeesbacks 

Wben Cc«g!R«i^ wifcwtiltd diascTB icpoirt c Lüw b J tihit 
iiii{ittkl raqvMÍüofi^ w4íTe «oeiuimlatiiig «i m nfád nie, aad 
dtfi Um:* mufir^íijurj hml ao »igg«8tkns f or incRasni liiaiirM . 
bnt laíd greni «trew «fiuii his widely distrosted tmVing 
fldbenfte. Pretenti/^ iiiq«¡rjr in CoogreaB caDed pnhiic atleii- 
ikm Ui ÜMíí ÍMet tibtt tibie ps j oí íhe mrmj was in «itbub» and 
a Üiird iaaqn' <^ UnÜed Btaiea nolea was foiefihadoTOd. Tbe 
admjiintoití<oo wa» abo aharpl j attacked f or ibe sn^ienskm 
oí ihín wrít <^ haJfjeoM oorptts and for tlie mooitny ptoclama- 
tíon <if *imMiÉid\miUnL Keanwliile diere was a quarrel in tbe 
Bef/ablkan rtjiikif. Tbe canciiB of tbe Señale adriaed tbe 
preBÍdínui io reoon^tmct bis cabínet, and in oonseqnenoe tbe 
9ecT*iÍMrus» íÁ «tale and of tbe tieasnry botb reaigned, bat 
were ymtyníUíA o[Jon bj Mr. Lincohi to remain in office. The 
great mí lítary event of tbe montb was Bomside's bloody repolse 
at Frederícksborg witb a loas of nearly 14,000 men. Under 
tbia combination of dejireeaing inflnenoea tbe first year of tbe 
paper standard closed witb a depreciation of 25 per cent 

In Janoary and Febmary tbe fall of tbe cnrrency was 
acceleraied in tbe manner shown above by tbe framing of 
tbe tbird legal-tender act. On tbe Potomac Hooker, wbo 
sncceeded Bamside, was qtdetly engaged in reorganizing 
tbe army and preparing for a spring campaign. Meanwhile 
it became known that Orantes ñrst campaign against Vicks- 
burg had been f mstrated by tbe destmction of bis depot at 
HoIIy Springs, and by Sherman^s repulse at Cbickasaw Bayou 
on tbe 29th of December. The next day tbe "Monitor" 
foundered oflf Cape Hatteras, Forrest's Confedérate cavalry 
were beaten at Parker's Cross Roads, and the great battle of 
Murfreesboro began. On the first of the new year Magmder 
reca[)tured Galveston, but ten days later Sherman, on bis 
return from the Yazoo river, captured Arkansas Post with 
6,000 prÍBoners. Early in Febniary a Federal attack on 
Fort McAIIister in Georgia and a Confedérate attack on Fort 



Speoie Valüb of thb Papbb Cubbenot 217 

Donelson in TenneBsee were repolsed. The rest of the 
month was rather quiet and the dominating influence in the 
gold market was the progresa of the third legal-tender act. 

This period, May, 1862, to February, 1863, commenced 
with a depreciation of but 2 per cent., and ended with one of 
42 per cent. From May to November the dominating causes 
of the decline were military disasters and the second issue 
of greenbacks. McClellan^s peninsular campaign was a mel- 
ancholy failure. Bichmond was not taken; instead. Lee 
invaded the North. Though his sortie was checked at 
Antietam, full advantage was not taken of the situation. 
When the offensive was at last resumed with vigor, the defeat 
of Frederícksburg resulted. What slight advantages had 
been gained in the West could not counterbalance such dis- 
asters. To this ill fortune in war was added the political 
defeat of the administration in the autumn elections, the dis- 
sensions among Bepublican leaders in Congress and the cabi- 
net, and the gloomy financial prospect. In January and 
February the depreciation was accelerated, but now because 
of the legiBlation pending in Congress rather than becanse 
of military events. 

3. T?ie rise from March to Augusta 1863. — February 
closed with the currency at about $58. In March a reaction 
began. There were no decisive military operations ; f or Grant 
was vainly trying to gei at Vicksburg from the North, Far- 
ragut bombarded Port Hudson without result, and in Ten- 
nessee and Virginia the fighting was mainly confíned to the 
cavalry. But Congress had passed the supplementary inter- 
nal revenue act, the national banking act, and the $900,- 
000,000 loan act; and the enactment of these laws was fol- 
lowed, as Secretary Chase said, "by an immediate revival of 
public credit.'" 

The same favorable causes continued to opérate in April. 

1 Bepart of tKe Secrttary of tKe Tretuury^ Deoember 186S, p. 2. 



218 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

Jñj Cooke now had his system of agencies for the five- 
twenty loan well organized, and subscriptions began to come 
ín. An onsuccessínl bombardment of the forts in Charles- 
tan barbor checked the ríse for a time ; bnt Banks was suc- 
cesBÍol in bis operations along the Bayou Teche in Louisiana, 
and Orant shifted his forces to the west of the Mississippi, 
marched them south of Yicksburg, ran his gnnboats and 
transporta past the batteries with slight loss, and prepared 
to croas again and attack the city from the sonth. Mean- 
wbile Hooker executed a well-planned movement across the 
Eappahannock and seemed to have Lee at a disadvantage. 
For these reasons the average valae of the cnrrency was a 
little higher in April than in March. 

During the first week in May there was a fall cansed by 
the disastrous battle of Chancellorsville. Bnt Grant's cav- 
alry reached Baton Bonge after cntting the commnnications 
of Yicksburg with the East, and his main army efFected its 
landing on the eastem bank of the Mississippi and won the 
seríes of victories that forced Pemberton back into the city 
aud c!ompleted its investment. A trine later in the month 
Banks closed in on Port Hudson farther down the river. 
Those events with increasing subscriptions to the loan* 
cauBcnl anotber advance in the valué of the cnrrency, so that 
the average for the month was slightly higher than for 
April. 

June presenta a striking example of an appreciation of 
the curn^noy --small, to be sure — despite military reverses. 
After C^haniH^llorsville, the Army of Virginia was reinforced 
hy Ivonne riptiotis and fitünl out better than ever before. On 
I he «id i)f June LtM> sel forwanl on a second grand invasión of 
t\\o Ni»r! h. At Winohesti^r he captured nearly 4,000 prisoners, 
v^ilh niany f^unn and liir^e supplies, and proceeded through 
iUt* Hhfnandoiib valley to Chambersburg in Pennsylvania. 

• t.y /^iMfcrt«* MfiiMimi*, Vol. XVII, p. SI7. 



Spboib Valub of thb Papbb Cubbbnot 219 

On the 15th President Lincoln issued a cali for 100,000 
militia from Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Vir- 
ginia, to aid in repelling the invasión. In the West nothing 
decisive was accomplished. Grant was pressing Vicksbnrg 
closely and Banks Port Hudson, bnt their attacks npon the 
works were repulsed without substantial gains. Meanwhile 
the political opponents of the administration seized the 
moment to pnsh their agitation against the conduct of the 
war. Mr. C. L. Yallandingham, who had been arrested for 
treasonable ntterances, was nominated for govemor of Ohio. 
At New York a great "peace meeting" was held. All this 
made the latter half of Jone a very dark period for the Union 
canse. Bnt the machinery of the national loan was now 
thoronghly organized, and, while Lee was advancing, the 
treasnry was receiving $1,500,000 to $2,500,000 daily for 
govemment bonds.^ The fact that the govemment was able 
to borrow on so large a scale, even at this crisis, had a great 
effect in maintaining its credit, and henee the valne of its 
notes. So, while Lee^s invasión cansed a heavy fall in the 
middle of the month, there was a reaction after the first scare 
snbsided, and for the month the average valué of the cnr- 
rency was $2 higher than in May. 

If June had shown the poesibility of a rise in the face of 
military reverses, July showed how powerfnl a stimnlant was 
military snccess. It was a month of victories — Gettysbnrg, 
Vicksbnrg, and Port Hudson. These great successes, with 
Sherman^s expulsión of Johnson from Jackson, the repulse 
of the Confederates at Helena, and the capture of Morgan 
and his raiders in Ohio, completely overshadowed the draft 
riot in New York and a few Union reverses. On the 15th 
President Lincoln appointed a day of thanksgiving, and on 
the 25th President Davis a day of fasting and prayer. The 
advance of the currency over June was $7.40. 

1 Banken* MaooMine, Vol. XVm, p. 007. 



220 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

Angnst continued the good times. In a militaiy way the 
month lacked dramatic featnres, for Grant, Meade, and Lee 
were allowing their troops a rest, essential after the forious 
campaigning oí Jtdy. Bosecrans, however, began his 
advance against Bragg at Chattanooga, and Bumside moved 
on Knoxville. Mnch enconragement was received from the 
vigoróos pnshing of the siege of Charleston.^ The draft in 
New York, which had been interrupted by riots, was resomed 
and completed. Elections in Kentncky, Yermont, and Cali- 
fornia resnlted most favorably for the administration candi- 
dates. Under these circmnstances the cnrrency reached 
$79.50 — a higher level than was again attained during the 
war. 

4. The fallfrom Septemher, 1863, to July^ 1864. — Many 
had expected after the great victoríes of Jnly that the end 
of the rebellion was at hand. But much to the chagrin of 
the president and the pnbUc, Lee, instead of being annihi- 
lated was suffered to withdraw unmolested across the Poto- 
mac, and was soon confronting Meade in the oíd positions 
along the Rappahannock. Early in September news of 
positive disaster was added to this disappointment. At 
Chickamanga Rosecrans lost 16,000 men and narrowly 
escaped the destruction of his whole army. The news 
caused a fall of nearly $3 in a single day. So the currency 
declined from $78.82 on the opening day of September to 
$69.87 on the 29th. 

From the last of September to the cióse of the year there 
was a slow but tolerably steady depreciation. The lowest 
point of the period was $63.80, October 15, caused by rumora 
of another f orward movement by Lee. After Longstreet had 
been sent west to reinf orce Bragg, Hooker was also dispatched 
with two corps to help Rosecrans. Lee then threatened to 
turn Meade^s flank and compelled him to fall back on Bull 

1 New Tork Timea^ money articles, Jnly 15, 17, and Angnst 25, 186S. 



Spegib Valüe op THE Papbb Cübbenoy 221 

Run. The operations in Virginia, however, were lesa important 
than those in Tennessee, where Orant relieved Rosecrans, 
who had allowed himself to be cooped up in Chattanooga by 
Bragg. In November the lowest prices, those of the 2l8t 
and 23d, were due to the inveetment by Longstreet of Knox- 
ville, where Bumside's forcea lay ; the highest, on the 27 th, 
to Grant^s spectacular victories at Chattanooga. December 
was a very qniet month with a slight range of variation. 
Sherman averted disaster to Bumside by hnrrying from 
Chattanooga to KnoxviUe and forcing Longstreet to raise 
the siege. In the East Meade recrossed the Rapidan and 
went into winter qnarters. Congress assembled and received 
a treasnry report of rather cheerfnl tenor, despite the f act 
that Chase found it necessary to ask anthority for borrowing 
$900,000,000. 

During the ñrst three months of 1864 the slow decline 
continned. In January the armies lay nearly still both east 
and west. On the Ist of February a draft was ordered for 
half a million men to serve three years or for the war. 
Butler's sally from Fortress Monroe, made in the hope of 
taking Richmond by snrprise and freeing the prísoners of 
war, was frustrated by a deserter who alarmed the Confed- 
erates, and Kilpatrick^s cavalry on a similar mission suc- 
ceeded in penetrating the first and second line of defenses 
abont the city, but were repulsed from the third. Late in 
the month the Florida expedition received a serióos check at 
Olnstree. In Mississippi Sherman succeeded in destroying 
Meridian and efFectually cntting the line of railway that 
supplied Mobile from the North, but the hoped-for destruc- 
tion of Pope's army was not accomplished because the co-op- 
erating cavalry failed to do its expected part in the cam- 
paign. In March the ill-f ated Red River expedition set out, 
and the Confedérate general Forrest defeated W. S. Smith 
at Okalona, re-captured Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, 



bat late in the month waa repulsed at Paducah with a loas 
of 1,500 meii. More important in ita effect upon the gold 
market vas the slowuesa of CoDgress in paasiiig the ñnance 
bilis, Even tlie New York Trtbune became impatieiit. "A 
Congresfl fit to exiet," it aaid, " would have matured and per- 
fected some sort of ñnance eyatem before the cióse of íts 
fourth month.'" 

In April Congress still paased no revenue lawB, and the 
war news was unfavorable. The masaacre of Fort Pillow, the 
failnre of the Hed River espedition, Steel's forced evacuation 
of his ¡>ofiition in Arkaneaa, the Confedérate capture of Fort 
Williams, and later of Plymouth, in North Carolina, all 
combined to make a gloomy comment-ement of the spring 
campaign.' Slight succesBos in Texas, Qrant's preparations 
for a vigoroua advance, and Union gains in the elections in 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Missouri, and New Jersey could 
not connterbalance these disasters and the inaetivity of 
CongresB. Conaequently the eurrency tell $3.50 below the 
average of March. 

In the firet half of May there was a rise. Sherman set- 
ting out froni Chattanooga suLceeded by skilful maneuverB 
in forcing Johnson baek from Dalton, then from Resaca and 
then from Allatoona Pass. At the sanie time Grant crosaed 
the Rapidan and fought the deaperate batties of the Wílder- 
nesB and Spottsylvania Conrt House. Every rumor from the 
field caused a rise or fall of the eurrency,' but despite 
Grant's enormoua loaaea, be was believed to have the advan- 
tage, Bo that the general trend of the flitctuationa was upward 
nntil near the middle uf the month. Buton the lOtb Ave- 

1 BditorUl artlole, Hueh 29, 1W(. 

■ ThotoellnsoldapressIiiD iBHbowaby theNew Yurh TWfnine') nmark: -'Wlth 
D«rh>ps a «ingle eie«ptiun. tha ímporlant milítarir «Tonta whicb os bms bovD eallnd 
apon to record tínco tho carly openluf uf thu camprnl^ 
oMIoaal csnn " (ApcU S. IHU), 

) B. Q., sae Mew Tork Tima, nunei articla. Uay 12, U 



J 



Speoie Yalub of THE Papeb Cubbenot 223 

rill's cavalry was defeated by Stuart, on the 15th Siegel 
WBB routed at Newmarket, and on the 16th Beaoregard 
forced Bntler back upon Bermnda Hundred and intrenched 
along his front so stronglj as to prevent bis co-operating 
with Grant Meantime Lee forestalled Grant in his move- 
ment to the North Anna, and Congress still failed to pass 
the tax bilis. Consequently after the lOth currency fell 
again ; by the 17th it was back to the opening valne of the 
month, and as the depreciation continued the average valué 
was $1.20 less than in ApriL 

During these first five months of 1864 there had been a 
depreciation of less than $2 a month, due to lack of prog- 
ress in snbduing the rebellion and the dilatoríness of Con- 
gress in voting taxes. In the next two months this rate of 
depreciation was greatly accelerated, in part at least because 
of the appearance of a new factor in the market — the 
"gold bilL" This measnre, however, was only the last of a 
series of govemmental attempts to control the price of gold. 
As was shown in the preceding section, the treasury officials 
believed that the premium was in very large measnre dne 
to a rise in the valne of gold effected by the nefarious 
arts of speculators. Could this speculation be broken up, 
they thonght that the premium would f all back to a modérate 
figure and the credit of the govemment be greatly enhanced. 
Acting on this principie, Congress, on March 3, 1863, laid a 
stamp tax upon time sales of gold, amounting to one-half of 
1 per cent, of the amount plus interest at 6 per cent, per 
annum, and at the same time forbade loans on the pledge of 
coin in excess of its par value.^ News of the passing of this 
law was foUowed by an advance of the currency from $58.22 

1 12 8iatwte$ at Large^ seos. 4, 5, p. 719. At the same time a bilí was pending in the 
New York legislature to prohibit banks from selling specie above par and from loan- 
ing npon specie so long as specie payments were suspended. It had some effect upon 
the markei, althongh it flnally failed of beooming law. See money articles of New 
York Tribune^ Febmary 6, 7, and March 5, 1863; Teme*, March 4, and April 17, 1863. 



HisTomr ov tvs 6mcK!rBACK9 



OB tlie 3d of Ibrcii to I8IL47 oa Ae ikk ; bot tíie gold nurfcet 
qmddj r&IBed, «nd bj tiie IOÚl Úie ennaiej had bllem 
agmók to |S1.3Su' 

Thoa^ this meiuuiij' prodaced bnt Ettl» effect, fbr odier 
rgMoniv the sienge gold Talae €if the ciuieu cy adruMccd 
flfeirij firom MsTcii lo Jmnev 1803y aad auicfc Boce nptdlj 
in Jolj cnd Au^^nsL Thaing Úúb periodo thi»efoce« the 
fuablíe ooneemed hielf littfe wítk the iniqalt f el goid specn- 
Idíon. Bal wfaen the cazTent tnracd and the preminm 
bqpui lo adraoice agamr demoiciatioB €if tfae spccnlatocs 
fecommenccd. As m specimen of the wmj in wUck they 
and tbeir works were regsrded hj a Is'g^ aectioa of the 
most eamest Dorthem people, ooe of tke numeróos edi- 
torial articles on the snbíeel may be qooled from the New 
York Trümme: 

For jeaní pasl, the partíaans of the Rebelión qoarlned in onr 
tüj ba^e sjstefnatícallj and bf c o mcrt stiiien and emplojedtbeír 
means to increafle Ifae prenúiun on gold. Thár mlscepÉed leiters 
piore thal tbej did Ibis in behalf of tbeir master« Jeff. Dtairis. and 
ín Ibe ocmTÍctíoo thal thej were aidín^ tbe Rpheltinn as tmlj and 
palpablj afl llioiii^ thej were wieldiiig' muskets in tbe fiont ranks 
c4 Lí*'» anny.* 

When CongresB aasembled in December the prevalence 
of the feeling tbat tbe preminm was largelj dne to specnla- 
tion, and specnlation to treason, manifeeted itself in propoeals 
to enact restríctive legislation. Bnt it was some time before 
thef^ propoBals were given serióos attention. In the Senate 
Mr. Lañe, of Kansas, introdneed a bilí December 15, 1863, 
to prohibit specnlative transactions in gold, and another 
Janaary 13, prohibiting the sale of gold at a price higher 
than that of 6 per cent federal bonds. Botb these measores 

1 S^^ maniíj artides of this períod. 

2 4nn#i 1'*, 1W4. Mor») or less similar ontborsts can be foond in most of the New 
York imifftTñ at any time that the preminm was adraneing rapidly. Cf^ e, g.^ New 
Yfjrrk Time»^ moo^jr artiele, Febmanr S, 186L 



Speoib Valué of thb Papbb Cubbengt 225 

were ref erred to the Committee on Finance and were no more 
hecoxl oV A third bilí of the same character met a similar 
fate, thoogh introduced by so inflnential a senator as John 
Sherman.' In the House Mr. Clay's "bilí to regúlate con- 
tracts for gold" was killed by the Committee on Judi- 
ciary, to which it had been referred," But while Congress 
was not yet ready to attack the bosiness of dealing in gold 
directly, it assented to a measnre of which the object was the 
reduction of the premiom. 

Just at this time the govemment was receiving more gold 
from customs duties than was reqnired for meeting the inter- 
est on the pnblic debt The excess was accnmnlating in the 
New York subtreasury. It was thonght that, if this large 
supply conld be suddenly thrown on the market, it wonld 
break the ''córner^' in gold and cause the premium to falL 
With this intent, the secretary of the treasury was author- 
ized to dispose of any surplus gold not required for interest/ 
The passage of this measure, like that of the tax provisión of 
March, 1863, was foUowed by a temporary appreciation of 
the currency from $59.61 on the 9th of March, when its 
defeat was expected, to $62.06 on the 17th, when it was 
approved by the president.* 

Mr. Chase, however, was loath to use the power thus 

1 Congretfionáí Olobe^ 88th Gong., Ist Seas., pp. 24, 173. When the oommittee was 
asked what it had done with the bilis, Fessenden replied that it still had the 
matter nnder oonsideratioii.— I&id., p. 900. 

1 Ihid,, p. 538. > Ibid., pp. 790, 2773. 

4 Joint resolation of Maroh 17, 1864, 13 StcUutet at Large^ p. 404. For the ffronnds 
on which the bilí was urged see Shennan, Congreuional Olobc, 38th Gong., Ist Sess., 
p. 1023; Hooper, i6id., p. 781 ; Kasson, pp. 707, 737, 738; Garfield, p. 734. On the other 
sido see Pendleton, pp. 731,732; Brooks, p. 733; Hendricks, pp. 1045, 1046; Reverdy 
Johnson, pp. 1060, 1061. As the bilí passed the House, it merely authorized the secre- 
tary to anticípate the payment of interest in gold, bnt the Senate Committee on 
Finance reported an amendment permitting the secretary to sell any gold in the 
treasnry not needed for the payment of interest (p. 1023). This resolation as amended 
was adopted by the Senate after a yea and nay vote of 90 to 8 on March 11 (p. 1062), 
and after mnch discossion was accepted by the Hoose March 16, by 84 Totes to 57 
(p. 1147). 

s New York Ttme», money articles, Maroh 9, 11, 12, 15, 1864. 



226 HlSTOBT OF THB GbEBNBACKS 

gÍTen him to sell gold, except as a last resort. He had 
another plan. Importers with customs datíes to pay had to 
boy the neceaeary coin in the gold room or on the stock 
exchange. Chase thonght the preminm might fall if this 
demand were taken ont of the market Conseqaently he 
annoimced that importéis wonld be allowed to deposit paper 
cnrrency with the sabtreasory, receive in retom certificates 
of deposit of gold at a rate a trifle below the cnirent pre- 
minm, and nse tbese certificates in payment of cnstoms.* 

The annonncement of this plan canaed a fall of gold from 
169f on the 26th to 165f on the 29th of March. This day 
certificates were sold at 165^, and for the 30th the price was 
set at 164. The market qaotation foUowed, and for the 
next day the price of certificates was 163¿. Bnt this time 
the market did not yield, and in conseqnence the rate for 
certificates had to be raised to 165 on April 1, and to 166 on 
the 2d« This advance meant the def eat of the plan. Instead 
of the treasnry being able to díctate to the market what the 
price of gold shonld be each day, it was obliged itself to 
accept the dictation of the market. However, the plan was 
kept in operation two weeks longer. The rate for certifi- 
cates was set permanently at 165 ; bnt the market qnotation 
regardless of this rose to 175 on the 12th. The next day 
Mr. Chase issned an order stopping the sale of certificates 
after the 16th.' 

Balked in his first scheme, Mr. Chase went to New York 
on the night of April 13 and ordered the surplns gold in the 
snbtreasnry to be sold.' On the 14th the gold qnotation 
reached 177^. By selling abont $11,000,000 of gold in 
five days Chase forced the premium down to 66J on the 21st. 
In comparíson with the effort made, the result was trifiing. 

1 See official annonncement in the New York papera of March 29, 1864. 

3 Pnblished in New York Trtímne, money article, April 18, 1864. These operatiooi 

all be followed beet in the eorrent money artioles. 

SSCHUOKBBS, op. ctl., p. 356. 



Spegie Valué of the Papes Cubbenot 227 

The policy conld not be continaed indefinitely, because suf- 
ficient gold had to be kept in the treasury to meet interest. 
When the pressore was removed, the advance recommenced, 
and by the 25th of April the premiuxn was higher than everJ 

At the ontset of this campaign in the gold market Mr. 
Chase seems to have been influenced by outside pressnre 
rather than by any conviction of his own that the expedients 
adopted would produce a permanently beneficial result. 
Many bosiness men as well as many politicians, who had 
become alarmed by the rapid leaps upward of the premium 
in the spring of 1864, were urging him to suppress the gam- 
bling in gold by any means in his power.' Bnt even when 
he was beginning the sales of gold Chase wrote to President 
Lincoln: "The sales which have been made — yesterday and 
today — seem to have reduced the price, bnt the rednction is 
only temporary, onless most decisive measnres for reducing 
the amonnt of circnlation and arresting the rapid increase of 
debt, be adopted." * And after the sales were over he wrote 
to Mr. S. D. Bloodgood, of New York: "I see that gold is 
again going np. This íb not nnexpected. Military success 
is indispensable to its permanent decline, or, in the absence 
of military success, taxation sufficient upon state bank issuee 
and state bank credits to secure .... an exclusive national 
currency ; and sufficient, also, to defray so large a proportion 
of current expenditures as to reduce the necessity for bor- 
rowing to the mínimum." * 

But neither this clear insight into the situation, ñor his 

1 Thoagh these operatíons had bnt a fleeting effect npon the price of gold, they 
prodnoed a seTere panic in the stock market. Money became exceedingly ** cióse/* 
and specnlators holding stocks for an advance were obliged to sell at heayy sacrí- 
fices. Cf. OoBNWAJLLis, TKc Oold Boom, p. 8; Mbdbbbbt, Men and Mysteries of Watt 
Street, pp. 248, 249. 

1 Cf, SoHUCKKBS, op. cit., pp. SS7, 358. Schuckers says that the plan of selling 
OQstoms-honse oertiflcates was adopted at the recommendation of the New York 
chamber of oommeree (p. 961). 

s Letter of April 15, ibid,, pp. 858, 359. 

* Letter of April 26, 1864, Wakdbn, Life of Chafe, p. 582. 



228 HlSTOBT OF THB ObEENBACKS 

• 

former f ailnreB, deterred Chase fiom trying a third plan — 
that of satisfying tbe export demand for gold by selling 
ezchange apon London at a rate below that prevailing in 
the market.^ This plan had still lesa effect than its pre- 
deceasors. It caosed a fall of gold from 181f on May 19 to 
181 on the 20th. Bnt the next day gold began to rise 
again, and on the 24th the treasory was forced to raise its 
price for exchange,' thus acknowledging another defeat 

Why all the attempts to reduce the preminm on gold had 
failed is not difficult to see. They were based on the 
assnmption that specnlators had increased the valué of gold 
— while the fact was rather that the govemment's notes had 
fallen in common esteem. Neither increasing the market 
supply of gold by selling the coin in the treasury, ñor dimin- 
ishing the market demand for gold by selling customs-house 
certificates or foreign exchange, conld better the govem- 
ment^s credit, and therefore such measures could bave noth- 
ing more than a temporary eflFect upon the premium. What 
was needed was, as Mr. Chase himself wrote, victories and 
heavier taxes. 

By this time, however, the secretary's temper had become 
ruffled by defeat, and he was ready to try extreme meas- 
ures. " The price of gold must and shall .come down," he 
wrote to Horace Greeley, June 16, "or FU quit and let 
Bomebody else try."* One resort was left: the govemment 
had failed to control the gold market; it remained to try 
abolishing the market altogether. 

A bilí with this purpose had been sent by Chase to the 
Senate Committee on Finance and reported by Sherman 
April 14.* This measure prohibited under heavy penalties 
all contracta for the sale of gold for future delivery and also 

> New York Tima^ money artiele, May 20, 1864. 

2 Jbid., May 24. > Warden« op. ctt, P- 003. 

' * Conffrcational Olobc, 88th Gong., Ist Sess., p. 161S. Comparo Fessenden*s expía- 
nations of the soaree of the bilí, i>. 1609. 



Spegie Valué of the Paper Cübbency 229 

forbade the sale of gold by a broker outside bis own office.^ 
Of course the bilí, if it became law, wonld make dealing in 
'^futures^' illegal, break np the gold room, and prevent salee 
at the stock exchange. 

It was with much misgiving that the Committee on 
Finance brought the bilí before the Senate and few advo- 
cates were fonnd who wonld say more than that they hoped 
it might accomplish some good. Fessenden spoke for the 
majoríty of his coUeagnes when he said: 

Although we may not beliere .... that a bilí of this kind 
will necessarily produce the effect . . . . it is nevertheless a duty 
in the present condition of things in this country to leave nothing 
untried which offers even a reasonable ground of hope ; and it is 
upon that supposition .... that the committee recommend the 
measure .... a bilí of this kind may produce an effect in two 
ways; fírst by operating upon public opinión, and second by high 
])enalties . . . . it may .... have an effect to check in some, 
perhaps not any inoonsiderable, degree, the rampant and heartless 
and wicked spirit which is actuating men with reference to this 
subject.' 

If those who voted for the bilí spoke doubtfully of it, 
those who voted against it were more certain of their 
ground. With one accord they declared that such legisla- 
tion could not accomplish what the secretary expected. Mr. 
Henderson, for example, reminded the Senate that the act 
authorizing sales of gold had been '' a total failure ^^ and 
added: ''It is utterly futile for us, unless we can keep up 
the character of the curf ency of the United States, to under- 
take to interfere with the price of gold." ' 

Senator CoUamer took similar ground: ''Gt)ld does not 
fluctuate in price," he said, " . . . . because they gamble 

1 Seo tezt,<Md.,p. 1640. 

s/6¿<i., p. 1640; oompare similar remarles of Chandler, p. 1644; Hale, p. 1671; 
Sherman, pp. 1640, 1646. 

*Ibid,t p. 1670. Qf, remarles of dark, p. 1643; PoweU, p. 1671 ; Reverdy Johnson, 
p.1645. 



230 HlSTOBT OF THE ObBBNBACKS 

ín it; bnt they gamble in it becanse it fluctnates. .... Bnt 
the flactnation íb not in the gold; the flactnation is in the 
cnrrencyy and it íb a flactnation ntterly beyond the control of 
individnalfi.^^ ' 

The trae way to reatore natíonal credit, said Cowan, was 
not to paas fatile enactments against gold specnlatíon, bnt to 
proeecate the war vigoroasly and to raiae large sama by 
taxation. ^^If we do that/' he conclnded, "if in the first 
place we satisíy the money lender that we are going to pnt 
down the rebellion, and in the second place that we are 
going to pay the ezpenaes .... then the pnblic credit at 
once will appreciate and pnblic secnritíes will rise, or, if yon 
chocae the other phrase, gold will apparently go down.^^ ' 

Perhaps the only senator who heartily approved of the 
bilí waa Lañe, of Kansas: *'It is my opinión,^' he said, "and 
the opinión of loyal and eagaciooB bosiness men of the city of 
New York, that the Confedérate govemment íb to day, and 
has been since last December, throogh its foreign agenta, 
engaged in the efifort to deprecíate our currency by gam- 
blíng/' His only objection was that Secretary Chase was 
being credited with the authorship of the bilí, when he 
himself had introduced a very similar measore several 
months before.' 

Though the bilí was passed by the Senate April 16,^ its 
consideration in the House was delayed while Mr. Chase 
was trying his other experiments in the gold market. When 
they had all failed he wrote a note to Samuel Hooper nrg- 
ing that the bilí be acted on. "Its passage,^' he said, "will 
probably check the advance and give a little time for further 
measures."* Accordingly the bilí was taken np Jime 7, but 
so closely was opinión divíded that the speakeres casting 

> Ibid,, pp. IMS, 1087. > Ibid., p. 1641. > Ihid,, p. 1069. 



• iota., pp. tooo, toDi. • JVM»., 

« The final rote was 23 to 17.— /6td., p. 167S. 
& Letter of Jone 2, Wardbn, op. cit,^ p. 5M. 



Specie Valub of thb Papeb Cubbengy 231 

vote was required to secure consideration for the snbject.^ 
A week later the bilí was passed after very little discnsBion 
in the Honse by a vote of 76 yeas to 62 naya.' It received 
the presidentas signature Juñe 17.* 

Gold opened in Jone at 190 and rose at the prospect that 
the gold bilí would be passed. On the 14thy when the 
House agreed to the bilí, the price touched 197^. When 
the law was put in operation on the 21st of June, the gold 
room was closed, and at the stock exchange the precióos 
metáis were dropped from the cfidl list; for it was now 
onlawfol for brokers to buy and sell gold outside of their 
offices. Persons who needed gold to pay enstoms or to send 
abroad were forced to go from one office to another inquir- 
ing the price.^ There being no organized market, there was 
no regular quotation, and the prices demanded by different 
brokers varied so widely that June 27 there was a difference 
of 19 points between the lowest and highest selling rates 
reported. Business was so greatly inconvenienced that a 
meeting of bankers and merchants convened on the 22d and 
appointed a committee to recommend necessary alterations 
in the law.^ Two days later the committee called upon Mr. 
Chase in Washington to urge the repeal of the act.* At a loss 
what to do, Chase had already authorized the assistant treas- 
urer at New York and Mr. Jay Cooke to take such measures as 
would arrest the rise of the premium.^ But they could do 
nothing, and the rise went on. Mr. Chase was very loath to 
recommend the repeal of the bilí, and yet he saw no other way 

1 OonoretnontU Oíobc, S8th Con^., Ist Seas., pp. 2793, 2794. 

2 Forty-three members did not vote.— J&id., p. 2937. The Senate ooncnrred in 
the Honse amendments. which did not affeot the snbstaoce of the bilí, oo the same 
day.-P. 2930. 

3 13 StahOa at Large^ p. 132. 

* New York Heraid^ editorial article, June 24, 1864. 

& See aoconnt of the meeting in New Tork papers of Jnne 28| 1M4. 

• Extract from Chase's diary, W abdbn, 14 fe of Cham^ p. 007. 
f Letter to J. Cooke, Jnne 21, Wabdbn, p. 606. 



232 HlSTOBT OF THE GbBBNBAGKS 

to remedy the sitnatíoiL' Before this dilemma was setÜed he 
sent his resignation to President Lincoln, June 29, and next 
day it was accepted. The vacant position was ofFered to 
Govemor David Tod of Ohio. When he declined it, Senator 
Fessenden was prevailed apon to asanme its dntiea.' 

Meanwhile the gold bilí had been repealed. Unanimons 
consent to introduce a bilí for this parpóse was granted to 
Senator Beverdy Johnson on the 22d of Jone.' Jaly 1, 
this bilí was called ap and passed with no debate ezcept 
Johnson's brief explanation : 

The tiniversal impression, so &r as I have been able to oollect 
it, in Congress and out of Cbngress, now is that .... the gold 
bUl is doing nothing but mischief ; and I have commanicatíons, and 
other Senators have reoeived them, from New Tork espedall y, beg- 
ging that that bilí shall be repealed. I do not know an y member 
of the Senate who formerly was willing to give that bilí his sanction 
who is not now jast as willing to repeal it. It has had its trial and 
has faúeá to produce anything but mischief.^ 

Later in the same day the bilí for repeal was passed by 
the House without any discussion.^ It was signed by Presi- 
dent Lincoln July 2;* the 3d was Sunday, and the 4th Inde- 
pendence Day, but on the 5th the gold room was reopened 
and the business of dealing in gold resumed its wonted 
course.' 

The great fall of the corrency, shown by the spectacular 
advance of the premium in June and July, was by no 
means due solely to the gold-bill blunder. Military news 
was unfavorable. After his frightful losses in the Wilder- 

1 Sm hÍB own aoeoont of what he said to Feseenden in rogard to the matter. 
Wakdkn, p. 619. 

2 Compare Part I« chap. t, seo. ii« p. 124, abore. 

3 Con4;re$tional Olobc^ 88th Coixg.^ Ist Ses8.« p. S16Q. « JMd., p. 8446. 
& Ihid.^ p. 3468. The TOte was: yeas, 87; nays, 29; not TOtlng, 66. 

• 18 StatuU» at Large^ p. 844. 

t At the stock exchange, howerer, transactions in gold were nerer regolarlj 
rwnmed after Jaoe 20. Cf, CommercicU and Financial Chronicle^ Yol. I, p. 168. 



Speoib Valué of the Papeb Cubbenoy 233 

ness and ai Spottsylvania, Grant had been compelled to 
give up his plan of taking Richmond by assanlts on Lee's 
linee. The bloody repulse at Cold Harbor, Jone 3, was fol- 
lowed bj ten days of inaction. When Grant crossed the 
James in the middle of the month, Lee merely fell back on 
Bichmond and seemed as safe as before. The attempt to 
secnre the Weldon railway south of Tetersburg by swinging 
inf antry corps to the lef t was foiled by EwelPs fíerce attacks, 
and thongh Wilson's cavalry succeeded in cutting the rail- 
way, they were afterward defeated and the damage repaired. 
On the last day of June the mine was exploded at Peters- 
bnrg, but the assault throngh the breach failed miserably. 
Meantime Hnnter, advancing on Lynchburg, was compelled 
to retreat into West Virginia by the sudden appearance of 
Early on his front with a superior forcé. This move opened 
the way for Early's dash on Washington in the first fort- 
night of July, which was almost successf al. Thongh miss- 
ing this prize, the Conf ederates operated in the Shenandoah 
for the rest of the month and on the 30th bumed Chambers- 
burg in Pennsylvania. Grant in the meanwhile was reduced 
to acting on the defensive ; for he had been compelled to 
send an army corps and two divisions of cavalry to confront 
Early. In the South Sherman seemed to be making slow 
progrees against the wary Johnston in his campaign about 
Atlanta, and all attempts to capture Forrest's cavalry in 
Mississippi proved futile. It seemed, indeed, in June and 
July that almost no progress was being made toward sub- 
duing the Confederacy, deepite the prodigious expenditure 
of money and blood. 

The financial outlook was no better. In ' contrast with 
the fíve-twenty loan which had closed in January, the ten- 
forty loan was a dismal failure. Another loan on seventeen- 
year bonds advertised Jime 25 met with so unflattering a 
reception that it had to be withdrawn on the 2d of July. 



234 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS 

The outBtanding certificates of indebtedness had mounted to 
$162,000,000 and there were unpaid reqnisitions on the 
treasurer of $72,000,000. The expenditnres were $2,250,000 
a daj, while the income f rom cnstoms was hardly more than 
sufficient to pay the coin interest on the debt, and even the 
secretary^s overestimate made the daily receipts from inter- 
nal taxes but $750,000.' Add to this the fact that there was 
little chance of quick improvement becanse Congress had 
delayed passing the revenue bilis until the last day of June, 
and the unhappy state of the finances becomes apparent.' 

Under the combination of nnf avorable circmnstances it is 
not strange that the valué of the currency fell rapidly. News 
of Mr. Chase 's resignation came to New York July 1, and 
was declared by the World to mean that the treasury was 
practically bankrupt.* This seems to have been the constmc- 
tion generally put on the resignation at first, and it was not 
until July 7 that the Tribune denied this story and declared 
that Chase withdrew simply because he and the president 
could not agree on a successor to Mr. Cisco. Senator Fes- 
senden^s appointment produced a temporary reaction, but 
Early^s raid was creating too much consterna tion to allow of 
much improvement. Sunday, July 10, he was within ten 
miles of Washington, where there was no forcé that seemed 
capable of withstanding his veterans. Next day the price of 
gold touched 285 — the highest valué of the war — that is, 
the currency fell to a specie valué of $35.09.* Though the 
crisis was passed, the market yielded stubbomly. Fessen- 

I Cf. Rcport of the Secretary of the Tretuury, Dooember« 1854, pp. 19, 20, and 
Part I, chap. y, sec. ii, aboTO. 

3 The tariff act, the ways and means act, and the intemal rerenue act were all 
approved June 30.— 13 Statutcs at Large^ pp. 202, 218, 2¿3. 

3 See tho reply of the Trilmne^ July 7. 

« After the regular markot had closed for the daj, transactions in gold at a still 
higher price are said to have taken place. Mbdberrt tells a circumstantial story 
of a frigh tened M issonri banker who bonght $100,000 of gold at 310, in Mcn and 
MWBteries of WaU Street, p. 2S0. 



Spboib Valub of thb Papeb Cubbengy 236 

den^s attempt to relieve the treasury by secnring a loan 
from the banks f ailed on acconnt of the limitations imposed 
by the snbtreasnry law, and the seven-thirty loan which he 
advertised on the 25th of July was not very well received.* 
Consequently while the cnrrency reached $40.98 on the ISth, 
it fell back again and closed for the month at about $39. 

Contemporary observers were wont to declare that this 
extraordinary rise of the premium after the gold room had 
been reopened was due solely to a well-concerted comer 
which had been arranged while the gold bilí was still in 
forcé.' When one examines the military and fínancial 
situation, however, one fínds little gronnd for surprise that 
the credit of the federal treasury was at a low ebb in the 
fírst half of July. No doubt the ^'bulls^^ in the gold room 
were doing their ntmost to raise the price, but their signal 
triumph over the " bears " would have been impossible had 
July, 1864, been like July, 1863, a month of great sub- 
scriptions to nationed loans and decisivo victories in the 
field. 

5. The rise from Augtist, 1864, to May, 1865. — In Au- 
gust there was a slow but tolerably steady appreciation in 
the vfidue of the currency, due to the improving military 
prospect. Sheridan took command in the Shenandoah, and 
while he accomplished nothing decisive against Early until 
September, all fear of the capture of Washington was 
removed. Grant was able at last to resume the offensive 
against Lee, and by feinting with his right wing succeeded 
in seizing the Weldon railway with his left and holding it 
against fíerce assaults. In the South Sherman continued 
his flanking movements against Atlanta, and Farragut cap- 
tured the Confedérate vessels in Mobile bay and reduced 

1 Pait I, ohap. Y, seo. ii, p. 125, aboTe. 

>Cy. IfxDBBSBT, op, cit, p. 250; CoBNW AiiLis, op. ct¿M P* 10;Chase's letter of 
Jone 21, to Jay Cooke, Wasdsn, op. eit.^ p. 606; editorial artíoles of New Tork 
Tribune^ July 8 and 15. 



236 HiSTOBT OF THX Gbscsbacks 



the Corta The rate of adruee, however, wws cbecked bj 
the eondítioD of the ímaTKafB At one timit the wnpBwi 
requiñtíoiis re^ched $130,000,000^' and the aeaetaij's 
«Itempts to ieD bonds weie bnt moderatelj fioccesEfoL 

Earl j in September iiews carne of the captare at Atlanta, 
and later in the month Sheiidan defeated Earlj at Opeqnan 
and Fuher*s HilL The meetii^ at the I>einoczatic conTen- 
tíoa in Chicago at the Tery end of Angnst had canaed a 
leaction^ bat thia was orercome bj the good news from the 
froDt. and the arerage Talne of the corraieT tat the month 
waa $5.50 abore that for the prerioi» month. 

Dnring October the ap|»eciati<Hi continned« for thoogh 
Kantz's caralry was defeated <hi the 7th and loat its gona, 
Hood in his adrance into Tenneasee was repaked at Alla- 
toona PasB and Besaca, Sheridan destrojed Earl t*s army at 
Cedar CreeL, Lieotenant Coshing sank the ^'Albemarle^^ 
wíth a torpedo, and the croiser ^ Florida'*'* was captnred. In 
November there was a cnrions reaction, dae mainlj to the 
presiden tial election. Mr. Lincoln^s triomph was taken to 
mean an indefinite continnation of the war, and so depressed 
the valué of the govemment's notes. In a militarr way the 
most important event was that Sherman cnt connections 
with the North and started from Atlanta on his march to 
the Bea. Hood meanwhile was still pressing north, whíle 
the imperturbable Thomas continued quiet preparations for 
his reception at Nashville. Schofield's withdrawal from the 
fíeld after the battle of Franklin was construed as a defeat. 

The interrupted rise reeommenced in December when 
word was received from Sherman that he had reached the 
sea in perfect safety and taken Savannah. A little later 
Thomas destroyed Hood's army at the battle of Nashville. 
The favorable efifect of these great successes was partially 
neutralized by the disappointment felt over Secretary Fes- 

1 JUport cf the Secretary cf the Treaturif^ Deeember, 1864, p. 21. 



Spegib Valub of thb Papeb Cubbengy 237 

senden's fínance report, by a cnrious bilí introduced into the 
House of Bepresentatives by Thaddeus Stevens imposing 
penfidties npon anyone who should pay more than its face 
valué for gold coin, or leas than its full valué for paper 
money,* and by Butler's failure to take Fort Pisher. 

In January Terry did what Butler had failed to do by 
capturíng Fort Fisher, and Sherman got ready for bis march 
north from Savannah. On the 28d an attempt to destroy 
Grant's shipping in the James faUed. These events, with the 
prevalence of peace rumora, sufficed to continué the gradual 
advance of the currency. In February Grant's attempt to 
tum the Confedérate Unes at Hatcher's Bun was unsuccess- 
ful, but Charleston and Wilmington fell in consequence of 
Sherman's advance. The failure of the '^ peace conf erence'' at 
Hampton Boads was depressing. Still, the rise continued 
until the currency regained the level which it had held in 
October before the relapse caused by the election. 

In March the very slow rate of appreciation suddenly 
became very rapid, because of the opening of the spring 
campaign. Word came March 14 from Sherman, who had not 
been heard from since early in February, that his army had 
safely reached Laurel Hill, in North Carolina ; and later 
came reporta of his victories at Averysboro and Bentonville. 
Meantime Sheridan joined Grant before Petersburg. Lee's 
position becoming desperate, he made a last assault upon 
the encompassing lines, but was driven back. Then Grant 
began the advance that was to end the war. In Wash- 
ington President Lincoln's second inauguration occurred, 
and Senator Fessenden was replaced by Hugh McCuUoch as 
secretary of the treasury. All this was favorable, and the 
average valué of currency for the month was $8.80 higher 
than it had been in February. 

iThe fall text of this bilí may be fonnd in the New York Tribune^ December 10, 
Ittá. For its effeot ai>on the gold market see ibid.^ money articles, December 6 and 7. 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbESSBACKS 



In tbe fixst two weeks at Apríl mctteis colmiiittfeed with 
the TÍctorj di Wire Forks, the ci^itiiie of Te^enbaig and 
BichmoDd, Lee's retremi and rarrender. A Kttle lalcr Sker- 
man trxjk Bakigfa. and Johnstcm's armj capitnlated. Presi- 
dent Lincoln's death was the one nntoward eren!. Noi- 
witbataníling it, the correncj gained $9.S0 orer March. 

Daring Haj there was a fmther adrance of $6.40 above 
the arerage for ApríL Armed resistance ceaaed, Preaident 
Dará was ca|>tared, and the war was over. MoreoTer, Jaj 
Cooke waa meeting with great snoceaB in aelling aeTen-thirty 
no4ea to obtain fonds for paying the armj. In theae last 
three montha of the war there was an a[^reciation aboTe 
Febmarj of $25. 

6, Decline from June to December^ 1865, — After the 
war waii orer, the gold market became cahn, indeed, oom- 
pared with what it had been. Oreat flnctnations gave plaoe 
to alight variationa from day to day. A reaction natnrally 
foUowe^l on the first joj cansed by the oeeaation of hostili- 
tíea. May 11 marked the high-water point — $77.82. After 
that there was a slow decline. Although the seven-thirty 
loan was readily sobscríbed, it led to a great increase of the 
debt Moreover, there was some danger of war with France 
becaase of Napoleones maintenance of Maximilian in México. 
By November the currency had depreciated $5.70 below the 
level for May. 

In December there was a slight reaction, doe to McCal- 
loch^H fínance report recommending a speedy resnmption of 
s[MK;ie ¡)ayment8 and the warm indorsement of this policy by 
the Uouse of Representatives. ' 

1 Btte Part I, eh«p. ▼, sec. iii, aboTe. 



CHAPTER IV 

PRICES 

I. FaUcner^a Table of Rélative Prices: 

Price Data of the Aldrich Beport — Criticisms of Falkner's Príce 
Table — EfiFect of Using Price Quotations for DifiFerent Months. 

II. A New Table of Rélative Prices by Qttarters : 

Method of Construction — Data Employed — Range of Fluctua- 
tions — Arithmetic Mean of Relativo Prices — Discrepancy between 
New Figures and Falkner's — Grouping of Cloeely Related Price 
Series — Second Series of Arithmetic Means — Treatment of South- 
ern Products — Third Series of Arithmetic Means — Median of 
Related Prices. 

III. Rélative Prices Paid by the Federal Qovemment for Supplies: 
Data Employed — Results of Computations — Comparison with 
Wholesale Prices. 

IV. Rélative Prices of Various Necessities at Retail: 

Weeks*s Report on Retail Prices — Rélative Prices of Twenty-three 
Commodities at Wholesale and at Retail — Rélative Retail Prices 
of Sizty Commodities — Comparison with Wholesale and Govern- 
ment Prices. 

V. Oener<il Causes of the Price Fluctuations Other than the Currency : 
Government Purchases — Diminished Supply of Southern Staples 
— ^War Tazation — Rise of Money Wages — Speculation — Quantity 
of Money — International Trade Relations — Decline in Valué of 
Gold. 

VI. The Currency as a Cause of the Price Fluctuations: 

Conoomitant Variations of Prices and the Premium — Conclusión 

I. FALKNEB^S TABLE OF BELATIYB PBIOES 

PoB the Btudy of prices during the Civil War the most 
copióos and trustworthy source of material is the report upon 
Wholesale Prices^ Wages, and Transportation made by Mr. 
Aldrich from the Senate Committee on Finance in 1893.' 
In Part I of this docnment there is an elabórate table, com- 

i Senate Beport No, 1894, 52d Gong., 2d Seas, (fonr parta), pp. 658, 1050. For the 
salce of broTity thiB doonment is hereafter cited simply as the Aldrich Report. 

239 



240 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

piled under the direction of Professor Boland P. Falkner, 
the statistician of the committee, showing the relative prices 
at Wholesale of some 230 commoditles each year from 1860 
to 1891. As the base from which varíations in price are 
measured in thís table is 1860, a proper starting-point for 
investigating the effect of the legal-tender acts apon prices, 
it maj seem that the present chapter can be confíned to an 
analysis of Professor Falkner's carefully elaborated resolta. 
Slight ezamination of the table, however, suffices to show 
that it ccuinot be accepted as a satisfactory index of ihe 
course of prices during the war. 

In the fírst place, Falkner's table gives but a single index 
number for each year, and therefore does not enable one to 
investigate in any detail the point of primary interest — the 
relation between the fluctuations of prices and the constantly 
changing preminm on coin. Second, the prices of the single 
commodities nsed in computing the average relative price 
for each year do not all refer to the same month. In col- 
lectíng material, Professor Falkner explains, an attempt was 
made to get four quotations each year for every article. In 
a few cases, however, this was not possible, and it was neces- 
sary to take instead average prices for the year. Where the 
prices were obtained by quarters the analysis proceeded on 
the basis of the quotations for January. "An exception to 
this rule is made, of course," he continúes, "for articles for 
which the January price is not the distinctive price for the 
year, as for fresh vegetables and the like. Thus, in the cost 
of potatoes, October is taken as the typical month, but the 
exceptions to the rule that January is the basis of the com- 
parison are very few/'^ 

It is probable that in years of less violent price fluctua- 
tions this use of some quotations for July, for example, in 
place of quotations for January would make little, if any, 

^Aldrich Report, Part I, p. 29. 



Pbiges 241 

difference in the general average for all commodities. But 
in the years of the Civil War the case is different. The 
tables of the last chapter show that the specie valué of the 
currency in which all prices were reckoned, fell 40 per cent, 
between January and July, 1864, and rose 52 per cent, be- 
tween January and July, 1865. When one is trying to 
ascertain what effect changes in the specie valué of the cur- 
rency had upon prices, it is clearly inadmissible to include 
in the Índex numbers for years marked by such extraordinary 
perturbations relative prices for both January and July. 

Ñor is this point one of merely theoretical signifícance. 
To determine how frequent is the use of quotations for other 
months than January, I have recomputed from the original 
data in Part II of the Aldrich Report all the relative prices 
given in Table I for 1865. The result indicates that the 
cases of divergence from the general rule of using the Janu- 
ary price are much more numerous than Professor Falkner's 
language would lead one to inf er. Of the 222 relative prices 
for that year only 99 are based on quotations for January. 
Of the remainder, 74 refer to unstated months or to averages 
for the year, 26 to July, 6 to March, 6 to the average of 
January and July, 4 to February, and 7 to various other 
months.' 

1 As these statements seem in some measore inoonsistent with the impressioo 
gÍTon by the langaage of the report, I append a list of the relative prices for 1865 
that are not based on Jannary quotations : 

1. Time withinyear not speoified: flsh, mackerel, No. 1, No. 2, No. 8; lard, pare 
leaf ; meat, bacon dear and ham; salt, ooarse solar, and fine boUed; blankets, cot- 
ton warp, all wool fllling; broadoloths, flrst and seoond qnality ; oassimeres, Nos. 1, 
2, and 3; checks; hides; horse blankets; shawls; solé leather; wool, medinm and 
fine; anvils; bar-iron; door knobs; iron rails; iron rods; lead, pig. No. 2; locks, 
mortise and rim; meat cntters; nails; pi|r iron; pocketkniTos, Nos. 1 to 25; saws. 
Nos. 1 to 4 ; scy thes ; carbonate of lead ; maple boards ; oak boards ; shingles. Nos. 
3 and 4 ; calomel ; glycerine ; glassware. Nos. 1 to 5. 

2. July: staroh, oom, No. 2; calicó; print cloths, Nos. 1 and 2; iron wire; bríck; 
oement; chestnnt logs; hemlock logs; lime; oxide of cinc; pine boards, Nos. 1, 3, 5, 
and 6; pine logs; pntty; shingles. No. 1; spmce boards; tar; torpentine; window 
glass, Nos. 1 to 4; starch, ordinary lanndry. 

8. ÁTcrage of Jannary and July: doors; hemlock boards; pine boards, Nos. 2, 4, 
and 7 ; pine shingles. No. 2. 



242 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

Precisely how great an effect these very freqnent devia* 
tions from the rule have upon Falkner's índex nomber for 
1866 it Í8 impossible to tell. In eleven of the above cases oí 
deviation the price for the other month is ídentical with that 
for Jannary, bnt in the majoríty of instances where a Jann- 
ary quotation is available for comparison the difference is 
considerable. Perhaps the best way to get a quantitative 
ezpressíon of this difference is to examine the case of the 
twenty-three commodities for which both Janaary and Jnly 
prices are given in the ezhibits, bnt where the relativo prices 
for 1865 are based on the latter qnotation. The average 
relative price of these articles for Janaary is 268, for Jnly 
202 — a difference of 66 points. 

It is evident that Professor Falkner^s average which 
includes relative prices based npon these twenty-three Jnly 
qnotations, to say nothing of the mnch larger nomber of 
relative prices based upon quotations for other months 
besides January, cannot show the true average relative price 
of the 222 articles for January, or for any single month, or 
for the year as a whole, and therefore cannot with propriety 
be compared with the premium on gold for any single month 
or for the yearJ Clearly, then, all thought of using the table 
of relative prices in the form in which it is published in the 
report for investigating the relation between the rise of prices 
and the depreciation of the currency in relation to specie 
must be given up.' 

4. M arch : píate glass. Nos. 1 to 6. 

5. Febmary : fish« ood ; meat, beef loins, beef ribs, and mnttoQ. 

6. April : carpeta, Wiltoo ; stareh. Gotario. 

7. October : coal« anthracite, pea ; potatoes, No. 2. 

8. Ma j : powder« rifle. No. 2. 

9. Auflrust : meat, lamb. 

10. November: potatoes. No. 1. 

1 Professor Falkner, orerloolcing the natare of his avera^, divides the average 
relatire price for each jear from 1862 to 1878 bj the premium oo ffold in Janaary, and 
ihas obtains a table which he calis *' Relative Prices in Qolá.^^—Ibid., p. 99. 

>Othcr objections might be urged against Falkner^s table, such as the inolnsioD 
of mauj different series for slightlj different forms of the same article, eto. Bnt 
what has been said is sufficient to show the reason for compiling a new table. 



Pbigbs 243 

Fortunately, while the table of relative prices pablished 
in Part I of the Aldrich Report is thns onsuitable for the 
present purpose, fiíll of the materifiíl from which that table 
was constructed is published at length in the ^'Exhibits'' of 
Part II. As this coUection of data was made from authen- 
tic sonrces with scrapnlous care, the stndent who fínds that 
he cannot employ Professor Falkner's averages is able in 
many cases to go back to the original material and compile 
from it new tablea specially adapted to his needs. This is 
the task attempted in the next section. 

II. A NEW TABLE OF BELATIVE PBIGES BY QUABTEBS 

The preceding criticism of Falkner's table of relative 
prices indicates what should be the distinctive features of 
the new table. First, in order that the comparison between 
the fluctuations of prices and of gold may be as full as pos- 
sible, it is desirable that several index numbers should be 
obtained for each year — the more the better. The attain- 
ment of this desiderátum in partial measure is made possible 
by the fact that for a large number of articles prices are 
given four times a year — for January, April, July, and 
October, and in a very few cases for February, May, August, 
and November. Second, in order that the meaning of the 
averages shall be clear when they are obtained, all articles 
that are not quoted in this manner must be excluded. By 
observing these two rules, a table can be made that will show 
the relative prices of a considerable number of commodities 
at four dates in each year for the period of the Civil War. 

Two points remain to be settled — What prices shall be 
used as the basis upon which to compute varíations, and, 
How shall the average of the price variations of the single 
commodities be struck? On the first point it seems well 
to foUow the precedent set by Professor Falkner and take 
the quotations for January, 1860, as the basis, except in 



244 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS 

cases where the quotation f or some other month or for the 
year as a whole is clearly more representative.' As pnces 
remamed nearly statíonary during this whole year and the 
fírst quarter of 1861, the general results obtained in this 
fashion will not vary appreciably from those that might be 
obtained from the use of the average for the year 1860, or 
for the fífteen months from January, 1860, to April, 1861. 
The advantage of the course chosen is that it facilitates 
comparison with Falkner's table. 

The same reason may be given for taking a simple arith- 
metic mean of the several relative prices each quarter as the 
fírst average. Afterward other methods of averaging will 
be tried. Weights, however, will not be in place in any of 
the averages that may be employed in this chapter. When 
one is concerned simply with ascertaining what effect mone- 
tary conditions have had upon prices, the importance of a 
commodity for purposes of consumption is a whoUy irreleyant 
faci To take a concrete illustration, the fluctuations in the 
price of cotton, while more significcmt than the fluctuations 
of, say, wood-screws, when a computation is being made of 
the increase in cost of living, are much less signifícant when 
the effect of the greenback issues upon prices is the subject 
of investigation. In the foUowing tables, therefore, all com- 
modities will be treated precisely alike, so far as the quanti- 
ties produced or consumed are concemed. 

Examination of Table XI of Part II of the Aldrich 
Reportj from which Falkner's table of relative prices was 
made, shows that there are tolerably complete series of 
quarterly quotations for 120 commodities. In Part IV there 
is a supplementary table (XXI) that f urnishes two more series. 
Further, as there is no reason for excluding from the inves- 
tigation any class of commodities for which the requisito data 
are obtainable, thirteen more series may be added for the 

1 Id dealing with aerricnltural prodncts, for ezample, it is best to ose the ayerag» 
of the quarterly quotations for 186U. 



Pbiobs 



245 



farm prodncts grouped by themselves in Table X of Part II. 
This makes a total of 135 nominally distinct articles — a num- 
ber considerably smaller than that incladed in Falkner's 
table, bnt larger than the nnmber inclnded in some of the 
currently received f oreign tablea. The relative prices of these 
commodities have been computed in the nsual f ashion as per- 
centages of the quotations for 1860. AU of the resolting 
series are published at length in the Appendix. 

Anyone who looks over these individual series will find 
that, while there was a very general and violent advance of 
prices from 1860 to 1865, this advance was far from oni- 
form. A few of the most extreme examples of dissimilar 
fluctnations may be presented, side by side to show how 
great the differences were: 

TABLB vm 

■XAMPIJB8 OF DZBSIlflLAB PBICB FLÜOTUATIONS 



Gold 



1860, January 
April . . . 
July ... 
October 

1861, January 
April . . . 

July 

October 

1862, January 
April . . . 

July 

October 

1863, January 
April . . . 

July 

October. 

1864, January 

April 

July 

October . 

1865, January 

April 

July 

October. 



Silk: 


Cotton: 






Wood 
Sorews 


Raw 
Italian 


Upland 
Middling 


Matches 


Meroory 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


101 


100 


100 


100 


106 


98 


100 


100 


81 


100 


98 


100 


100 


117 


100 


109 


100 


100 


117 


83 


117 


100 


100 


117 


78 


134 


100 


100 


117 


72 


196 


100 


82 


117 


72 


327 


100 


82 


117 


72 


250 


100 


82 


117 


83 


336 


100 


82 


117 


81 


509 


100 


109 


117 


75 


614 


100 


127 


135 


72 


664 


100 


127 


158 


67 


627 


100 


127 


158 


67 


768 


100 


142 


119 


69 


736 


100 


151 


158 


75 


691 


100 


200 


158 


89 


1400 


208 


282 


216 


94 


1091 


208 


346 


216 


89 


1091 


208 


251 


216 


100 


318 


396 


182 


216 


111 


455 


396 


96 


216 


100 


400 


396 


96 


216 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
103 
102 
116 
129 
145 
152 
131 
148 
156 
173 
258 
207 
216 
149 
142 
146 



246 HlSTOBT OF THB GbBBNBACKS 

A lees spectacolar, but more comprehensive, view of the 
range of price flnctnations may be had from Table IX, which 
showB the 135 oommodities classified each quarter aooording 
to the degree of their rise or fall in price. 

The chief valué of such an ezhibit is that it emphasizes a 
f act that one interested in tracing the effect npon pnces of 
the monetary changes of the war is prone to slur over — 
namely, that, however powerfnl a factor in determining the 
ratios of exchange between dollars and oommoditiee, the shift 
from a specie to an irredeemable paper standard may have 
been, it was by no means solely responsible for the changes 
that took place. Every article bonght and sold oontinned to 
feel in undiminished forcé the effect of all changes in the 
conditions affecting its own particular demand and supply, 
as well as of changes in the specie valué of the currency. 
But from the present point of view all matters that caused 
price flnctnations, except those connected with the cur- 
rency, are disturbing factors to be eliminated so far as possi- 
ble. To attain this end it is customary to strike an average 
of the relative pnces at stated intervals, on the theory that in 
such an average the effect of the conditions peculiar to each 
article that cause some to rise while others fall will neutral- 
ize each other and thus leave evident only those changes 
connected with the cunency or some other common cause. 
Accordingly, in Table X are shown the aríthmetic means of 
the relative pnces of the 135 quarterly seríes, side by side 
with Falkner^s corresponding figures for 230 commodities. 

In examining this table and the material from which it 
is made, one finds two matters that shake confidence in the 
representative character of the resulte. The more obvious is 
the not inconsiderable discrepancy between the figures of the 
quarterly table and of Falkner^s annual table. This discrep- 
ancy, however, is more apparent than real, and need cause little 
uneasiness. From what was said in the preceding section of 





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275-209 

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450-499 

500-749 

750-999 

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248 



HlSTOBT OF THB GbEENBAOKS 



AKITHiaTIO MBAN OP THB 



TABLB X 

BXLATITB PKI0B8 AT WHOI.BBAIJÍ OF 135 OOMMOD! 
BT ^ ABTEB8, 1860-85 1 





185 


Falkner*8 




135 


Falkner*e 


Date 


Commodi- 


Qeneral 


Date 


Commodi- 


General 




ties 


ÁTorace 




ties 


ÁTera^e 


1800,Janaary.. 


101» 


100 


1863, January.. 


147 


149 


April 


102 




April 


165 




July 


100 




July 


150 




October. . 


102 




October.. 


160 




1861,January.. 


98 


101 


1864, January.. 


185 


191 


April 


98 




April 


201 




July 


94 




July 


254 




October.. 


101 




• October.. 


254 




1862,January.. 


111 


118 


1866,January.. 


262 


217 


April 


111 




April 


211 




July 


115 




July 


193 




October. . 


130 




October. . 


213 





the elementa from which Falkner's average is constmcted, it 
f oUows that the two averages would not agree, even were the 
list of articles inclnded in both identical. The use of so 
many quotations for other months than January necessarily 
makes Falkner^s figure higher than that in the other table for 
January in years when pnces were rising, and lower in years 
when prices were f alling. As the observed discrepancies are 

1 Á table somewhat like the aboye was made in 1896 bj MxsB S. McLkan Habdt 
and pnblished in the Journal of Political JEoonomy, Yol. III, p. 158. Her table, how- 
eyer, coyerod onlj the qnarters from January, 1861, to Janoary, 1865, inelosiye, and 
oontained 114 instead of 135 commodities. She omitted the thirteen farm i>rodaet8, 
raw silk, and tin platas from Table XXI of the Aldrich Reporta and calicó, denims, 
tickinffs, shoyeU, castor oil, and jute from Table XI. The omission of the last two 
articles of this list alone is explained, bnt the reasons giyen— that the price of jnte 
is expressed part of the time in gold and that there is a chance in the nnit of meas- 
nre applied to castor oil — do not apply to the period coyered by either table. I haye 
not been ableto use Miss Hardy's flúores oyen for the articles and qnarters common 
to both tables, becaose of the discoyery of numeróos errors in her computations. 
Most of these, howevor, are mínate, and the only case in which they seem appreeia- 
bly to affect the general result is in October, 1861, when her table, apparently because 
of a mistake in addition, shows a yery sudden adyance from 95 to 125, followed by a 
fall to 113. In no other quarter is the dífforenoe between Miss Hardy's resulte for 
114 commodities and mine for 135 greater than four points. 

3 The reason why the arithmetic mean in January, 1860, is not 100 is that the 
relativo prices of agricultural prodacts is based upon the ayerage prices for four 
quarters, and, of course, the January price is in most casos aboye this ayerage. 



Pbigbs 249 

of this character, they are cause for conñdence rather than 
for dístrust. 

The Becond reason for donbting the fairness of the qnar- 
terly table as an índex of price movements, though less 
obtrusive, is more serioas. On looking over the 135 series 
that enter into the quarterly table one finds a considerable 
number of cases where two or more series of relative prices 
are given for more or less similar varieties of the same com- 
modities. These cases are as follows: bread — Boston crack- 
ers, three series; beeves — beef loins, beef ribs, salt mess 
beef; sheep, mutton; hogs and pork — pork, salt mess; 
molasses — New Orleans and Porto Rico; salt — Ashton^s, 
Ashton's Liverpool fine, Turk's Island; sngar — fair refining, 
Havana brown, refined; vegetables — fresh potatoes, two 
series; carpets — Brussels, ingrain, Wilton; print cloths — 
metacomet, standard; sngar of lead — brown, white; fomi- 
ture — chairs, bedroom, kitchen; pails — wooden, two-hoops 
(two series), three-hoops, tubs (fonr series) ; starch — Ontario, 
pearl, puré, refined, silver gloss; coal, anthracite — chestnut, 
egg, grate, stove; copper — ingot, sheet; lead — drop shot, 
pig, pipe; rope — Migiila, tarred American; pine — boards, 
lumber in log; window-glass — American firsts and thirds, 
French firsts and thirds. 

Now, according to the logic of the average whon used for 
such a purpose as the present, it is not admissible to include 
more than one series of relative prices for any single article. 
For, as has been said, the average is employed here as a device 
for eliminating price changes due to conditions a£Fecting the 
supply and demand of the individual commodities. This 
elimination is believed to take place because, when a large 
number of commodities are selected at random, it is probable 
that the cases where these changes in supply and demand 
are in the direction of higher prices will be about as numer- 
cus as the cases where they are in the direction of lower 



' )V> HlSTORY OF THE GbEENBACKS 



I »i u % . 1. Uut if oue coQiinoditj is coiinted two or more times, 
iiiil v>iIk is iHxt ouvv, the factors affecting that one oommodity 
(u* ^;ivv^u uuduo pcuminence, and the chance is diminished 
i<i ttu ii Iviii^ oflset by changes of an opposite chaiacter in 
I hv' ^ a;io v>f other commodities.' 

'lUv' lucludiou of several seríes for different varieties of 
i Iw kuuo arúcle is not quite so objectionable as the counting 
«•I a •u4^lo !k.'riet» aeveral times over, becanse the chances are 
•111.^ t tlua ihi^üo different varíeties will all be subject to pre- 
« iu\A\ úw skuuo changes of supply and demand. To take 
(Ut« iiu«t4Uioo of Btarch, for which the greatest nnmber of 
uv lu'ti mv givou iu the qnarterly table it appears from the 
(4vM\' v4i tho following page that no two of the five seríes 
<>U^>\\\^1 tho iMiuo variations. 

U\ii \^hilo tho fluotnations in the relative príces of the 
>H'\\i<^t kiuvb of any oommodity may not be identical — 
ihoix' m i4 diffort'noe of 56 points between the highest and 
U»\\\\-»i ivUtivo pnces of starch in Janoary, 1865 — they 
uiu.illx u^^mblt^ each other enoogh to snbstantiate the 
iiv Uol ihüi thoro aiv certain broad conditions of supply and 
tU'iu 4iul thnt afftvt all the varíeties in somewhat the same 
Iw .liuui. Hy iucluding seríes for the different varíeties these 
tuo ul vouditious are given more prominence than similar 
\ ouxUuxuiíiHffei'tingothercommodities. Therefore thechance 
ol oUtaiuiug an average in which the effect of príce changes 
Uuv' lo thiotuations in the supply and demand for the varíous 
v^duuukiUuvi id subetantiallv eliminated* seems to be 
íU4>u»\\hI bv takiug but one seríes for each distinct oommodity. 
Uui üio v|Ui>stion what shall bedtvmed distinct commodities 
ih i\v»l oasy to answer. The gt^noral rule must be that com- 

> vU v\»ur:»\ ikMtM" T>ranArk.> hATt» xk» «pp!kati«>c to ÍDd^x<aimher$ vbra as«d for 
^lUi^H'^.--» \\\ji% lUAky» w;4:ht<vi ATy>r«4pe« dMsinS>. Fn^^o^ci^ in six-h c4Laet$ th<* 
^ck»U«iu« c**u Uv"! Ke ivrfx*T»<vi bf USÍIV4? íífripr*! Sl^nee^ for an:c'.<r* c»f (irreAl iin{*i>r- 
Vau«%' >«stvi l'uv \v;ke fxNT ih<' mA:or:XT %>f %>(¿»irr An>c>< RuU as h&s twteo ^xplaixMNl 



Pbioes 



251 



BKLATITB PBICB8 



TABLB XI 
OP irní YABIBTnBB OF BTABCH 



Date 



Ontario 



1860, 



1861, 



1862, 



1863, 



1864, 



1865, 



Jan.. 
Apr.. 
July . 
Oct.. 
Jan.. 
Apr.. 
July . 
Oct.. 
Jan.. 
Apr.. 
July . 
Oct.. 
Jan.. 
Apr.. 
July . 
Oct.. 
Jan.. 
Apr. . 
July . 
Oct.. 
Jan.. 
Apr.. 
July . 
Oct.. 



Pearl 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

lio 

130 
140 
130 
130 
160 
180 
200 
244 
240 
240 
200 
200 



Puré 



Beflned 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
92 
92 
92 
92 
100 
117 
125 
117 
117 
142 
158 
175 
192 
206 
206 
175 
175 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
92 
92 
92 
92 
100 
115 
123 
115 
115 
139 
154 
169 
185 
200 
200 
169 
169 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
93 
93 
93 
93 
100 
114 
121 
114 
114 
136 
150 
164 
179 
193 
193 
164 
164 



SUy'rOloss 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
94 
94 
94 
94 
100 
113 
119 
113 
113 
132 
145 
158 
171 
184 
184 
158 
158 



Ayera^ 



100 
100 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
94 
94 
94 
94 
102 
118 
126 
118 
118 
142 
158 
173 
194 
205 
205 
173 
173 



modities are distinct for the present purpose when the con- 
ditions affecting their production and consumption, their 
supply and demand, are distinct. This Une, however, is diffi- 
cnlt to draw because of the many degrees of relationship 
between different goods. While everyone may admit, that 
the difference between wooden pails with two hoops and 
with three hoops is not sojBScient to entitle the articles to be 
treated as distinct commodities, there is room for difference 
of opinión regarding such articles as brown and reñned 
silgar, Bmssels, ingrain and Wilton carpets, etc. In the 
present case, I have thonght it best to err rather on the side 
of drawing the line too stríctly than too loosely. With this 
purpose I have taken the average relativo prices of all the 



252 



HlSTOBT OF THB GbBBNBAOKS 



aboye enomerated gronps of related articles, and recom- 
pnted the arithmetic mean for each qnarter, osing these 
averages in place of the original seríes. Thls procednre 
reduces the nnmber of seríes that enter into the average 
from 135 to 97. It will be noticed that the new seríes of 
averages is somewhat higher than the former one from 
Table X, which is introdnced into the new table to facilítate 
comparison. 

TÁBLB xn 

ABITHMBTIO MEAN OF RBLATIVX PKICIS OF 195 OOMMODTTIBS BXFOBB Ain> A 
ATSRAODfO 8KBIB8 FOB DIFFBBBlfT YABIBTnBB OF THB BAMB OOMMODXTT 



Date 



1860, January.. 

April 

July 

October . . 

1861, January.. 

April 

July 

October . . 

1862, January.. 

April 

July 

October . . 



Before 


After 


Áyerasing 


Áyeraging 


Series for 


Series for 


Different 


Different 


Yaríeties 


Yaríeties 


of Same 


of Same 


Commo- 


Commo- 


ditj 


dity 


101 


102 


102 


102 


100 


100 


102 


lOé 


98 


98 


98 


98 


94 


94 


101 


101 


111 


114 


111 


113 


115 


117 


130 


134 





Before 




Áyerasing 




Seríes for 


v^ 


Di£ferent 


Date 


Yaríeties 




of Same 




Commo- 




ditj 


1863, January.. 


147 


April 


165 


July 


159 


October.. 


160 


1864, January.. 


185 


April .... 


201 


July 


254 


October. . 


254 


1865, January.. 


262 


April 


211 


July 


193 


October.. 


213 



After 

ÁTera^inir 

Seríes for 

Different 

Yaríeties 

of Same 

Commo- 

dity 



154 
173 

165 
166 
193 
208 
264 
262 
272 
216 
197 
214 



One objection against the aYerage, eYen after the cor- 
rection has been made for difFerent Yaríeties of the same 
commodities, remains to be dealt with. On lobking OYer the 
amended list of seríes one finds a number of articles that 
show extraordinary fluctuations which are clearly due to other 
causes than the currency — especially the staple southem 
products, cotton, molasses, sugar, turpentine, and fínished 
products made of these materials, like cotton f abrícs. It may 
seem at first sight that there can be no question abont the 



Pbioes 253 

propriety of excluding all such articles from the list on tho 
groiind that their price perturbations are assignable in large 
measare to known causes other than the changes in the 
carrency. But, after all, the matter is not so simple. Every 
series in the table has a valué not only as an indication of 
the effect of the currency on the price of the specific com- 
modity which it represents, but also as bearing within it a 
corrective for the e£Fect upon the average of changes in 
the supply and demand of other commodities. If, then, 
one commodity is thrown out because the investigator hap- 
pens to know something of the conditions a£Fecting its 
demand and supply, there is danger that the effect of oppo- 
site conditions affecting some other commodity about which 
he happens to know less will not be offset. 

In other words, use of the average to ascertain the effect 
upon prices of any general cause like the issue of an irre- 
deemable paper currency, implies reliance upon the laws of 
chance, and the operation of these laws should not be lightly 
interf ered with by limiting the number of cases submitted to 
them. Of course, this reliance upon chance is not and should 
not be blind. The investigator properly uses his discretion in 
determining whether the material which he subjects to the 
process of averaging is of a representativo character. Under 
this head comes, for example, his liberty to combine series 
that represent the effects of the same set of particular con- 
ditions. But the mere fact that he happens to know some- 
thing of the reasons why one article advanced or fell in 
price much more than the majority gives him no logical 
right to throw it out. If he were to commence upon 
the process of excluding all articles for the deviation of 
which from the mode he could account, consistency would 
demand that he make a careful study of the conditions 
affecting the supply of and demand for all articles in his list 
and try to distinguish in each and every case between the 



264 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

üffects npon príce of the monetary conditions and of other 
factors. But it is precisely because snch dÍBcrimination of 
the part played by di£Ferent causes in prodncing the given 
resalt is admitted to be impossible that he has recourse to 
the deyice of the average. When he employs that device 
at all, he shoald employ it consistently, and not allow his 
accidental knowledge of the market conditions afPectiog cer- 
tain commodities, and his inevitable ignorance of the market 
conditions affecting other commodities, to interfere with the 
operations of the laws of chance. 

But, while it wonld be inconsistent to exclude the whole 
list of southem products because the cause of their remark- 
able advance in price is known, there is the same reason for 
cntting down the representation of one group of them as for 
oaing but a single series for the ñve different kinds of 
starch. The extreme advance in the price of cotton caused 
by the practical cessation of exporta from the South, com- 
municated itself in large measure to all goods made of cot- 
ton — print cloths, drillings, shirtings, sheetings, calicó, 
denims, and tickings. To include all of these sepárate series 
would give an undue prominence to the changes in the sup- 
ply of and demand for cotton, precisely like the undue 
prominence given to the corresponding particular conditions 
affecting starch by the use of the five series for it. There- 
fbre it seems probable that the representative character of 
the average will be improved by treating cotton and cotton 
ftibrics like the other groups of closely related commodities, 
i. e., by substitutiug for tho original eight series their aver- 
age relative price. When tbis change has been made the 
new average given in the next table sido by side with the 
preceding two is obtained. 

The preceding disoussion points to the conclusión that 
Iba third of these columus has a better claim upon accept- 
M an Índex of the general trend of price fluctuations 





PS 


ss 


lll 




SU 


£§ 


S = 






^ 




0n 


$ 


lll 


D>U 




11 


m 


Dat« 




■tú 


s,M 




n 








i 




111 


18eO,J»nuary. 


101 


102 


102 


1B63, Januarj. 


147 


,.-. 


142 


April.,.. 
















July 










159 


165 


156 






lU 


104 


Oclober . 








1861, Jan uary. 


HH 


m 


97 


18Si,JanuBry. 


185 


m^ 


176 


April.... 












aw 


191 


July 


94 


94 


93 


July 


254 




233 


October. 


mi 


i(n 


100 


October . 


2M 


2H2 


234 


1862, January. 


111 


114 


111 


18a5,Jani.ary. 


262 


272 


247 


April.... 


111 








211 


218 


207 


July 


ii;> 


11/ 


113 


July 


193 


197 


184 


October - 


130 




124 


October. 


as 


214 


199 



than either of the otliers. Bat, granting that thia seriee 
rests apon the beet arrangement of the available data, the 
queation may well be asked vhether the añtlmietic mean is 
the beat method o£ averaging to employ. It has been 
poioted out frequently BÍnce the days of Jevona that in sa 
arithmetic mean a few cases of extraordinary advance in 
pnce will offset many cases of declina As such cases of 
nnosaal advance are not wantíng in the seríes even as finally 
amended, it seems wise to tiy some method of etriking an 
average not open to thia cñticism. For this parpóse the 
median may be naed — that íb, the point which divides the 
whole nnmber of relativa pnces each qnarter into two eqoal 
groups, one showing advances ín price greater than the 
median, and the other less. In ascertaining the median, the 
final gronping of pnce seríes nsed in making Table XIII has 



256 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbeBSBACKS 



been 

8ide 

table. 



88 ihe b88Í8y Bzid the leBolts 8ie 
the fiíud 8et oC Brithiiietíc 



presented side b j 
fiom the 88ine 



A«D 



.1 



Dato 


Xedian 


Ariihmttíe 
Memn 


Dato 


Median 


AriUuMtíe 
Mean 


IMOfJannsry.. 


100 


102 




130 


142 


April 


100 


102 


AprQ 


142 


182 


Jaly 


100 


100 


Jaly 


138 


158 


October.. 


100 


lOi 


October.. 


140 


154 


1801, Januaij.. 


100 


97 




181 


178 


April 


07 


98 


AprQ 


175 


194 


July 


85 


93 


Jaly 


20O 


233 


October.. 


100 


100 


October.. 


208 


234 


1802, Janu&ry.. 


100 


111 


1865,Janiiar7.. 


ZZ8 


247 


April 


100 


110 


April 


184 


207 


Jaly 


103 


113 


July 


180 


184 


October . . 


117 


124 


October . . 


. 180 


198 



On the whole, I incline to believe that the colnmn show- 
ing the median is the most tmstworthy indication of the 
general character and degree of price fluctuations that can 
be obtained from the data for wholesale prices given in the 
AUlrich Report. It is interesting, however, to see whether 
the resulta thus obtained agree with corresponding figures 
from other sources. Such material as is available for the 
pur¡)ose of comparison is analyzed in the next two sections. 



III. BBLATIVE PBIGBS PAID BT THE FEDEBAL OOVEBNMENT 

POB 8ÜPPLIE8 

In Part IV of the Aldrich Report there is a series of 
tables showing the prices paid by various bureaus of the 
federal government for a large variety of articles. From 
theHe tables it is possible to obtain fifty series representing 
the Hums paid contractors for various kinds of food, clothing, 
and drugs for the years 1860 to 1865, and twenty-nine addi- 



Pbiobs 



257 



tional series of similar character for 1861 to 1865. In the 
majority of cases it is stated that the prices are averages for 
the year, or else the prices are given by months so that an 
average can be stmck; but in the case of twenty-three of 
the series the time of the year to which they refer is not 
explicitly indicated. For this reason, because there were 
probably changes in the quality of the sapplies famished 
by army contractors from time to time, and because nearly 
half of the series are for a single class of articles — drugs — 
these data have not so hígh a character as the data dealt 
with in sec. ii. However, any credible price data deserve 
a brief analysis, if only for the purpose of comparison with 
the preceding tables. With this end in yiew the arithmetic 
means of the series have been computed, first before, and 
second after, grouping the intimately related articles, and 
then the medians of the series as they stand after grouping 
have been ascertained. These three sets of results are pre- 
sented in the next table side by side with the annual averages 
of the quarterly index-numbers obtained by simUar methods 
from the data for wholesale prices: 



TABLE XV 

■XLATIVB PBIOBS PAID BT THB FBDBBAL OOTEBNMENT rOB B17PPLZB8 

BBLATTVB PBICBS IN WHOI.BSALB MABKXTB 



OOMPABBD WTTH 



mm 

Datb 


ÁBiTHiaETio Mean of 
Ali. Sbbibs Bbfobr 

ObOUPINO of BbIíAT- 
■D COMMODITIXB 


Abithmbtio Mean 
Aftbb Gboupino of 
Bblatbd Commodi- 

TZB8 


Median Aftbb Oboüp- 
INO of Related 

COMMODITIES 




GoTern- 
ment Sap- 
plies 


Wholasale 

Market 

Prioes 


GoTern- 

ment Sap- 
plies 


Wholesale 

Market 

Prices 


Gk>yem- 
ment Sap- 
plies 


Wholesal» 

Market 

Prices 


1860 

1861 

1862 

1863 

1864 

1866 


100 
101 
110 
126 
179 
206 


101 
98 
117 
158 
224 
220 


100 
101 
109 
123 
176 
202 


102 
97 
115 
154 
209 
209 


100 * 

100 

100 

113 

173 

187 


100 
98 
105 
138 
186 
188 




He -mü h» ziatioHf£ ciia£ üm :£rrjiipmc <^ thtf^ ceJaÉid 

to^ thiñ «ódunecii: ansa as «i 

infÜcsfie» duit die advou» ízl cb» pn» af db» coaoBodities 
parrilAflüd by die ^vamnmc fizr whur& diriaa «ce srmiUble 
wm U^flB tliaa tíiifr advsnce^ ql Aií pcui^ af m miiiMwhit luger 
Iwtof <*oiiiiiHidxCH» é»b a upas, th» wiuaímmkt Mufcela. 
Wlu»dier th» resolt » dn» to dii» xmf&S»etísmB of the 
flw&mak oa wbick xht takkt i» baneii. or wbetker il ib furiy 
m|>r p jw.n taítr7!ft of úie reittive aimie» a diB» pnces pud hj 
01^ gn(9«nuMBt snd W pnvmÉ» |wi wim. ift is düBcvh to bkj. 
th^ nnmnaik opínicn his becnüíat tbednand fcr mar sop* 
pÜí^s was ft w^Tj impogtMñk factor m cMiíng: &e adruioe of 
pm^s «ad ÚkMt tífeose artkles pvR&ised bj &e goivniíiient 
^m « bkrg« wc§le admced mvcb Bot^ m prioe than the 
HM/^rit/ of other things. No doabl tíuB opinioii is well 
ír,nruU^ when expreseed with refér«ice to tlie fizsl year of 
tK^ w^ir, when there was a sodden as weii a$ a Urge incieaae 
m th^ qoantities of goods ordered bj the war and nayy 
d^rpurtm^ntu. To fíll sDch large orders at once was difficolt, 
«ir»^'! íU'^'XjiTáin^lj compeüng contractors foond it poesible and 
ué^'.^rmtírj to advance prices. This conditKMi of afFaiis Í8 
f*<ñé-4iU^[ \fj the iable, which indícales that, while there was 
* f(^Ȏ^hl d^^line in the pnces paid in wholesale markets in 
lH^/1, the [irices of govemnient snpplies did not fall bat 
r/M; MÜ^htly. Bat one need not be surprised to find that 
fitu-r nnífír'ihni time had been given to readjost the machinery 
ffl \trffíluf:iion to meet the govemment demand and to organ- 
í/^í Um? íntrír^ate bosiness of fomishing snpplies, the very 
iwn'tim', in the quantities ordered enabled contractors to 
nuf/fily the majoríty of articles at an ad vanee in price some. 



Pbiobs 259 

what leas than purchasers in the open market were asked 
to pay. While, however, there is no inherent improbability 
in the resulta of the comparison between the advance in 
prices paid by govemment and by prívate persona, the 
statistical material on which that comparison is based is not 
of sofficient scope or of snfficiently uniform character to 
make one comfortably snre of its reliability. 

IV. BELATIVE PBIOBS OF VABIOUS NEGESSITIBS AT BBTAIL 

Another interesting body of price data is foand in the 
twentíeth volume of the Tenth Census, which contains a 
'^Report on the Average Retail Prices of Necessaríes of Life 
in the United States/' by Joseph D. Weeka The material 
for this report was collected by sending a large nnmber of 
schednles to retail merchants in varióos sections of the 
country, with the reqnest that they report the prices of 
apecified ataple articlea in which they dealt. Some 409 
retnma were received giving the retail pricea of abont aixty 
different oommoditiea for longer or ahorter periods of time. 
As Mr. Weeks says,it is not probable that the articles qnoted 
by different dealers under the same caption — as, e.g.^ rice, 
cheese, starch, beans, etc. — are all of precisely the same 
quality. Bnt this fact did not serionsly diminish the valué 
of the material for the calculation of rélative prices in Mr. 
Weeks's opinión, becaose he thought it ''fair to presume 
that in a given tabulation the price of the same quality or 
grade of each article, as near as is possible, is quoted for the 
different years, as the report is made by the same person 
and of the prices at the same shop.''^ 

While the material thus collected was tabulated with care 
and published at length in Mr. Weeks's report, no attempt 
was made to analyze or combine the different seríes for the 
same or different articles in such a manner as to show the 



1 P. 2 of the " Beport. 



»» 



360 HiaTOET OF the Geeesbacks 



general trcnd cí príee ■cwpmgpte CaoBBqmeBÚj^ fiftde;. if 
«117, vse liEE emer bees EHide of this aocce bj itedents of 
prioes. Ib tbe bope of geCtín^ some 1%U «pon Üie t^tj 
bderetíáag qtttttíaa of tlke feUtíon between tlie CactiMtiaBE 
oC fñohm El wbolesule Eod Et letEÍL, however, h seens well 
worth iriiüe U> i^e whEt eas be EHide of Weeks*s data tor tbe 
jears of tbe Cml War bj Epptjing lo tbeak tbe EietfaodB aaed 
in dealing witb tbe material of tbe Aldneh Sepcri^ 

A cfÁlxtkm of tbe Hst of articles for wbicb tbis Censos 
leport gÍT€a retaü prieea witb tbe wbcJefiale price ÜBts of tbe 
Ahirích Rejff/rt fbowa tbat tbere are twentr-tbree coomiodi- 
tiea inchidefl ín botb soorcea tbat 8eem to be klentical, en* Terj 
ahnilar. Tbia fact makea poesíble a companaon between tbe 
relatÍTe pricea of tbeae articks at wbcdeaale and at retaíL 
Tbere ia, bowerer, one ofaatacle. Tbe oensns seriea iised 
porport to sbow arerage prioea for tbe jear, wbile tbe 
Aldricb seríea gire retnriM aa a role for foor montbs onlj — 
in moat cásea Janoarj, April, Joly, and October. It is 
accordJDgljr neceesary to take the average pricea c^ tbeae foor 
montha aa representing tbe average for the jear— a pro- 
cedare that seems from comparison of other tablea to be 
legitímate. The fnll detail of the ccMnparíson is giren in 
the Appendix and a snmmarj of tbe resolta is preaented in 
Table XVL 

This table indícatea that pricea at retail continoed to cor- 
respond rooghly witb the floctuations in wbolesale pricea, 
despite the distnrbances cansed by the paper cnrrency, but 
that their movements were more sloggisb. From the figures 
it seems that the fall in wholesale prices in the spring and 
sommer of 1861 caused by the cessation of remittances from 
the Sonth that embarrassed so many large jobbing bouses' 
was not reflected in retail prices — probably becanse it was 
foUowed by the sharp upward tnm in the last qaarter of the 

1 Compare Part I, chap. L, p. 21« aboTa. 



Pbices 



261 



TABLEXYI 

BBLATTVS PBICB8 OF TWENTT-THBEB CX>MMODI- 
TIB8 AT WHOLBaALE AND AT BETAII« 1 



Datb 


AVBBAOB PbIOBSPBB 

Ykab 


Whole- 
sale 


BetaU 


1860 


100 
88 
106 
138 
221 
222 
206 


100 


1861 


107 


1862 


129 


1863 


165 


1864 


211 


1865 


214 


1866 


202 







year.^ On the other hand, the advance of wholesale prices 
from 1863 to 1864 under the stimulus of the paper issues was 
more prompt and more considerable than the advance of 
prices at retail. Finally wholesale prices fell rather more 
rapidly when the war ended and the paper money began to 
appreciate in valne. 

The uses of the censns data, however, are not exhausted 
by this comparison of the relative prices of the articles which 
appear both in the Weeks and the Aldrich Report. Similar 
materials are given for the retail prices of thirty-seven other 
commodities, and it will be well to employ all the data 
available in the compntation of a new set of index-numbers. 
While the whole number of commodities included by Mr. 
Weeks^s investigation (sixty) is less than half as great as the 
nmnber in the preceding qnarterly tables and is only one- 
qnarter as great as that in Falkner's table, it is still con- 
siderable enough to afford a fair average. In transcribing 
the actual prices as given in the censas volume, all series 

> While the number of articles inelnded in this table is not large, the ehanges in 
the relatiTe retail prices are almost identical with thoee of the flfty-eight articles 
for which prices are ^Ten below from the same sonree. On the ayerage there are 
more than ten series from different towns for each of the twenty-three articles. 

> See Table XIV aboye. 



202 



HlSTOBT OF THB ObEENBACKB 



veré rejected except tbose which were ezplicitly said to give 
average pnces for the several years. Thia courae was ueces- 
Bary to secure oniform material, and vhile it reduces con- 
BÍderabl; the number of Beries for some articlee, 656 are left 
— an averege of more than nine series for each of the sixty 
articles. In constmcting the table all of the Beríes of rela- 
tive prices for each article were averaged to form a single 
seríes, and theu these average seríes were treated as the 
representatives of the artictm to which they referred. The 
whole materíal may be foond in the Appendix and a ootion 
of its general character and acope formed trom the next 
table: 



QroupB of Artiolos 


i 

P 


1 


IMÚ 


«, 


IRffi 


ISSS 


1884 


im 


issa 


D irooda 


11 

5 
2 
2 

GO 


IOS 
27 
»i 
H'i 
26 
35 
20 
J7 
50 
14 
Si 
41 
38 
20 


100 
100 

100 
100 

loo 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
lÜO 
100 
lÜO 
100 

100 


126 

loa 

IM 
107 
107 
108 
108 
109 
111 
98 
90 
IM 
99 
IOS 

109 


Iflñ 

119 

12S 
lU 
137 
112 
109 
111 
117 
112 

lor 

118 

107 
Jlfl 

130 


290 

138 
162 
150 
158 
129 
126 
122 
131 
127 
130 
151 
116 
136 

165 


402 

19« 
205 
185 
182 
158 
15T 
135 
165 
150 
162 
173 
131 
li3i 

206 


364 
165 
212 
198 
182 
167 

loo 

158 
187 
155 

lai 

176 
136 

leo 
sil 
















Rice, beans.BDd potatoes 
Beef 


193 










Pork and hog producto. 
PÍBh,drÍod orpickled... 
Egffs and dairy producte 


186 
159 
182 














AveraRP relativa price ol 
al) articles (except 













Pbices 263 

In this table the average relative price ís not the aver- 
age of the índex numbers of the groups, but the average 
of the relative prices of the fífty-eight commodities. 
Board is excluded from the average because of the proba- 
bility that the character of the food fumished at most 
boarding-honses changed very much as the result of the 
advance in prices. 

As in the case of the wholesale-price tables, a considerable 
variety is to be observed in the price movements of the 
different groups. For example, in 1865 dry goods, which 
here consist entirely of cotton fabrics, show an advance of 
264 per cent, over the prices prevailing bef ore the war, while 
físh show an increase of 55 and honse rent of bnt 86 per 
cent. A study of the 556 series given in the Appendix from 
which the averages for the several groups have been made 
will discover still greater divergencies. Even in the case of 
the scmie articles the relative change in the retail price in 
different towns is by no means uniform, for the equalizing 
effect of competition is much less felt in the case of prices 
at retail than at wholesale. But the number of quotations 
osed is considerable enough to give some ground for accept- 
ing the general average as f airly representative of the fluctu- 
ations in the retail prices of some of the most important 
articles of daily consumption. 

In order to make possible comparisons with what have 
been regarded as the better forms of the preceding tables, a 
new series of arithmetic means and one of medians have been 
computed from the above data after grouping the closely 
related commodities. The results of these computations 
with the corresponding figures for wholesale prices and for 
govemment supplies are shown in Table XVIII. In order 
to make the character of the material more uniform, ordinary 
commodities alone are included — that is, the series for board 
aud house rent are not used. 



264 



HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS 



TABLE XVín 

MBAír AND MBDIAM OP EKLATIVB BBTAII«, WHOI,»WAf.» AITD 
PBICBB, AFTKB AYCRAOINO BKKIXS POR BKLATKD ABTICLBS 





ABmnfBTio Mbam op 


Mbdtaw op 


Datb 


BaUUTe 
BetaU 
Príoes 


BalaÜTe 

Wholesale 

Prioes 


BelaÜTe 

Prioes of 

QoTeram*t 

Sapplies 


BeUÜTe 
BetaU 
Prioes 


BeUÜTe 

Wliolesale 

Príoes 


BeUÜTe 

Prioes of 

OoTeram*t 

SappUes 


1860 

1861 

1862 

1863 

1864 

1865 


100 
105 
121 
150 
184 
191 


102 
97 
115 
154 
209 
209 


100 
101 
109 
123 
176 
202 


100 
103 
115 
144 
172 
181 


100 
98 
105 
138 
186 
188 


100 
100 
100 
113 
173 
187 



When the differenoeB between the souroeB fiom which 
the data for tfaese three seta of averages are drawiiy the 
liats of articles which enter into them, and the character 
of the material, are taken acconnt of , the oorrespondence 
between them must be regarded as fairly cióse. Confidence 
in the representative character of each series is materially 
increased by the conñrmation borne by the other two. The 
greatest advance is shown by the largest and most fully 
authenticated set of series — that for wholesale prioes. Be- 
tail prioes, on the contrary, show the steadiest movement — 
a fact that may be due in part to the lees complete organi- 
Kation of retail markets and in part perhaps to the fact that 
the seríes used for each commodity in making np the table 
is itaelf an average of several seríes from different towns. 



V. QBNBBAL 0AU8ES OF THB PBICB FLUCTUATION8 OTHEB 

THAN THB CUBBBNCT 

Tho tables in the three preceding sections present the 
faets c*onceming the príce changes of the Civil War as fnlly 
as they can be ascertained from the available data by the 
common methoda of analysis. Bnt, while a príce table may 



Pbiobs 265 

show with approximate faimess the general trend of price 
movements, it does not show to what causes these move- 
ments are due. The only help a table gives in solving 
this problem is by eliminating the effect of fluctuations in 
the particular supply of and demand for single commodi- 
ties or small groups of commodities. But if changes of a 
tolerably uniform character have taken place in the supply 
of and demand for a large number of the commodities in- 
cluded in the table, their effect will not be eliminated by 
the process of averaging. Before concluding that the results 
shown by the price tables were produced by the issue of the 
greenbacks, it is therefore necessary to consider what other 
general causes of price perturbations were active during the 
Civil War. Such a study is the more imperative because 
contemporary observers were in many cases inclined to 
ascribe the price disturbances mainly to other factors than 
the currency. 

Two of these other factors on which much stress has been 
laid have already been noticed briefly — govemment pur- 
chases and the interruption in the supply of southem 
products. On the whole, there seems to be much more 
dangerof over-than of underestimating the importance of both 
these causes. The govemment demand for many articles 
was not at all an increase in the whole amount required by 
the commimity, but amounted merely to a change in the 
channel through which the commodities reached their con- 
somers. For example, the War Department purchased each 
year thousands of unif orms and vast quantities of rations ; but 
had the volunteers remained at home, they would doubtless 
have bought nearly as much clothing and eaten an equal 
amount of food. While the demand for certain kinds of food 
and clothing was increased, the demand for other kinds fell 
off in nearly the same degree. Indeed it is not unlikely 
that the increase of price f rom the former cause was less 



2^>0 HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBAOKS 

coniiid«rable than the decrease from the latter, because a 
f(iv<m quantity can be fumished at lower prices when there 
in htit little varíety in quantity and style, as in the case of 
Hrmy uniforms and rations, than when there is a great diver- 
nlly In ihme respects as is the case with food and clothing 
umnl hy the general public. Finally, if the war increased 
(h<« taltal (iemand for certain articles, like lead, it indirectly 
iliK^roiim^i tho total demand for others, like brick.^ Snch 
ii|f|Nmit(« ohanges in the demand for different articles may be 
i«X|Muit<Ml tc) neutralize each other in the averages of a large 
|iri<'o tablo. But si)eculative analysis is not the only resort 
in (iMHÜiig with this question. It has already been shown 
llirti IhinHi íh available a considerable body of statistical data 
i*t«((nniiiig tho prices paid by govemment bureaos for war 
NUpplitm, aiid that these data indícate an average increase 
rnlhor h^iui than that indicated by other data for ordinary 
wholoiiiil(« iniirkots. If one accepts the evidence, therefore, 
niiM iiiunt (Htnolude that this factor is reeponsible in very slight 
ih«f(riM% if nt all, for tho great advance in prices shown by the 
InIiIoh. 

Muoli tho Hamo must be said of the interruption in the 
HUpply of tilo Htaplo products of the Confedérate statee. The 
tliiuliilMluHl HUpply of i\>tton, tar, turpentine, etc., caused a 
M|HM^Uo\ilHr mlvHiKH^ íu thoir prices; but it is also true that 
Iho oivnuntioii of si>utht'ru demand for northem products 
loiuhnl to U^wt^r tho priivs of the latter articles. The latter 
olToot WAH uuu>h K^«8 uotivvablo than the former, because less 
ovhNMuo, but it wiun prv>l>alJy Mx by a larger number of com- 
iibHÍHit>ii, lu tho prtv^iug price tables« as they stand after 
tho ^r\n)piiig of ix^ttivu aiul ootton fabrics under a single 
ii«^i(o«i« thoiv «io<m)i^ littlo riMus^m to fear that the peculiar con- 
(tihouit MtT«sMii^ tho fow ^>utheTn products included in the 
(i»t o\«'iviM^ uih)uo intiui^Ace upon the general averages — 



Pbioes 267 

especially when the median is substituted for the arithmetic 
mean.' 

A third mnch-emphasized factor in causing the advance 
of prices was the war taxation. In its need of revenue the 
federal govemment snbjected almost all imported articles to 
heavy cnstoms dnties, and levied intemal taxes npon almost 
all articles prodnced within the conntry. These taxes, it 
has been held, were equivalent to a general increase in cost 
of prodnction and as such were added to the selling prices 
of products.* 

This contention raises a most complex question which it 
is obviously impossible to discuss fully in this place — 
namely, the incidence of the war taxes. But a little 
consideration serves to show that the danger again lies 
in nnduly exaggerating rather than in undoly minimizing 
the importance of the factor. For, in the first place, not 
all of the intemal taxes at least were of a natore to be shif ted 
— 6, g.j the tax npon incomes was not. And, second, the 
shifting of the taxes npon manufactures, sales, etc., was 
serionsly impeded by the very nniversality of the levies. 
A tax npon a few competitivo products is nsnally trans- 
ferred to the consumers, because, unless they will submit to 
the addition of the tax to the price, the prodncers out of 
whose pockets the money is taken in the first instance have 
the alternativo of gradually tnming their attention at least 
m part to nntaxed branches of indnstry. But when nearly 
all branches of indnstry are taxed at a tolerably uniform 
rate, as was the case during the Civil War, there is no sucb 
alternativo open to the producer. He must pay the tax out 
of his profits and sell at the oíd rates, or add all or a part 

> For, as stated aboTe, an adyanoe in relatiye príoe very mach in exoess of the 
average, has no more effect npon the median than an adranoe yery little in ezoess 
of the ayerace. 

3See, e,g.,J,S,QiBBOiiB,The PubiUDeMcf the United 8taUa(liew York, ÍSfflh 
Iip.2Uk82. 



268 



HlSTOBT OF THB GbEENBAOKS 



of the tax to bis price and snbmit to a diminished volume 
of sales in consequence. Which policy will be pursned will 
depend upon a number of circumstances, such as the elasticity 
of the demand for the products taxed, the closeness of com- 
petition among producers, etc. If this statement be trae, it 
is clearly inadmissible to assume that in the case of all 
articles the full amount of tax was added to the price, 
though some addition mnst have been made in many cases 
on this accoant. It is accordingly impossible to determine, 
by reasoning npon the incidence of the intemal taxes, how 
much importance should be attached to taxation in ad- 
vancing pnces. 

Unfortonately no satisfactory statistical test can be 
applied to snpplement this indeterminate analysis. The 
most promising test case tums out on examination to have 
little significance. The 5 per cent, tax on sales, of which 
most has been said as a factor in raising pnces, imposed by 
the act of Jnne 30, 1864, and increased to 6 per cent, in 
March, 1865, applied to most domestic products except 
lumber, breadstuffs and a few less important articles.^ 
Accordingly one might hope to gauge the effect of this levy 
roughly by seeing whether by 1866 these excepted articles 
had rísen in price less than the average.' Examination shows 
that the average relative price of the eight grains and the five 

1 n, R. Executive Document No. 34^ p. 13, 39th Gong., Ist Sess. 

3 The ftTerase relatÍTe prices of tha thírteen commodities refarred to compare 
as foUows with tha general índex numbers for 1862 and 18fó: 





1882 


1865 


Month 


Thirteen 
Commodi- 
ties 


AU Com- 
modities 


Thirteen 
Commodi- 
ties 


All Com. 
modities 


Janoary 

April 

July 

Ootober 


101 
107 
106 
113 


111 
110 
113 
124 


212 
179 
157 
168 


247 
207 
184 
199 



Pbiges 269 

kinds of lumber included in the quarterly table of sec. ii 
was indeed lesa than the average for all articles in 1865, 
but also that it was lesa before this tax was thonght of . 
Accordingly, quite aside from the objection that might hold 
against this comparison on the score of the scanty number 
of commodities included, it throws no new light on the 
problenu 

There are two facts, however, of some sígnificance, to 
which attention may be called: first, prices had reached 
almost their highest point before the 6 per cent tax on 
sales was imposed; second, the repeal of the intemal revé- 
nue duties after the war did not cause any considerable 
decline of prices. David A. Wells, special commissioner of 
the revenue, who had maintained in his report of December, 
1866, that ''the burden of national taxation^^ was ''perhaps 
the most influential'' of the causes to which the ''inflation 
of prices may be attríbuted,'' admitted in his report of 
January, 1869, that he was ''constrained to confess, that 
thus far the abatement of prices consequent upon the large 
annual reduction of taxes has not been what was antici- 
pated."* 

A somewhat more defínite conclusión can be reached 
regarding the effect of duties on imports. Successive tariff 
acts advanced these duties to a much higher point than had 
ever been reached before in the United States, and as the legal 
tender acts forbade the acceptance of greenbacks at the cus- 
toms house, the real increase of taxation was greater than in 
the case of excises which were paid in paper money. 
Importers had consequently to buy goods abroad for specie, 
pay duties upon them in gold, and fínally sell them for 
paper money. New duties would therefore increase directly 
the prices charged to American consumers of imported 

1 Senate ExecuUve DoeumetU No. 2, p. 20, 39th Gong., 2d Sess., and H. R. BxeeU' 
Uve DoeumetU No, iff, p. 23, 40th Cooff., Sd Sess. 



iV HlSTOKY OF THE GbEENBAGKS 



^<>x\.i» \iahout oitui|H4Ung tho foreign producer to accept a 
.■^^v; i»iuo oxoopt i>erIia[)B indirectly if there were a con- 
.v[..:kMo talliiij^ otT iii aales which the producer hoped to 
X .:.vx ^"k '\\ makíii^ cimceHsionB. One oxpects to find, there- 
.•.v« iuii iuiitctrUtl couimodities on the average advanced 
..¿ux '^ ^uii luoro rapitlly iii price than domestio products, 
. .V .:i v'.viiuiímtioii of tho price series in the Appendix will 
..•v ^k lUii thw o\|HH*tntion is justified, so far as materials for 
.i « x.u^ iho i'iUii|»íirÍHon exiat. It seems altogether probable, 
u .V .v>iv*, thiit tho war tariffs and perhaps the intemal taxes 
..^K> i'.v* icb|KUi8Íhh) fur some portion of the advance in prices 
^. ..u>v\u lu tlio prt'ccding tables. 

lii'.vH' K»thor matters that have {)la7ed rOles in the dis- 

;..... u'ii» of war prices may be dismissed more briefly. 

\\u:k.Ua\\iil iif meii from their ordinary occupations to fill 

u 4í uiioí*, it liHH lHH»n frequently argutnl, made labor acaree; 

V'.; viiuoiktlv WH^os rose, expenses of prodiiction increased 

• v«|Kti(uMi, antl this increase made it necessary to advance 

, .. ' hut, aH will Ix» shown in the next chapter, the rise 
■ «i^v'íi was sulnjoquont, not prior, t o the rise of prices. 
^V 4,;\ .i vlul ikot advance fírst and increase prices by augmeut- 
•.^^ V *»rtl; luit quito tho contrary, prices rose so sharply as to 
xK s \ .iM» iohI wa^oH in a markod degrtH\ and this decrease 
^,.. Ouiu^li not inimodiatoly, to an increasi* in money wagos. 
Hi ii iho risi» of monoy wages whou once secured was an 
. Kiuulo in tho way of n»ducing prici»s is tnie, but it can 
\.k\\i\\ Iv tlmt tho advance of wagos causod the pre<*eding 
*.^o .«í pi"ii*i»H. In fact, doprociation actually decreasod tho 
xvi oí laU>r to tho omployor and so workod in the direi.*tion 
.ú 4 íull, uot a riso, i^f pricos. 

V\iutoui|K>rary obsorvors woro apt to hold si^ei^ulation 
>v<i(K»u^iblo for tho ad vaneo of pricos as for tho advance of 

' V. vf . MHt i\ A. II^NN. /Vift^r Vc*iMir vNt»w York. 187J\ p. 39; JOHN Kadxb, 
Mi«ii« I» (Ai- JUi>#i«ir Mstrkrt (N^'W York. IST;*'. i». Ü4. 



Pbices 271 

the premium on gold.* But it would probably be more true 
to say that the marked speculation of the war time was the 
effect than that it was the cause of the price movements — 
although neither statement is trae without qnalifícation. 
So nniversal and long-continued a rise of pnces camiot have 
been due to artificial comering of the supply of nearly all 
articles. The really important part, with reference to pnces, 
that speculators played then as at other times, was in fore- 
seeing the advances that were coming from the general 
conditions of the market — monetary and other — and pur- 
chasing commodities at a lower range of prices in the 
hope of selling at a higher. Such operations had the 
effect of accelerating the advance, bat also of tempering 
its excesses, for the stocks of speculators, sold after prices 
had risen in order to realize profits, tended to depress the 
market. 

Finally a word may be said about the relation between 
prices and the quantity of money in circulation — a subject 
that was much debated by the pamphleteers of the greenback 
agitation.' It is altogether impossible to determine whether 
there was a cióse correspondence between the course of 
prices and the volume of the currency, as was affirmed by 
Bome wríters and denied by others, because, as has been 
shown at length,' the quantity of money in use cannot be 
ascertained. And more than this, the circumspect quantity- 
theorist would hardly expect to find a cióse correspondence 
at a time when ** other things" were so far from "being 
equal.'^ To add one important, but unobstrusive, point to 
the list of these inconstant '^ other things^' that readily 
come to mind — there was a very decided contraction of 

I E. g.y see CommercicU and Financial ChroniclCy Yol. 11, p. 2. 

3See, e. g.^ H. C. Carkt, Contraction or Expansión f (Philadelphia, 1866), Lettera 
m and IV; J. S. Oibbonb, Pudítc Debtqf the United State» (New York, 1867), pp. 

> Part II, chap. ii, aee. tü. 



272 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

credit during the war, arísing from the unstable volume of 
the paper currency, and consequently, a considerably larger 
proportion of oxchanges than usual was performed by the 
use of cash.' 

While the importance of all the foregoing considerations 
in the study of the war prices has been frequently observed 
and exaggerated, there remains another factor that has 
attracted little, if any, attention. The notion that prices in 
any country which has important commercial relations with 
other nations are necessarily influenced by the course of 
prices elsewhere has long been familiar, but it was probably 
not until the compilation of elabórate tables of relative prices 
for different countríes that the degree of correspondence 
between the direction of price movements was duly appre- 
ciated. After examining such tables, a careful student 
would hardly think of discussing the fluctuations in the 
price level of the United States, without taking account of 
the trend of prices in England and Europe. But the aban- 
donment of the specie for the greenback standard in 1862 
seemed to sever the connection between prices in America 
and elsewhere. The fluctuations of prices in the United 
States were so exceedingly violent that they appeared to 
have no relation to the gentle undulations of the foreign 
price leveL How great the diflPerences were is best seen 
by comparing Sauerbeck's index-numbers for England and 
Soetbeer^s for Germany, as recomputed by Falkner upon the 
basis of prices in 1860, with averages of the quarterly 
arithmetic means for each year from the preceding tables. 

But this emancipation of American prices from the 
influence of the intemational markets for goods and gold 
was more apparent than real. Even the barriers of a war 
tariff did not greatly diminish the extent of exports and 
imports, and so long as such commercial relations continued, 

1 See Part U, chap. yü, sec iii. 



Pbiges 



273 



TABLE XDL 

COMPABIBON OP KBLATIVB PRICB8 IN THB ÜMTTRD 8TATB8, BNOLAND, AND OESMANT t 



Date 


United 
States 


Eu^land 


Germany 


1860 


102 


100 


100 


1861 


97 


99.6 


97.6 


1862 


115 


106.5 


101.4 


1883 


154 


109.3 


103.7 


1864 


208 


112.3 


106.9 


1865 


209 


105.8 


101.4 



the conditions of supply and demand in one market neces- 
Barily exercised a very considerable influence over the cor- 
responding conditions in all related markets. During the 
paper-money períod the influence of these commercial rela- 
tions was towards making the advance of pnces in the United 
States conform to the decline in the specie valué of Ameri- 
can currency, in the same manner that before suspensión it 
had been toward making the movements of gold pnces in 
the United States conrespond in a general way with similar 
movements abroad. For, had the prices of exportable com- 
modities in the United States not risen above their specie 
prices elsewhere in proportion as the price of gold in paper 
money advanced, there would have been a large profit in 
sending gold from London to New York, selling it for 
greenbacks, investing the latter in American products, and 
shipping them abroad to sell again for gold with which to 
repeat the operation. Of course, the influence of such oper- 
ations would be to depress the price of gold and raise the 
prices of commodities until the divergence between their 
relative advances in price had been reduced to compara- 

iFortheEiiirlisl^And Cterman prices see Aldrich Reporta Part I, pp. 255, 295. 
8anerbeck*8 flúores for Bngland are distinctly superior to those of the London 
BconomUt at this period, beoause the inclnsion in the latter of so many articles 
affected by the prioe of ootton gives altogether too mnch wei^ht to the diminished 
supply of that article as a price factor. As reoomputed on the basis of 1860, the 
BconmU&t figures are, 1861,102; 1882,109; 1863,135.9; 1864,144.8; 1865, 135.5.— JTMd.^ 
p.22ft. 



274 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

tively narrow limite. On the other hand, had the prices of 
commodities in the United States risen above their prices 
elsewhere much in excess of the advance in the premium on 
gold, a large profit would have been realized by shipping 
European products to the United States, selling them at the 
high currency prices, converting the paper money received 
into 8i)ecie by buying gold in the gold room, and taking the 
ooin back to Europe to invest anew in articles for export. 
Here again the effect would be in the direction of bringing 
the cnrrency price of gold and commodities in the United 
States into tolerable harmony with the trend of the European 
equation between money and wares — but this time the 
means would be reduction of prices from the increased sup- 
ply of imported articles, and a rise in the premium from the 
increased demand for gold. 

Such a Une of reasoning, however, must not be pushed 
too far. (1) While the purchase of American products for 
shipment abroad in case the premium was much above 
prices would not have been hindered by law, the converse 
operation when prices had outstripped the premium would 
have encountered an obstacle in the high duties upon impor- 
tation of foreign commodities. Of course, the American 
prices for such articles might remain above the European 
level by the amount of the duties and the cost of transporta- 
tion ; but once given this difiference in the general level, a 
divergence from it would be checked by the process indi- 
cated. (2) It is also true that such complicated operations 
would have been more than commonly hazardous during the 
war because of the rapid fluctuations both of the pn^mium 
and of prices. A state of nffairs that promised a largo mar- 
gin of profit one week might so far change before the series 
of transactions could be completed as to substituto loss for 
gain. The existence, then, of brief divergencies between 
the courses of the premium and of prices is quite compati- 
ble with the logic of the argument ; but if the argument 



Pbioes 275 

Í8 valid, one wonld not ezpect to find a wide divergence 
long-continued. (3) The trend of the commercial forcea 
was not in the direction of making the movement of com- 
modity piices and of the gold premium in the United States 
parallel, but in the direction of making the movements 
harmonize with the relative valué of commodities and 
gold abroad. At the time of the Civil War the purchasing 
power of gold was every where slowly declining in conse- 
quence of the immense prodnction from the Califomian and 
Atistralian mines. Consequently one would expect to find 
in the United States a corresponding advance of relative 
prices of commodities slightly greater than the advance of 
the premiwn on golA 

One must not be betrayed, then, by the very great differ- 
ence between the course of specie prices in England and 
Germany and of greenback prices in the United States, into 
treating the latter as entirely independent of the former. 
In f act, barring the inflnence of increased taxation in this 
conntry, the connection between the markets of the great 
commercial nations was quite as real during the paper- 
money period as at other times, and the common influences 
upon prices were as truly felt, despite the fact that their 
effect in the United States was effectually concealed from 
superficial observation. Had there been no war and no 
paper standard, doubtless prices would have advanced here 
in somewhat the same degree as they advanced in England 
and Germany, and we seem bound to believe that some 
part — though, of course, a small part — of the violent rise 
actually experienced was due to the decline in the exchange 
valué of gold. 

VL THB OÜBBENOY AS A CAUSE OP THE PBIOE FLÜOTÜATIONS 

The argument has at last reached a stage where the prob- 
lem of chief interest may be attacked : How far were the 
fluctuations of prices due to the disorders of the greenback 



curreDL-y ? By procese of exclusión the couclusion has beea 
reached that these fluctuatíons cannot be accounted for, 
exctipt in Bntall measiire, on any other ground than has been 
SQggested; but ít remains to be seen wbether any positive 
evidence can be adduced for the opinión that the monetaiy 
conditions preponderated over all other factors as a price 
determinant. The most eífective method of dealíug with 
thie problem is to apply the teat of concomitaitt variations 
hy comparing the specíe valué of the currency with its rela- 
tive purchasing power over commodities, To put the data 
in convenient form for making this test, the average monthly 
valué of gold in currency, and the average relative pnces of 
commoditiea at wholesale by quarters are platted oq tbe 
accompanying diagram. Most valué seems to attech to the 
median of the relative príces, but a líne representing the 
arithmetic mean ís added for purposes of comparison. 

Examination of this chart shows that there is a general 
correapondenoe between the relative prices of spscie and of 
commodities in greenbacks. Agreement in detall ia pre- 
cluded by the nature of the data; for prices are given bat 
once a quaríer, and the intermedíate monthly ñnctnatioos 
answering to those of gold can only be surmised. But in 
general direction and to a less extent in degree of movement 
the gold and commodity lines harmonizo well. There are, 
however, two noticeable differences. Firat, the fluctuationa * 
of prices are more sluggisb than tboae of gold, partly, no 
doubt, because the lines for commodity prices represent 
averages, and partly because the market for gold was more 
higbly organized, and therefore more imniediately aensitive 
to all changes in conditiona of anpply and demand, than even 
wholeaale markets for commoditiea. Sectmd, the advance of 
commodities duea not halt at any time until it baa consider- 
ably outstñpped the advance of gold. In this excesa of 
pñcGB ebove the premium we see the effect of varióos 



_ ^ ^ ^ ^ 6 B 1 I » g I 1 . 



278 HlSTOBT OF THB GbBENBAOKS 

general canses other than the currency — particnlarly war 
taxation and the world-wide decline in the ezchange valne 
oí gold. Bnt to appreciate fnlly the facts as shown by the 
chart it is necessary to follow the conrse of pnces and of 
gold quarter by quarter. In so doing attention will be 
directed to the median, rather than the arithmetic mean. 

Throughout 1860, then, príces remained practically con- 
stant, but in the smnmer of 1861 the general business depres- 
sion caosed a rather general but modérate decline. In the 
autumn, however, bnsiness improved somewhat and immense 
govemment parchases caused a sharp stiffening in the price 
of supplies. The class of articles affected, however, was not 
large, and consequently the median shows merely a retnm to 
the price level of 1860. Suspensión of specie payments and 
the appearance of a small premium apon gold had no appre- 
ciable effect apon prices for the fírst six months; bat when 
the premiam began to rise rapidly after the fallare of 
McClellan^s campaign against Bichmond, prices followed. 
The rise of gold, however, was considerably faster, so that 
by January , 1863, its average valué was 145 against a median 
relative price of 130. But after the advance of gold had 
culminated in February and the current tumed sharply in 
the other direction, prices still continued to rise for three 
months and then reacted very little, so that by July prices 
were higher than the premium. 

Very similar maneuvers were ezecuted from the middle of 
1863 to the end of 1865. There was a rapid rush upward 
of gold in which prices were left behind ; then gold f ell, 
while prices continued to climb until they had outstripped 
the premium once more. The chief difiference between the 
two periods, aside from the greater scale of the fluctuations, 
is that in the beginning the advance of the premium was not 
so fast, but that prices could keep fairly even pace with it. 
But in June and July of 1864 the premium advanced at a 



Pbioes 279 

pace that made the progresa of prices seem bIow, and it was 
not untÜ October, when the premium had been f alling rapidly 
for three months, whíle prices continued to rise at a scarcely 
diminished rate, that the two were on even terms again. 
Another sudden advance of gold in November gave it a 
momentary advantage, but after its great faU began prices 
passed it once more, and, declining with less precipitance 
after January, remained for the rest of the year considerably 
higher. 

In all these movements from 1862 to 1865 the Unes repre- 
senting the premium and the median of relative prices cor- 
respond so well that one cannot resist the conclusión that \^ 
these changes are mainly due to a common cause, which can ; 
hardly be other than the varying esteem in which the notes 
of the govemment that constituted the standard money of \ 
the country were held. If this conclusión be accepted, it J 
foUows that the suspensión of specie payments and the legal- 
tender acts must be held almost entirely responsible for all 
the far-reaching economic disturbances foUowing from the 
price upheaval which it is the task of the following chapters 
to trace in detail. 



CHAPTER V 



L FáOmet^M Tabie of BOative Wages: 

DeféctB of Falkner's Tmble-- A New Tibie NeoosBuy. 
II. Seope of íhe Data Cometrmmg Wages in ihe Aidridí Beport: 
Kindsof Work — Industries — Geogrmphical Bange. 

III. New Tab¡es of Beiative WagtM Battd upom tke Aidridí Beport: 
Method — Weighting — Bange of Flactoations — Actiud Wages — 
Wages in Nine Industries — Oonstant and Variable Weights — 
Various OocupatioDS — Men and Women — Bdatíre Wages and 
Eamings before Suspensión — Actual and Belatíre Wages — 
Relatire Wages of All Employees — New Tables and Falkner*8 
Resulta. 

IV. Relative Wages in Coal, Ifxm^ Gkut^ and PoUerg Industries: 
Weeks*8 Data — Goal Miners — Iron-Ore Minéis — Iron WorkerB 
— Pótters — Glaas Blowers. 

V. ROaHve Saiaries ofSehool Tea^ers: 

Character of the Data — Eamings of P ro fanBáon al Men. 
VI. Beiative Wages of Farm Laborers: 

Character of the Data — Results of CcMnputations. 
VIL Tables of Relative Moneg Wages Based on Tenth Oensus: 

Character and Scope of Data — Ayerage Relative Wages — Range 
of Fluctuations — East and West — Relative Wages and Eamings 
before Suspensión. 
VIII. Pay of Oovemment Employees: 

Clerical Elmployees in Washington — Prívate Soldiers. 
IX. Increase of Living Expenses: 

Difficulty of Weighting the Pnce Tables ~ Wholesale and Retail 
Tables — Median and Arithmetic Mean. 

X. Beiative Beal Wages: 

Character of Seríes — Real Wages of Varíous Qroups — E^ast and 
West. 
XL Conclusión, 

I. falkneb's tablb of belatiye wages 

PoB the Btndy of money wages, as for the sttidy of prices, 
the most important source of material is the Aldrich Report. 
Part I contains a table — No. 37 — prepared under the direc- 

280 



Wagbs 281 

tion of Professor Falkner, showing the relative wages of 
working people in twenty-one industríes from 1860 to 1891. 
Bnt this table, like the corresponding table of prices, is 
found on cióse ezamination to be constructed in snch a man- 
ner as to be unfít for the purposes of the present investiga- 
tion. From the point of view of statistical method, its chief 
defects are as foUows: 

1. Only one indez-nmnber is given for each year. This 
index-number is nsually compnted from the wages paid in 
January; bnt in some cases — what cases is not specifícally 
stated — from the wages paid in July or October. For the 
present purpose more than one index-number per year is 
highly desirable, and the indiscriminate use of retums for 
different months is to be deprecated. An average into 
which enter figures for several different months cannot be 
taken to represent the condition of affairs at any ^pecific 
time, and therefore is of little valué for comparisons with 
the data regarding prices. 

2. No attempt is made to distinguish between the wages 
of men and women, or between the wages of groups of 
workers possessing different degrees of skill and receiving 
unlike remuneration. As will be shown later, the paper 
standard did not produce the same effect upon the wages of 
the different sexes or the different groups, and a table must 
be had which will permit an investigation of these diver- 
gences. 

3. The 543 wage series included in this table are classi- 
fíed by industries, but not by occupations. It is as impor- 
tant, 6. g., to know the variations in the wages of carpenters, 
machinists, etc., wherever employed, as it is to know the 
variations in wages paid in the building and metallic indus- 
tries as a whole. 

4. In computing the average variations of wages in each 
industry Professor Falkner treated all wage series as if they 



282 HisTOBY op THE Gbeenbages 

posseseed precisely the same importance, quite irrespective 
of whether they represented the pay of a single man or that 
of several hnndreds. But if the table is to be employed as 
an Índex of the probable average variation in the wages of 
the great mass of workers, a retum which shows the pay of 
many men is of mnch greater importance than one which 
shows the pay of but few. Every series, that is, should be 
given a weight in the computations, proportioned to the nnm- 
ber of persoHS whose pay it representa 

Becognition of these defects has the unhappy conse- 
quence that Professor Falkner's table of relative wages most 
be discarded altogether and a fresh table of relative ¥mges, 
like the fresh table of relative prices, laborionsly compiled 
from the data published in the ''exhibits^' of the Aldrich 
BeporV 

1 More extended criticisms of the wage-tables of the Aldrieh Beport maj be 
fonnd in several places. In 1894 F. C. Waitb published in Washington a pamphlet 
entitled Pricea and Wages: A Dimection oftKe SentUe Finance Committee^t QrtaX 
Report, This was a rather acrid criticism of the methods employed by Falkner in 
analyzin^ the wage-data and of the conclnsions drawn from his results. In 1895 an 
arti(üe by A. L. Bowlet appeared in the Economic Journal (Vol. V, pp. 369-83) under 
the title ** Comparison of the Rates of Increase of Wa^es in the United States and in 
Oreat Britain, 1800-91." Bowley took ezception to Falkner's methods. His chief 
objections were (1) that there was no sanaran tee that the establishments from which 
returns were obtained were typical of the industries to which they belonged; 
(2) that no aoconnt was taken of the nnmber of men represented by the different 
series; (3) that the relative importance of the series was unwarrantedly assumed to 
have remained constant throughout the whole period ; and (4) that the tablee showed, 
not the change in average wages, but the average change in wages. Bowley, however, 
like Waite, put a high valué npon the material published in the "exhibits** of the 
Report, Again, C. B. Spahb, in his Euay on the Preaent DistribtUion of Wealth in 
the United States (New York, 1896), declared that it is *^ necessary to throw away 
the work done by the committee^s ozperts." He did not hesitate to charge that the 
Aldrich Report was **prepared by men who wished to show the highest possible 
level of wages," and that the statisticians ** employed to summarize the returns were 
to a hurtful eztent in sympathy with the political aim of the investigation " (pp. 
103, 106). Finally Pbofebsob C. J. Bullk>ck in his '' Contributions to the Study of 
Wage Statistics " (Pvhlications of the American Economic Association^ Vol. VI, pp. 
187-218) subjected Falkner's tables once more to a searching criticism, which, how- 
ever, added little to the points developed by his predecessors. It seems to ha ve been 
this systematic critique of Bullock's that led Falkner to publish his article upon 
**" Wage Statistics, in Theory and Practice " {Publications of the American StatisticcU 
Association^ Vol. VI, pp. 275-89). To the detailed criticisms of the methods which he 
had followed, however, he fonnd no effective answer. 



Wages 283 

ii. soope of the data gongebning wages in table xii 

of the aldbioh bepobt 

These data, which are all brought together in Table XII, 
were coUected by the Department oí Labor from actual pay- 
rolls and show the daily wages paid in January and Jnly — or, 
in a few cases, October — of each year to the different dasses 
of employees in twenty-one industries, together with the num- 
ber and sez of the employees and the length of the working- 
day. Some 1,268 pages are covered by this exhibit. 

Though the material thus supplied is much more compre- 
hensive than that from which most wage tables have been 
constructed, it suffers from serious limitations. 

1. The data are confined almost entirely to manual 
laborers engaged in manufactures or transportation. Pro- 
fessional eamings are represented only by a scant supple- 
mentary report upon the salaries of school-teachers. Clerical 
work is omitted entirely, while three wage series from two 
New Hampehire stores give the only data for the large body 
of sales-people. No account is taken of domestic servants, 
ñor of fishermen, while miners again are treated in a supple- 
mentary report for which the data were coUected in a differ- 
ent fashion.^ Last and most important, agricultural laborers 
-the most numeróos group of workingmen in the United 
States of the Civil War — are entirely unrepresented. 

2. The exhibit is incomplete even for manufactures and 
transportation. Nominally there are retums for eighteen 
manufacturing industries; but of these industries three are 
of slight importance, viz., sidewalks, spice, and white lead. 
On the other hand, certain very important branches are rep- 
resented only in the supplementary reports — as is the case 
with the iron, glass, and pottery industries; or else are not 
represented at all — as is the case with the boot and shoe, 
the milling and baking, dressmaking and millinery, tailoring, 

lAidrieh Report, Part I, p. 180, and Part lY, Table XIII. 



284 



HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



ship-boilding, tobáceo, and bríck indnstrieB. Fnrthennoie, 
tbe data for some of the important industriea included are 
very meager. This may best be seen from the following 
table, which shows for each of the twenty-one industriea the 
number of eetablishinents from which retoms were obtained 
oovering the war períod, the number of wage series, and the 
number of employeee whose pay is reported. 

TABLE XX 

OONarBOTDS OP WAOB DATA FOB THX TKASS 1B60 TO 1886 eiTKM IM TABLB ZH OT 

THK AU>KICH KKPOBT 



lDdiastri« 



Aicricultural implements. 

Ale, beer, and porter 

Books and newspapers... 

BuUding trades 

CarriageB and wagons 

City public works 

Ootton goods 

Dry ffoods 

Oinf^hams 

Oroet>n©8 

lUuminating gas 

Leather 

Lumber 

Metals and metallic goods 

Pa|H»r 

Railwa^'s 

Sidewalks 

Spice 

Stone 

Whitelead 

Woolen goods 

Total 



Number of 
EsUblUh- 



1 
1 
3 

21 
1 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 

19 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
3 



78 



Number of 



5 

5 

17 

42 

4 



105 

3 
30 

2 
22 
16 

5 
138 

7 
11 

4 

4 
19 

4 
62 



OTl 



Number of 
Bmpkvees 



9 

40 

76 

216 

14 



10 



3 
460 

46 

35 
803 

41 
263 

31 

8 

227 

20 
177 



5,641 



If it be thought that retums for 100 emploveesis as nar- 
row a baais as can woU be acoepted in computing the probable 
wage fluctúa tions iu any industrv, ten of the eighteen 
branches of manufacture would have to be exeluded. 

8. Of the soventy-eight establishments included in the 
above table, all but tive were situated in the North Atlantic 



Wagbs 285 

states, and oí these five foor were in Maryland and one — a 
gas plant — was in Ohio.^ Thtis the material shows the 
course of wages in but one section of the country. 

4. While the material of Table XII seems to have been 
collected and published with scrupulous care, it nevertheless 
soffers from a defect characteristic of wage statistics in 
general. It frequently occurs that when several men are 
employed in an establishment to do snbstantially similar 
work they are paid different rates of wages, which vary as 
their efficiency, the length of time they have been connected 
with the firm, etc. In this case, when the several men are 
not distingoished in the reports, it is necessary to take the 
average wage as the basis of calculation. But at any time 
some of these hands may be discharged. If the ones sent 
away are the recipients of the lower wages, the average pay 
rises; on the other hand, if the better-paid men are dis- 
missed, the average falls. A similar change is effected by 
taking on new men at wages differing from the pay of the 
oíd employees. Thus the table may show a flnctuation in 
wages, though no change whatever has taken place in the 
pay of the men who have had steady employment* Of 
course, a fall in average wages caused by the employment of 
more men is not an injnry to wage-earners, and a rise caused 
by the discharge of the lower-paid portion of a forcé is a 
purely fíctitious gain. But while the effect of such adventi- 
tious changes cannot be whoUy eliminated by any manipula- 
tion of the material, it may be expected that in a large 
namber of cases the depressing influence of some such 
changes upon the general average will be counterbalanced 
more or less completely by the opposite influence of others. 
It may seem that the imperfections of the material to 

1 The distríbntion of the establishments by states was as follows: New Hamp- 
shire, 4; Massachnsetts, 21; Rhode Island, 1; Conneoticut, 9; New York, 25; New 
Jersey, 2 ; Pennsylyania, 11 ; Maryland, 4 ; Ohio, 1. 

2 For examples see the '' Sxhibits," pp. 947, 973, 982, 1818, and 15ia 



286 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEESBACK8 

wfaich attention has been called are so serióos as to íutsK- 
dale any ooncltisioiis regarding the general trend of wages 
that may be based apon it. Bal, after aU has been sakl, the 
tací remains that Table XII ot the Aldrich Repart shows the 
actual wages paid to more than 5,000 men and woami 
thronghoat the war períod. Of oonise, the whole number 
ot wage-eamers, even ín the North Atlantic States alcme, was 
many times 5,000 ; bnt if there be any considerable degree 
of tmtb in the common assumption r^arding the effect of 
competition apon the price paid for similar services there 
•eems to be sofficient reason for believing that a range of 
observation so considerable as the table affords may be 
accepted as fairly typicaL The assumption involved in the 
use of snch material as the basis for generalizations is that a 
common canse — the rise of pnces — which is shown to have 
had a certain average effect npon the remnneration of 5,000 
persons had a sabstantially similar effect npon the remnnera- 
tion of the thoosands doing similar work whose pay is not 
recorded. 

III. NEW TABLES OF BELATIVE MOKET WAOE8 BASED UPON 
THE DATA IN TABLE XII OF THE ALDBIOH BEPOBT 

In order to get the material of these elabórate "exhibits" 
into usable shape the seríes of actual wages were reduced to 
seríes of relatíve wages on the " index-number plan«" Every 
seríes ín Table XII that ^ave tolerably complete retums twice 
a year from 1800 to 1866 was transcríbed upon a card. The 
induHtry, number, and locatíon of the establishment, and the 
nunil>er and sex of the workers were recorded as well as the 
rntoH of pay. Then the relatíve wages in January and July of 
each y(»ar were computed as percentages of the wage in Janu- 
ary, 18()0. Next, in order to secure to the most im{K>rtant 
occupatíoiis a weight proportíonate to their numbers, the 
series of relatíve wages were multíplied by the number of 



Wages 287 

persona whose pay they represented. Finally, these producís 
were added together, and the resulting sums divided by the 
whole number of persons employed. Thns the resalís show in 
all cases the arithmetical average change in the pay of all the 
persons inclnded in any gronp. By arranging the cards in 
different ways ií was possible ío classify the wage-eamers by 
industries, occupations, sez, establishments, per diem wages, 
etc., and to compute the average changes inpay for the vary- 
ing groups thus f ormed. 

In carrying ouí íhis general plan íhe mosí serious prob- 
lem that presented itself was in what manner the weighting 
of the several series according to number of employees 
should be performed. The choice lay between multiplying 
the relative wage shown by each series for each succes- 
sive January and July by the average number of persons 
employed during the whole period under investigation, and 
multiplying by the number actually employed ai differení 
dates. In the many cases of series which show no change in 
number of employees the results of the two meíhods — which 
for convenience may be called the meíhods of ** consíaní " 
and of *' variable weighís" — are ideníical. Buí íhere are 
many and imporíaní series íhaí show considerable variations 
in number of employees, and ií is accordingly necessary to 
canvass íhe relaíive meriís of íhe rival meíhods. 

The disíincíive advaníage of íhe meíhod of variable 
weighís is íhaí ií shows íhe average change in íhe money 
wages of a división of íhe indusírial army as ií was acíually 
eonsíiíuíed. Changes in number of employees are a con- 
Btaní and imporíaní feature of íhe indusírial siíuaíion and 
ene of peculiar signifícance for íhe wage-earning classes, 
whose iníeresís are ai presení íhe subjecí of invesíigaíion. 
To adopí a scheme of weighíing which íakes no accouní of 
Buch changes would be ío eliminaíe íhis imporíaní elemení 
in íhe siíuaíion. If an increase in íhe numbers employed in 



288 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 

* 

certain kinds of work as compared witb thenumbers employed 
in other kinds caases a change in the average relative wage 
for the whole body of working men that change is as real 
in its effect upon the well-being of laborers as if it had been 
dne to some other canse. Accordinglj, ít maj be argned, no 
Bcheme of analysis can be trusted that will exclnde the effect 
of cbanges in nnmber of emplojees. 

On the other hand, one wbo examines the wage-series 
and notes how freqnent and how considerable are the flnctn- 
ations in nnmbers employed, is not nnlikely to distrust an 
average made np of snch shifting elements. The total nnm- 
ber of emplojees represented by the series inclnded in the 
foUowing tables as working in January, 1860, is 5,611. In 
Jnly the nnmber rose to 6,444. Then followed a gradual 
decline to 4,009 in January, 1868, and afterward a rise to 
5,576 in July, 1866. If these changes in aggregate nnm- 
bers were produced by nniform changes of corresponding 
degree in all the series, variable weights wonld make no 
difference in the results, because, while the nnmber of men 
represented by any series would vary absolntely, it wonld 
bear a constant proportion to the nnmbers in all other series. 
But, of conrse, the variations of nnmbers in the different 
series are not thns nniform, and the weights therefore fluc- 
tuate relatively as well as absolntely. To take the most 
extreme example — common laborers employed by some city 
in the state of New York — the number of employees varíes 
from 1,500 in July, 1800, to 420 in January, 1866, and the 
proportion of these nnmbers to the aggregate number of all 
employees varíes from 23 per cent at the first date to 8 per 
cent, at the second. Now, it may be argued, if the object is 
to ascertain the effect of the paper currency upon money 
wages, it would be improper to compute the average of 
changes in a fashion that would ex¡x)8e the results to the 
influence of such fluctuations in the constitution of the 
wage-eaming class as those represented by the Aldrích data. 



Waqbs 289 

In deciding, on the basis of the preceding argnments, 
what course to pnrsue in regard io weighting, the qnestion 
seems io tum apon the character of the changes in nnmbers. 
If these changes are largely due io particular canses — such 
for example, as the completion of an elabórate plan for 
paving streets that would reduce the number of men 
employed by a city, or the sale of a factory followed by a 
new policy of rapid expansión that would increase the work- 
ing forcé — they cannot properly be allowed consideration. 
In this -case the method of constant weights is to be pre- 
ferred. But if the changes in numbers are not mainly due 
to causes that may from the present point of view be 
regarded as accidental; if, on the contrary, they should 
prove to be largely an indirect consequence of the monetary 
situation itself, then careful account should be taken of them 
and variable weights used for this purpose. Inasmuch as it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to determine in advance whether 
the changes are of the one kind or the other, the best course 
to pursue is to employ both methods of weighting, see what 
differences exist between the two seis of results, and try to 
form some conclusión regarding the signifícance of these 
differences. 

All of the series used in the foUowing computations are 
published in the Appendix, where they are arranged accord- 
ing io industries, establishments, sex, and occupation. To 
save space, the initial wage, number of employees, and rela- 
tive wages alone are given, but to show more clearly how the 
computations have been made, a specimen of the card actu- 
ally used in making the tables is placed here. 

It will be noticed that on this specimen card the series is 
extended through 1866. This last year is included in all 
the foUowing wage-tables in order to supply data for deter- 
mining whether or not the withdrawal of wage-eamers from 
the labor market into the army was a chief cause of the 



290 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbEEKBACKS 



SPBCDCEN CARD 



MXTAIB BukCKSMITBS 

EflTABLUHiaDrr 57 Mal^b MAKTi.Ain> 


Dftto 


Wa«M 


Nui- 
ber 


BaUtíve 


Prodnets 


YarUble Cottatonl 


1860, JanoaiT 

July 


$1.565 
1.605 
1.555 
1.50 
1.48 
1.48 
1.705 
1.83 
2.105 
2.655 
2.75 
2.71 
2.875 
2.78 


8 
8 
3 
2 

4 
4 
6 
6 
7 
8 
7 
6 
6 
8 

5.9 


100 
103 


800 ' 590.0 

RU fím 1 


1861, JanoaiT 

July 


99 297 . 584.1 
96 192 * MA 4 


1862, Janoarj 

July 


95 1 380 

95 aso 


560.5 

560.5 

643.1 

690.3 

796.5 

1/Kn.O 

1,(HH.4 

l/JttO.7 

1^065.6 

1/XÍ0.2 


1863, JmnuñTj 

July 


109 ' 
117 


654 
702 


1864, January 

July 


135 
170 
176 
173 
184 
178 


915 
1,380 
1,232 
1,038 
U04 
1,424 


1865, January 

July 


1866, January 

July 


" ***j • 



advance ín money wages. If it appears that when the 
volunteers were disbanded and retamed to their usual occu- 
pationB wages did not fall, there will be a strong presumption 
that Bome other cause iban enlistments was a more powerful 
factor in determining wages. 

A study of tbe individual seríes of relative wages, as 
given in tbe Appendix, sbows tbat duríng tbe war tbe range 
of fluctuations was considerably narrower in tbe príce of labor 
tban in tbe príce of commodities. For a comparison it is 
best to take tbe cbanges between January, 1860, and Jan- 
uary, 1865 — tbe culminating point of príces. Tbe greatest 
relative advance in príce sbown by tbo quarterly table 
between tbese dates was 991 per cent, (cotton), and tbe 
greatest fall 11 points (raw Italian silk). On tbe otber 
band, tbe greatest advance in wages was 220 per cent, (slate 
and metal roofers), and tbe greatest fall 37 per cent, (steam- 



Waoes 



291 



and gas-fitters' helpers). Thus while the prices of the com- 
modities included in the table covered a range of 1,002 
points, the prices of labor covered but 257. Of the 135 
articles for which relative prices are given in 1865 some 67 
per cent, had donbled or more than doubled in príce ; bnt 
this was true of only 3 per cent of the wage-series and of an 
even smaller proportion of the wage-eamers. 

Within this comparatively restricted range, however, no 
great degree of uniformity is observable in the fluctuations 
of wages. This may best be seen from the subjoined table, 
in which the wage-eamers for whom reporta are given in 
Jannary, 1865, are classified according to the degree in 
which their wages had changed since 1860 : 



TABLE XXI 

DI JAHÜABT, 186S, OLASSmSD ACOOBDINO TO BBLATZYB OHAMGB DT 

WAGKB BINCB líMO 



Ratio of Waobs m 
Januabt, 1866, TO 


NUMBBB OF EmPIíOTKBS IM 
THB BBBPBCTXYB GbOUPB 


PbsckntaobofWholb Num- 

BBB OF EM PLOYBB8 IN TUB 

Bbbpbotiyb Gboups 


Waokb um 1800 


Males 


Females 


Males 


Females 


60- 69i 


4 

3 

16 

30 

72 

183 

444 

414 

459 

787 

370 

385 

379 

539 

30 

2 

4 

2 


• • • 

6 

12 

52 

144 

54 

206 

130 

10 

1 

2 

5 

5 

1 

• • • 
■ • • 

• • • 


0.1« 

0.07 

0.39 

0.73 

1.74 

4.44 

10.77 

10.04 

11.13 

19.09 

8.97 

9.34 

9.19 

13.07 

0.73 

0.05 

0.10 

0.05 




70-79 




80- 89 

90- 99 


0,96% 
1.91 


100-109 


8.28 


110-119 


22.94 


120-129 


8.60 


130-139 


32.80 


140-149 


20.70 


150-159 


1.59 


160-169 


0.16 


170-179 


0.32 


180-189 


0.79 


190 199 


0.79 


200-224 


0.16 


225-249 




250-299 




dOOandover 




Totals 


4,123 


628 


100.00^ 


100.00^ 







292 HlSTOBT OF THB GbBBHBACKS 

Thk taUe shows that over nine-tenths of the men had 
leoeÍTed an increase of between 20 and 100 per cent, and 
nearlj nine-tenths of the women an increase of between 10 
and 50 per cent. Bnt there is no verj stríking ooncentra- 
tion on anj one point in the scale of increase, except that 
nearly one-thírd of the women had gained abont one-third, 
and nearly one-fifth of the men had gained between 50 and 
59 per cent in pay. 

The absence of cases of extreme variation in the wage- 
seríes makes it onnecessary to work out ayerages in two 
ways, as was done in the chapter on príces. The reason 
given for nsing the median there was that the few commodi- 
ties which showed an extraordinary adyance in príce affected 
the aríthmetic mean much more powerfuUy than the few 
commodities which were jost as extraordinary in not rising 
at all. Accordingly, the median which is not affected by 
the degree of divergence from the average shown by any 
series gave results considerably lower than the aríthmetic 
mean. With the wage data, however, the two methods of 
averaging give almost the same resnlts. In the above table 
the median point is found in the group 50-54 per cent, for 
males and 80-84 per cent, for females. The corresponding 
aríthmetic means are 55 and 28 per cent. Such differences 
are hardly sufficient to justify the laborious computation of 
two sets of results.' 

More concrete ideas regarding the change in wages are 
given by study of the actual amounts of money received per 
day in 1860 and 1865. An average wage computed for such 
diverse kinds of labor as those included in the material 
would mean little, and consequently a '^classified^^ table 
has been arranged for the parpóse of the comparison. 

The significant fact brought out by this exhibit is the 

> I i mmj be addod that arithmetic meaos of boih wa^es and prices wer« oom- 
INiUmI before the toperiorüy of the median in areracing tbe prioe series was faUy 
appreoiated. 







OÍ 


D*n.TW*OWl 
















— 


FKIIA1.N 


w„.c.„.„ 


Nomber of 


Nambec 


Nnmher of 

EmplojreBs 


Nuinba°r 






IKS 


I»0 


1805 


twa 


1«H 


IgflO 


196. 


ÍO.25-0.19 

0.500.71 

0.75-0.99 

1.001.21 

1.25 1.19 

1.50 1.71 

1.751.99 

2.00-2.21 

2.25-2.19 

2.50-2.74 

2.75-2.99 

3-00-3.21 

3.25-3.19 


118 
123 
699 
2.186 

542 
«H) 
184 

66 
23 
1 

1 
3 


51 
88 
ñ7 
276 
567 
381 
897 
611 
332 
319 
18] 
259 
31 
5i 


2.31S 
2.11 

11.72 

42.77 

10.01 

11.92 

3.60 

13.29 

1.29 

.45 

.01 

.55 

.01 

.06 


1.24Í 
2.09 
1,39 
6.72 
13,81 
9-28 
21.85 
14-96 
80,9 
7-77 
4.41 
6.31 
.76 
1-32 


LT9 

469 
14 
10 


16 

250 

313 

1 

11 


21,91 
74,2 
2.2' 
1,5( 


i 


2 
42 
52 

1 

; 


71|í 

;« 

96 
17 
86 










6,111 


4406 


100. oos 


100,001 


632 


591 


100, OOí 


100,00» 



decrease in the mimber of persone of both sexea iu the 
lower wage classes and the increaae iu tbe higher. AmoDg 
males the laigest groap of wage eemers ín 1860 was the 
ll-Sl.24 class, aud iu 1865 the $1.75-11-99 class ; amoug 
females, the $0.60-10.74 chue in 1860, and the $0.75-$0.99 
claas in 1865. The mediao wage for males was $1.05¿ in 
1860 aud $1.90 iu 1866. For females it was $0.56 in 1860 
and $0.80 in 1866. 

Q-reater Bignificance attaches to the resulta obtained 
when the nnmerons wage-series are classiñed according to 

I Tha toUU of Tablea XXl and «Ttn do not agree. becan» in a fsw caaes thg 
AUrich RepoTt gires piece-iato wages iustnad of time wa«B8,aDd Iu a taw otbec 
cásea giiea wage* «ith board fnrnighed. Aa Chese series show ahonges in relatira 
PBT, ther are iacladed in Table IXJ. bat as the; do not Bbovr cet earníngs, the; ara 
exclnded trom Table SXH and all enbseqaent campntationa in^bicbactoal, iastead 
ot relatiTe. woges ia regarded. 



294 HlSTORY OF THE GbEENBACKS 

ihe varíoua economio gronps lo which the wage-eamers 
tielonged. One sucb classification — tbat according to 
iuduBtriea — is made in ihe next table. No industiy íb 
included in which retoms are not giyen for an aTerage of at 
leaat 200 employees. The resulta are presented according 
to both the systems of weigbting descríbed aboTe. 

Ck)mparÍBon of tbese industries shows tbat the sligbtest 
advance of relative wages occorred in the textile trades 
which employ nnmerons women and cbildren. At the 
other extreme, with the greatest adyance are city public 
works and the manufacture of gas in which the employees 
represented by the data are all men and mostly men who 
rank as unskilled laborera. 

It will be noticed that the two systems of weigbting pro- 
duce resulta that vary but little. What difference exists, 
however, is, on the whole, on the side of higher figures for 
the oonstant weights. If one compares the two sets of 
index-numbers for each of the nine industries from January, 
1864, when the full eflfects of the paper currency began to 
be felt, to July, 1866, one fínds that in ten cases the con- 
stant weights give the same figure as the variable weights, 
iu twolve cases a lower figure, and in thirty-two cases a 
highor figure. Observation of these difFerences raises again 
the problem that was mentioned in discussing the two sys- 
team of weigbting: What is the cause of the differences — 
are they accidental results due to the imperfections of the 
data, or are they indicative of some general feature of the 
WH^e situation which has so far been overlooked ? 

In answer to these questions a hypothetical explanation 
uiay be suggested. In organizing the labor forcé of a fac- 
Un'\y a railway, or a commercial house, it is often possible to 
seeure substantially similar results at about the same cost 
fri>m several diflFerent combinations of laborera belonging to 
different trades or possessing diflFerent degrees of skilL For 



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296 HisroBT of thb Gbeexbacks 

example, in different faetones producíng tbe same prodncts 
eme is likely to find more foremen employed by one manager, 
more skilled mechanics by another, more nnskilled laborers 
by a thütL Now, any change in tbe relatÍTe rales of pay 
gÍTen to theee Tarious classes of workingmen may make it 
profitable to alter tbe constitution of a gÍTen forcé by biríng 
relatívely f ewer of tbose persons wbose wages baTe risen most 
and more of tbose wbose wages bave risen least Of coarse, 
tbe ose of constan! weigbts conceals any efifect tbat sucb snb- 
stitntions of one kind of labor for otber kinds may bave apon 
tbe resnlts, for in multiplying tbe relative wages of eacb 
series always by tbe same nomber one introduces tbe arbi- 
trary assnmption tbat no cbanges take place in tbe propor- 
tional numbers of workingmen of di£Ferent sorts employed. 
Tbe variable weigbts, on tbe contrary, representing tbe 
actual number of men of Tarious trades employed at eacb 
successive period, allow any cbanges of tbe sort described to 
bave tbeir due influence upon tbe averages. 

To test wbetber tbe observad diflFerences may be explained 
in tbe manner indicated, it is necessary to make a new classi- 
fication of tbe wage-series according to ratio of increase in 
relative wages, and tben to ascertain wbetber tbere was in 
fact a cbange in tbe constitution of tbe labor forcé in 
tbe direction of relatively larger employment of men wbose 
wages bad increased little, and relatively smaller employ- 
ment of men wbose wages bad increased mucb. Witb tbis 
object in view, tbe wage-series belonging to eacb of tbe 
nine industries included in tbe last table were divided into 
two equal groups, one containing all series tbat sbow an 
increase in relative wages between January, 1860, and Janu- 
ary, 1865, less tban tbe median increase, and the otber all 
serios tbat sbow an increase greater tban tbe median. Tben 
the pro[)ortionate number of tbe total employees belonging 
to tbese two groups at tbe two dates was computed for eacb 



Wages 



297 



of the industries, generally witb the result of finding that 
the group of seríes showing an increase less than the median 
bad a larger percentage of tbe wbole number of emplojees 
in 1865 tban in 1860. Tbe figures for tbe several industríes 
are as foUows: 

TABLE XXIY 

PSOPOBTXON OF TOTAL NÜICBBB OF BMPLOTXB8 IM NINS INDU8TBZB8 TN JANUABT OF 
1860 AND 1865, BSIiONOlNO TO WAGB-8BBIX8 SHOWDfO AN DfCBKASB IN SBLA- 
TTVB WAOB8 



Indostnr 



City public works 

lUuminating gas 

Stone 

Building tradee 

Metals and metallic goods 

Railways 

Ck)tton textiles 

Oinghams 

Woolen textiles 



Lesa than the 


Oreater than the 


Median for AU Series 


Median for All Series 


in the Industry 


in the Industry 


IMO 


1Mfi> 


1860 


1865 


1% 


22^ 


93% 


7&% 


9 


8 


91 


92 


8 


11 


92 


89 


41 


52 


59 


48 


48 


46 


52 


54 


43 


42 


57 


58 


39 


47 


61 


53 


16 


18 


84 


82 


39 


39 


61 


61 



Of course, it cannot be assumed tbat desire to substitute 
men wbose wages bad risen less for men wbose wages bad 
risen more for tbe performance of tbe same work, wberever 
feasible, was tbe solé cause of cbanges in tbe constitution of 
working forces. Numerous otber causes in individual in- 
stances no doubt led to similar cbanges. In tbe case of 
city public works, for example, tbe cbange sbown by tbe 
above figures is probably due in large part to some altera- 
tion in tbe kind of tasks tbat were being performed — a 
cbange tbat bappened to créate a mucb greater proportion- 
ate demand for men belonging to tbose groups wbose 
pay bad increased less.' But sucb cbanges as are due to 

1 As an industry city pnblie works is rather unsatisfactory because of the inter- 
mittent character of the work and the chan^ in its nature f rom time to time. Dur- 
ing the war there seems to have been a decrease in the attention deroted to civie 
ondertakings — at least the ñgaiea f rom the Aldrich Report show a marked falling 




HlSTOBY OF THE QbEENBAOKS 



accidental canece may be espected to coiinterbaIanc« each 
other over a fíeld of obeervatioa eo wide as tbe preseiit; and 
aa tho casee oí iacreased relative employment of mea whoee 
pay had increased Icea than the median for all kínde prepon- 
derate decidedly over the cásea oí an opposite character, one 
Í8 forced to the conclusión that tbe ñgures reflect the reenlta 
oí the obvioTiB economic motive to reconetitute forcea of 
workingmen in Buch a fasliion as to aecure given reealts 
moBt cheaply. And, to reíum to the starting-point, it ia 
clear that such subetítutíons of men whose labor had become 
relatively cheaper for others must prodnce differences of the 
kind obaerved between the averages of Table XXIII ob- 
tained by the nse of constant and of variable weighte, 

A BÍmilar conspectus of changes in relntive wagee, bol 
one based on a classificatioo of wage-earncra according to 
occupationa instead of iuduatriee, ia presented ín the next 
table. 

This table, though including a mnch larger nomber of 
gronps, shows but a elightly greater range of Snctoations 
than Table XXIII. The masimum and minimum relative 
wages in January, 1865, of tho twenty-aeven occupationB 
included are 173 (laborera) and 122 ( machinists' helj^ersj.ae 
compared with 17C (illuminating gas) and 181 (ginghatns) 

off in th« nninber ot iMnplnjreo). Aa tbi9 faUing off is particalsrly K^^at {n tha 

iioeaBiiiiotilT rspid iocrense in pajr. Chediffereiuw ío tbc 
torce Íd H60 and 1S6S ihown by Ihe aboie table may be 
nndnliF. But i( tbiit wrlN bo omilted. the proportioaat 
■natcr. an tha follonritig fl(TUii« abuH : 



o ba axaM«ralcd 



«FU.™» UI-UBBHTSD >I «UI» 


■DOWINO A 




™ ■U.ATITB «M» 




LeuUuutba 


Or«¡jj«-«U- 




im uat 


IW 


im 




18» 


SSft 


82« 


«« 



I 



300 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

among the nine industries. Since these gronps are mnch 
more homogeneous than those of Table XXIII, which are 
composed of persons belongíng to dissimilar trades but 
employed in the same indostry, the qnestion of the relativo 
weights attached to different series is of less conseqnence, 
and I have not thonght it necessary to work out new aver- 
ages by the use of constant weighta The only occupation 
in which inspection of the data makes it certain that di£Fer- 
ent results woald be obtained is the first — laborers. Here 
a somewhat greater advance would be shown by the applica- 
tion of constant weights. 

Because of the large nmnber of occnpations represented 
in Table XXV the detall is rather confusing. A simpler 
and clearer resolt may be obtcdned from the same data by 
grouping the occnpations according to the degree of skill 
and responsibility which they require. For this pnrpose 
four gronps may be constitnted: (1) superintendents, (2) 
skilled handicraftsmen, (3) assistants of artisans, (4) un- 
skilled laborers. The resnlts of this grouping are presented 
in Table XXVI. 

This table shows clearly that men in the lower ranks of 
the industrial army received a relatively greater increase in 
pay during the war than men in the higher ranks.^ 

The two series in Table XXV representing wages of 
women are not included in the gronps of Table XXVI. A 
glance at them shows that they indícate a relatively smaller 
increase in wages than was received by men in the majority 
of the occnpations for which figures are given. The com- 
putatíon of median wages based on Table XXI, and also the 
relatively small advance found from Table XXIII to charac- 
terize the textile industries, point to a similar conclusión — 
that women on the whole succeeded less well than men in 

1 The reason for this difference, and the qaestion whether the greater relatire 
increase in wages meant also a greater absolate addition to the pay received, will 
bediscnssed presently. 



Wages 



301 



TABLE XXYI 

SBLATXVE WAOB8 OF VOTTB OBADB8 OF WAOI-BASNEBB, 1800-66 1 



Number of seríes 

Average number of employees, 
Average wages per day in 1860 

1860, January 

July 

1861, January 

July 

1862, January 

July 

1863, January 

July 

1864, January 

July 

1865, January 

July 

1866, January 

July 



UnskiUed 
Laborera 


Assistants 
of Handi- 


SkUled 
Handi- 


craftsmen 


craftsmen 


60 


51 


142 


1,701 


535 


1,404 


$1.00 


$1.10 


$1.66 


100 


100 


100 


100 


102 


100 


103 


101 


101 


083 


103 


101 


100 


103 


104 


009 


106 


106 


121 


116 


112 


121 


127 


116 


143 


137 


125 


157 


144 


139 


169 


151 


151 


167 


155 


153 


176 


161 


156 


169 


163 


162 



Superín- 
tendents 



69 

140 

$1.95 

100 
102 
099 
101 
099 
099 
107 
111 
119 
131 
137 
140 
144 
152 



the Btruggle to readjust money wages to the increased cost 
of living. Bnt all these indications are less accurate than a 
comparison that can readily be made by computing the rela- 
tive wages of men and women in all industries in which the 
material shows the employment of persons of both sexes. 
Figures for this purpose are given in Table XXVII. To 
save space only one set of results is given under each 
industry — that obtained by the application of variable 
weights — but the totals for all the industries are presen ted 
in both forms. It will be noticed that the differences 
between the results produced by the two systems of weight- 
ing are slight. 

I The occapations inclnded inthe several groups are as f ollows : (1) unskilled 
laborers — laborers, watchmen, teamsters, quarrymen; (2) assistants of handicrafts- 
men — helpers of machinists, boilermakers, molders, masons, and blacksmiths, fire- 
men, and apprentices; (8) skilled handicraftsmen — stonecutters, masons, painters, 
carpenters, machinists, engineers, blacksmiths, pattemmakers, printers, weavers 
(males), molders, and boilermakers ; (4) saperintendents -— foremen and overseers 
and second-hands. 



HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBAOES 



TABLB XSTn 

«BBMBIIFLOYBD. IBSO-flSI 





COWOB 


Gmo- 


'S'í- 


P^ 


s 


SflCB 


QoODB 


\i.i. Indobtum 




























Yar. 


Con. 




























Wts. 


WM. 




ií.' F. 


M. 


p. u. 


P. 


H. 


P. 


u. 


F. 


u. 


P. 


IC 


F. 












1 
1 


- 


- 


- 


- 


- 


- 




- 


- 


U. 


F. 


U. 


F. 


No-of 










BariM. 


BS 


33 








































































































ploy-a 


SW 


201 


IHZ 


S23 171 


4g 


21 


16 


[jg 


27 


K 


9 


5 


5 


799 


82S 


-99 


K» 


'W,SaD 




100 


loo 






IDO 














100 


100 








lOO 


'JdIj 




101 


100 


101 


iM 


03 


100 
















100 






101 


■ai,Jao 


B8 


98 






106 




100 


00 


96 


9-t 




00 








102 


99 




Juij 


91 


98 








09 








9rt 












¡«a 


01 




■ez-Jao 




91 


99 


108 


















100 












Jalj 


9» 


M 


101 


116 




iH 














IDO 


00 


102 








•SS.3ua 


lOT 


06 






121 


IJ 


105 


.00 


IX 




109 


00 






110 


109 


m 


110 


Jaly 


109 












11» 












IM) 






109 






«.Jan 




IS 




109 


IZZ 


20 


























Jnlj 




a 


117 


118 


128 


27 








121 






150 


00 


130 








e5,JaD 




a 










152 


JIT 




lí« 


I« 












la 


in 


July 




3D 








39 


ISS 


,22 


l« 


128 


IM 










Ití 


,« 


lU 


fiMau 




59 


as 








IM 














M 










^ulj 


Iffi! 




'•' 


ni 


115 


118 




m 


m 


115 


150 


100 


191 




181 


19S 


159 


167 



From this table it appearg that in all tbe indostriee except 
the manafacture of gingbams the wages of womea adyanced 
lesB rapidly than the wages of men, while prices continned 
to rÍBe, bat tbat after prices had begun to recede the relative 
wages of women caoght ap and at the end of the period' 
covered by the figures were od the whole slightly in the 
lead. It is also noticeable tbat in tbese industries in wbicb 
many of the male employees were exposed to the competition 
of women their wages increased rather lesa rapidly than in 

iThesndd(HirisBtromlOelnJanDBrT,U03,tal52¡D Jnly, toUoved brsdropto 
1S1 Id the relatlTS «ages of témales employed in the manutactan ot books and news- 
pipers, ia an aígiSTated lustanee oí a defecC of wase statiatica mentinned in sec. ii, 
abOTe. It iadnstoUie tacC tfaat oí the tweoty-oDe employees atwork Id JauDar;, 
1883. tweot; wen diachargod before Jnly, wbile torty new vomen had been taken on 
agaÍD by July, 1861. The one «ornan who remaiaed atwork stoadllj raoeiiMl wacaa 
ooDBÍdsrably greaterthan moatof her compaDiDU. 

iH.= llBle; F.= FemBle. 



Wages 303 

other industries. It is true, however, that the number of 
retums for spice and dry goods are too slender to possess 
mnch significance, and the same remark applies in a less 
degree to paper and to books. Of the series ín the table, 
those for the three textile industries alone are based upon 
fairly comprehensive material 

Table XXV, in which wage-eamers are classified accord- 
ing to occupations, and still more clearly Table XXVI, in 
which these occupations are grouped according to degree of 
skill and responsibility, suggest that there may have been 
some connection between actual eamings before prices rose 
and the degree of advance in relative wages during the war. 
If the increased cost of living was the primary factor in pro- 
ducing the rise of money wages, the existence of some such 
relation between actual income and degree of increase seems 
not improbable. For increased cost of living would neces- 
sarily press more severely upon families barely able to make 
both ends meet before the war than upon families which had 
a comfortable margin above subsistence, and would there- 
fore forcé the breadwinners of families in the fírst class to 
be particularly strenuous in demanding higher pay. To 
discover whether such a connection actually existed, all of 
the wage-series have been reclassifíed according to the per 
diem wage received in 1860, and the relative increase of pay 
has been computed for the groups thus formed. The results 
obtained by the use of variable weights are presented in 
Table XXVIII A. 

These figures indicate that there was an important nexus 
between the advance of wages and eamings before the sus- 
pensión of specie payments. In the case both of men and 
of women the higher grades of employees received a rela- 
tively less increase in pay than the lower grades. It will be 
observed, however, that among males the group that fared 
relatively best was not the lowest paid, but the fourth in 



HlBTOBT OV THB ObBEKBACKS 



TABLBIXTin A 







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1 


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1 


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i 


1 


i 


1 


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1 
























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1 














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11 




ion 


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las 


M 


ta 


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71 




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21 


w 




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m lu 


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US 


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102 




M 


lis IM 


IM 






¡30 


MI 


M 


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l« 


l.V» 




loa 






01 


101 


m 


IS 




5S 


ut la 


71 






1» 




II» 


lOO 


00 




0! 




113 


na 




S7 


m 153 


U 


W 


S"!íí' 


«0 


MI 




101 




IOS 


on 




na 


n 




W 


IS ISS 


n 


iM 


MI», 




ni 




w 








¡m 


101 




IS3 




la 






151 




u 


SIU 




lOD 


uo 


91 


w 




IKI 


toe 


1» 








53 




B-l,»,, 


> 


u 












too 


ion 


03 


IOS 


13 


la 


131 


S 


m 


52 !S' 




n 




100 








m 


as 




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la 


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S'*" ■ 


11 


El 


ino 


100 






MI 




















».»+ 


í 






i<n 


100 


100 




m 




la 


1» 


3t 




13 




1J1 


r«n*l<.r 
























1 








*s s-^s- 




tu 










IOS 




IOS 


lis 


1Í5 


I9D IM 




\a 


170 


OÜO U74. 


u 


Ol 






lo: 


IOS 










loo 


111 'is: 


\a 






0.13-0,».. 


a 








ii« 










IM 












I.OO-IU, 




* 


MU 


lUfl 




10^ 


71 


Tfl 


81 


87 


KB 


'alna 


» 


m iM 



rank — persona rpceiving from $1 to $1.24 per day. And it 
will also be noticiMl that the decline in relative increase does 
not liold perfpetly oí each auccesBive group. For instance, 
in Jnnuary, 18ti5, the group J1.50 — J1.74 shows a slightly 
gri'atcr gain than the group $1.25 — $1.49, aiid the very small 
hi^host group, thnt includes but tliree one-man series, shows 
aniong its irregularities some very considerable iacreasee. 
To fnoilitate tlie study oí the connection in a broader way by 
reducing the detall, and to get series that are more signifi- 
caiit nnd regular bocause larger, it is convenient to regronp 
til» ninlcí employees in the manner suggested by the braces 
Olí the margin. The resulta ot such a regroaping are pre- 
■eiitt'ii in Tnble XXVIII B. 

Thia Bummary exhibita a higher degree of regnlarity 
than Tnble XXVIII A. It shows that from the time when 
tlie iui-rcaBod cost oí living began to be an important íactor 

> Jolr, l*n to Julr, iMt. iDolDiin. 



TABLE XXYIII B 



I. (M^SNT OBOUPa) 





m 


1800 


1 


m 


IBK 


ia03 


18M 


» 


tSBS 


1 
10< 

1« 


■a 
la 


i 

100 

102 

IOS 
100 

99 


w 


1 


1 


s 

1 


1 

IQÍ 


1 


j? 


1 


í 


1 


1 


lo.ss-ae8i.... 

I.(U-I.ltt 

1-W-I.W 

!.<»-2.*».... 
Z.SCH- .■-■ 


'1 i 


1« 


i» 


J5( 


i 


i 


IftO 



— abont the cióse of 1862 — to the end ot the períod cot- 
ered hy the figures, the íncrease in relative wages varíed in 
a rottgh way inversely as per diera wages in 1860, with the 
important ezception that men eaming leas than $1 per day 
received a lesa proportional íncrease in pay than men in the 
secand clasB. It also showa that when the rapid fall of 
pnces b^an early in 1865 these dÜFerences between the 
relative ratee of increase in money wages became less. If 
we take men paid leas than S2.50 per day in 1860 — over 98 
per cent, of the whole nnmber — we find that the difference 
between the increase in the relative wagea of the varions 
gronpa declined from 23 points in January, 186Í, to 19 
points in Jannary, 1866, and to 8 points in Jnly, 1866. 

Áa already snggested, the general fact of a conaection 
between the relative increase of wages and the amonnt 



iWanbiula 
labUnotildbeu 


foUows: 


loolodad wlth male. 


ba flrst two seríM Id th> abon) 




i 

< 1 


1860 


ISOl 


1882 


18S3 


ISSt 


186S 


ISGS 


inlSBO 


1 

lUU 


1 


S 


1 


-^ 


1 
101 


11» 


121 


i 

ja 


12) 


101 


¡s 


JU7 


3 


_ 


1.109 

2.» 














' THE Greenbac 



.^ 






\í 



v:^ 




earaed before th© fludden advance in cust of living ¡s readily 

explaiuable on tho hypothesis thatthe rise of pricea rather 

thon the withdrawal of men iuto the army or any other 

cause waa the chief reason tor the higher pay. Though it 

mBj not seem so clear at first, both tbe exception to thís 

general rule ia the case of men eaming less than $1 per day 

before the war, aud the decreasing divergeuee between the 

«enes after prices had begun to fnll, can be accouiited for oa 

similar groundB. It is probable that most of the men repre- 

sented in the table who receíved lesa than $1 a daj befare 

the war were unmarried, or at least that a considerably larger 

proportion of them than of meu eamíng from $1 to $1.49 

were without family responsibilities. On tbe average, b 

single man is better off, from the material poiiit of view, on 

^ ^ »j I a wage of, say, 75 cents a day than a man with a family on 

':3 V" c a wage of, say, $1.25 a day. If thís be so, there is tho same 

^ * ' reason why mt-n in the first of our groui» shonld receive a 

lesB average incroase in money wages because of the increased 

cost of living that thero is why men in the thini group 

sboul*^ rweive a lesa average advance than men in tha 

/ ,p8e«S'd,yien in the fourtb less than men in tbe third, and 

rf/ ^ i/^ inlhe fiftb group lesa than men in the fourth. 

ty * lY**^ «Tor the decreasing divcrgenciea between the seríes of 

) fJP <L ralVtive wages, a study of the table shows its cause to be 

|( j4bat after pnces began to fall in January, 1865, the rate ol 

r ^\ increase in wages bocame distínctly smaller in the caá© of 

\ O Á^^ gronp that had been most affected by the increased coet 

^* ' V ' • of living, but not In the case of the other group». Ab the 

#(( jF cbanges in tbe pay of men eaming from {l-Sl-^í) per day 

vV (T tonformed more ilosely to the cbanges in cost of living 

T jÍ '^^ when tbe cost was advaucing than did the changes in the 

jV pay of other men eaming either more 



I 






/ , 



V 

^ 



»\<>^ 



less, so aLso, whea 



the cusí of bving dectined, this group woe the first to show 1 
the effect of the change. 





Wages 



307 



Similar considerations explain why on the whole the wages 
of women increased leas than the wages of men. One of the 
reasons commonly given for the fact that female employees 
are paid lesa than men for similar work is that they have 
smaller family responaibilities. ' If such is the case, an 
increase in the cost of living wonld press on the average less 
severely npon working women than npon working men, just 
as it woold press less severely on men receiving high, than 
npon men receiving low, wages. 

It wonld be an error, however, not to note that this 
connection between earnings and change in relative wages 
holds tme only in a broad and general way. The contrast 
between the fírst and second forms of Table XXVIII shows 
that the míe does not hold nniformly in the smaller wage- 
gronpa Similarly, reference to Table XXV will show that, 
while the better-paid occupations on the whole exhibit a 
less considerable increase in relative wages than the poorer- 
paid occnpations, this is not tme in every individual case. 
For example, the average increase in the pay of 440 machin- 
ists who received an average wage of $1.62 per day in 1860 
was 52 per cent, by Jannary, 1865, as compared with 22 per 
cent, in the case of 69 of their helpers, who got but $1.16 
a day in 1860. This qoalification means nothing more, 
however, than that the general law of statistics applies to 
these figures — uniformities are disco vered only when large 
groups are taken. 

Another misapprehension may be guarded against by call- 

1 A ronffh illnstration of this fact is fnrnished by the foUowing classifloation of 
male and female breadwinners in the United States in 1890 according to conjucral 
eondition— compated from EleverUh CennUn ** Population/* Part II, p. cxzvi. 



Males. . . 
Females 



Total 



Single 



lOOjí 



39.2^ 
69.8% 



Marríed 



57.1^ 
13.2JÍ 



Widowed 



16.1;í 



Divorced 



0.3í 
0.9^ 



808 HisTOHT OP TBE Gbeenbacks 


ing attention to the fact that the above diBcueaion refere 
only to the relative — not to the absolute — increase in money 
wageB. The fact that men earning from $1 to $1.49 per day 
in 1860 receivfd a rolativelj greater advance in pay than any 
other clase doca not mean that the extra aums given them 
were ae large aa the satns added to the pay of employees of 
higher grade. As a matter of fact, the actual increase was 
greater in the pay of men receiving higher wages at the 
ootflet. To bring out this fact, Table XXIX has been pre- 
pared by computing the average actual increase of pay 
represented by the average relative increase for each of the 
groups of Table XXVIIIB. A wage midway between the 
greatest and the least included in each group has been taken 
as the basis for the computations. 

TA.BLE XXIS 


i. 

lo.s: 


uw 


iin 


,»= 


I» 


,« 


MS 


- 1 


1 




1 


f 


1 

1 


J5 


1 
1 




S 




1 
í 


1 

.« 


1.00 


I 

1 a 


(.01 

'.tí 


loo 

03 

.00 
OS 


t.ai 

.08 
.01 
OS 

.00 


101 

.111 
.oa 

.0! 


1 


:oi 


s 

.1) 


in 


:* 




Aocording to this table the most considerable average 
increase in actual wagee was that of men earning from %'2 to 
$2.49 per day iu l8t!0; but the relative increase was greater 
in the case oF men earning tesa, bei'anse the suialler actual 
additions bore a higher proportion to the lower initial wages. M 
Of the two forma of presentatíon — relative and actual ^| 
increase— the former eoems to poesess more significance H 
when one is concemed with the economic well being of 1 



Wages 309 

wage-eamers, for the reason that the importance of a given 
snm added to an income dependa upon the amount of that 
income before the addition is made. An increase of 75 
cents to the daily wage of an onskilled laborer who f ormerly 
received $1.25 means more to him than an increase of $1 
to the daily wage of a carpenter who had been paid $2.25. 
Conseqnently a better idea of the alteration in the circum- 
stances of the two men is afForded by saying the^t the day- 
laborer's pay had been increased 60 per cent, and the car- 
penter's 44 per cent., than by saying that the former's pay 
had been increased 75 cents and the latter^s $1. 

As has been said, an average wage computed from the 
retums of employees of such diverse character as the persons 
for whom the Aldrich Report gives retums means compara- 
tively little ; but there is no valid objection to a compntation 
of the average variation in the pay of men in onlike occupa- 
tions. While a series of such averages does not present the 
facts conceming the changes in the wages of any specifíc 
individuáis or groups, it is nevertheless the only means by 
which a general notion regarding the circumstances of the 
whole class of workingmen can be arrived at. Conseqnently 
it seems worth while to present a summary of the average 
relative wages of all employees for whom we have data and 
to compare it with the results obtained by Professor Falkner 
from practically the same material. This is the purpose of 
Table XXX. 

Between the two forms of the semiannual table it is f ound 
again that the differences are slight, but that the constant 
weights give slightly higher figures. In order to test once 
again the explanation given above for this diflFerence, all of 
the wage-series have been divided into two nearly equal 
groups, onecontaining the 255 series that show an advance by 
January, 1865, of 42 per cent, or less, and the other the 257 
series that show an advance of 43 per cent, or more. The 



810 HlSTOBT OF THB ObBBNBAOKS 



TABLE XXX 

▲TBU0B WMéAmm WAOBS OF ALL BMTLOTBBS lOB WHCMC DATA AMM OirSV ZH T. 

Xn OP THB AU>UCH BXPOBT 



Semianniial TaUe 


FalkiMr> Tableí 


Variable 
Weiffhto 


Coostant 
Wei«lito 


áimpto 
AmacB 


Wei«litod 
Ama#B 


100 
100 


100 1 

99 S 


lOOX) 


IOOjO 


102 

99 


102 1 
99 í 


100^ 


100.7 


102 

- 104 


102 1 

103 ) 


102^ 


ifla? 


116 
- 119 


114 1 
119 ) 


110^ 


118.8 


131 
142 


132 1 
144 t 


125^ 


1310 


152 
155 


156 ^ 
159 ) 


143.1 


148.6 


161 
164 


165 / 

166 S 


152.4 


156.6 



1800, January 
July 

1861, January 
July - 

1862, January 
July 

1863, January 
July 

1864, January 
July - 

1865, January 
July - 

1866, January 
July - 

former gronp includes 27 per cent, of the whole nnmber of 
employees in 1860 and 38 per cent in 1865 ; conversely , the 
latter group includes 78 per cent, of the whole nnmber in 
1800 and 62 per cent in 1865. Lest it be thought that this 
difiference is due to the prominence of the one very large 
seríes — laborers employed by establishment 35 — the figures 
have been recomputed after excluding it Then the result is 
that the group of seríes showing an increase less than the 
median include 35 per cent of the employees in 1860 and 42 
per cent, of the employees in 1865, while the corresponding 
figures for the other group are 65 and 58 per cent The 
data thus show unmistakably the tendency to substitute 
employees whose j)ay had increased relatively less for 
employees whose pay had increased relatively more, wher- 
ever such a change was feasible. 

I Aldrich Bepari, Part I« pp. 174, 178. 



Wages 311 

The discrepancies between both the columns of tbe semi- 
annnal table and the two seis of resulta obtained by Falkner 
are much greater than the differences produced by variable 
and constant weights. Tbese discrepanciee deserve care- 
ful attention, because they show clearly the effects prodnced 
by dissimilar methods of analyzing substantially the same 
data. 

The first of the Falkner snmmaries was obtained by 
striking a simple arithmetic average of the 600 or more 
wage-series, all of which were treated as having precisely 
the same importance. In the semiannual table, on the con- 
trary, each series was weighted by the number of persons 
whose pay it represented. That this difFerence in the method 
of striking the averages must produce somewhat divergent 
results may be seen from Table XXV III A or B. Not only 
are the wage-groups in this table that show the greatest 
increase in pay represented by a larger number of series 
than the groups that show a smaller increase, but, more than 
this, their series include on the average a larger number of 
employees. Falkner^s method of preparing a general aver- 
age of variations would allow to each of these groups an 
influence upon the result in proportion to the number of 
series included in it; but the method adopted in construct- 
ing the semiannual table would give each group an impor- 
tance in proportion to the number of employees. For 
example, in computing the index number for January, 1865, 
the group $1-$1.49, which shows the greatest advance in 
money wages, would have a weight of 35 per cent., accord- 
ing to Professor Falkner^s method, because 179 of the 505 
series fall within it, and a weight of 50 per cent, according 
to the second method, because 2,325 of the 4,696 employees 
fall within it. It is further true that the average index num- 
ber for this group is higher wben calculated according to tbe 
second method, because the large series as a rule show a 



312 Hi^TOKT or THE Gkeesbacks 

mmMTwhMÍ grest^T increase than the small señesL Tlds bst 
üaet flMj ftfhMfm m^san that esUbUshmenlB requmng die 
flerrioM of mm j luiiids CooikI it neoesBur in oider lo a e mi e 
full qiK4«i to c4f er wages rather higher than a smalI empiojcr 
waa coiDpíflkid to {jaj to aecure two or three men. 

Tbe aecoEid of the Falkner aeiiea in TaUe ^xx, like tlie 
aemiannoal aeiiea, íb a ^^ weighted ** average. Bat the meth- 
oda of weigbtmg adopled in the two cases are venr diíFeienL 
Insiead of moltiplying each relative wage bj the niunber íá 
etnplojreea whose [lay it repreaented, PiofeascH' Falkner 
atrofrk a aimple arerage of the lehitive wagea in each indoa- 
try and then maltiplied the series for each indostrT bj 
the number of [jersons engaged in it according to the fed- 
eral censos re{x>rts. As several of hÍB crítics haré pointed 
oot, there are grave objections to this procednie. First, the 
census drjes not parport to show the nnmber of persona 
engaged in industries — like the manofactore of agricaltaral 
implements, for example ; but the nnmber of persona 
engaged ín varíou» occu[>ation8 — like painting, brícklajing, 
taiioriüg, caquen tenug, and the like. Ñor is it possible to 
awMfrtaín from these retoms for occnpations the nnmbers 
eniployed in industries. To take one example, the first of 
Falkriíír'B industries — " Agricultural Implements *' — is 
Wí'ighted for the years 1880-91 by the number of persons 
re|>ort<Hl in the occupation tables of the Tenth Census under 
the caption " Agricultural Implement Makers " — viz., 4,891.' 
But that this number does not include by any means all the 
[lermnis engaged in this industry is indicated by the foUow- 
ing fcxAnote a[)[)eDded to the caption in the census table: 
**(ií'n<Tally reported as *iron founders,' *carpenter8,' 'machin- 
ísíh/ 'painters and vamishers,' etc." 

Sec(nid, if tho weights used are erratic, some oí the series 
for thí^ industries to which they aro applied are not leas so. 

« Tenth Ccnau», Vol. I, " Popalation/* p. 746; cf. Aldrich Rejtort, Part I, p. 175. 



Wages 313 

It has been pointed ont above tbat the nninber of wage- 
series in several of the " industries" of the Aldrich Beport 
is altogether insufficient to give a reliable indication of the 
general trend of wages.' To take the most extreme cases, 
there are but two series for "Groceries" and three for 
"Dry Gkx)ds."* Of course this is an altogether inadequate 
basis for conclusions about the wages of salesmen, yet ^' Dry 
Goods " receives, in Professor Falkner^s table, a weight sec- 
ond only to that of " Bnilding Trades." 

In considering which of the four series of relative wages 
in Table XXX has the best claim to acceptance, therefore, 
Falkner^s weighted series must be discarded. Curiously 
enough it approaches the results of the semiannual tables 
more closely than its companion series of simple averages. 
But in view of the faulty method by which the weights 
were obtained and the recklessness with which they were 
applied, this closer approach must be regarded as an acci- 
dental virtue. 

Of the three remaining series, Professor Falkner^s simple 
average will be preferred only by those, if any such there 
be, who believe that in computing average variations in 
wages no attention should be paid to the number of persons 
employed at different rates of pay. On the other hand, 
the semiannual table will be preferred by those in whose 
eyes the numbers are important. Perhaps the difference 
between the two tables can best be expressed by saying that 
Falkner's simple average shows the average change in the 
price paid for various kinds of worky allowing to each kind 
an importance in proportion to the number of reporting 
establishments in which it is performed, while the semi- 
annual table shows the average change in the pay of all the 
wage-eamers for whom retums are given. 

1 See seo. ii, aboye. 
>See Table XX, aboTo. 



314 



HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBACKS 



lY. BELATIVB MONEY WAOES IN THE GOAL, IBÓN, OLASS, AND 

POTTEBY INDU8TBIE8 

The preceding discussion has been confined to the 
material aflForded by Table XII of the Aldrich Report. 
Before combining the fígares for money wages with the 
tables of prices it is in order to seek what additional wage- 
data may be found in other sources. 

The task of collecting material for the Aldrich committee 
regarding wages in the coal, iron, glass, and pottery 
industries was intmsted to Mr. Joseph D. Weeks. Hís 
report presented the data in such a difíerent form that they 
cannot readily be compared with the uniform retoms for 
other industries secured by the Department of Labor. Not 
only do Mr. Weeks^s tables fail to report number and sex 
of the workers, but they also do not give wages for the same 

TABLE XXXI 

RKLATITK WXOBS OP GOAL MINBR8 1 



Akthkacitk Ck>AL 


BlTUMINODS 
COAL 


Anthracitk Coal 


BiTuicncocB 

COAI« 


Date 




« ce 


Date 


Date 


« ce 


« « 


Date 


1859, Nov 

1860, March . . 
Dec 

1861, May 

Aug 

1862, May 

July. . . . 
Nov 

1863, July.. .. 

Sep 

1864, May 

July. . . . 


a3 

107 
93 
107 
93 
100 
107 
123 
154 
185 
208 
239 


100 
lUO 

■ • • 

50 

75 

88 

88 

100 

150 

200 

250 

• • • 


1859 
1860 

• • • • 

1861 
1861 
1861 
1862 
1862 

isas 

1863 
1864 

• • • • 


1865, May 

July 

Sep 

Oct 

1866, Jan 

Feb 

April 

June 

Aug 

Dec 


208 
162 
185 
208 
169 
181 
166 
185 
208 
166 


250 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

200 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 


1865 

• • • > 

• • • » 

• • • • 

1866 

• • « • 

• • • • 

• • • • 

• • • • 

• • • • 



I In computing the relativo waires in the first of these series the averafre of the 
wace paid in November, 1859 (|6 per week), and March, 1860 (|6.96)« was taken as 
the basis. In the case of the second series the monthB of the year in whlch the 
specifled wages were paid are not stated. 



Wages 



315 



months in tbe year. As a glance at any of the previous 
tablea will show, this second lack of uniformity is particu- 
larly serious when one is studying the efifects of the green- 
back issnes, because wages changed so rapidly during the 
war. It is, therefore, necessary to take up Mr. Weeks's 
reporta for the several industries separately. 

For the coal indnstry he givee two series, one presenting 
the weekly wages of a miner of anthracite coal doing 
" company work " in Lozerne county, Pa., and the other 
showing the price paid per bnshel for mining bituminons 
coal near Pittsburg. These series are shown in the preced- 
ing table. 

Both these series show a somewhat greater relative 

TABLE xxxn 

BBLATITB WAOB8 OF IBON-OSS 1IINBB8 



Nbw Jbuxt 


OZIOBD , N. J. 


CoB]rwAi.L, Pa. 




Blastera 
and Drillen 


Minera 




Un- 

skilled 

Laborero 


SkUled 
Laboren 


Minera 


Per diem 
wage, IMO 

1860 

Oct. 


11.00 

100 
113 
100 
100 
144 
144 
163 
200 
250 
250 
200 
150 
165 


Per diem 
wage, 1860 

1860 


$1.00 
100 

• • • 

90 
100 
125 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

175 

• • • 

• • • 

188 
138 
150 


Per diem 
wage, ÍSBO 

1860 


10.75 
100 

• • • 

107 
120 
133 

• • • 
■ • • 

207 

• • • 

• • ■ 

187 

• ■ • 

103 


10.95 
100 

• • ■ 

106 
116 
126 

• • • 

• • • 

179 

• • • 

• • • 

179 

• • • 

184 


11.25 
100 


1861 

1862 

1863 

1864, Jan. 


1861, Oct 
1862,July 
18HH,July 


1861 

1862 

1863 


100 
106 
112 


Feb. 








Apr. 
July 




1864 


200 


1864,July 




1865, Jan. 


isés! '.'.y. 




Apr. 
July 




120 


1865,July 
1866,Jan. 
1866,July 




1866, Jan. 


1866 


132 



316 



HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



increase of pay than any of the occupations included in 
Table XXV, but not greater than some of the individual 
seríes, as may be seen by refemng to Table XXI. The 
anthracite miners belong in the $1.00-$1.24 wage group, 
for their pay per day before the war averaged $1.08. In 
which group the bituminous miners belong it is difficolt to 
say. During tho nine years, 1852 to 1860, they had been 
paid two cents a bushel, and according to Mr. Weeks men 
in good mines working fuU time could mine about 100 
bushels a day. What average earnings per day had been, 
however, we do not know. 

Among men engaged in mining iron ore Mr. Weeks^s 
figures also show not only a large increase in money wages, 
but also violent fluctuations from time to time. An attempt 
to compare the fíve seríes relating to this industry is made 
in Table XXXII. 

Men employed in making pig iron, on the contrary, 
received an advance in pay below the average, if the two 
series given by Mr. Weeks and represented in Table XXXIII 
give a correct impression. 



TABLE xxxni 

BBLATIVE WAOE8 IN THE PIG IRON INDD8TBT 



CATA8ADqCA, PA. 


Year 


Fillers at 

Blast 
Fu mace 


Keepersat 

Blast 
Farnaoe 


Per diera wage, 1860. 

iseo 


$1.37 

100 
106 
91 
101 
15.3 
141 
142 


$1.85 
100 


1861 


103 


1862 


91 


1863 


103 


1864 


146 


1865 


135 


1866 


130 







Wages 



317 



TABLE XXXIV 

BBLATTVB BARNINOS IN THB BAB IBÓN INDUBTBT 



PüDDLiif O Ibón 
Btma, Pa. 



Date 



Per diem wage/60 

iseo 

September 8 

1861 

1862,Aprill2..... 

Julyl2 

August 23. . . 

September 1 

September22 

October 

October 18. . 

November 35 
1863^pril 

April25 

NLtLy ^* • • • • • • 

June 

July 

December . . 
1864, January 30. . 

AprU9 

May 

May 17 

June 

June 4 

July 

August 27 . . 

October 1 . . . 

December . . 
1866,February 4. . 

March 

April 

Mayia 

July 

September. . 

September 9 

September23 

October 21. 

January6.. 
January 27 . 
March 31 . . 
December 22 






100 

• • • 

100 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

113 

• • • 

125 

• • • 

• • • 

138 

• • • 

• • • 

150 

• • • 

163 

• • • 

• • • 

175 

• • • 

188 

• • • 

200 

• • • 

• • • 

225 

• • • 

200 
150 

Í44 
200 



200 
225 



e 

I 



$2.67 
100 

• • • 

100 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

112 

• • • 

125 

• • • 

• • • 

137 

• • • 

• • • 

150 

• • « 

162 

• • • 

• • • 

175 

• • • 

187 

• • • 

200 

• » • 

• • ■ 

225 

• • • 

200 
150 

• • • 

143 

200 



201' 
226 



•oís 



11.33 
100 

ióó 



113 
Í26 

• • • 

Í38 

• • • 

Í5Ó 
Í63 

• • • 

• • ■ 

175 
Í88 
2ÓÍ 

• • • 

226 

2ÓÍ 
150 

Í44 
201 



202 
227 



PuDDLnfo Ibón 

DUNOANMON, Pa. 



§5 



100 

• • • 

100 

• • • 

114 
129 



136 
143 

• • • 

157 



171 
186 



214 



229 
2ÓÓ 



171 



157 
171 
200 
200 



e 

•o 



$2.01 
100 

• • • 

100 

• • • 

114 
129 



136 
143 

• • • 

158 



189 

• • • 

206 
223 



257 



275 

• • • 

240 



206 



189 
205 
240 
240 



si 



$1.01 
100 

ióó 

ÍÍ4 
129 



136 
143 

Í56 



188 

2Ó5 
222 



256 



273 

24Ó 



205 



188 
205 
240 
240 



RoLLiNO Ibón 

dumcannon, 

Pa. 



&9 


Ls 


«^ 


l« 






$3.20 



100 
100 
113 



125 



138 

• • • 

• • • 

Í5Ó 

• • • 

Í63 



175 

• • • 

Í66 

• • • 

Í5Ó 



138 
150 
165 

• • • 

158 
165 



100 
100 
113 



125 



138 

• • • 

• • • 

Í5Ó 

• • • 

Í63 

• • • 

• • • 

Í75 

• • • 

Í65 

• • • 

Í5Ó 



138 
150 
165 

• • • 

158 
165 



818 



HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



For the bar iron industry Mr. Weeks^B reporta are not 
quite so restricted. They indícate a large increase in the 
pay of pnddlers and their helpers, cbecked by a brief reac- 
tion in 1865, and for the better paid bar-roUers an increase 
not gteatly in advance of that of pig-iron workers. 

The two series given by Mr. Weeks as representativo of 
the pottery industry are both for men making very high 
wages. The net eamings of the hoUow-ware pressers from 
1859 to 1863 are reported as $10 a day, and of the handlers 
as |9. The doUar a day added to their eamings in 1864 
accordingly represented a relatively slight increase. 

TABLEXXXY 

SELATIYB BAUrmOS OP POTTBBS 



Tear 


HoUow-Ware 
Pressers 


Handlers 


Average net eamings 
in iSeo 


$10.00 

100 
100 
100 
100 
110 

lio 
lio 


18.00 


iseo 


100 


1861 


100 


1862 


100 


1863 


100 


1864 


111 


1865 


111 


1866 


111 







Finally, Mr. Weeks gives six series representing the aver- 
age daily eamings of glass-blowers engaged in making wín- 
dow glass and green-glass bottles of various sizee. These 
figures are for years beginning in September and ending 
in May or June, for glass-blowing is generally suspended 
during the summer months. Table XXXVI shows that until 
May, 1866, the average eamings of blowers had increased 
slightly less than wages in the industries represented in 
Table XXX. 



Wages 



319 



TABLE XXXVI 

SELATIYB KABNIN08 OF OLA88 BLOWKS8 





Blowers 

of 

Window- 

Glass 


Blowkbs of 


Gbben Glabs Bottlbs 


Ybab 


2 os. 


4 oz. 


8 oz. 


Pint 


.Quart 


Av. earnings a day in 
1859-60 


$3.32 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
136 
151 
213 


12.25 

100 
93 
100 
100 
100 
149 
149 
233 


12.25 

100 
98 
107 
107 
107 
156 
156 
231 


12.40 

100 
96 
110 
110 
110 
156 
156 
225 


$2.97 

100 
91 
121 
121 
121 
148 
148 
167 


S3.06 
100 


1859-60 


1860 61 


94 


1861-62 


125 


1862-63 


125 


1863 64 


125 


1864-65 


155 


1865-66 


155 


1866-67 


159 







V. BELATIVE SALABIES OF SGHOOL TEACHEBS 

The Aldrich committee found it impractical to coUect 
data regarding the earnings of professional men, such as 
lawyers, physicians, or even clergymen ; but as in a measure 
representative of this whole class tbeir statistician used a f ew 
carefuUy selected retnms of the salaries of teachers in the 
public schools of four cities — Boston, Baltimore, Cincinnati, 
and Si Louis — and of two rural counties in Massachusetts 
— Franklin and Bamstable. These retums are presented in 
Table XXXVII. 

On the whole, these results accord well with those of the 
preceding sectiona The average increase in the salaries of 
male teachers is less than that shown by any of the twenty- 
seven occupations represented in Table XXV with two excep- 
tions. The discussion based on Table XXVIII suggests 
that the reason for this slight increase is found in the high 
initial earnings. On the other hand, a seeming contradiction 
of the rule is found in the f act that the advance in the sal- 
aries of women teachers is greater than in the case of men. 
But this exception is one in seeming only. In gathering 



HlSTOBT OP THE GbEENBACKS 



TABLE XXIVIt 





».™ 


lULTtMdBE 


CWCWATl 


Si. Locis 


CODNTat 
I» M»IB. 


ii?s;i¿' 




H. 


Fbih 


u. 


F«n- 


U. 


P,m 


-■ 


f™. 


M. 


F... 


H. 


Fam 


Botb 


YMr. 

IIMO. 

i ■ 

il : 


a 

tójffi 

i 

toe 


2 
»ta> 

luo 


9 

11» 

130 


llít 


n.4Z3 

'S 

87 


3 

tan 

ptjrr. 

s 


n.KK 

S2 


»M0 


tM.O» 
priBO 

il 

IOS 

iS 


ni.u 
1 

íí* 


100 

s 

lio 


1 

100 
IW 

lia 


n 

1» 

im 
1» 

IM 



their data the agents of the Aldrích committee foand it poe- 
sible to mclnde only the bigbest and the lowest grades of 
teachers; hecaose the intermedíate grades are so many and 
show Buch variations in pay tbat no satisfactory data conld 
be obtained regarding them." Since the highest grades of 
teachiTs in American schools are meo and the lowest woinen, 
tho figures of the report for women relate to teacbers with 
very low salaries and the figures for men to well-paid teacb- 
ers. Tbe salaries of the women ranga from $100 to $500 a 
jear and those of the men from $900 to $2,800. Now, wbile 
it has been shown that in most industries in wbicb botb 
sexes particípate the average increase in the pay of men was 
greater, it does not foUow that the increase in tbe wages of 
the best-paid meu was greater than that in the wages of the 
worst-jMiid women. Indeed, a com^mrison of the two parta 
of Tnble XXVIII A will show tbat the men belonging in the 
wage-gronps $2.25-$2.'i9 and above receivod on tbe whole a 
smallor average advance than the ti28 females for wbom we 
bavtí retums. Of course, in Table XXXVII we are com- 

1 AldrifS tteporl. P«rt I. p. IM. 



Waoes 321 

paring with women men receiving on the average con- 
siderably more than $2.25 a day. 

A less definite, bnt nevertheles» an important contríbn- 
tion to knowledge of the economic siination of professional 
men during the war, is supplied by an inquiry made in 1869 
by David A. Wells, then special commissioner of the revenue. 
"The answers/' he saya in his fourth report, "to a large 
number of circulare sent out by the commissioner during the 
past year to clergymen, teachere and other professional men, 
lead to the conclusión that, while their salaries or incomes 
have, as a general rule, been advanced siuce 1861, the 
advance has not been equal, by any means, in extent, to the 
advance in the price of commodities.'" 

Since prices fell after January, 1865, while money eam- 
ings of such pereons apparently continued to increase, it 
follows that the case of these correspondents was probably 
worse during the war than when their troubles were laid 
before Mr. Wells in 1869. 

VI. BELATIVE WAOBS OF FABM LABOBEBS 

It is especially regretable that wages of farm laborera 
are not included in the exhibits of the Aldrich Report, 
because they formed in the United States of the Civil War 
the largest single class of wage-eamere.' Ñor can this gap 
be satisfactorily closed with material drawn from other 
sources. The Department of Agriculture has made several 
investigations into the wages of farm laborers, but the earliest 
of these was not undertaken until 1866, and no systematic 

1 H. E. Executive Documcnt No. 27, p. xlii, ilst Gong., 2d Sess. 

S In the oecupations table of the Censns of 1860 the number of *' farm laborers " in 
the nine states represented in the material of the Aldrich Report (see sec 2) is 
reported as 885,246, while the nnmber of ** laborers " given is 512,481. Bnt the pre> 
ponderance of the latter class is probably due to the f act that in mral districts a 
farm hand is often reported simply as a *' laborer " on the schednles flUed in by the 
«ramerator and tabnlated as such in the Census Office, when he should have been 
reported as an '* agricultural laborer." 



HlSTOBX OV THB GbBBNBACKS 



attempt was made then to ascertain what wages had beeu 
paid in formar years. Mr. Dodge, th© etatUtician of the 
department, however, gave it as his opinión that there had 
been an increase of abont 50 per cent, between 1861 and 
1866.' Bnt when the ninth of these inveetigations was 
made, in 1892, the department reqnested its correepondents 
to Bend it copies of an; accessible wage-records relating to 
years before 1866. A considerable number of replies was 
received from different sections of the cotintry and pablished 
by Mr. Dodge in his report.' Fragmentary as is this mate- 
rial, one can glean from it a few señes that may give soma 
notion of the changeB in the pay of farm hands dnring the 
war. The resalta of snch an attempt are preeented in Table 
XXXVIII. 

TABLS XZXYin 



Tarms 


isea 


IMl 


im 


1SS3 


UU 


IW 


M 




00 

1» 
00 
00 

loo 
luu 

100 

11» 

100 

100 


Sí 
M 

so 
IOS 

m 

lüO 

ioo 
loo 


i 

109 

IOS 

80 

100 

100 
100 


129 

11 

i:a 

i 

1« 


*3S 
'17 
54 

IM 

129 

i 

IM 






, Kofis.. SoathampUm.. . . 










s;=!í:'rí!£ 


;K;fcXKV.°¿':: 


u 


Per,..noth.wthboarc 


ni.Ohio.Batt'eiCo 


54 


Per muoth. with boart 

Per dav, w th boanl, c 
Por dajr, w Ih bonrd. c 

Per dar, w thont bd. | 

Fe 

Per week, with board 

Aíorage ralatÍT« wage 


ommoD labor, N.J 


14J 






1, hariest, 0.. ButlerCió'. 

T] Ohio, Bailar Co 

s.>ftbai<lit«easarii!B.... 


ISI 

va 


100 


os 


103 


128 


lis 


lU 



Scanty as íb tbís material, it eeems to be the most 
anthentic apon the Bubj'ect, and some interest attaches, 

■ Annual Report, Dcpartmtítt of Affriculturt. IBBO, p. U. 

■ Waoa oí Farm Labor In (fie United Statti { Department of Acrlenlture. DítI- 
BioD of Statistica, Hisc. Series, Beport No. i. 1892), pp. U-6S. 



Waoes 



323 



therefore, to a comparÍBon with the fuUer retoma for other 
occupations. To facilítate such comparíson the series for 
" farm laborers," " all employees," " laborers," and ''unskilled 
laborers^' are placed side by side in Table XXXIX. 

TABLE XXXIX 

C0MPARI80N OF RBLATIVB WAOB8 OF FABM LABOBEB8 AND OTHEB WAOB-BASNSB8 



Date 


Farm 

Laborers 

Tab. XXXVIII 


All Emplqyees 
Table XXX 


Laborera 
Table XXV 


Unskllled 

Laborers 

Table XXVI 


1860, January 

July 


• • • 

100 

• • • 

99 

• • • 

107 
Í26 
Í45 

• • • 

158 


100 

100 
102 
99 
102 
104 
116 
119 
131 
142 
152 
155 


100 
100 
100 
93 
100 
101 
123 
125 
143 
167 
173 
176 


100 

100 


1861, January 

July 


103 
93 


1862, January 

July 


100 
99 


1863, January 

July 


121 
121 


1864, January 

July 

1865, January 

July 


143 
157 
169 
167 







From this comparison it appears that farm laborers 
received an advance in monej wages slightly greater than 
the average for the 5,000 employees for whom the Aldrich 
JReport gives retums, but considerably less than the 
advance in the pay of the groups with which they have 
most in common. This restdt is what the previous analysis 
would lead one to anticípate. As the rise of wages seems to 
have been dne primarily to an increase in liviug expenses, 
one wonld ezpect to fínd that when part of this increased 
expense was assumed by the employer in furnishing board, 
the advance in money wages would be less than when the 
person had to find himself. Table XXXYIII shows that in 
the case of but one of the sixteen series is it positively stated 
that the pay was **without board." Second, there seems 
reason to believe that, as a rule, farm hands have smaller 
family responsibilities than unskilled laborers in towns. 



íi'H HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

— 

Tbi» occnpation retnms of the censos of 1860 are not classi- 
fUfd by conjugal condition, bnt it is improbable that there 
WAH u change in this respect in the next generation sufficient 
Ui irivalidato the application of the ratios shown by the 
iHsMni^ of 1S90. Aecording to the latter census, in the nine 
(itiiUfM oovorod by the Aldrich retums, slightly more than 
oiid-imlf of tho **un8pecified laborers** were married as com- 
partid wltli but throo-tenths of the " agricultnral laborers." 
Am iimiiy who bt^long in the latter class are probably classi- 
ttiui tuTonoouHly in the former, the real difference wonid 
^|t|»imr grtmtor, could it be ascertained accurately.' As has 
Ihhhi tfuggt^MttHl, a single man is less affected by a sndden 
iiM^rtmmt la tho eont of living than one with a family, and the 
|iriivÍoutf diHouHsions seem to show that wage-eamers received 
Hii im^rouHo in uionoy wages ronghiy proportioned to the dis- 
(liibü cHUMttd them by the rise of prices. 

Vil TAHl.KH OF RELATIVE MONEY WAGES BASED UPON THB 
MATKHUL IN VüL. XX OF THE TENTH CENSUS 

Tlm HtHMind of tlio great collections of data regarding 
WH^iü iii tho Unitod States covering the period of the Civil 
Wiu itt fi»uiul in Yol. XX of tho Teiith Censúa (1880). 
ht^^luuiíi^ in lS-0» tho CVnsus Office had made attempts to 
Mm ni lililí llio ratoH of WH4joa paid in the census year; but in 
\h*>{í Hiíh iuvt^tigation was oxttMided to cover a long series 
iif yiiiiiw lUttiik Hchoiluloi* wort* sent to the proprietors of a 
Im4(m iiiiiiilior of i^arofully soliH^teil manufacturing establish- 
iMi hlu io|iiiiMoiitiii>; ovor tifty measurably distinct industries 
mihI ImmiIimI iii ilitToivnt nwtions of the country, with the 

• ( t' iiiMtt>«4 (Miu^t(U»U (loiu TnUloi'XYl of tho Hocond TolumeoD Populationan 

" ( ii ,• 

AtfriouUural Luborors Laborers, Unspecifled 

IVI t ..I,... 470,U6 782.hu 

lí,. \, i MJ,»*a SS3,124 

iit I , • i.( *• *5 

(I ■• (' t I I • ol 30 51 



Waoes 325 

reqnest that they report the wages paid to certain important 
classes of their employees f or as many years as their records 
allowed. When these schedules were received bj the Census 
Office they were examined, and when necessary sent back to 
the mannf acturers f or correction, completion, or explanation. 
"Not infrequently," it is stated in the report, "schedules 
were passed backward and forward several times before a 
final adjustment was reached.'^' 

Owing to the care exercised in their compilation, the 
figures as finally published have borne a good reputation ;" 
but very little use has been made of them becanse of the 
inconvenient form of pnblication. Mr. Joseph D. Weeks, 
the special agent in charge of the investigation, made no 
attempt to analyze or combine the data obtained, or to 
discnss their significance. He confíned his efforts to 
coUecting and verif ying materials from many sources, and 
published the reports made to him by some 600 faetones 
substantially as received. Oonsequently anyone who 
desired to make use of the material was imder the hard 
necessity of working it into intelligible form for himself . 

An examination of the figures as published, however, 
shows sufficient promise in them to warrant an attempt to 
discover how far they bear out the inferences drawn from 
the materials already dealt with. In particular, the Census 
figures have the great meritsof being more comprehensive 
than the data of the Aldrich Report Nearly three times 
as many wage-series available for the present investigation 
can be collected from the former source as from the latter, 
and these series represent a larger number of branches of 
manufacture and a larger geographical área. A conspectus 

> Tenth CennUt Vol. XX, p. xr. 

3 See, for ezample, the opinión expressed by C. J. Bullock in his paper npon 
**Wage Statistics and the Federal Censas," in The Federal Census ("Publications 
American Economic Association," New Series, No. 2), pp. %1, 352, and the prefatory 
note by General F. A. Wajukeb in the report itself , p. x. 



326 



HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 



of the material deríved from the censos is afforded by 
Table XL. 

In ibis ezbibit twelve indostries are marked by a star 
(*) to indícate that tbey are not represented in the wage- 

TABLE XL 

0LA88IFICATION OF WAOB-6BBIBS FBOII THB TBirTH OXMBirS 



I. Accx>RDiNa TO Industries 



Agricultural implements 

Boots and shoes* 

Breweries 

Brick* 

Carriages . 

Carpets* 

Clothing* 

Cotton 

Flint glasst 

Plour milis* 

Fumiture* 

Gas and coke 

Hardware 

Ice* 

Iron blast fumacest 

Iron miningt 

Machinery 

Marble 

Paper 

Pianos* 

Pins* 

Potteryt 

RoUing millst 

Saw milis 

Ship carpentry* 

Stove foundriest 

Tanneries 

Tin* 

Tobacco* 

Woolen 

Totol 



I 



1 

3 

1 

3 
9 
1 
3 

14 
4 
5 

13 
2 
7 
1 
8 
2 

11 
2 
7 
3 
1 
4 
1 
7 
2 
4 

•8 
1 
4 

10 



142 



I 

O 

Is 



5 
17 

4 
32 
73 
18 
17 
258 
62 
28 
117 

4 
47 

9 
76 

3 

98 

11 

103 

26 

3 
38 

6 
61 

8 
46 
63 

7 

16 
173 



1429 



n. ACCORDINO TO LOCATIOH 



East: 

Maine 

New Hampshire. 
Massachusetts. . 

Connecticut 

New York 

New Jersey 

Pennsylvania. . . 

Delaware 

Maryland 

District of Col- 

umbia 

West Virginia. . 



West: 

Ohio 

Indiana. .. 
Illinois. . . 
Kentucky. 
Michigan , 
Wisconsin 

lowa 

Missouri. 



Total East and 
West 



il 
0.9 



3 
8 

16 
8 

26 
7 

12 
2 
2 

1 
1 

86 



13 
13 
7 
6 
3 
6 
2 
6 

56 



142 



«o 

«4 



51 
114 
206 
116 
265 

52 

134 

4 

13 

1 
11 

969 



128 
100 
63 
51 
23 
45 
9 
41 

460 



1429 



Wagbs 327 

tablea of the Aldrich Reporta and six more by a dagger (f) 
to indícate that they are included only in the supple- 
mentary retoma diacnaaed in aec. iv above.' Quite aa 
important aa the larger number of induatriea ia the greater 
geographical range of the material Aa waa pointed ont in 
aec. ii, all the eatabliahmenta for which retnma are inaerted 
in the main wage-table of the Aldrich Report were aitnated 
in atatea eaat of Ohio, with the exception of a aingle gaa plant. 
But of the aeriea obtaíned from the Tenth Cenaua nearly 
one-third are from the middle Weai Thia makea it poa- 
aible to compare the fluctuationa of money wagea in different 
aectiona of the country. 

On the other hand, the character of the Cenaua aeriea ia in 
aeveral reapecta diatinctly inferior to that of the Aldrich aeriea. 
(1) But one wage ia reported for the different kinda of labor 
in each year, and it ia not atated whether thia quotation rep- 
reaenta the average wagea for the whole year, or the wagea 
paid in aome one month. Thia muat be regarded aa a decided 
blemiah, particularly unfortunate for the atudy of money 
wagea during the war; for the preceding aummariea ahow 
diatinctly that from 1863 to 1865 wagea were fluctuating ao 
violently that there waa on the average a conaiderable 
difference between the ratea paid at the beginning, middle, 
and end of the year, and that the average for twelve montha 
might differ from the wage at any apecifíed date within the 
year. (2) The aex of the employeea ia not uniformly 
reported, ao that it ia impoaaible to aeparate the f emale from 
the male aeriea. (3) The number of peraona whoae pay ia 
repreaented by the aeriea ia not atated. Thua it becomea 
neceaaary in making up aummariea from these aeriea to treat 
them in the way that Profeaaor Falkner treated the Aldrich 
material — that ia, to diaregard the number of wage-eamera 

I This diyision cannot be made with entire confldence in every case, because no 
precise statement is made of the nature of the establishments included in the 
twcnty-one '' industries '" of the Aldrich Beport, 



328 



HlBTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS 



belonging to the different groups altogether. (4) The 
material is even more strictly confíned to mannfactnríng 
indostrieB than that of the Aldrich Report, 

BecaoBe of these limitations of the Censué wage material 
— partictdarly the absence of information regarding the 
nombers employed at different wages — it seems advisable 
to confine the comparison between it and the seríes from the 
Aldrich Report to a few of the most general forms of 
presentation. We may begin by comparing the average 
varíation in relative wages as computed from all the series 
derived from both sources. 

TABLE XLI 

OOMPAUBON OF BBLATITK WAOBS OOICPÜTED FBOK THB TBMTH 0KN8Ü8 AHD THB 

ALDBICH RBPOBT 





Total 


Number of series 

1860 


1,429 
100 


1861 


102 


1862 


106 


1863 


117 


1864 


133 


1865 


145 


1866 


152 



Census of 1880 



East 



969 
100 
101 
104 
112 
127 
141 
irjO 



West 



460 
100 
103 
112 
127 
144 
153 
155 



Falkner's 
Table 



543 
100 
101 
103 
111 
126 
143 
152 



Semi- 

annnal 

Tabla 



520 

100 
102 
99 
102 
104 
116 
119 
131 
142 
152 
155 
161 
164 



It will be observed that there is a remarkably cióse 
correspondence between the average varíation in wages 
computed from the Census material for the eastem states 
and Professor Falkner's average for all industries. This 
correspondence enhances confidence in the approximate 



Waoes 



329 



accuracy of both seis of data. These are the two columna 
that onght logically to agree, because they refer to prac- 
tically the same district and the averages are obtained in the 
same way. On the other hand, the lack of correspondence 
between the resulta of the Census series and the semiannual 
table does not disturb faith in the latter, because of the 
unavoidable difference in the methods employed. As has 
just been ezplained, in the latter case each relative wage was 
weighted by the number of persons whose pay it repre- 
sented, while in the case of the Census series this could not 
be done for lack of data. Substantial agreement is here 
shown by differences nearly identical with those between 
the two series obtained from the Aldrich material by the 
two methods of computation. 

But while the general average variation in wages appears 
practically the same in the Census and the Falkner tablea, 
the fluctuations of the individual series from the two sources 
are somewhat different. This is best shown by Table XLII: 

TABLE xui 

WAOli-SSBISS FBOM THB TKNTH CENSUS AND THB ALDBICH BEPORT CLA88I7IED 
ACCX>BDINa TO BBIíATIYB CHANOB IN WAOB8 BBTWSEN 1860 AND 1865 



Batió of Waobs in 

1865 TO Waobs 

IN 1860 



60-99 jí 

No change . . 
101-119 % ... 

120-139 

140-159 

160-179 

180-199 

200-219 

220-259 

260-299 

300 and over 



No. OF 'Sbbibs in Each Gboüp 



Census of 1880 



Total 



21 
182 
164 
349 
268 
206 

75 
112 

41 
7 
2 



Bast 



19 

111 

128 

273 

185 

144 

35 

50 

19 

5 



969 



West 



2 
71 
36 
76 
83 
64 
40 
62 
22 
2 
2 

4^ 



Aldr'ch 

Report 

Seríes 



19 

13 

71 

132 

148 

80 

33 

10 

3 

1 

1 

5ir 



Pbbcbntaob of Sbbibs in 
Each Qroup 



Census of 1880 



Total 



1.5íí 

12.7 

11.5 

24.4 

18.8 

14. b 

5.2 

7.8 

2.9 

0.5 

0.1 

100.0 



East 



1.9% 

11.5 

13.2 

28.2 

19.1 

14.9 

3.6 

5.2 

1.9 

0.5 



100.0 



West 



0.4^ 

15.4 

7.8 

16.6 

18.1 

13,9 

8.7 

13.5 

4.8 

0.4 

0.4 

100.0 



Aldr'ch 

Report 

Series 



3.7jí 

2.5 

13.9 

25.8 

29.0 

15.7 

6.5 

1.9 

0.6 

0.2 

0.2 

100^ 



330 HlSTOBY OF THE GbBENBAOKS 

As shown here, the grouping of the seríes from the Cen- 
sos is somewhat less symmetrícaL A relatively larger num- 
ber show no variation or a very considerable increase. Of 
the seríes nsed in the semiannual table 71 per cent, show an 
increase of from 20 to 79 per cent, in wages, as compared 
with 62 per cent of the eastem and 49 per cent, of the 
westem Censns seríes. 

A second fact bronght out by Table XLI is that the in- 
crease in relative wages seems to have been greater in the 
Mississippi valley than on the Atlantic slope. This difFer- 
ence is due, in part at least, to the fact that the teztile indus- 
tríes that fnmish over 30 per cent, of the Census seríes 
(Table XL) had their chief seats in the East, and in them 
the relative increase of wages has been shown to have been 
least among the indostríes represented in Table XII of the 
Aldrich Reporta But this fact cannot acconnt for the whole 
difference, because among persons belonging to the same 
economic groups the average increase in pay was generally 
greater in the West. The foUowing table has been arranged 
to bring out this relation. It shows the relative wages paid 
in the eastem and westem states to men foUowing the eight 
trades most fuUy represented in the Tenth Census retums. 

It will be noticed that in six of these eight cases westem 
workingmen received a larger average increase in pay than 
their fellows in the East. Why this should have been so is 
a question that can best be discussed after the course of 
príces in the two sections of the country has been investi- 
gated.* 

There is one feature of this table that seems to contra- 
dict certain of the conclusions drawn from the Aldrich 
Report data. In Table XXV it appears that the poorest- 
paid occupations as a rule show the greatest relative gain in 
wages, but the same is not true of Table XLIII. This 

I See Table XXIII, above. iSee pp. 346, 547, below. 



Waobs 

•^ iH iH iH tH iH iH iH 
S5 ^ iH iH iH ÍH iH iH iH 

« ^ 88S^SS8 

iH ^ iH iH iH rH iH iH iH 

^ f-H tH iH iH iH iH iH 
g 

iH iH tHiHiHiH 
«» 

^ iH iH iH iH fH fH iH 

<» 

» ^ 8S8SS:;]S 

CSl _I iH rHiHiHiHfH 

t. ^ 8S3^!8^9 

^ iH iH r-i iH iH iH iH 

« ^ 8S8SS!SS 

^ ,H iH iH iH iH iH iH 

m 

!S f^ 88SS18gS 

fH ^ rH iH iH tH tH iH iH 

^ ^ 8S8^^SS!g 

iH ^ rH f-H f-H ^ f-H «H tH 
«» 

_j rH iH rH iH »H rH iH 
g 

00 «j rH »H rH rH tH »H rH 
g 

53 S 8882SSS 

04 r-J rH rH rH rH rH rH rH 

O S 
►28) ^^dr4 



881 



O 

B 

B 






B 

I 

3 



^ 

a 






a 

ü 



s 



»4 
n 



00 



s 

o 

n 



S 

9 



< 



o 






I 



8 



4» 

I 



I 



8 






I 



8 



I 



» 



I 



í 



I 




332 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 



obeeiratíon snggeets that the connection between raiio of 
increase and eamings per day, of which so mach has been 
made, may not be shown bj the Census material. When, 
however, these series are all classified according to daily 
wages received in 1860 and the average rates of increase 
compnted for the several gronps, this inference is found to 
be mistaken. The figures for the comparison are given in 
Table XLIV, A and B, which corresponds to Table XXVIII, 
A and B. 

TABLE XUY 



WAO; 



wmou THs Tnrm ckhbus clabofixd aoooeddio to dailt waoi 

BKCKiYKD nr IMO 



Per DiemWmteñB 
Beceived in IMO 


No.of 
Series 


lan 


isa 


1M2 


1M8 


18M 


1866 


1M6 


$0.15-0.49 


63 


100 


101 


103 


116 


126 


146 


162 


0.50 0.74 


126 


100 


103 


108 


114 


128 


144 


158 


0.75-0.99 


169 


100 


101 


107 


119 


140 


158 


167 


1.00-1.24 


S62 


100 


101 


106 


118 


138 


149 


156 


1.25-1.49 


191 


100 


103 


109 


123 


138 


149 


156 


1.50-1.74 


254 


100 


101 


106 


116 


134 


143 


149 


1.75-1.99 


108 


100 


102 


107 


118 


132 


143 


145 


2.00-2.24 


120 


100 


101 


106 


114 


126 


136 


140 


2.2^2.49 


28 


100 


99 


101 


105 


117 


120 


124 


2.50-3.99 


89 


100 


101 


106 


113 


120 


127 


131 


4.00-6.99 


19 


100 


102 


102 


105 


112 


126 


127 



B 



Per Diem Wñgwi 
BeceiTod in IMO 


No.of 
Series 


i8m 


1861 


1862 


1863 


1864 


186K 


1866 


ündor $1.00 

$1.00 1.49 

1.50-1.99 

2.00 2.49 

2.50+ 


358 
453 
362 
148 
108 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 


102 
102 
101 
101 
101 


107 
107 
106 
106 
106 


117 
120 
117 
112 
112 


133 
138 
133 
124 
119 


151 
149 
143 
133 
126 


163 
156 
148 
137 
131 







While the general rule that there is a regular connection 
between the advance in pay under the stimulus of the price 
disturbances and the amount of wages eamed before the war 



Waoes 333 

Í8 fully confírmed bj this exhibit, it is noticeable that the 
most considerable gain is f ound, not among persons eaming 
$1-$1.24 a day, but in the next lower gronp. When, how- 
ever, the fifty-cent groups are taken instead of the twenty- 
five, the second group — $1-$1.24 — shows the greatest gain 
in both tables in the years 1863 and 1864, while by the end 
of the períod the first group takes the lead. It is also trae 
of both sets of data that, while employees in the lower 
gronps received a greater relative increase in pay, the actual 
sums added to their wages were less than in the higher 
groups. The application of the method of Table XXIX to 
the figures for 1865 in Table XLIV B shows the average 
actual increase in the daily wages of the fíve groups to be 
32, 61, 75, 74, and 78 cents, respectively. 

VIII. PAY OF GOVEBNMENT EMPLOYEES 

An interesting side light is thrown upon the advance of 
wages during the war by the poeition of govemment 
employees as represented in the reports of officials. Of 
course, the war caused a vast increase in the amount of busi- 
ness to be transacted by most of the departments, and the 
clerical forcé employed in Washington was increased accord- 
ingly. The salaries paid for clerks were generally regarded 
as f airly liberal bef ore the war, but as the cost of living rose 
after the issue of the greenbacks many employees, especially 
men with families, began to find themselves pinched for 
funds. Congressional action was required to increase the 
rates of pay allowed, and in the face of the enormous 
expenditures for the military and naval service Oongress 
was unwilling to pass any general act that would involve an 
increased outlay for clerks. Consequently many men resigued 
their positions in Washington to accept places with private 
employers. So general did this movement become that the 
heads of several bureaus found themselves seriously embar- 



834 HlBTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 

raseed by the difficulty of securing and retaining sufficient 
skilled assistants. The reporta of 1864 and 1865 are foll of 
such complaints. General F. E. Spinner, for example, the 
treasurer of the United States, declared in his report for 
1864 that *' Bnt for the employment of females, whose com- 
pensation is low, and in most cases too low, it would have 
been impossible to have carried on the bosiness of the office 
with the compensation allowed. Dnring the year many 
clerks who were employed in this office have been obliged^ 
in justice to themselves, to resign their positions, in order to 
enter into business for themselves, or to take places with 
moneyed and other corporations, or in bnsiness hooses, 
where their talents and services were better appreciated and 
rewarded."* Similar remarks can readily be found in the 
reports of General Spinner's coUeagues. ' 

The rank and file of the army fared somewhat better 
than the clerks in Washington. At the outbreak of the 
war the pay of pri vates was $11 per month.* One of the 
first of the war measures passed in August, 1861, increased 
this pay to $13.* As the rise of prices proceeded, much was 
heard in Congress of the distress caused to the soldiers by 
the decline in the purchasing power of their pay. Tnie, 
the soldier himself was supplied with food and clothing, so 
that his position was less serious than that of a clerk who 
had to pay board and tailor bilis; but the soldier's family, if 
dependent on his earnings, was no better oflf than the clerk's. 
At last in June, 1864, when the specie valué of $13 in 
greenbacks had fallen to $6.18, Ck)ngre8s undertook to 

1 Finance Report, 1864, p. 76. 

> For examples see reports of the secretary of the nary, 1864, p. zlii, and 1866^ p. 37 ; 
secreta ry of the treasnry, 1865, p. 42 ; comptroUer of thecurrency, 1864, p. 55 of Finance 
Report; treasurer, t'frtd., 1865, p. 98; second auditor of tho treasury, t6td., 1864, p. 99, 
and 18t>5, p. 127; foorth auditor, >6id., 1864, p. 110; oommissioner of intemal reTenne, 
tMd., 1865, p. «2. 

SAct of Aoffost 4, 1854, 10 Statntetat Large, p. 575. 

« Aet of Aoffost 6, 1861, 12 Statutea at Large, p. 326. 



Waoes 835 

relieve the army. Bejecting a proposition to pay the $13 
a month in gold, or an amount of paper equivalent at the 
market rate to $13 in gold,' Congress added $3 to the 
monthly pay.' This act raised the stipend to $16 per month, 
at which figure it remained for the rest of the war. The 
ad vanee was but 23 per cent, on the oíd rate — an increase 
in relativo wages less, according to all our tables, than that 
received by the majoríty of workingmen. It must be 
remembered, however, that both the local and federal gov- 
emments were paying lavish bonnties for volunteers. Of 
course these extra sums mitigated somewhat the hardshipe 
snffered by soldiers' families. 

IX. INOBEASE IN LIVINO EXPENSES 

Statistics of relative money wages, no matter how elabó- 
rate, throw no light apon the relative well-being of the 
working classes nntil they have been compared with figures 
that show the changes in cost of living. In the present 
case satisfactory figures of the latter sort are extremely 
difficult to obtain. Of course, the tables of relative prices 
in the preceding chapter may be made to serve as a general 
guide of increased expenditure, but it will be remembered 
that in making up these tables, all commodities were treated 
as having the same importance. From the point of view of 
statistical theory this procedure was correct in the last chap- 
ter, for there the object was simply to ascertain how far the 
changes in the specie valué of the paper currency were 
reflected in the prices of commodities. But here, when an 
Índex of variation in the living expenses of workingmen^s 
families is the desiderátum, another form of computation 
would be preferable. Theoretically, each commodity should 

1 This proposition was made by Senator Powell, of Kentucky.— CongretaioncU 
Qlobe, S8th Gong., Ist Sess.. p. 2306. 

2 Act approTodJiíne 20, 1864 {ISStatwte» at Large^ p. 144). This act took effect 
from May 1, 1864. Priyates in the cavalry, artillery and infantry were all included. 



HlSTOBY OP THE GbEENBACKS 



^ 



now be weiglited according to its importance as an it«m of 
expcDditure to wage eamers. Profeasor Falkner has per- 
formed this procesa upon bis table of wholesale prices by 
uamg weighta for groups of espenditure obtained from an 
elabórate collection of American workingmen'a budgets. 
The resulta of the weighting are lower Índex nunibera for 
all the years of the war except 1865.' Reasons bave been 
given in the preteding chapter, however, for distrusting 
Falkner'a table of prices, and it therefore aeema unwise to 
accept tho weighted series, which ia but a modification of 
the unweighted, and open to all criticisms urged againat the 
latter. 

If Falkner'a figures are not to be ased, the qaestioa 
becomeB serioua whether it is not posaíble to weight the 
tables that bave bcen preferred to hia in auch faabion os to 
take account of the relative importance of various Ítems of 
expenditure. The obstacle in the way is that the tables do 
not contaiii price aeriea for many of the oommodities that 
figure moat prominently in family outlay. In the quarterly 
table of wholesale prices, there are no series for men's cloth- 
ing, tea, or houae rent, and in many other caaes it would be 
neceaaary to infer changes in the pnce of conaumption geoda 
from changea in the price of materiala- — e. g., shoes from 
hameaa leather, The same obstacle is even more soríoaa ín 
the caae of the table of retail prices, for it containa even 
fewer series than thi; quarterly table. Of conree, an elabó- 
rate scheme of welghts la of no advantage unless one \xaa 
correa pondiog price series to which to apply the weights. 
Without auch data the attempt at iniproving the character of 
the table by weigbting is futile. 

The fact tbat a aatiafactory plan of allowiiig for the 
ini[»ortance of the various price aeries ís not attaiuable with 
the bndgetary and price data at our dleposal ooght not, how- 

■ Aldrtch RtfOTl, Pan I, pp. 93, M. 




Waoes 337 

ever, to prejadice ns in advance against the resulta that can 
be obtained from oar unweighted tables. Statistical experí- 
ence has shown abundantly that where there is no bíased 
error in the figures, the applicatíon of weights to a large 
number of seríes makes little change in the final averages. 
Even in a time of such remarkable fluctuatíons as that of 
the Civil War, Falkner's simple and weighted seríes are very 
similar, and there is no reason for assuming that an applica> 
tion of weights to the tables of the last chapter, were such 
an application possible, would seríously modify the character 
of the results.' As has been said frequently before, the 
margin of error in all such computations as the present is 
wide, and the difiPerences introduced by weighting would not 
be great in comparison with difíerences that might be made 
by the possession of a wider range of data for príces or 
money wages. 

If we are to content ourselves with the tables of the last 
chapter from a conviction that with the data at hand we 
cannot weight them satisfactoríly, it remains only to decide 
what seríes shall be used as the index of increase in living 
expenses. Both the wholesale and retail seríes have char- 
acterístic advantages. The former contains a larger number 
of articles and, moreover, gives index numbers for January 
and July that can readily be applied to the figures for rela- 
tive wages obtained from the Aldrich Report On the 
other hand, the latter table is better because based on retail- 
príce retums. But a glance back at Table XVIII, where 
the two seríes are presented side by side, shows that it does 

1 It may be pointed oat that the problem of weighting as affecting the wage 
tablra is qnite different from the problem as affecting the price tables. The reason 
for this difference is that there is a biased error in the wage statistics — that is, the 
wage-series representing the lower and most numeróos grades of labore rs show 
rather nniformly a more considerable advance in pay than the series representing 
the higher and less numeróos grades. Therefore, weighting the series according to 
number of employees represented gives higher figures. But there is no reason for 
assuming that the articles of much importance as Ítems of expenditure would show 
a uniformly higher or lower range of pnces than the articles of slight importance. 




not matter grestly which eeriea ie used. TliP chief diflfer- 
I that pricea at retail show a Bomewhat more slng- 
gish movement than pricea at wboleeale — not oxhibiting a 
fall in 1861, rising lesa rapidly frora 1802 to 1864, and tall- 
iug lesB promptly iu 1865. Conseqoently it seems fair to 
use in any case the series that applies most conveniently to 
the wage statistics in hand, but with the constant remem- 
brance Ihat the wholesale figures probably show somewhat 
too large a purchasing power of wages in 1861 and again in 
1865, aod too Small a purchasing power in the earlier years 
ot the war. 

One other question remaíns: Shall the arithmetic mean 
or th© median of the price tablea I» employed ? In the last 
fhapter it was argued that the latter is a more significant 
form of average for the years oí the war, but in the present 
chapter the arithmetic mean alone has been used in making 
the wage tablea The median was not used in the latter case, 
however, simply because the absence from among the wage- 
series in Tables XXI and XLII of such cases of extreme 
advance as are found among the price-series, shows that 
the ñuctuations of relativo wages were mucli more anifonu 
than the fluctuations of relattve prices as exhibited in Table 
IX. Therefore, there can Iw no such divergence between 
the two forms of average for relative wages as for relativa 
prices. A trial of the semiannaal wage-table for the single 
date, January, 1865, has ehowit that the median is a triflo 
lower (han the arithmetic mean for males and a trifle hígher 
for femalea.' Since the resulta of the two methods of averag- 
ing are 80 neariy identical, there ¡a no valid objection againsi 
using the arithmetic mean of relative wages in the same w«y 
that the median woald be nsed had twosets of avernges been 
oumputed. In the tables of the followíng section, therefore, 
the median of the price-series will be employed, for the rea- 

•A-e.tii,t>.tK.».i>on. 



I 





Wages 339 

son that it was preferred in chap. iv. Computatíons based 
on the arithmetic mean would show a lower range of real 
wages. 

X. BBLATIVE BEAL WAOBS 

It is now possible to combine the results of the investi- 
gations into money wages and into prices wíth the par- 
pose of obtaining an idea of the manner in which the 
issue of greenbacks affected the material well-being of 
families dependent on wages. Despite all that has been 
said, it may not be superfluoos to enter once again a 
caution that the results obtained can be nothing more 
than rough approximations. The límítations of the wage 
data have been dwelt upon at length, and the tables have 
shown that the money incomes of some worklngmen's 
families increased much more than those of others. No 
colomns of "average variations" can give an adequate 
notion of these differences. If one set of figures shows 
fairly the changes in the pay of any one man or class of 
men, it must from that very fact be inaccurate as applied to 
others. Limitations not less serious exist in the price- 
series that are to be used as indicative of changes in the 
cost of living. Families living side by side in the same 
town have diflferent scales of expenditure, and therefore will 
be affected in different degrees by price fluctuations. And 
an examination of the retail-price series, as given in the 
Appendix, will show that the living expenses of men receiv- 
ing similar incomes did not vary in the same degree in dif- 
ferent towns. To bring this fact out more clearly a table 
has been compiled showing the average variations in the 
retail prices of thirty-six articles in the f our towns f or which 
the fullest reports are found in the Census volume. 

If it is well to enter this caution, it is equally well to 
guard against an undervaluation of the results. Though 
the data both of wages and of prices leave much to be 




Twr 


NewComber- 
iHiid. W. Va. 


Csnton, O. 




íSr^issr 


1800 


100 


100 


100 


100 


1861 


15B 


93 


115 


9& 






141 


135 




1863 


236 


21Ü 


176 


185 


1864 


S64 


283 


248 


218 


188& 


S65 


246 


221 


183 


1866 


222 




209 


170 



(Jesired in fulness, they have been carefully collected from 
reliable Bources and Bhow the actual wagea paid to thon- 
eands of employees for work of a diverse cliaracter per- 
formed in many different placea, and the actual pricea paid 
at wboleaale aiid at retail for many articlea of great iropur- 
tanve. So far as tlie material extends, there is liüle reason 
to doabt ita Biibstantial accuracy. Confídence in its repre- 
sentative character is strongly supported by the uniformity 
in the resalta obtained regarding both wages and prícee 
from the figures drawii from different sources. Pinally, 
thoagh there are manydeviations from the general averagea, 
the trend of fluctuatinns is the same in atmost all cásea. It 
aeems, tben, that we may procced to combine tho two seta uf 
tablea with a considerable degree of confídence in the aig- 
nificance of their resulte. 

This combiuation may begin with Tablea XXI and XIV, 
In Table XXI tbo wage-earners included iu the seríes 
drawn from the main exhibita of the Aldrick Report are 
clasaified according to the relative changa in wages between 
1860 and Jannary, 1805. The more coaservativ© pric«- 
aeries of Table XIV indicates that priesa had more tban 
doabled within this period. But of the 4,751 employees 
accoonted for in Table XXI the pay of but thirty-oine 




Waqes 341 

had increased as much as 100 per cent. — less than one 
in a hondred. The remaining ninety-nine wage-eamers 
in every hondred must have snffered in no inconsider- 
able degree from the paper standard of valué, because 
their money incomes had risen less rapídly than the 
cost of commodities. Of the men, half had received an 
increase of less than 54 per cent, in pay, and of the women 
half less than 34 per cent. If money income increases but 
one-half, while living expenses double, real income is 
reduced a quarter; this, or worse than this, appears to have 
been the case with half the men and much more than half 
the women. It seems clear, then, that practically all wage- 
eamers found themselves in more straightened circmnstances 
in 1865 than in 1860, and that in the majority of cases the 
inconvenience suffered was not slight. 

This combination refers to a single year. Some notion 
of the rapidity of the changes that took place in the circum- 
stances of working-people may be gained by tuming to the 
tables that represent the fluctuations of money wages year 
by year. Table XXX gives the average relative wages of 
over 5,000 persons from 1860 to 1866. A series showing 
average changes in real wages to July, 1865, may be readily 
computed from these figures and the price index numbers of 
Table XIY. In making the computation both columns for 
relative wages and the lower column for relative prices — 
the median — have been employed. 

According to these figures, the average relative purchas- 
ing power of money wages over the commodities included in 
our largest pnce table was at its lowest ebb from the middle 
of 1864 to the beginning of 1865 — although money wages 
at this time were nearly half again as great as they had 
been before the war. From this low point there was an 
extraordinary recovery owing to the very rapid f all of pnces 
between January and July, 1865. It must not be forgotten, 



842 



HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 



TABLB XLVI 

lOKAVGB DT BBAL WAOn OF OTSK 5,000 WAOl 



D«to 


VarUble 


Constant 




WeichU 


Wei^U 


1860, January. . 


100 


100 


July 


100 


99 


1861, January.. 


102 


102 


July 


lOá 


lOá 


1862, January.. 


102 


102 


July 


101 


100 



D«to 


Variable 
Wei^U 


1863, January. . 

July 

186á, January . . 

July 

1866, January.. 

July 


89 
86 
81 
71 
67 
97 



Constani 
Weichts 



88 
86 
82 
72 
68 
99 



however, that this fall was much more sndden in wholesale 
than in retail markets, and therefore the figures gíve an 
altogether too favorable picture of the sitnation of the 
workingman's famíly in the middle of 1865. Even accord- 
ing to the wholesale price table there was a sharp reaction 
of pnces in the latter part of the year that woold make the 
real wage-index number for October considerably lees than 
that for July, had we data for computing it. 

It would be interesting to apply the retail-price table to 
these same figures for relative wages and see how different 
the results would be. But such an application is scarcely 
legitímate, because the retail prices are averages for the 
year and the wages are the rates prevailing in but two 
months. On the whole, therefore, it seems best to rest con- 
tent with the rather vague modification of the preceding 
series suggested by the relation between wholesale and 
retail prices brought out in the last chapter. 

With these results may be compared similar figures 
computed from the tables of the Aldrich Beport, The 
re-working of the price data in the last chapter and of the 
wage data in the present chapter has led to the conclusión 
that Falkner^s methods of analysis show too slight an 
advance in both cases. The question remains whether the 
failare to gauge the full extent of the rise in prices is offset 



Waqes 343 

by the failure to gauge the full extent of the rise o£ money 
wages. To answer this question two seríes of relative real 
wages have been compated from Falkner's tables by using 
his weighted and his simple averages for both wages and 
príces. 

TABLE XLVn 

OOMFABZSOHOFBBLATTVa BBAI« WAOB8 AS 8HOWV IN TABLS XLYI. WITH BBLATXYX 

BBAI. WAOB8 OOMPUTBD FBOM FAI«KNXB*8 TABLES 

Falkner*a Tables 

Table XLYI Simple Weighted 

Averages Averages 



1860, January 100 
July - - - 100 

1861, January - 102 
July - - - 104 

1862, January - - 102 
July - - 101 

1863, January 89 
July - - - 86 

1864, January 81 
July - - - 71 

1865, January 67 
July - - 97 



í 


100 


! 


- 100 


! 


87 


í 


- 7á 


> 


66 


í 


- 66 



100 

107 

100 

90 

78 

64 



On the whole, there is less difference between these resalís 
for real wages than between the results of the tables of 
príces or of money wages. The extreme depression of real 
wages in all three seríes is abont the same, and except in 
1865 the impression left by Falkner's weighted average 
agrees very closely with that left by the seríes from Table 
XLYI. The chief difference is that the semiannual figures 
show the recovery of real wages in the middle of the last 
year — a recovery that certainly took place, although its 
completeness is exaggerated by the enforced reliance upon 
Wholesale instead of retail príce data. 

This examination of the decline in the real wages of all 
ení^loyees represented in Table XII of the Aldrich Report 
might be elaborated by making similar computations of real 



344 



HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



wages in the several industries, occupations, and wage-groups 
of the preceding tables. The reader who will compare the 
figures for money wages in these tables with the figures for 
pnces will find that in no case did the wage-eamers escape 
a considerable loss in real income. By way of illustration, 
three tables based upon the most significant groupings of 
the wage-series are presented below. In examining them, 
one must remember that, like the preceding tables, they 
overstate real wages in July, 1865. 

TABLB XLVni 



AVSBAOB CHANOS IN RKAL 


ITAOBS IN NINB INDUBTBISB, OOMPÜTED 


> FBOM ' 


VABLEB 








XIV AND xxm 1 










Date 


City 
PabUo 
Works 


Illumi- 

nating 

Gas 


Stone 


Baild. 

inff 
Trades 


MeUls 

andlie- 

Ullio 

Goods 


Bail- 
ways 


Cotton 
Goods 


Qing- 
hama 


Wo*leo 
Qoods 


1800, Jan.. 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


July. 


100 


99 


100 


102 


101 


103 


101 


100 


103 


1861, Jan.. 


100 


100 


128 


101 


102 


105 


97 


103 


106 


July. 


96 


104 


96 


107 


108 


111 


102 


115 


113 


1862, Jan.. 


09 


100 


96 


ia3 


106 


106 


98 


106 


108 


July. 


96 


100 


87 


104 


106 


100 


95 


107 


108 


18a3, Jan.. 


94 


96 


77 


91 


88 


82 


82 


84 


92 


July. 


88 


102 


81 


85 


86 


78 


78 


77 


82 


1864, Jan.. 


89 


98 


89 


80 


78 


71 


76 


66 


76 


July. 


85 


81 


68 


72 


70 


56 


65 


59 


64 


1865, Jan.. 


77 


77 


68 


64 


65 


63 


61 


57 


62 


July. 


111 


109 


94 


99 


94 


91 


88 


93 


89 



Extended comment upon these tables is superfluous. 
While the fluctuations of real wages are seen to have been 
by no means uniform in all cases, there is no industry or 
occupation in which the advance in money wages kept pace 
with the advance in prices. The differences represent 
merely greater or less degrees of inconvenience, not to say 
suffering. Perhaps the most interesting of the tables is the 
third, for it brings out once more the rule that the incomes 
of thoso familiesnearest the minimum of subsistence before 

1 The Tariable-weight wace-eeries are tised here. 



Wages 



345 



TABLE XLIX 

ATBBAGB CHAMGK IN BBAL WAGBB« IN NINE OCCUPATIONS, OOMFUTKD FBOM TABLB8 

XIV AND XXY 



Dato 


Labor- 
era 


Quar- 
rymen 


Masons 


Stone- 
catton 


Car- 
pentors 


Mold. 
era 


Machi- 
nists 


Fir». 
men 


Weav- 

ers, 
Female 


1860, Jan.. 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


July. 


100 


100 


99 


101 


100 


102 


100 


102 


99 


1861, Jan.. 


100 


114 


101 


100 


99 


104 


103 


103 


103 


July. 


96 


96 


100 


108 


106 


108 


109 


107 


115 


1862, Jan.. 


100 


100 


99 


91 


103 


105 


107 


102 


104 


July. 


96 


87 


100 


92 


100 


103 


107 


106 


109 


1863, Jan.. 


95 


78 


85 


79 


80 


85 


92 


92 


85 


July. 


90 


81 


80 


80 


79 


83 


89 


101 


79 


186á, Jan.. 


89 


92 


76 


75 


78 


76 


80 


101 


68 


July. 


8á 


69 


66 


73 


70 


68 


71 


79 


58. 


1865, Jan.. 


76 


71 


63 


68 


67 


65 


67 


75 


59 


July. 


110 


96 


92 


99 


96 


94 


95 


106 


92 



the war were reduced relatively leas than the incomes of 
f amilies in easíer circumstances. 

It does not seem worth while to multiplj examples of 
decline in the pnrchasing power of the money incomes of 
wage-eamers by computations based on the wage-series 

TABLE L 

AVERAOK CHAMOB IN BBAI< WAOBS IN FIVB WAOE^BOUPS OOMPÜTED FBOM TABLE8 

xiY ai:d xxvm b 



Dato 


Males Earnings in 1860, Daily Wages of 


$0.25-10.99 


$1.00-$1.49 


$1.5a-«.99 


$2.00-12.49 


$2.50+ 


1860, January 

July 


100 

102 

100 

107 

102 

103 

88 

85 

79 

69 

65 

94 


100 

100 

102 

100 

101 

98 

92 

87 

87 

76 

71 

101 


100 

100 

102 

107 

105 

105 

89 

86 

79 

69 

66 

95 


100 

100 

100 

103 

99 

97 

79 

78 

73 

68 

62 

93 


100 
100 


1861, January 

July 


99 
105 


1862, January 

July 


100 
95 


1863, January 

July 


75 
73 


1864, January 

July 


66 
57 


1865, January 

July 


54 
76 


" ***rf ••• 





846 



HlSTOBY OF THB tíSEENBAOKS 



drawD from the Tenth Census. Were tbÍB done, a sotne- 
whaí harsher state of afTaire would be ehown, for the 
abseuce of data regarding numbers eniployed produces a 
general average advanco in wages k-sa than that cotiiputed 
from the completar data of the Ahirich Rcport' But there 
íb one point brought out by Table XLI that deserves 
fnrther notice- — viz., the difference betwtien the riae of 
wages ÍB tho Eaet aud West. It waa fontid that even if the 
comparísoD be conñned to members of the same trade, the 
average lacrease in wages seems to have been eomewhat 
greater in the uurth central than in the north Atlantic states. 
It Í8 interesting to aee whether this difference can be 
Bcconnted for on our general hypotheaiB, that the rise of 
wages was due chieÜy to the increased cost of living. If 
so, prices must have advanced more rapidly in the West 
than in the Eaet. The Censúa statistics of retail prices 
mak« it possible to discover whether or not this was the 
cose, for there are 239 seríes from the East and 2ílí7 from 
tho West. An exhibit of the relative prices of the fifty- 



Qaadi ' 



Artlol's 
No-iit 
Pr, Ssr, 



3 3 » IB 4 i 



1W3.... St 

laN. » 

IHB,... M 
^^^H )8«iii 



( lis m II 

l 12B1 lU » 

I isi iM a 

I isM lu a 



tlt I-( IM im) KX IX 
Tí' IW 18» 104 IS 1» 

n! iK lu )«:> is 10 



Waoes 



847 



eight articles arranged in nine groupe is presented in 
Table LL 

This table indicates that boots, flonr and meal, meat and 
ñahy and eggs and dairy producís increased more in price in 
the West, while the opposite is true of fnel, and the remain- 
ing gronps — dry goods, groceries, rice, beans, and potatoes, 
and house rent — varied in abont the same degree in both 
sections. If the arithmetic mean be struck of the relative 
pnces of all the fifty-eight articles in the Census list, the 
advance is fonnd to be greater in the West, as the next table 
shows : 



AVEEAGB BXLATIVB 



TABLE UI 

PBICBS AT BXTAIIi OF FIFTT-EIOHT OOMMODITIB8 IN 
KAST AND WB8T 



Date 



1860. 

1861. 

1862 

1863 

1864. 

1866 

1866 



East 


West 


100 


100 


116 


106 


139 


126 


16á 


169 


200 


216 


206 


216 


196 


207 



These figures lend strong support to the view that the 
difiPerence between the advance of relative wages in the two 
sections of the North was in large measure due to the unlike 
changes in relative cost of living. 

XI. OONOLÜSION 

All of the statistical evidence that has been presented in 
the preceding pages supports unequivocally the common 
theory that persons whose incomes are derived from wages 
suffer seriously from a depreciation of the currency. The 
confirmation seems particularly striking when the conditions 
other than monetary afiPecting the labor market are taken 
into consideration. American worklngmen are intelligent 



84S 



HlKTOBV OP THE GRBBNBA0K6 



and keenly alive to their interests, There ere probably few 
distrícts wbere cuetom playa a smaUer and competition a 
larger rOle in determining wagea than in the northera States. 
While labor organizations hnd not jet attaiiied their present 
power, manual laborera dld not fail to avail themselvt^ of 
the help of t-oncorted action in the attempt to secur© more 
pay. Strikea were frequent.' All these facts favored a 
speedj readjuBÍment of money wages to correapond with 
changed priees. But more than all else, a very considerable 
part of the labor supply was withdrawn from the market into 
tbe army and navy. In 18IÍ4 aud 18t)5 about oue million of 
men seem to have been enrollad.' What pro[X)rtioii this 
namber forme of the wage-eamera can be very roughly esti- 
mated from the Censúa statistics of occupations. Accord- 
ing to the Eighth Censas, there were 0.791, 84-t persons 
engaged in gaiuful occupations in the loyal states in 1860.' 
If we assunie that as large a proportion of wage-eamerB 
went to the war as of those who were workiug on their own 
Rccount, it follows that about one-aeventh oí the labor snpply 
wtthdrew from the market. But despite all these favoring 
circumatatices, the men who stayed at home did not succeed 
in obtaíning au advance in pay at all commenaurate with the 
increaae in living expenses. 

It is sometimes argued that the withdrawal of laborera 

Kcputliri 



■ The Bpriaofli 
tlmoKt oTOfT braoc 
Uu thno «li Btrike 
(be Erle. Hodsoo I 
of Ote oltT. nao tha employ 



. ot Uarch ES, ISOS. sald: ". . . . th< 
o hail their atrike within ttao last leí 

er. and Camdeo and Ambo; raüroad», the Jonn 



L 



1 Th(i Rrporl of tKe SccrrUiTn of War tot 1M5 itat» tbo oambar □( man anrolM 
■3 970.710. Maj 1. UMi Rffi^l. Harch I. Ifü: and 1.000.510. Maj 1. 1865.-Pp. I.S, and 11. 
Tbv Krport itf IKt Sarelitrt of l*e Narv tot the fame jear ttaU» llitl ths Dumbetaf 
mea in «rTics In Ui<- 
UJOOatitiisloM. TI 
aama period troin ÍU 

■CoaiiUed tromthe tabla < 




Wages 349 

from industrial Ufe was the chief cause of the príce dis- 
turbanoes of the war períod. This withdrawal, it is said, 
caused the advance of wages, and greater cost of labor led to 
the rise of prices. The baselessness of this view is shown 
by two facts, established by the preceding tables — fírst, that 
the advance of wages was later than the advance of prices, 
and second, that wages continued to rise in 1866 after the 
volunteer armies had been disbanded and the men gone 
back to work. 

Though the figures developed in the foregoing analysis 
show a slightly smaller decline in real wages than those 
heretofore accepted on the authority of the Aldrich Reporta 
it is probable that even the new figures overstate rather 
than understate the actual injury suffered by wage-eamers. 
The tables used as an index of the change in cost of living 
really show what would have been the relative cost of the 
articles included in the príce lists had people continued to 
purchase them in the same proportions as before the war. 
But, of course, the character of the consumption of most 
families did not remain unchanged. In many cases it was 
possible to substitute some other article for one which had 
risen more than common in príce. Thus woolen, linen, and 
other fabrícs were largely made to take the place of cotton 
goods, and cheaper beverages took the place of tea and 
eoffee. In so far as the substitutes were less agreeable as 
articles of consumption, the change represents a loss of eco- 
nomicsatisfaction. But the degree of this loss of satisfac- 
tion is exaggerated somewhat by a table that shows the 
increase in cost of the less-used article ; for the motive for 
buying other things is found precisely in the possibility of 
thus avoiding a portion of the inconvenience caused by the 
high príces. 

As the príce tables probably exaggerate the increase in 
relative living expenses, so the wage tables probably under- 



860 



HlSTOBT OP THE GbEENBACKS 



eatimBte the increaso ín the incume of workÍQg-[)eople. The 
reason for tbinking tlins ie tliat wage-eamers Beem to bave 
been more fiilly employed diiring the war than ín cummoD 
times of prosperity. Of course, the euliatmL'nt of eo mauy 
thouBaiids of the most efficient workers made places Cor 
many who might otherwise have fonnd it diffi(;ult to secure 
work. Moreover, the paper currency iteelf tended to obtfiin 
full employment for the laborer, for the very reason that 
it dimiuiebed his real income. In the distribution of wbat 
Mareball has termed the "national dividend" a diminn- 
tion of the proportion received by the laborer must have 
been aci-ompanied by an inorease in the ehare of eomeone 
else. Ñor is it difficait to determine who this person was. 
The beneficiary wns the active eniployer, who fouud that the 
money wages, intereet, and rent he liad to pay increased lesa 
rapidly than the money pricea of hÍ3 producís. The differ- 
ence between the increaBe of receipta aiid the increase of 
ex[>en9es ewelled hi8 profite, Of eoiirse, the po&stbility of 
making high profita provided an incentive for employing as 
many banda aa posaible. But here we are trencbing apon 
the Bubject of a lator chapter. 

The impórtanos of theae factora — the changes in the 
character of consumption and the fuller employmeut — as 
affecting the material well-being of wage-earnera is inca- 
pable of statistical measurement with the materials at hand, 
But while they must be recognized aa modifying in consider- 
able measuro the infereuces to be drawn from the series of 
"changea in real wages" givon above, it can bardly be that 
they Bufficed tu componaate many familiea for the increased 
money cost of living. Most famiUes were doubtless forced 
to practico economies of a very uncomfortabie character to 
make both ends meet. 

Aft«r BUch an examination of the change in the condítion of 
the great maaa of wage-earners, it may seem aurprising that 



U 



Wages 851 

few complaints were heard from them of unusnal privations.' 
This silence may be due in part to the fact that a conoider- 
able increase of money income produces ín the minds of many 
a fatuous feeling of prosperity, even though it be more than 
offset by an increase of pricea But doubtless the chief 
reason is to be fonnd in the absorption of pnblic interest in 
the events of the war. The people both of the Sonth and 
North were so vitally concemed with the struggle that they 
bore withont mormuring the hardships it entailed of what- 
ever kind. Goyemment taxation that under other circum- 
stances might have been felt to be intolerable was submitted 
to with cheerfulness. The paper currency imposed upon 
wage-eamers a heavier tax — amonnting to confíscation of 
perhaps a fífth or a sixth of real incomes. But the working- 
men of the North were receiving considerably more than a 
bare subsistence minimum before the war, and reduction of 
consnmption was possible withont producing serions want. 
Accordingly the currency tax, like the tariff and the intemal 
revenue duties, was accepted as a necessary sacrifíce to the 
common cause and paid without protest by severe retrench- 
ment. 

1 Compare D. A. Wblls, Recent FinaneUU, Indu§trÍ€U^ and CommereiiU Experi- 
etuse» of iht United Statet (New York, 1872), p. 22. 



CHAPTER VI 

RENT 

I. UrbanRenU: 

Use of Term ^Rent"— Long and Short Leasee — Wells^s Investiga- 
tions into House Renta — Statistical Data f rom the Tenth Census — 
Renta in Elastem and Western States — In Cities and Towns — Nar- 
row Range of the Data. 

II. Farm Rents: 

Farms Let for Money Rents — Farms Let "on Sharea** 

I. UBBAN BENTS 

In studying the influence of depreciation apon rent, it ís 
necessary to use that term in its popular rather than in its 
scientific sense. The distinction, so dear to the economist, 
between payment for situation and retum on capital invested 
in improvements, cannot be maintained in a discussion based 
on figures which show simply the sams paid for the use of 
real property. This fact is less to be lamented, because the 
theorist himself admits that the distinction becomes sadly 
blurred when he attempts to deal with short intervals of 
time. Capital once invested in improvements can seldom be 
withdrawn rapidly. In "the short run," therefore, it is 
practically a part of the land, and the retum to it foUows 
the analogy of rent rather than of interest.* 

Like the lending capitalist, the renting landlord found 
that the degree in which he was aflfected by the fluctuations 
in the valué of the paper money depended largely upon the 
terms of the contract into which he had entered. It is clear 
from the preceding chapters that the landlord who before 
suspensión had leased his property for a considerable i)eriod 
without opportunity for revaluation must have suffered 

1 Comi>are Marshall, PríncipU$ of Economics, Book V, chapa, viü, ix. 

352 



Rent 853 

severely if paid in greenbacks. The number of '^dollars^^ 
receíved as rental might be the same in 1865 as in 1860, 
bnt their pnrchasing power was less than one-half as great. 

Somewhat less hard was the situation of the landiord 
who had let bis property for but one or two years. At the 
expiration of the leases he had opportunities to make new 
contracts with the tenants. To ascertain accurately how far 
he succeeded in recouping himself for the ríse of prices by 
increasing rentáis, elabórate statistics of the sums paid for 
the use of different classes of real estáte would be necessary. 
Unfortunately, such figures are scanty, and such as are avail- 
able refer entirely to urban property. 

In his capacity as special commissioner of the revenue, 
Mr. David A. Wells devoted some attention to the rise of 
rent. His report for December, 1866, says: 

The average advanoe in the renta of houses occupied by mechan- 
ics and laboréis in the great manufactnring oenters of the country 
is estimated to have been about 90 per cent.; in some sections, 
however, a much greater advanoe has been experíenoed, as, for 
example, at Pittsburg, where 200 per cent, and upward is reported. 
In many of the rural districts, on the other hand, the advanoe has 
been much less.' 

In his third annual report, dated January, 1869, Mr. 
Wells modified this estimate somewhat Edward Young 
had prepared for him '' tables showing the comparativo cost 
of provisions, groceries, domestic dry goods, house rent, etc., 
in the manufactnring towns of the United States in the 
respective years 1860-61 and 1867-68." These tables made 
out an average increase of about 65 per cent, in rents. Mr. 
Wells remarked, however, that 

this .... average is . . . . largely affected by the circiunstance 
that in New EIngland, where manuf acturing companies .... very 
generally own the tenements occupied by the operatives, rents have 

^Senaíe Executive DocumerU No. 2, 39th Gong., 2d Sess., p. 14. 



854 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



not been advanoed to any considerable extent. Excluding New 
England from the calculation, the average advanoe in renta for 
1867, as oompared with 1860-61, must be estimated at a much 
higher figure. Thus in the smaller manufacturing towns oí Penn- 
sylvania'the average increase in the rents oí honses occupied by 
operatives is believed to have been about 81 per cent., and in New 
Jersey 111 per cent. In the cities oí New Tork, Philadelphia, 
Newark, and Pittsburg the increase has been from 90 to 100 per 
cent.' 

Yoong^s figures, on which these conclusions were based, 
are as foUows: 

TABLE Lin 

HODSE BKNT IN M ANUrACTURINO TOWNS 1800-61 AND 1867-M* 





FouR-BooM Tbnkmknts 


Sxx-BooM Tbvbmxnts 


Statb 


1860-61 


1867-68 


Per 
cent, of 

In- 
crease 


1860^ 


1867-68 


Per 
oeni.of 

In. 
crease 


Maine 


$3.25 
2.42 

5.86 
5.93 
4.04 
4.20 
5.60 
4.67 
4.00 


$5.67 
3.68 

10.28 
9.63 
5.77 
6.85 
9.60 

10.00 
5.00 


74 
52 
75 
62 
43 
51 
71 
114 
25 


$4.67 
3.17 
6.54 
9.11 
4.56 
5.78 
8.00 
7.17 
5.17 


$8.17 

5.75 

10.14 

11.69 

6.81 

9.37 

15.20 

15.00 

6.33 


75 


N. Hamp., Vennont 

Massachusetts 

Rhode Island 

Connecticut 

New York 

Pennsylvania 

New Jersey 

Delaware 


81 
55 
28 
49 
62 
90 
109 
22 






General average . . 


$4.44 


$7.39 


66 


$6.02 


$9.83 


63 



These figures become more significant for the present 
purpose when interpretad in the light of the similar data 
already presentad in part in the chapter on prices.* The 
latter figures are taken from Mr. Weeks's report in the Tenth 
Cerisus and show the relative rents paid for four- and six- 

1 n. R. ExectUive Document No. 16^ 40th Gong., Sd Sess., p. 14. 

s/Md., Appendiz D, pp. 11^21. 

tSee Part II, chap. iv, seo. ít, Table XYII. 



Rent 



856 



or seven-room hooses in twenty towns scattered over eleven 
states from Massachnsetts to Missouri. Comparison with 
Yonng^s figures, however, should be confined to eastem 
towns, and of these retums are given but for five/ In these 
five towns the average increase in rents between 1860 and 
1868 was somewhat less than Young makes out for four- 
room tenements — viz., 56 instead of 66 per cent. — and 
slightly greater in the case of six-room tenements — viz., 
68 as compared with 63 per cent 

Bnt thongh it be inferred, as both these sets of data indi- 
cate, that rents of workingmen's houses in eastem towns 
were on the average some 60 or 65 per cent, higher in 1868 
than they had been before the war, it does not at all follow 
that rents had advanced so mnch as this in 1864 and 1865. 
In fact, the Censas figures that cover the intervening years 
indicate that in most towns rents rose during the war more 
slowly than prices, but that, like wages, they continued to 
rise for some time after prices had fallen. Table LIV com- 

TABLE LIV 

XELATIYX BXHTS IN FIYB SA8TEBN TOWNS AND RKLATIYB PBICE8 * 

(Arithmetio means) 



Vkav 


Rents 


Prices 


aSAK 


RetaU 


Wholesale 


1860. 


100 
100 
101 
101 
120 
132 
138 
141 
163 


100 
116 
139 
164 
200 
206 
196 


100 


1861 


101 


1862. 


118 


1863. 


149 


1864 


191 


1865 


217 


1866. 


191 


1867 


172 


1868 


161 







1 Boston ; Jewett City, Conn. ; Camden, N. J. : Philadelphia and Hokendauqna, 
Pa. New Cnmberland, W. Va., which is included in tho East in the table of the pre- 
oedlxifir chapter, is exclnded here becanse Yoong gives no fígaros for West Virginia. 

3The figores for rpnt are simple averages of the ten series for the five towns; 
the retail prices are from Table Lllof chap. ▼, and the wholesale prices are from the 
Aldrich Beport, Part I, p. 91. 



866 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 

pares the flactnations of rent in the five eastem towns with 
the Índex nombers for retail prices in the Elast, as far as 
they extend, and with Falkner^s nnweighted average of the 
relative prices of all articles. 

According to this table, thongh owners of small honses in 
these towns may have f oond themselves approximately as well 
o£F in 1868 as before the war, they had not escaped severe 
injury from the depreciation of the currency during the 
interim. Elsewhere landlords seem to have been in a rather 
worse plight« In the fifteen westem towns for whích the 
Tenth Census gaye retnms the increase in rents of similar 
property seems to have been somewhat less, as Table LV 
shows: 

TABLE LV 

BBLATiyB BXMTS IN FIF T EEH WBflTEBN TOWm « 

1860 - - - - 100 1865 - - - - 138 

1861 ... - 99 1866 - - - - 139 

1862 - - - 108 1867 - - - - 137 

1863 - - - - 121 1868 .... 136 

1864 - - - 135 

This contrast between renta in the East and West is vitiated 
to a certain extent by the fact that a much larger propor- 
tion of the westem towns were small places. More signifi- 
cant is the comparison between rents in the five cities for 
which figures are given — Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, 
Louisville, and St. Loáis — and the fifteen lesser towns.* 
Table LVI presents the data in snccinct form. 

The conclusión, supported by these figures, that the ad- 
vance in rents was greater in cities than in minor towns, is 
not difficult to accept In two of the cities — Cincinnati 
and Louisville — owners of workingmen's tenements appear 

1 The flirureii are simple aríthmetic means of the iwenty-eitfht series. New Ciiin- 
berlantl, W. Va., is incladod. 

3 Loainville, with 68,003 inhabitants in 1860, ím the smaUest of the eities, and 
Indianapolis, with 19,611 inhabitautt», tho largeüt of the towns. 



Rent 



357 



TABLELVI 

BXLATIVB RKNTS IN CITIB8 AND TOWN8 



Year 


Boston 


PhUa- 
del- 
phia 


Cincin- 
nati 


Lonin- 
▼ille 


St. 
Lonis 


Averatfefor 

Preceding 

Cities 


Averagofor 
Fifteen 
Lesser 
Towns 


1860 


100 
100 
100 
100 
138 
138 
138 
138 
196 


100 
100 
100 
100 
133 
167 
200 
200 
200 


100 
84 
84 
117 
207 
207 
207 
167 
167 


100 
129 
129 
167 
221 
221 
221 
167 
167 


100 
90 
90 
131 
131 
131 
157 
157 
157 


100 
101 
101 
123 
166 
173 
185 
166 
177 


100 


1861 


99 


1862 


110 


1863 


115 


1864 


120 


1866 


124 


1866 


122 


1867 


128 


1868 


128 







to have been able to increase their money incomes rather 
more rapidly than prices advanced, but in Boston, Phila- 
delphia, St. Louis, and in all the smaller towns on the list, 
with the possible exception of Terre Haute, their money 
incomes appear to have increased more slowly than living 
expenses.' 

It mnst be remembered that these conclosions rest on a 
narrow statistical basis. No figures for house rent can be 
altogether satisfactory because of the change in the charac- 
ter of accommodation from time to time. What figures are 
available refer to one class of property alone — such tene- 
ments as are occupied by working people in manufacturing 
towns. For houses of other classes and for business prop- 
erty of all kinds no reliable data are known to me. And 
even for the workingmen's tenements the Tenth Census gives 
but two or three series for each town. But though all this 
be true, the fact remains that the figures seem to be worthy 
of credence for one class of urban property at least, and, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, establish a pre- 
sumption that relatively few owners of urban real estáte of 
other descriptions escaped injury from the greenback issuea 

1 The figures for aU the towns are giyen in detail in the Appendix, 



358 HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 



Eyen in thoee cases where rents adyanced more rapidly 
than oommodity prices it is probable that the greenbacks 
depriyed the landlords of a portion of the gains that thej 
wcnld otherwise haye made. 

II. FABM BENTS 

All the foregoing refers to the rent of nrban property. 
For agricultnral rents Wells and Weeks giye no data. Inas- 
much, howeyer, as costom seems to play a larger rtíle in deter- 
i níTiíng the price paid per acre for f arms than the price paid 
per month for city hooses, it is probable that mnch the same 
difference existed between the adyance of rents in the conn- 
try and in the small towns that Table LVI indicates as 
haying existed between the adyance in towns and in cities. 
If this conjecture be jost, it follo¥7S that the rural landowner 
sofFered serious injory from the paper corrency when he let 
his land for a money rent. 

But renting farms for a fixed sum of money has always 
been less common in the United States than renting for a 
defínite share of the produets. Prior to 1880 the Censas 
OfSce made no attempt to ascertain the tenore on which farms 
were held. In that year, however, 30 per cent, of the farms 
not occupied by their owners are reported as ** rented for a 
ñxed money yalue'' in the northem and western states, and 
70 per cent, as " rented for a share of the produets." Sinee 
the enumeration of 1890 showed that the practice of accept- 
ing money rent was increasing, so that the above percentages 
had become 35 and 65 respectively/ it is probable that at 
the time of the Civil War more than three-quarters of the 
rented farms were let **on shares." Inasmuch as no money 
payments entered into such arrangements, the pecuniary 
relations of landlord and tenant were not directly aflFected 

1 Percentaffe<4 compatod from Table S of the Report on the Statútic» cf Agricul- 
fürc at the Elevcnth Cen»u$, pp. U6, 117. 



Rent 359 

by the change in the monetary standard. Farm owners who 
had let their places on these conditions escaped the direct 
losses that weighed so heavily on the recipients of money 
rents. But even they did not avoid all loss. For, as will be 
shown at length in chapv viii, the price of agricnltural prod- 
ucts for the greater part of the war period lagged consid- 
erably behind the price of other goods. This diflference, of 
coofse, meant loss to men whose incomes were paid in bush- 
els of grain. 



CHAPTER Vn 

INTEREST AND LOAN CAPITAL 

L Tke Probiem of Ltnders and Barrowers of Capital: 

Two Elements in the Problem : Rate of Interest and Purchasiiig 
Power of Principal — DifferenceB in RelatiTe Importanoe of Theee 
Elements to Different Lenders and Borrowers. 

II. Purehasing Power of the Principal of Uxms: 

Table Illustratíng Variations in Purchasing Pówer of Loans and 
Consequent Loes or Qain of Lenders. 

III. The Rate of Interest: 

Interest on Long-Term Loans— On Short-Term Loans — DefecÜTe 
Character of Statístics Regarding Interest— Slight Increase in Rates 
on Short Loans— Failure of Lenders and Borrowers to Foresee the 
Fu ture Course of Prioes— Inability of Lenders to Recoup Them- 
selTes fór Losses Due to Such Failures — Effect of GoTemment 
Loans and Profítableness of Business on the Rate of Interest — 
Contraction of Credit Operations During the War— Gains of Lend- 
ers after January, 1965— Position of Capitalists Who Invested in 
Federal Bonds. 

I. THE PBOBLEM OF LENDEBS AND BOBBOWEBS OF CAPITAL 

The task of ascertaining the efiFect of the greenback 
ÍBBues upon the situation of lenders and borrowers of capital 
íb in one respect more simple and in another respect more 
complex than the task of dealing with wage-eamers. It is 
simpler in that there are not different grades of capital to 
be considered like the different grades of labor. But it is 
more complex in that the capitalist must be considered not 
only as the recipient of a money income, as is the laborer, 
but also as the possessor of certain property that may be 
affected by changes in the standard money. 

The problem is fnrther complicated by the fact that the 
relative importance of these two ítems — rate of interest and 

360 



Intebest and Loan Capital 361 

valué of principal — is not the same in all cases. Whether 
a lender is affected more by the one item or the other 
depends apon what he intends to do with his property at the 
expiration of existing contracts. A widow left in 1860 with 
an estáte of say $10,000, who expected to keep this snm 
constantly at interest and to find new borrowers as soon as 
the oíd loans were paid, conld neglect everything but the 
net rate of interest received. On the other hand, if this 
estáte had been left to a yonth of twenty who intended to 
invest his property in some business after a few years, the 
rate of interest would be of relatively less importance to him 
than the purchasing power of the principal when the time 
carne to set np for himself . 

Of course, the same difference exists, mutatis mutandis, 
in the case of diflferent borrowers. Those borrowers who 
expected to renew oíd loans on maturíty would have to con- 
sider little beyond the interest demanded by lenders, while 
borrowers who expected to pay ofiF the loans out of the pro- 
ceeds of their ventures would be interested primarily in the 
amount of goods that would sell for sufficient money to make 
up the principal. 

Although these two classes of cases are by no means 
independent of each other, the foUowing discussion will be 
rendered clearer by observing the broad diflference between 
them. Accordingly, attention will first be directed to the 
effect of the price fluctuations upon the purchasing power of 
the principal of loans, and afterward to changes in the rate 
of interest. 

II. PUBCHASINQ POWEB OF THE PRINCIPAL OF LOANS 

It follows directly from the chapter upon prices that 
most persons who made loans in the earlier part of the Civil 
War and were repaid in greenbacks must have sufiFered 
heavy losses from the smaller purchasing power of the 



principal when it was retnmed to them. Bnt while this 
funeral fact is clear, it is difficult to make a quautitatire 
statemeDt of tlie degree of the Iosb that will be even tolerably 
sattafactory. Indeed, no single series of percentages can 
represeut the loes of all lenders, any more than any single 
series can represeut the declino iu tbe real wages of all 
laborera, for the reason that tbe loas depends both upon 
the time of lending and repayment, and uiKtn the particular 
commodíties wbich the capitalist wishes to ptirchase. Prob- 
ably the best course to purene Íb to take tbe median of 
relative pnces at wholesale as the most reliable index of 
general price movements, and work out a table based upon 
it which shall show the relative rise or fall in the purchasing 
power of money from quarter to quarter. Buch a table is 
given on tbe next page. 

The ñrst Une of figures across the top of tbis table, 
sbowing the relative pnrchasing power of money, is 
obtained by computing the reciprocáis of the correspouding 
Índex nambers for prices as given in Table XIV. To see 
bow the variatioDS shown by this series of figures affected 
the interests of lenders, a number of loana is BUpjxtsed 
to be made eacb quarter, one of which matures and is re[iaid 
each Bubsequent quarter, The Becond to the twenty-fourth 
linea of figures atToss th© table show what waa the perceut- 
age of loss or gaiu in the purchasing power of the prin- 
cipal in the months of repayment as compared with the 
monlbs when the loana were made. To obtain these seríes, 
the figure represe nting the relative purchasing power 
of money each quarter is taken as the starting-jíoint. and 
the correBponding figures for each subst^quent quarter ari' 
treated as percentages of the first. For esaniple, the lúes 
on a loan made in Jaiiuary, 18(i3, and ropaid in Janaary, 
18C5, is stated as -tS per cent., because 44, which representa 
the relative power of money at the later date, is only 57 




Intebest and Loan Capital 





i 


; í f í 1 f í f 


7yT,Fi,7.-^E:g 


. í 




EEEEI^ilSC 


BBSH:2 = = - = SKap| 


- } 




? f nií í í 


7 ? t í ? f í ? * ■ : j s i í 






IjtSlSsii 


ssasaEesflBs;!^ 






í ? ; í 7 í í í 


=E=,,=E,,=;ti 


s 




í í í ? f í ? ! 


íínn?!--!* 


- í 




? 5 9 5 5 S í 5 


• í ? í ? ! í í T 1 í 






? í í í í 1 ? í 


1!íí!77-|S 






í í í í í T í í 


! í í 7 : ; 7 s í 






*? í f í f í f í 


f « í 7 T -. ! i 


'- \ 




fi s e E « R E ^ 


1 í 5 7 T ! í 






1 ? ■ « í í í f 


?!i:!} 






*■■•"'*" 


7 ni í 






1 I 7 ■; T ■! ■; 7 


77!< 


'■ } 




........ 


•!í 






........ 


tí 

t 






....,,, J 






-. t , . -. , 1 í 


: 


- i 




-.TiTTsí 






•=.-íí 








...!,( 


. 


t 




..|í 




' S 




•M 




i 


t 


!J 




1 
il 


j 



864 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEBNBACKS 

per cent of 77, which representa its porchasing power ai 
the earlier date.* 

The conclnsion to be drawn from the table is so clear as 
hardlj to reqnire formal statement. In the case of ahnost 
all loans made before the middle of 1864 and repaid at any 
subseqnent time embraced by the table, the creditor foond 
that the sum retnmed to him had a pnrchasing power much 
less than the pnrchasing power that had been transferred to 
the borrower when the loan was made. According to the 
fígnres, this decline varied from 1 to more than 50 per 
cent On loans made in the middle of 1864 or later, on the 
contrary, the creditor gained as a míe. In the case of 
loans made in Jannary, 1865, and repaid six months later, 
the increase in pnrchasing power was over 40 per cent. It 
may not be nnwise, however, to enter once again a cantion 
against taking such figures too literally.' 

III. THE BATE OF INTEBEST 

In tuming to study the fortunes of men who have no 
thonght of employing their capital for themselves, but 
expect to seek new borrowers as rapidly as oíd loans are 
repaid, one finds it necessary to distinguish between 

1 A more strictly aecorate method of estima tin« the relatire loss or ^ain woald 
be to oompate the avorage relative prices of all the series anew on the basis of the 
actual prices at each suocessive period. Bnt this woald be a hearj task, and it is 
thoti^ht that the inaccoracy of the simple method employed is not greñter than the 
inaccuracy of the material upon which the whole computation rests. To pretend to 
ffreat refinement in the method of analysis for the pnrposes of so roogh a statement 
as the present would be pedantio. 

2 Loans made before the i>a8sa«e of the flrst le^sral-tender act, Febraary 25, 186S, 
are troated in the table as if they were all repaid in ^roenbacks. Some debtors, how- 
ever, are said to have repaid snch obli^ations in gold. (See letter of Jud^ Hoar 
to E. J. James in Publicationa of the American Economic ABaociation^ Vol. III, p. 51.) 
Bot so nice a sense of bosiness honor was not nniTorsal, and the courts were called 
apon to adjndicate the question inTolved. In Hepbarn v$. Qiiswold (8 WalUice, p. 
608; 1869) the federal Supreme Coart held that United States notes were not a 
le^al tender for debts contracted bofore Febraary 25, 1862; but within a year the 
court rorerHod this decisión ("The LtCfcal Tender Cases," 12 Wallace^ p. -457). Bat 
the table indícales that losses on loans made in April, 1862, were not loss hoary 
thau ou loans made In 1860. 



Intebest and Loan Capital 365 

cases where loans have been made for short and for 
long terms ; between the cases, that is, where there is and 
where there is not an opportanity to make a new contract 
regarding the rate of interest. The latter cases may be 
dismissed with a word. The capitalist who lent $10,000 for 
ñve years in April, 1862, at 6 per cent, interest woald be in 
relatively the same position as the workingman who received 
no advance in money wages; while his money income 
remained the same, the rise of pnces would decrease his 
real income in 1864 and 1865 by about one-half. Of 
coorse, this loss to the creditor is a gain to the debtor; for 
to the business man osing borrowed capital the advance of 
prices means that he can raise his interest money by selling 
a smaller proportion of his oatput 

More interesting is the case of loans maturing and made 
afresh daring the period nnder examination. The impor- 
tant question is : How f ar did the lender secure compensa- 
tion for the diminished purchasing power of the money in 
which he was paid by contracting for a higher rate of 
interest? To answei this question adequately abundant 
statistics of the rate of interest received on loans of differ- 
ent kinds daring the war are necessary. Unfortnnately, 
however, it is extremely difficalt to find such figures. To 
my knowledge there are no systematic records of rates of 
interest on long-time business loans, and the data for 
short-time loans are unusually meager and doubtful. In 
1860 Hunfs Merchants* Magazine and the Bankers* Maga- 
zine — the most prominent business periodicals of the day — 
were publishing each month tables showing the rates of 
interest paid in New York for loans of several diflFerent 
kinds. But during the war they ceased these systematic 
reports and one can glean f rom them but occasional scatter- 
ing statements. Professor Irving Fisher, however, in his 
Appreciation and Interest gives a table which purports to 



86<5 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 

show the rate on "cali" loans, "60 day" loans and "prime, 
two ñame, 60 day" loans for a period of years inclnding 
1860 to 1865. The third of these seríes was obtained, he 
«tates, from a diagram prepared by one of his stadents 
•howing**the highest and lowest monthly rates" — though 
from what soorce the data were taken he does not say. 
The other two seríes were obtained from a table compiled 
by Mr. E. B. Elliott. Elliott made this table for a paper 
uiKJu "The Periodicity of Rates of Interest,'* read 
ÍKifcire the Americfin Association for the Advancement of 
Bcitínoe in 1874. The paper was not published in the pro- 
ütítídiugñ of the association, and the only record which I 
have been able to find of it is a brief abstract published 
in tlie Bankera^ Magazine} It is here said regarding the 
Muurca of Information npon which Elliott drew: "Being 
atikad whence the data were obtained, Professor Elliott 
roplied that they were coUated from The Bankers* Maga- 
9Íne, The Financial Chronicle and HunVs Merchantá^ 
Miígaziney I have no doubt that this statement is correct 
fnr ijumt of the years included in the table (1849 to 1874), 
Ihíí ttiiu'e the (^ommrrcial and Financial Chronicle was not 
MMtiililÍHhtíd until July, 1865, and the other joumals men- 
tiniitid did nt)t maintain these tables of interest regularly, it 
fulliiWd tlittt Mr. Elliott must have had irregular data for the 
y^urii (if tlia war, or else that he went to some unknown 
ütiiiictí fur hia fígures. 

líiidur thuHo eircumstances it seems justifiable to attempt 
yMikti\i\\i'.\\\\^ a nt^w table from the reports of the daily news- 
iunM:4tí. ( )u tixamination, however, one finds that this course 
mIüw iri ti|Hiu ti) ohjtHition. In the first place, regular state- 
ll«i ulo i:iiii Ih) found only for one kind of transactions — 
iuMim •íii í'íill. lü the second place, whenever the rates for 
\\^\\\ lu.ind ribe alxive 7 jwr cent, the repórter is apt to say 



Intebest and Loan Capital 



367 



merely that the mling rate is "the legal máximum plus a 
small commission.^' In the third place, one is justifíed in 
f eeling some snspicions of the accuracy oí newspaper reports. 
However, I have compiled a table from the ñnancial columns 
of the newspapers of the rate for cali loans every Saturday 
from 1862 to 1865. In doing so I have been compelled to 
supplement one paper by another, for no one gives the 
reports with perfect regularity for the whole periodo 

Since none of these series have an unquestioned title to 
acceptance, they are all presented in the next table. The 

table LVín 

INTSBB8T RATE8 IN THS NEW TOBK MONET MABKET 1860 TO 1865 

I. AVEBAOB BATES PEB TEAB 



Tbab 


Call 


SiXTY DAY8 


Pbimb two 
Name60Datb 




Elliott 


Newspapers 


Elliott 


Fisher 


1860 


5.4 
5.6 
5.0 
7.2 
6.1 


• • • 

• • • 

5.2^ 
6.2 
6.6 
6.2 


SA% 
9.0 
6.8 
6.7 
9.3 
10.2 


7.7^ 


1861 


6.6 


1862 


5.4 


1863 


5.8 


1864 


8.0 


1865 


8.2 







n. AVEBAOB BATKH 1 


PEE MONTH FOI 


( CALL LOANS 






1X62 


18G3 


1864 


1865 


Januarv 


6.0 
5.5 
5.5 
4.6 
4.1 
5.4 
4.0 
4.3 
4.6 
6.3 
6.0 


6.3 

6.1 
5.2 
5.3 
6.1 
6.1 
6.0 
6.6 
6.5 
7.0 
7.0 


7.0SÍ 

6.1 

5.9 

6.8 

5.6 

6.7 

6.8 

6.9 

7.0 

6.8 

6.9 

6.6 


7.0^ 
6.1 


Februarv 


Marcli 


7.0 


April 


5.6 


May 


5.4 


June 


4.9 


July 


5.5 


AUGTUSt 


5.9 


September 


6.0 


October 


7.0 


November 


6.8 


December 


6.8 







1 The Her<ildt TrihunCy Evening Express^ and World have all been drawn upen. 



sm 



HlSTOHT OP THE GbEENBAOKS 



exhibit of ayerage annoal rates is foUowed by a statement of 
tbe average raie each month based apon the newspaper 
reports. 

While tbe different seríes showing annual average rates 
of interest do not agree witb each otber perfectly, they all 
indícate tbat tbe advance ín the rate of interest was com- 
|Haralively small — mucb too small to compénsate persons 
wViiiíi^ income was derived f rom sucb sources f or the increased 
4>ítn\ ci \Mng, To bring tbis fact out clearly the neit table 
ti)>í*wí^ tb^ T^lative increase in tbe rates of interest skle by 
Hii)<^ m^itb t}>^ T^lative increase in prices and in monej wages: 



^Vv^ 










TABLS LIX 










A^rtT 


mmimiac ik i«n 


BWT, pmicn, . 


hXU WAAI 


m 




* 


1?4i"ies ( 


^TV»-. 


PUCB 


Wa 


« 






t>«im 




1 


1i 






^,' 


^*TM í> ^WWMfr 






• 








*|ÍtK.T* 


^ 

T 




a 


s 












.^ 




m 




\^ .. 






^ 


9 


« 




^ 








XV 


1 


>> 


a 
.y 


v\ 


ICD ; 


100 






*•* 


>o 


*• 


:u8 


101 


101 




A 


Ni 


V 


\<> 


113 


IOS 


103 


1 


:a 


S.' 


r» 


'.,^ 


14^ 


lis ! 


117 


■\ 


* 


• 


^.-^ 


'-"^ 


i::! 


vxi . 


138 


A' 


.V 




».n 


'S> 


isa 


154 


158 






i\^s* .iv..^ ka;^%4i*'>. js 3v»c onlv tbat per- 

.' .i is.v.^«v Tx^t H^atal lent at interest 

V ... X. V V u^..,cnÍ n i\x> ^.5^uv•5^ of tire ^^w^nbacks, 

• u»^ < -k ' '.^....so H* ¿^> Mtvr*» :<^.TÍous than tbose 



,i*.v' s uhuís. s. íK»c tí«sv. The first 
i.Nv »t '.o i!io ujLÍu»i oonsideririir the 



ili O Uv'.a liuvk'i»» v^jLád bv.»rix»wvw failed to foresee 



pV^vt^^** 



Intebest and Loan Capital 369 

the changos that would take place in the purchasing power 
of money between the dates when loans were made and 
repaid. No doubt there is much forcé in this explanation. 
If, for instance, men arranging for loans in April, 1862, to 
be repaid a year later, had known that in the meantime the 
purchasing power of money would decline 30 per cent., they 
would have agreed upon a very high rate of interest. On 
the assumption that, monetary conditions aside, the rate 
would have been 6 per cent., the lender gifted with second 
sight would have demanded 50.52 per cent.; i. e., 6 per 
cent, plus 42 per cent, of both capital and interest to offset 
the decline of 30 per cent, in the purchasing power of the 
doUars received in repayment as compared with that of the 
dollars lent. According to the table of relative prices, any 
interest rate less than this would have deprived capitalists 
of a portion of their ordinary retums; and, on the other 
hand, since the prices of products increased on the average 
42 per cent, between April, 1862, and April, 1863, borro wers 
could afford to pay on the average 50.52 per cent, for loans 
quite as well as they could afford to pay 6 per cent, in years 
of stable prices. Men able to discem the future course of 
prices would not have lent money at the ordinary rates, and 
if , as the table indicates, the rates prevailing in the New 
York market throughout all 1862 and 1863 were less than 
7 per cent., it must have been because the extraordinary 
rise of prices was not foreseen by borrowers and lenders. 

Ñor, if the arguments of the preceding chapters are valid, 
is it surprising that business men failed to see what was 
coming; for the course of prices depended chiefly upon the 
valuation set upon the greenbacks, and this valuation in turn 
depended chiefly upon the state of the fínances and the 
fortunes of war — matters that no one could foresee with cer- 
tainty. Indeed, there was much of the time a very general 
disposition to take an unwarrantedly optimistic view of the 



370 HlSTOBT OF THE ObEENBAOKS 

military situation and the chances oí an early peace. Many 
members of the business community seem to have felt that 
the premium on gold was artificial and mnst soon drop, that 
pnces were inñated and must collapse. To the extent that 
fluch views prevailed borrowers would be cautions about 
making engagements to repay money in a future that might 
well present a lower range of prices, and lenders wonid 
expect a gain instead of a loss f rom the changes in the por- 
chasing power of money. 

But the full explanation of the slight advance in interest 
cannot be found in this inability to foresee the futnre — at 
least not without f urther analysis of what conseqnences such 
inability entailed. Workingmen are commonly credited 
with less foresight than capitalists, and nevertheless they 
seem, according to the figures, to have succeeded better in 
making bargains with employers of labor than did lenders 
with employers of capital. The explanation of this less 
success seems to be found in the diflference between the way 
in which depreciation affected what the capitalist and the 
laborer had to offer in retum for interest and wages. There 
is no reason for assuming that an artisan who changed 
employers during the war would render less eflScient service 
in his new than in his oíd position, or that a landlord who 
changed tenants had less advantages to put at the disposal 
of the incoming lessee. In both these cases the good oflFered 
to the active business man remained substantially the scmie, 
and it may safely be assumed that, other things being equal, 
this business man could afford to give quite as much for the 
labor and the land after as before suspensión. From the 
business man's point of view, therefore, there seems to have 
been room for a doubling of money wages and rent when the 
purchasing power of money had fallen one-half. But in the 
case of the borrower of capital the like was not true. The 
thousand dollars which Mr. A. oflFered him in 1865 was not, 



Intebest and Loan Capital 371 

like the labor oí John Smith or the farm of Mr. B., as effi- 
cient for his pnrposes as it would have been ñve years before. 
For, with the thousand doUars he could not parchase any thing 
like the scune amount of machinery, material, or labor. And 
since the same nominal amount of capital was of lessefficiency 
in the hands of the borrower, he could not without loss to him- 
self increase the interest which he pcdd for new loans in pro- 
portion to the decline in the purchasing power of money, as 
he could increase the wages of laborers or the rent for land. 
From the point of view of the lender this remark means 
simpl j that the expiration of oíd contracts and the making 
of fresh ones gave him no opportunity to remedy the mis- 
takes of judgment once committed. If a farm hand in April, 
1862, contracting to work a year, failedto foresee the advance 
of prices that would occur, and agreed to accept his usual 
wage of $15 a month and board, he would suffer during the 
year from having to pay more for clothing, etc. ; but when 
he cctme to renew his bargain in April, 1863, he would be in 
a strong position to demand an increase of wages sufficient 
to offset the depreciation in the purchasing power of money. 
But if a capitalist with no more power of divination than the 
farm hand lent $1,000 in April, 1862, for a year at 6 per 
cent, interest, he would not only suffer during this time from 
the rise of prices, but he would also have no ground for ask- 
ing from a new borrower compensation, in the f orm of higher 
interest, for the advance that had already taken place in 
prices. If both lender and borrower in April, 1863, antici- 
pated that the rise of prices would continué during the 
next year, they might attempt to adjust the rate of interest 
so as to counterbalance the expected changes, but the bor- 
rower could give no compensation for the changes that had 
already taken place, inasmuch as these changes diminished 
the efficiency of the thousand doUars which the lender trans- 
f erred to his controL 



372 HlSTOBT OF THB GbEENBAOKS 

ThuB gronnd once lost by a lender through monetaiy 
depreciatíon could not be recovered so long as prices con- 
tinued to advance; the ntmost that the lender could hope to 
accomplish was to keep from f alling f arther behind by obtain- 
ing a rate of interest sufficiently high to offset the further 
advances of the futnre. As has been shown, the capitalist 
who lent $1,000 in April, 1862, for a year shoald have 
charged 60.52 per cent, for interest After deducting his 
income of 6 per cent, plus 42 per cent, of itself , he would 
have had left at the end of the year a nominal principal of 
$1,420, which in April, 1863, had the same purchasing 
power as $1,000 in April, 1862. With this number of paper 
dollars to put at the disposal of borrowers, the capitalist 
could prevent a decline in his real income if he were able to 
f oresee that the purchasing power of money would deprecíate 
19 per cent more during the next year and to persuade bor- 
rowers of the same fact. The rate charged should be 30.9 
per cent — i, e., 6 per cent, plus 23.4 per cent, of capital and 
interest to offset the diminution of 19 per cent in purchasing 
power. This rate would give the usual real income to the 
capitalist and leave him in April, 1864, a nominal capital of 
$1,752, or the equivalent in purchasing power of $1,000 in 
April, 1862. For the next year the rate should be 11.61 
per cent, which on $1,750 would give the usual real income and 
a principal of $1,841 in April, 1865, which again is equal to 
$1,000 in April, 1862. Failure to obtain these exceedingly 
high rates of interest in making the loan for any year would 
subject the lender to a heavy loss of real income not only for 
that year, but also for the years to come, beause it would not 
próvido for an increase in the nominal amount of the prin- 
cipal sufficient to sustain its purchasing power undiminished. 
The failure of the rate of interest to attain anything like 
the extraordinary rates which alone could have saved lenders 
from loss seems at fírst sight more remarkable when the 



Intebest and Loan Capital 373 

goyemment demand for loans and the high profits made by 
business men are taken into account. But neither of these 
f actore had quite so much influence as one at firet imagines. 
Just as the governmenf s demand for food and clothing 
was not a new demand superadded to that formerly exist- 
ing, but rather a part of the oíd demand making itself felt 
through a new channel, so in a measure the govemment 
demand for capital was a substituto for prívate demands 
rather than an increase in the whole sum required by the 
community. The govemment had become the employer of 
a considerable fraction of the working population, and it 
needed large sums of money to provide for these employees, 
in the same way that a Corporation that increased the number 
of its hands would need a largor working capital to pay 
wages and purchase supplies. But after all there is a 
radical difFerence between the effect of war loans and 
industríal loans upon the rate of interest. The Corporation 
would hope to direct the labor in such fashion that it 
would more than replace the capital consumed in providing 
for it; while the majoríty of the men employed by the 
federal govemment duríng the Civil War were not engaged 
in productivo operations. Since the soldiers enlisted in 1862 
did not produce an equivalent in commodities for the food 
they ate and the clothes they wore, the govemment had 
to borrow new sums of capital to maintain them in 1863, 
and new sums again in 1864 and 1865. Through the 
war loans the community was voluntarily devoting a not 
inconsiderable proportion of its labor and capital each year 
to employments that from the stríctly economic point of 
view must be called unproductive, and so far as this was 
the case the process of accumulation was retarded. It 
seems therefore safe to say that though the govemment 
demand for loans was m considerable degree a substituto 
for prívate demands, the difference in the use made of the 



^1 HlSTOET aP TKK GkXMSBACKS 

harroñmá fauis Imded to rmise the rate of interest for fature 



Tke Bodificalkm nMjvired b j the pvofnsElioii thmt the 
Idgii profits of tnde were a fiactor of great impc^tance 
m the loan market is more smoas. That {Hofits were 
mmtoaoi^j kige daring tl>e w«r b i>o4 doobted ; indeed. 
the next diapter will be deToted primarilf to abowing that 
MMrh waa the fact. Ñor is it doabled that mider ordinary 
circoiiifftanrcs higfa [»ofits will tend powi^fuUj to prodaoe 
hígh ratea of interest ; bolh bj mafcing basinees men aiudoas 
to borrow capital with which to extrad the acope of their 
exíating operations or to ondertake new Tratnres, and by 
■lakfng capitalista who haTe the choáce betve^i em{dojiiig 
theír means themaelvea and lending them to otheis prefer 
the fonoer comae. Bat doring the Ciril War this usual 
eoDfeqiieiioe of high profits conflicted with another conae- 
qnence of the monetarj sitnaticMi — namelj, the nncertainty 
aboat the fatnre couiae of prices. Men were at any given 
time •" mAkíTig money/' bnt they recognized that their ana- 
anal profits were in a large measare the prodact of monetary 
depreciation. If the premiam on gold shoald drop saddenly, 
as it might at almost any time in conseqaence of a favorable 
cbange in the military sitaation, prices woald probably fol- 
low, and the trend of affairs might set as strongly against 
the realization of high profits as it had set formerly in its 
favor. Under sach circamstances pradenee forbade men to 
enter into contracts that woald cali for the repayment of 
large soms of money in a fntare that might bring a low 
level of prices and make it necessary for the debtor to sell 
an unexpectedly large part of his prodact to obtain safficient 
money to meet bis obligations. A man woald be in a safer 
position if be kept free of debt and confined his operations 
as closely as possible to business that he coald manage with 
his own capital. In other words, men realized their inability 



Intebest and Loan Capital 375 

te foresee the futnre and, knowing that it might bring great 
price fluctuations in either direction, sought protection 
against these changes bj limiting their f ature pecuniary 
obligations as narrowly as possible. 

That considerations of this character were carefully 
weighed by business men is clearly shown by the remarkable 
contraction of credit operations that took place during the 
war. When no one could foresee with conñdence what would 
be the relative pnrchasing power of a dollar three months in 
advance, it was obviously risky for a merchant te accept a 
note dae in ninety days for goods sold, or to give such a note 
for goods bought. Consequently, cash business increased in 
importance and credit operations diminished — a condition 
of affairs that was remarked in mercantile circles as early as 
August, 1862/ In proportion as the fluctuations of prices 
became more marked, credits were more stríctly curtailed. 
** Even the West,'* said the New York Times of November 
28, 1863, '^ which has long been wont te strain credit te its 
utmost, is now buying and selling for cash to an unprece- 
dented degree." The circular published in 1864 by Dun's 
Mercantile Agency ascribed the small number of bankrupt- 
cies in large part ^' to that rigid caution which has obtained 
in our business community in dispensing credits."' Mr. 
McCulloch in his report as secretary of the treasury, Decem- 
ber, 1865, said that '* it is undoubtedly true that trade is 
carried on much more largely for cash than was ever the 
case previous te 1861." * In the autumn of the same year 
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle made a careful 
inquiry inte the credits being granted to the South and 
West, and reached the folio wing conclusions: "The great 
bulk of jobbing sales now being made are on short time, say 
from sixty days to four months Half of the buyers 

1 Compare HurW» Merehania^ Ma0axine,\ol. XLVII. p. 333, and the " Commercial 
Chronicle and Beview *' of later issues. 

2 Ibid,, Yol. JAL, p. 148. 3 p. n. 



376 HlSTOBT OF THE ObEENBAOKS 

pay in cash, and a large portion of the remainder average 
lesB iban three months in their credits, while bat a very few 
obtain six or eigbt months."^ ' 

Of coorse, the increase in cash business meant that the 
demand for commercial loans was lees, and this diminntion 
in the quaiitity of commercial paper on the market may not 
improbably have offset the great increase in pablic secorities 
offered to investors. It must be noticed, however, that in 
explaining the canse of the contraction of credit one finds 
bimself bronght back again to men^s conscious inability to 
foresee the futnre conrse of prices as the controlling factor 
in the loan market. Ordinarily men treat the valué of 
money as a constant and arrange their transactions with 
little conscious ref erence to its fluctuations. A paper stand- 
ard, however, the valué of which depends upon the varying 
credit of a govemment passing through a serious crisis, 
forces upon everyone a realization of the fact that the pur- 
chasing power of money is subject to great varíations. But 
the realization of this fact is of little practical use in arran- 
ging business affairs unless men can foresee the character of 
the im[)ending changes. During the Civil War the uncer- 
tainty was so great that such foresight was hardly possible. 
As a consequence it seems probable from what information 
is available that men made their bargains for borrowing and 
lending money upon terms not very unlike the terms pre- 
vailing in less unquiet times. The chief difference appears 
to have been that, so far as possible, everyone refrained from 
assuming obligations to receive or to pay money at future 
dates, because everyone realized that the sum which he would 
be called upon to give or take njight well possess much less 
purchasing power than the sum which he had received or 
given — particularly when the time that would elapse between 
the making and repayment of the loan would be considerable. 

1 Vol. I, p. 325. 



Intebest and Loan Capital 377 

Lest too strong an impression be given of the losses of 
creditors during the war, it is well to cali attention to the 
f act that against the losses during the períod of rising prices, 
extending broadly from 1862 to January, 1865, were set 
similar gains during the period of falling prices, extending 
broadly from January, 1865, to the resumption of specie 
payments in 1879. If Falkner's index number of 100 
for the latter year can be accepted, it foUows that a man 
who had kept a snm of money at interest for the whole 
period from suspensión to resumption would fínd its pur- 
chasing power at the end of the paper-money régime 
substantially the same as it had been at the beginning. In 
the meantime, however, he would have suffered a heavy loss 
of real income from 1862 to 1866, and on the other hand 
would have enjoyed an íncrease of real income from the 
latter date to 1879. 

It should also be pointed out that on one important class 
of loans capitalists suffered comparatively little even during 
the war. Interest on many forms of govemment bonds was 
paid in gold. Capitalists who invested their means in these 
securities consequently received an income of unvarying 
specie valué. But even these investors did not escape all the 
evil consequences of the paper-money system ; because, as has 
been shown, prices rose in the end to a greater height than 
the premium upon gold. To illustrate the situation of such 
investors, suppose the case of a man who in 1860 had 
$10,000 of the fifteen-year 5 per cent, federal bonds of the 
loan of 1858. The foUowing table shows what would be his 
income in gold and paper money, and how its ptirchasing 
power would fluctuate in consequence of the advance in 
prices. 

While persons who had purchased bonds as an investment 
before the war suffered no great loss of income, persons who 
had sufficient f aith in the stability of the federal govemment 



378 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



TABLE LX 

MONBT AKD BBAL INOOME TIELDED BT $10,000 OF BONDB OW LOAN OW 1858 



Year 


Incomein 
GoldCoin 


Average 

Valué of 

$100 of 

GoldCk>in 

in 
Cnrrency 
• 


Eqniya- 

lent of 

Gold In- 

come in 

Cnrrency 


Belative 

Prices at 

Betail 


Porehas- 

ing Power 

or Money 

Income 


BelatÍTe 

Beal 
Incom« 


1860 

1861 

1862 

1863 

1864 

1865 


$500 
500 
500 
500 
500 
500 


$100.0 
100.0 
113.3 
145.2 
203.3 
157.3 


$500.0 
500.0 
566.5 
726.0 

1.016.5 
786.5 


100 
103 
115 
144 
172 
181 


500 
485 
493 
504 
591 
435 


100 

97 

99 

101 

118 

87 



to purchase its securities at the low prices that prevailed 
during the war realized a very high rate of interest. By 
way of rough illnstration, consider the case of a foreigner 
who sent $1,000 in gold to New York every January and 
directed his broker to purchase 6 per cent, twenty-year 
bonds of the loan of 1861. The following table shows the 
amount of bonds which this sum would buy and the interest 
which the investment would yield: 

TABLE LXI 

IKTBBB8T TIBLDED BY AN INYBSTICENT OF $1,000 IN OOLD IN UNITED STATES BIXB8 
OF 1881, MADE IN JANUABY OF EACH TEAB FBOM 1862 TO 1865 



Date 


Avera^ 

Valué m 

Cnrrency 

of $1,000 m 

Gold 


* Ayerage 
Price of 
Ü.S.e'sof 
1881 


Amount of 

Bonds 

Which 

$1,000 in 

Gold 

Would Bny 


Gold 

Interest at 

6 per cent. 

on Bonds 

Bought 


Rateof 
Interest 
Realized 


1862, January 

1863, January 

1864, January 

1865, January 


$1,025 
1.451 
1,555 
2,162 


89.6 

95.4 

105.5 

110.9 


$1.143 

1,521 
1,474 
1,950 


$68.58 
91.26 
88.44 

117.00 


6.9jí 
9.1 
8.8 
11.7 



If the person who made these investments were an 
American, he would be able to sell his gold-interest money 
at a high premium, but he would also have to pay corre- 



Intbbest and Loan Capital 379 

spondingly high prices for commodities, so that npon the 
whole bis poBÍtion would not be greatly different from that 
of the foreign investor. That such opportanities for invest- 
ment as these secoríties offered shoold exist when men were 
most of the time loaning money for short terms at 7 per 
cent or less, is perhaps the most emphatic proof that coald 
be offered of the inability of the pablic to foresee what the 
future had in store. Had men been able to make clearer 
forecastSy the rate of interest would have risen mach more 
than it did, and had they not feared for the solvency of the 
federal govemment, its bonds would not have fallen so low. 
But, for that matter, this same distrust of the govemmenf s 
solvency, arising from the darkness of the future, may be 
said to have been fundamentally responsible for all the 
economic disturbances of the war times, because to it was 
due the varying depreciation of the greenbacka 



CHAPTER Vin 

PROPITS 

I. ProJlU €u a Share in ihe DiatribuHon of the Produet: 

Use of the Témis «* Profits " and "* Residual Claimants **— Oains of 
Residual Claimants at the Expense of Laborera, Landlords, and 
Lending Capitalists— Other Things being equid, Profits Varied 
Inversely as Average Wages Paid to Ejmployeee and Directly as the 
Complezity of Business Organization. 

II. ProflU in Different Industries: 

Dependence of Profits on Relative Advance in Pnces of Different 
Products — Profits of Farmere as an Illustration. 

III. Statistical Evidenee Regarding Profits: 

MeagemesB of the Eyidence — Statistics of Failures. 

L PB0FIT8 A8 A 8HABB IN THB DI8TBIBUTION OF THB PBODUOT 

In the three preceding chapters an attempt has been 
made to show in what mannér the depreciatíon of the paper 
standard afifected the real incomes of laborera, landlords, 
and lending capitalists. These classes are all alike in that 
the amount of the remuneration received by them for the 
aid which they render to prodaction is commonly fixed in 
advance by agreement, and is not immediately affected by 
the profítableness or onprofítableness of the ondertaking. 
It remains to examine the economic fortnnes of those men 
whose money incomes are made np by the snms left over 
in any bnsiness after all the stipnlated expenses have been 
met. 

For the pnrposes of the discnssion it is convenient to 
cali these men '* residual claimants," and to use the term 
"profits" to denote the sums which they receive. It will be 
observad that neither of these terms is used in the sense 
frequently assigned it in economic treatises. When one is 

380 



Pbofits 381 

investigating the consequences of monetary depreciation or 
appreciation, particularly within a limited períod of time, 
one fínds that the economic fxmctions that men perform in 
the procesa of production are f acts of lesa signifícance than 
the legal positions in which they stand with reference to the 
payment of their incomes. The residual claimant of the 
present chapter is likely to be that man in any business 
organization whom Marshall wonld cali the ondertaker; but 
the factor of importance in determining whether the rise of 
prices injures or benefits him is not the work that he per- 
forms in initiating and superintending operations, but the 
fact that, instead of having entered into a contract to accept 
a certain sum for his services, he has as his share whatever 
funds are left after paying all fíxed charges and operating 
expenses. The residual claimant in this sense may be either 
manager, capitalist, landlord, or laborer, or any two or three, 
or all of these persons in one. Which man in any establish- 
ment of those who contribute services or property to aid the 
process of production is in the legal position of residual 
claimant depends upon the organization of the business. 
Many cases can be differentiated, varying in complezity 
from that of the farmer who works his own land without 
assistance of hired labor or borrowed capital, to that of the 
great Corporation which leases its land, borrows most of its 
capital, hires its laborers, and pays fixed salaries to its 
officials. In the last case the residual claimants are the 
shareholders among whom the profits are divided in the 
form of dividends, and these shareholders may include 
among their number persons who are officials, or laborers, 
or bondholders, or landlords of the corporation, or who have 
no other connection with it than that of owning stock. 
But widely different as these residual claimants may be 
from other points of view, they are all alike in that the 
amount of their incomes depends upon the difference between 



3>92 HiüToar of thk GaKx:sBA€rKS 

dMr total fiM«ípC»o€ Ae bosocss md the «■■» pñd to di 
the odwr CEM^ipisrmtocs í& pcodaetsan wiio kste fiMBfcw i 
tibeir dÚBS ío thant m Út« prodoct tat a ftti|wl»lrd paj- 
■e&t The probirem o€ tiie pccasit chapter »: How liid 
tha depreeíatíoQ of the greeniíaeks aSect tbeae diCerenccs 
h ctw ^ e^ tt total recepta and dte tocal of pa jaamtB to otiwr 



When the proUem oí prcifita is conceÍTcd of in ths 
tmhuAL, it beeomea ckar that a tctj important part of the 
aohxtioa haa abeadj been contríbiited bj the pvcceding 
atndiea of wagea, rent, and UMteresL - The eridence haa been 
foimd to sopport the coucIibíoii that in abnoat all cases the 
aama of mooej wages, reni, and intereat receired bj labor- 
era, haidlorda and capttaüsts increased mneh lesa rapídlj 
than did the general price lereL If the wording of this 
eoocloakm be rerersed — the prices of prodncts roae more 
rapídly than wagea, rent, or interest — we ccnne at ooce to 
the propoaitíon that as a rule profits mnst haré increased 
mr/re rapidl j than pnces. For. if the soms paid to all the 
other co-operating parties were increased in jost the same 
ratio as the prices of the articies soid, it woald foUow that 
other thinga remaining the same, monej profits also woold 
increaae in the same ratio. Bat if, while prices donbled, the 
pajrments to iaborers, landlords, and capitalista increased in 
anjr ratio \em than 100 per cent, the soms of money ieft for 
the rfüaidoal claimants must have more than doabled. In other 
wonls, the effect of the depreciation of the paper currency 
ajK/n the distríbation of wealth may be Bommed ap in the 
profi^jfíition : The ehares of wage-eamers, landowners, and 
lenderH in the national dividend were diminished and the 
ahari) of reaidnai claimants was increased. 

Ríml [irofits were anusaally iarge during the Civil War, 
theri?fore, bnt Iarge becaose real wages, rent, and interest 
were low. It most not be asaomed, however, that the residnal 



Pbofits 383 

claimant necessaríly gained as much as the other parties in 
distríbution losi In the chapter apon wages, for example, 
it was snggested that the efficiency of labor probably 
decreased somewhat during the Civil War, because a lárge 
nnmber of the most efficient laborero had enlisted in the 
armies and their places had to be fiUed with less skilful 
hands. So far as this was the case, the volume of output 
most have diminished, and, of course, such diminution would 
decrease the difiference between total income and total outgo 
that figures with us as profits. But if this was an important 
consideration, it was one due, not to the paper standard, 
but to the fact that the country was involved in a great war. 
With regard to the relations between residual claimant 
and lending capitalist it must be said that the capital bor- 
rowed during the war decreased very much more in eflSciency 
than the labor hired. When prices had doubled, $1,000 of 
capital was the equivalent of only $500 on the oíd level of 
prices, and if the borrower had to pay 8 instead of 6 per 
cent, interest, he seems to have been worse instead of better 
off in consequence of the depreciation of money. And, of 
course, the residual claimant is, in fact, worse off because of 
even a slight increase in the rate of interest which he has to 
pay — unless further depreciation takes place between the 
time that he invests the funds lent him and repays them to 
the lender. But if such depreciation does take place, he is 
likely to make a larger gain at the expense of the lender 
than he makes at the expense of the laborer, because the 
contract which he makes with the f ormer is likely to run for 
a longer time than the contract with the latter, and conse- 
quently the person who finds himself injured by the course 
of events cannot seek relief so promptly by insisting upon 
making new terms. Moreover, the borrower gains not only 
by continuing to pay the same money income to the lender 
for a considerable period, as he may perhaps do with the 



384 HlSTOBT OF THK GbEESBACKS 

Ubofer, bat abr> bj retnming the principal smn leot in dol- 
ían of moch let» parchBBmg power than the doOazB receÍTod. 
On the other hand, the bairoirer of capital feda the efieet of 
a doimward tnm of pricea moch more qidcklj than the 
emplojer of labor. The wage-tables indícate that, thoogfa 
moDej wagea continoed to rise for sonie time afier prices had 
be^on to (all, thej had nererthelesB not caoght ap with 
prícea by the end of the war. Therefore, while emplojers 
were mAkíng leas extra gain at the expense of their hands 
at the cióse of 1865 than the j had been making in 1863 and 
1864, they were nerertheleas receiving an extra profit as 
compared with the sitnation before the sospension of apecie 
pajrmenta. The extra gain of the borrower, howeTer, was 
tomed into a posítiTe losa as soon as the porchasíng power 
of the dollars in which his obligations were repaid became 
greater than the porchasing power of dollars which had been 
lent to him. 

As for the relations between the tenant and landlord, they 
were like those between employer and employee in that 
the efficieney of the good transferred was not affected by 
monetary conditions, and like those between borrower and 
lender in that the contract was likely to mn for a con- 
siderable term. From the tablea of chap. vi which indícate 
that money rents increased less rapidly than money wages, 
it follows that the gain of the residual claimant at the expense 
of his landlord was probably greater in degree than the gain 
at the expense of laborers. 

Two other general propositions respecting profíts are sng- 
gestíHl by the resolts of preceding investigations. First, 
othíír things being equal, profits varied inversely as the 
average wage per day paid to employees. This conclusión 
follows directly from the demonstration in chap. v that the 
monoy wages of men earning $1-$1.49 per day before the 
perturbation of prices increased in higher ratio than those 



Pbofits 385 

of men eaming $1.50-$1.99; that the-wages of the latter 
class increased more than the wages of men in the next 
higher wage class, etc. Second, other things being equal, 
profíts varied directly as the complexitj of the bnsiness 
organization. By this proposition is meant, for example, 
that a farmer who paid money rent, nsed borrowed capital, 
and employed hired laborero, made a higher percentage of 
profits than a farmer of whom any one of these suppositions 
did not hold true. If, as has been argued, the increase of 
profits was made at the expense of laborero, landlords, and 
capitalists, it follows that that residual claimant fared best 
whose contracts enabled him to exploit the largest number 
of these other persons. 

II. PBOFITS IN DIFFEBBNT INDUSTBIBS 

The e£Fect of monetary depreciation upon profits resulting 
from the increase in the share of the residual claimant in the 
product at the expense of the shares of laborero, landlords, 
and capitalists, was felt more or less alike in all industries. 
Of course, the average advance of money wages was not uni- 
form in all branches of production: there were probably 
similar differences in the increase of the sums paid as rent 
for locations of various sorts, and there may have been dif- 
ferences in the fluctuation of rates of interest charged to 
borrowero in dissimUar Unes of business. But, despite 
these differences in degree of diminution in the shares of 
these three classes of participants in distribution, as compared 
with the share of residual claimants, the general character of 
this effect of depreciation was substantially the same in all 
industries. 

There was another and hardly less important effect of 
depreciation upon profits, however, that was by no means 
uniform. In chap. iv emphasis was put upon the dissimi- 
larity in the price fluctuations of different commodities» 



386 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBACKS 



Tbeie diminilaríties prodaced corresponding y&riationB in 
tbe profito realized by prodacers. Tbe residual claimant 
wfaose profitB carne from the prodactían of oommoditieB that 
adranced in price more rapidly than the majority of other 
comiDoditiea deriyed a second gain in addition lo the gain 
made at the expense of his laborera, landlord, and creditors. 
Not only did sach a reaidnal claimant have a relatively larger 
abare in the prodnct, bnt the money valae of that prodnet 
waa relatÍTely larger as compared with the money valne of 
other things that he might wish to bny. When the advance 
of the prodact in price was nearly the same as the advance 
of the articles which the residual claimant porchased, he 
enjoyed no such second gain — the only way in which he 
was benefíted by the depreciation was throngh his ability 
to satisfy contracta with the proceeds of a smaller portion of 
the output Finally, in the case of products that advanced 
in valué lesa than the average the residual claimant not only 
made no second gain, but he even suffered a loes through 
the diminshed relative purchasing power of his product — a 
loss that might or might not be offset by the gains made at 
the expense of the other participants in distribution. 

The statistical material is not complete enough to make 
possible an elabórate investigation of these differences in 
the profitableness of industries due to the dissimilar price 
fluctuations. But there is one case that merits attention, not 
only because of the relative fulness of the statistical record, 
but also because of the great importance of the industry. It 
will be remembered that thirteen agricultural products are in- 
cluded in the tables of relative prices at wholesale. Since 
this list comprises all the most important farm products of 
the northem states, it affords a fair basis for estimating how 
the farmer's money income was affected by price changes in 
comparison with that of other producers. Table LXII pre- 
sente the data regarding the prices of farm products in two 



Pbofits 



387 



TABLE LXn 

BBLATTTB WHOLBBALB FBI0B8 OF FABM PBODÜOTS AND OF OTHBB OOMMODITIBS 





AsrrHMBTic M: 


v% . 


Thirteen 


Seven 


Datb 


Farm 


Farm 




Products— 


Products— 




Simple 


Wei«hted 




Average 


Arerage 


1860, Jan ... 


103 


108 


April.. 


105 


103 


July . . 


98 


94 


Oct ... 


95 


95 


1861, Jan . . . 


92 


91 


April.. 


94 


87 


July . . 


74 


66 


Oct... 


76 


71 


1862, Jan ... 


83 


78 


April.. 


92 


81 


July . . 


87 


77 


Oct . . . 


97 


85 


1863, Jan... 


119 


100 


April.. 


144 


129 


July .. 


129 


110 


Oct... 


133 


125 


1864, Jan... 


159 


157 


April.. 


171 


171 


July . . 


189 


192 


Oct... 


194 


194 


1866, Jan . . . 


223 


216 


April.. 


186 


177 


July . . 


143 


129 


Oct... 


166 


154 



All 
Artides 
Induded 

TabííxiV 



Median 



102 
102 
100 
104 
97 
98 
93 
100 
111 
110 
113 
124 
142 
162 
156 
154 
176 
194 
233 
234 
247 
207 
184 
199 



Thirteen 

Farm 

Products— 

Simple 

Arerage 


Seyen 

Farm 

Products— 

Weighted 

Ayerage 


101 


102 


105 


105 


96 


92 


94 


97 


94 


90 


90 


92 


66 


66 


71 


72 


84 


79 


87 


85 


86 


74 


96 


82 


100 


94 


130 


120 


115 


103 


127 


122 


152 


153 


161 


160 


185 


206 


194 


174 


224 


212 


179 


169 


139 


117 


149 


149 



All 
Articles 
Inoluded 

TabíeXIV 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
97 
95 
100 
100 
100 
103 
117 
130 
142 
139 
140 
161 
175 
200 
208 
228 
184 
160 
180 



waye. The fírst column gíves the simple arithmetíc means 
of the relative prices of the thirteen agricultural prodncts 
included in the general price tables ; the second column gíves 
a similar average of the relative prices of barlej, com, meats, 
oats, rye, tobáceo, and wheat weighted according to the esti- 
mated money valué of these products in the northem and 
westem states in 1860;' the third column gives the arith- 

1 These weights are as foUows in peroentageM : Com, 39.4 ; meats, 32.2 ; wheat, 17.4 ; 
oats, 6.9 ; rye, 1.7 ; barley, 1.6 ; tobáceo, 0.8. They are doriyed f rom the table of quan- 
tities and yalues preparad by the statisticiao of the Department of Agricultura for 
Senator Aldrich^s oommittee and published in its report, Part I, p. 106. In order to 
ezclude the south Atlantic and south central states, recourse was had to the censúa 
reporte of farm yields in 180O, as giyen in the EleveiUh Ceiuia, ** Beport upon Agri- 
culture,'* Tabla 2. 




metic mean of the relative prices of all artícles inL-laded in 
the whoIesale price-tablcB of chap. iv, A second set of aver- 
ages is added in whicb the median is eubstitated for the 
aríth metic mean. 

It eeems safe to conclude from these Sgares that the 
farmers of the loyal states were among (lie unfortunate pro- 
ducere whoae producís rose in price lesa than the majority of 
other articlee, and that from thís staodpoiDt they veré loeeis 
rather than gainers hj the paper currency, Of conrse, it is 
poasible that the farmer's losa from thís ineqnality of pnce 
flactnations might be more than offset by his gaine at the 
expense of laborera, landlord, and lending capitalist. Bnt 
there is good reason for believíug that the increase of the 
residaal clatmant's proBts in the latter fashion was lees in 
farming than in any other important indnstrv- This conela- 
aion seems to follow from the proposition that, other things 
being eqnal, profita varied directly as the complexity of 
business organizatSon. The American farmers of the Civil 
War were in a large proportion of cases tbeir own landlords, 
capitalists, and laborera. So far as thia was true, they had 
few important pecuniary contraéis with other persons of 
vhich they conld tak© advantage by paying in depreciated 
dollara üf those farmers who hired labor very many paid 
wagea partly In board and lodging — an arrangement whicb 
tbrew a considerable part of the increased cost of living 
opon them instead of upon their employees. Finally. the 
renting farmer probably gained lees on the average from 
the contract with his landlord than tenante of any other 
class, because in a majorily of cases the rent was not a sam 
of money, but a share of the prodnce. Wliile, then, the 
general effect of the paper standard was in the direction of 
iocreasing proSts, it eeems vcry doubtfnl whother farmers as 
B whole did not lose more than they gained becaose of the 
lirioe disinrbADcas. 




Pbofits 



389 



III. 8TATI8TICAL EVIDENGE BEOABDINO PBOFITS 

So far the conclusión that profits were on the whole much 
increased dnríng the Civil War has been based mainly on the 
resolts of preceding chapters. It would be highly desirable 
to test these conclnsions by means of direct Information 
regarding profits made in various branches of trade, but the 
data available f or such a purpose are more meager even than 
the data conceming rent or interest. What scraps of informa- 
tion are available, however, snpport the view that profits 
were uncommonly large. Mr. David A. Wells, for example, 
in his reports as special commissioner of the revenue, has 
stories of ^'most anomalons and extraordinary'^ profits that 
were realized in the paper, woolen, pig-iron, and salt indus- 
tries.^ A more general indication of the profitableness of 
businesB is afforded by the remark in the annual circular of 
Dun^s Mercantile Agency for 1864, that *4t is generally 
conceded that the average profits on trade range from 12 
to 15 per cent."' 

But the most important piece of evidence is found in the 
statistics of failures compiled by the same agency. The fol- 
lowing table shows Dun's report of the number of bank- 
ruptcies and the amount of liabilities in the loyal states from 
the panic year 1857 to the end of the war: 

TABLE Lxni 

8TATZ8TIC8 OF FAZLUBB8 ZN THB LOTAL STATES FROM 1857 TO 1865 ACCOKDINQ TO 

dun's mercantile AGENCT' 



Tear 



1857 
1858 
1859 
1860 




Liabilities 



$265,500,000 
73,600,000 
51,300,000 
61,700,000 



Year 


Number 


1861.... 


5,935 


1862.... 


1,652 


1863.... 


495 


1864.... 


510 


1865.... 


500 



Liabilities 



$178,600,000 

23,000,000 

7,900,000 

8,600,000 

17,600,000 



^Executive DocumerU No. 37, ilst Gong., 2d Sess., pp. Ixxzi, zciii, oyi ; ExectUive 
DoeumetU No, 16, 40th Cong,, 3d Sess., pp. 42, 46; House of RepreaentaJUve» Report No. 
72, 4l8t Gong., 2d Sess., pp. 73, 74. Qf. also CommercicU and FinancicU Chronicle, VoL 
II, p. 227; C. B. Conant in HurU^a Merchante^ Magcuinc, Yol. LII, p. 359. 

^HurWa MerchanU' Magazine, Yol. LII, p. 146. 

3 Commercial and Financial Chroniele, Yol. II, p. S4. 



31l0 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEEKBACKS 

The rerj great decrease both in tbe namber and the liabili- 
tíes of finns that failed is the best proof that ahnoet all 
busiiieflB enterpríseB were '^making money.^^ 

From one poínt of view the small nnmber of failnres is 
mirprímng. An nnstable cnrrency is generally held to make 
bnsinesB tmsafe, and seldom has the standard money of a 
mercantíle commnnity proTen so nnstable, nndergone snch 
violent flnctnations in so short a time, as in the United States 
of the Civil War. Yet, instead of being extremely hazard- 
oos, business seems from the statistics of failnres to have 
been more than nsually safe. 

The explanation of the anomaly seems to be that the very 
extremity of the danger proved a safegnard. Business men 
realized that the inflation of pnces was due to the deprecia- 
tion of the cnrrency, and that when the war was over gold 
would fall and prices follow. They realized very clearly the 
necessity of taking precautions against being canght in a 
position where a sndden decline of prices wonld ruin them. 
How they did this by curtailing credits has been shown in 
the preceding chapter. So long as prices continued to rise 
such precautions were really not needed by the man in active 
business except, in so far as he was a creditor of other men ; 
but when prices commenced to fall prudence had its rewari 
Such a sudden and violent drop of prices as occurred between 
January and July, 1865, would have brought a fínancial 
revulsión of a most serious character upon a business com- 
munity under ordinary circumstances. But so well had the 
chango been prepared for, that the number of failures was 
actunlly less than it had been in the preceding year of rap- 
idly rising prices. 

The whole situation can hardly be explained better than 
it was by a New York business man writing in Harper's 
Monthly Mngazine: *'When the war ended," he said, " we 
all kuew we should have a panic. Some of us, like Mr. Hoar, 



Pbofits 391 

expected that greenbacks and volnnteers would be disbanded 
together. Others expected gold to fall to 101 or 102 in a 
few days. Others saw a collapse of manufacturing industry, 
owing to the cessation of govemment purchases. But we all 
knew a ' crisis ^ was coming, and having set our houses in 
order accordingly, the 'crisis' of coorse never carne." * 

iyoLXL,p.747. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH 

I. Production: 

Attempt oí Publicists to Demónstrate Prosperity oí the Korth 
During the War — Contemporary Críticisms — Effect of the Paper 
Currency on Production — Influence of High Profíts on Industrial 
Enterprises Counterbalanced by Uncertainty of the Futuro — And 
by Attractiveness of Speculative Lines of Trade. 

II. Consumption: 

Ck)ntemporary Ck)mplaint8 of Extravagance — Increased Ck)n8ump- 
tion of Articles of Luzury — Decreased Consumption of Neceesitíes 
and Comforts. 

I. PBODÜCTION 

DüBiNO the Civil War the question whether or not the 
loyal states were really "prosperous" was debated with much 
zeaL Supporters of the Greenback policy, like Spaulding 
and Hooper, were in the habit of claiming that the paper 
currency " operated very beneficially upon the buBÍness of 
the conntry " and prometed the general well-being of the 
people.* **It íb an indisputable fact," said Hooper in Jan- 
uary, 1863, "that the material interests of the North were 
never more prosperous than at present.'" 

From Congress such assertions passed on to newspapers 
and pamphleteers. Publicists of the prominence of Dr. Wil- 
liam Eider, D. A. Wells, and Lorin Blodget employed their 
pens in drawing most cheerful pictures of the condition and 
prospects of the country. A brief citation from the first 
writer will suffice to indícate the general character of the 
conclusions at which these optimistic patriots arrived: "The 
knowledge of an immensely enhanced activity in all branches 

I Spaulding, Congrestional Qlobe^ 37th Cong., Sd Sess., P> 288. 
2/&ÚI., P.S86. 

392 



Pbodüotion and Consumption of Wealth 393 

of industry/' said Dr. Eider, "is brought home to everybody 
in the free etates by the almost perfect distríbution of its 
benefits. One class, and one class only, of the people, and 
that a class which the general prosperity always injures, 
suffers something — the class of annoitants, salaríed officers, 
and people living upon accumulated capital/' ' 

The general tone of all these pamphlets suggests that 
the primary object of the writers who prepared them was to 
encourage the public to accept heavy taxation without 
gmmbling, and to invest their savings in govemment bonds 
without hesitation. Laudable as such a design may have 
been, it was not conducive to impartial selection of data or to 
successful analysis, and sober-minded critics had no diffi- 
culty in showing to such as would listen that the boásted 
prosperity was not so real as it seemed. The little pamphlet, 
"Are We Prosperous?" by "A Boston Merchant" is a good 
example of the protests against accepting the specious 
appearances of activity in business as sufficient evidence of 
actual increase in well-being. The booklet begins by admit- 
ting that "labor is fully employed, .... trade is active, 
. . . . money plenty," and that everywhere "are heard 
rejoicings over our prosperity." But, runs the argument, 
if true prosperity consists "in the productive employment of 
labor," there is no great ground for congratulation. For 
nearly a million of men are engaged in the service of the 
govemment and nearly a million more are making materials 
of war. So far as the work of supplying the wants of the 
community is concemed, all these persons are "not only 
non-producers, but are destroyers and consumers of the cap- 
ital of the country." The "enhanced activity" of trade and 

1 Debt and Rettmrce» of the United States (Philadelphia, Jnne, 1863), pp. 21, 28, 24; 
cf. Wblls, Our Burden and Our Strength^ Troy, N. Y., 1864; Blodget, The Commer- 
cial and Financial Strength of the United Staiet, Phlladelphia, 1864. Also seo the 
series of letters published in London by Bobbbt J. Walkxb, onder the title Ameri» 
can Financee and BetourceBt 1868 and 1864. 



3S4 HlSTOBT OF THE GSKESBACKS 

tbe fon emploTment of labor mean aaüj tkal the psople 
lett at bome are working more than osiiaDj kazd m íhe 
effort to sopplj these Don-producerB as weü as tlM^MM^li*»* 
wíth the reqnisites of lífe. Tbe prodncers wbo seD to the 
goTemment are receWíng ín exchange nol psodncta thai are 
wealth, bot eridencea of debt Tbis mi{MwliictÍTe emploj- 
ment of labor, conatunption of capital witboot replacement, 
and rapid accomalation of debt, may qoickoi the pace €¡t 
bnsinesfi, bot ít doea not make trae prosperitr/ 

From the pre0ent point of view it woold be improper to 
enter at length o[Km the qoeation in what d^ree the pro- 
dnction and accomalation of wealth were retarded in the 
jears from 1861 to 1865. Soch a diacoasion woold inTolve 
an attempt to gaoge the relatiye importance of seTeral inde- 
termínate elementa, Boch as the degree in which the labor 
forcé of the North was weakened bj enlistmenta, how fár 
the withdrawal of laborero into the armj was compensated 
by the increased exertíons of those who stayed at home, how 
far the introdaction of lalx)r-Baving machinery in agricoltore 
and other industries was prometed by the lack of hands, 
whether industry suffered from lack of capital becaose of 
the huge sums lent the government, etc. All these probleois 
lie beyond the scí>i>e of the present inquiry. But it is 
pertinent to ask here: what influence did the greenback 
currency have as one of the many factore that affected the 
production of wealth? On this problem the preceding 
investigations throw some light. 

lu the first place, the paper standard was responsible in 
large measure for the feeling of **pro8perity" that seems 
from all the evidence to have characterized the publicas frame 
üf mind. Almost every owner of property found thnt the 
price of his ¡xíssessions had increased, and almost every 

< /« Our Protperity a Delutionf Our National Debt atui Currency. by a Boston 
If erchaDt ( A. W. Stbtson T), Boston, 1864. The title on the coyer is Th€ Age Qf Ot 
back§. 



Pbodüotion and Consümption of Wbalth 395 

wage-eamer found that his pay was advanced. Strive as 
people may to emancípate themselves from the feeling that 
a dollar represents a fíxed qnantity of desirable things, it Í8 
very difficult f or them to resist a pleasurable sensation when 
the money valué of their property rises or their incomes 
increase. They are aknost certain to feel cheerful over the 
larger soms that they can spend, even thoogh the amoont of 
commodities the larger sums will buy Í8 decreased. Habit 
ÍB too strong f or arithmetic. 

But, more than thís, "basinees'' in the common meaning 
of the word was unusually profítable during the war. The 
''residual claimant" of the last chapter is in most enterprises 
the active business man, and, as has been shown, his money 
income did as a rule rise more rapidly than the cost of living. 
Only in those cases where the advance of the product with 
which the given individual was concemed lagged so far 
behind the advance of those things that he wished to buy as 
to neutralize the gain which he made at the expense of his 
employees and creditors, was the business man actually 
worse oflF. In other words, "business" was, in reality as well 
as in appearance, rendered more profitable by the greenbacka 
There is therefore no error in saying that the business of the 
country enjbyed unwonted prosperity during the war. And 
it may be added that the active business man is probably a 
more potent factor in determining the community's feeling 
about "good times" and "bad times" than is the working- 
man, the landlord, or the lending capitalist. 

The effect of high profits, however, is not limited to pro- 
ducing a cheerful frame of mind among business men. 
ünder ordinary circumstances one would say that when the 
great majority of men already in business are "making 
money'' with more than usual rapidity they will be inclined 
to enlarge their operations, that others will be inclined to 
enter the field, and that thus the production of wealth will 



• I. 



: •; i- iii: i:\HACKS 

.::!!N:;i::i'e> oí tht- war uenoc 



.*«. H- 



! . .:-. it ::^:»*i: for their suco** 

-:- . . ::t»:iri;v al! opemñon? 

.-:- i::i :- ronsommaii^i. 

... N. ::^ .iiSTKíSitioE pR-VS-- 

; -. .: .: it\x ust- of CTvc::. 

— .;s. hi> hnsinea^ a* 

V . •■ ...T- tíurnost. Tbu? 

. ... » ^ .: iht fumre in & 



>\: :m: ali busiuffií^ 

■ j^: T of winniíu: 

::uiucf lh»-n. 

Ani»*rii'h!¡> 

::ií: U' tíikf 

• iv.iuiii nmkf 

a • 

'I ■ ■•■te*"T 



Pbodüotion and Consumption op Wealth 397 

in the narrower sense might be largor than common, but 
this would not attract investors in large numbers if the 
probable profits of trading were larger jet; and such seems 
clearly to have been the case doring the war when the paper 
currency offered such brilliant possibilities to fortúnate 
speculators in gold, in stocks, or in commodities. Instead, 
then, of the greenbacks being credited with stimulating the 
production of wealth, they must be charged with offering 
inducements to abandon agriculture and manufactures for 
the more speculative forms of trade. 

This tendency of the times did not escape observation. 
On the contrary, it was often remarked and lamented in 
terms that seem exaggerated. Hugh McCuUoch, for instance, 
in his report as secretary of the treasury for 1865, said: 

There are no indications of real and permanent prosperíty . . . . 
in the splendid fortunes reported to be made by skilf ul manipu- 
lations at the gold room or the stock board; no evidenoes of increas- 
ing wealth in the facts that railroads and steamboats are crowded 
with passengers, and hotels with guests; that cities are full to 
overflowing,and rents and the neoessities of life, as well as luxuríes, 
are daily advancing. AU these things prove rather .... that the 
number of non-producers is increasing, and that .productive indus- 
try is being diminished. There is no f act more manif est than that 
the plethora of paper money is not only undermining the moráis 
of the people by encouraging waste and extravagance, but is strik- 
ing at the root of our material prosperíty by diminishing labor.' 

More explicit was Mr. Wells's statement of the movement 
away from industry and toward speculative trading. In one 
of his reports as special commissioner of the revenue he said: 

During the last few years large numbers of our population, 
under the influence and example of high profits realized in trading 
during the períod of monetary expansión, have abandonad employ- 
ments directly productive of national wealth, and sought employ- 
ments oonnected with oommerce, trading, or speculation. As a 

ip.9. 



398 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 

oonsequenoe we everywhere find large additions to the populatíon 
oí our oommercial cities, an increase in the number and oost of the 
buildings devoted to banking, brokerage, insurance, oommission 
business, and agencies of all kinds, the spirít of trading and specu- 
lating pervading the whole communit j, as distingnished from the 
spirít of production.' 

Within the period under review, then, it seems very 
doubtful whether the high profíts had their usual effect of 
leading to a larger production of raw materíals or to an 
increase in manufactures. The prudent man hesitated to 
expand his undertakings because of the instability of the 
inflated level of prices; the man with a tum for speculative 
ventures found more alluring opportunities in trade. 

II. CONSÜMPTION 

No one can read contemporary comments on American 
social Ufe of the later years of the war without being 
impressed by the charges of extravagance made against the 
people of the North. Newspapers and pulpits were at one 
in denouncing the sinful waste tliat, they declared, was 
increasing at a most alarming rate. The "shoddy aris- 
tocracy'* with its ostentatious display of wealth bec€mie a 
stock subject for cartoonists at home, and eamed a well- 
merited reputation for vulgarity abroad. So common are 
the comments on this subject that no specific references 
need be given ; one has only to examine the files of news- 
papers and magazines, or to read published sermons or let- 
ters, to find how universally observers were impressed by 
the prevalence of extravagant expenditure. 

> Executive Document No, 27, 41st Coni;., 2d Scss., p. xxxi. Cf. Charles A. Maitn, 
Paper Moncy, pp. 187-94. Tho opponontü t>f the Kr<»t»nback party wero fond of point- 
ing to tho l(>s<4 rapid incrcaso of uatioaal wealth betwcco Í^IO and 1870 than between 
1350 and 1S60, shown by tho fifnires of the federal census, as an indicatioD of the infin- 
•ncc of th«> i>aper currency iu discoura^n^ production. Cf. .\m aha Walkkr, The 
National (\irrency (New York, 1876), p. 44; The Nation (New York), Vol. XII, p. í<6; 
Wkllh's fourth report, cited at the beginning of this note, p. xxxi. The imperfee> 
tions of the Censas of 1870, however, to say nothioK of the unreliability of statistics 
of aational wealth in aU American censuses, make these data of sli^ht Taloe. 



Pbodüction and Consümption op Wealth 399 

In trying to account for this nnpleasant phase oí social 
development, men usually laid the blame upon the paper 
standard. High pnces were said to make everyone feel 
suddenly rícher and so to tempt everyone to adopt a more 
lavish style of living than his former woni Thus the view 
gained general credence that the greenbacks were ultimately 
responsible for a great increase in the consümption of wealth. 

If the conclnsions reached in the preceding chapters 
regarding the changes in the distríbution of wealth caused 
by the paper money are sound, however, such a view regarding 
the consümption of wealth can be but partially trae. The 
enormoos profits of '' residual claimants^^ made possible the 
rapid accmnulation of an unnsual number of fortunes, and 
the families thus lifted into sudden affluence enjoyed spend- 
ing their money in the ostentations fashion characteristic of 
the newly rich. It is therefore tme that the monetary situ- 
ation was largely responsible for the appearance of a con- 
siderable class of persons — of whom the fortúnate speculator 
and the army contractor are typical — who plunged into the 
recklessly extravagant habits that called down upon their 
heads the condemnation of the popular moralisi 

But if the greenbacks were in the last resort a chief 
cause of the increased consümption of articles of luxury by 
families whom they had aided in enriching, they were not 
less truly a cause of restricted consümption by a much larger 
class of humbler folL The laboring man whose money 
wages increased but one-half, while the cost of living 
doubled, could not continué to provide for his family's wants 
so fully as before. He was forced to practice economies — 
to wear his oíd clothing longer, to use less coffee and less 
sugar, to substitute cheaper for better qualities in every line 
of expenditure where possible. Similar retrenchment of liv- 
ing expenses must have been practiced by the families of 
many owners of land and lenders of capital. In other words, 



400 HlSTOBT OF THB ObEBNBAOKS 

the war-time fortunes resulted in a very large measure from 
the mere transfer of wealth from a wide circle of persona to 
the relatively small number of residual daimants to the 
proceeds of business enterprises. The enlarged consumption 
of wealth which the paper currency made possible for the 
fortúnate few was therefore contrasted wíth a diminished 
consumption on the part of the unf ortunate many on whose 
slender mélins the greenbacks levied contributions for the 
benefít of their employers. 

That the diminished consumption of wealth by large num- 
bers of poor people escaped general notice, whíle the extrava- 
gance of the newly rich attracted so much attention, need not 
shake one's confídence in the validity of these conclusion& 
The purchase of a f ast trotting-horse by a govemment con- 
tractor, and the elaborateness of his wife^s gowns and jewelry, 
are much more conspicuous facts than the petty economies 
practiced by his employees. The same trait that leads for- 
túnate people to flaunt their material prosperity in the eyee 
of the world leads the unfortunate to conceal their small 
privations. Even an attentive observer may fail to notice 
that the wives of workingmen are still wearing their last 
year^s dresses and that the children are running barefoot 
longer than usual. 

But though the newspapers were not f ull of comments on 
the enforced economies of the mass of the population, whole- 
sale dealers in staple articles of food and clothing noticed a 
decrease in sales. In reviewing the trade situation in Sep- 
tember, 1864, when real wages were near their lowest ebb, 
HunVs Merchants* Magazine remarked that "the rise inthe 
prices of commodities has .... outrun the power of con- 
sumption and the fall trade has been almost at a stand. 
Those articles such as coffee, sugar, low grade goods, which 
[form] the staple products of the great mass of the people in 
modérate circumstances, has \8Íc\ reached such high rates 



Pbodüction and Consümption op Wealth 401 

that the decline in consümption is very marked, amoonting 
almost to a stagnation of the fall trade/^ ' 

It would be of exceeding interest to trace the temporary 
change in the character of the consümption of the people 
that resulted from the artificial alteration of the distribution 
of wealth by the greenback currency — to see, for example, 
how the consümption of tobáceo and liqnors was affected as 
compared with the consümption of sogar, coffee, flour, and 
woolen fabrics. Bnt nnfortunately there are no reliable 
data to serve as the basis of such an investigation. The 
Bevenue Commission of 1865-66 made an attempt to esti» 
mate the decline in the consümption of cotton, tea, coffee, 
sngar, and molasses, but its figures are too largely thé 
resnlts of guesBwork to poBsees much significance. ' AU that 
can be said with assorance is that the consümption of many 
articles of luxury increased very greatly, while the con- 
sümption of many staple articles decliñed. It is probable 
that in the first year or two of the war a spirit of economy 
pervaded nearly all classes of the people.' As the charac- 
teristic effects of the greenback standard began to make 
themselves felt, still more carefol supervisión of expendi- 
tnres was forced npon wage-eamers and small owners of 
land and lenders of capital, while residual claimants began 
to find their profits xmcommonly great. The great fall of 
prices in the first half of 1865, combined with the continued 
advance of money wages, alleviated the situation of the first 
class of persons, though it did not quite restore them to the 
situation that existed before the war. To residual claimants 
it brought a reduction in profits that was in part merely 
nominal — the expression of their fortunes in fewer figures, 

1 VoL U, I». 248; qf. also pp. 810, 447. 

S£r. B. Sxeoutíve Document No, M, 89th Gong., Ist Sess., Special Beports Nos.1-4. 

s QT., e. Q; remarles of T. M« Parker, Congrettional Olobe^ S7th Gong., 2d Sess., 
pb 9Si; ** Beport of the Bank Commissioners of the State of Maine," December» 
1868, in Sxeoutíve Document No, 80, 88th Ckmg., Ist Sess., p. 8. 



402 HlSTOBT OF THB GbEENBAOKS 



bnt with a denominator oí enhanced valué — and in part real 
— the relative increase in the shares of the prodact that 
went to other co-operators in production and the increaaed 
valué of the doUars in which whatever pecnniary obligations 
they had contracted must be paid. Bnt, on the other hand, 
the foct that they had survived the sharp fall of prices that 
they had foreseen would come with the end of the war 
relieved their minds of a great source of anxiety, and pnt 
them in a position to enjoy the gains that they had eaved. 
Oonsequently in 1865, consnmption of goods of all kinds prob- 
ably increased over that of 1864; of staple articles, becanse 
money wages had risen, while prices had fallen ; of loxnríee, 
becansoy though profíts were less enormoos, fortunes were 
felt to be lees precarions. 



CHAPTER X 

THE GREENBACKS AND THE COST OP THE CIVIL WAR 

I. The Problem and the Method of Solutian: 
Financial vs. Economic Consequences of the Legal-Tender Acts — 
VariouB Estimates of Increase in Debt Caused by Qreenbacks — 
Method by which Estímate Should Proceed. 

II. The OreenbaekB cuid Expenditures : 

DifFerence Between Increase of Ezpenditures f or Commodities and 
for Seryices — Difficulty of Distinguishing Between the two Classes 
in Qovemment Accounts — Estímate of Increase in Ordinary 
Expenditures. 

III. TJie QreenboLcki and Receipia: 

EfFect of Depreciatíon on Various ítems of Revenue — Indirect 
Financial Consequences of the Legal-tender Acts. 

IV. The Greenbaeks and the Public Debt: 

Danger of Double Computation of Loss by Qreenbacks — Terms 
on Which Bonds were Sold — Saving and Loss of Interest. 

V, Conclusión: 

Net EfFect of Greenbaeks on Amount of Debt Incurred During 
War — FHnancial Consequences af ter Retum of Peace. 

I. THB PBOBLEM AND THB líETHOD OF 80LUTI0N 

DisoussiON of the consequences of the legal-tender acts 
has so far been confíned to the economic relations between 
individuáis. There is, however, another phase of the sub- 
ject to be considered. The reader who tums back to the 
account of the debates upon the legal-tender bilis will fínd 
that most of the unfortunate consequences that foUowed 
their enactment were foretold in Congress — the decline of 
real wages, the injury done creditors, the uncertainty of 
prices that hampered legítimate business and fostered specu- 
lation. But a majority of this Congress were ready to sub- 
ject the community to such ills because they believed that 

403 



404 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOES 

the relief of the treasury from its embarrassments was of 
more importance than the maintenance of a relatively stable 
monetary standard. There was líttle of that confusión 
between economic and fiscal considerations that has fre- 
quently been held responsible for the attempts of govem- 
ment to ose its power over the cnrrency as a financial 
resource. Rather, there was a conscious subordination of 
the interest of the community in a stable monetary standard 
to the interest of the govemment in obtaining funds to 
carry on the war. It is therefore incumbent npon one who 
wonld judge the policy from the standpoint of its sponsors 
to inquire into the financial effects which to them seemed 
most important as well as into the effeots on the distribu- 
tion of wealth. 

This topic has two aspects — one of which has already 
been discussed. Power to issue greenbacks formed a 
quickly available financial resource from which the treasury 
was able to meet large amounts of indebtedness already 
accumulated when the legal-tender acts were passed. But 
while such issues relieved immediate needs, their ultímate 
eflfect was to increase the future demands on the treasury. 
The fírst of these consequences has been dealt with in the 
historical chapters of Part I, where an attempt was made to 
show how much immediate help the greenbacks afforded Mr. 
Chase. It remains for the present chapter to treat the 
larger question: What effect had the greenbacks upon the 
amount of expenditures incurred? 

Few questions raised by the legal-tender acts have 
attracted more attention than this last. Even while the 
first legal-tender bilí was being considered its critics 
declared that if made a law it would increase the cost of 
waging the war by causing an advance in the prices of 
articles that the govemment had to buy.* As the war went 

1 See Part I, chap. ii, p. 57. 



Gbeenbagks and Cost of THE CiviL Wab 405 

on the soondness of this view became apparent. Simón 
Newcomb, writing e^irly in 1865, estímated that by the end of 
1864 the greenbacks had increased the amount of indebted- 
ness incurred by the federal govemment $180,000,000 
beyond the amount that wonld have been incurred had the 
Bpecie standard been maintained. Even if the war should 
end in 1865, he prophesied, $300,000,000 more would be 
added to this needless augmentation of the debt.' 

When the war was over and the divers reasons that had 
deterred many men from críticising the fínancial poUcy of 
the govemment were removed, competent writers began to 
express similar views with freedom. For example, Mr. H. 
R. Hulburd, comptroUer of the currency, said in his report 
for 1867: "Probably not less than 33 per cent, of the 
present indebtedness of the United States is owing to the 
high prices paid by the govemment while its disbursements 
were heaviesi"' Mr. C P. Williams put the increase of 
debt at one-third to two-ñfths; C. A. Mann, at one-fourth; 
S. T. Spear, at a billion doUars ; L. H. Courtney, an English 
critic, at nearly $900,000,000." Of later discussions that of 
Professor H. C. Adams has attracted the most attention. 
He estimated that of the gross receipts from debts created 
between January 1, 1862, and September 30, 1865, amount- 
ing to $2,565,000,000 the gold valué was but $1,695,000,- 
000 — a difPerence of $870,000,000 between valué received 
and obligations incurred.^ 

All of these estimates seem to rest either upon guesses or 
upon reduction of sums borrowed in currency to specie valué. 
The former method of arriving at the result inspires little 

1 OriHcal BxamincUicn of <mr Financial PoUcy (New York, 1865), pp. 171« 172. 

^Finanee Reporta 1867, p. 15. 

3 Seo A Reoiew of the Financial Situaticn of Our Country (Albany, 1868), p. 7; 
Paper Money (New York, 1873), p. 184; The Legal-Tender AcU (New York, 1875), p. 78; 
Jowmal of the Boyal Statietical aodety, Vol. XXXI, p. 204. 

«P«6ltcDe6to, P.1S1. 



406 HlSTOBT OF THB GbEBNBAGES 

oonfidenoe even when the guesses are made by men inti- 
mately familiar with the federal finances, and the latter 
method assnmes that all goTemment expenditares rose in 
proportion to the decline in the specie valué of the green- 
back doUar, and that all revenues remained what they would 
have been on a special basis — assumptions subject to impor- 
tant exceptions.' The problem of ascertaining the financial 
consequencee of the greenback issnes is much too complex 
to be solved by methods so cmde. Some branchee of ex- 
penditure were much affected by the depreciation of the 
currency, other branches but little. The efifect of the paper 
carrency on the receipts of the govemment is quite as 
important a part of the problem as the efFect on expendi- 
tures, and examination shows that here as there different 
ítems were affected in very different degrees. FinaUy, the 
greenbacks were themselves a 'Moan without interest^* 
though, on the other hand, they increased the volume of the 
interest-bearing debt by augmenting expenditurea. Theee 
threo topics, then — the influence of the paper-money standard 
on ordinary expenditures and receipts, and on interest — 
mus! all be examined by anyone who hopes to frame an 
adeí]iiate estímate of the net effect of the greenbacks on the 
coflt i)f the war. As will appear, however, examination of 
them^ topics is beeet by serious difficultie& 

II. GBEEKBACXS AND BXPENDITrBBS 

It ifl a familiar remark of writers on public finance that 
all things required by govemment fall into one of two 
oate^ories — commodities and services, If the conclusions 
of thi* pnveding ohapters on pnces and wages are well 
loumliHl, it follows that this elementary distinction regard- 

t Pr\tfvAM)r Adams is frp« from ih» reprcMch, for he is carefal doí to say tiuit 
IJb lUurtte r(«i»rfiM*Qt the diffc>rrocco in«<l« by the cT««enback policy in the eoaX of the 
^ngr. Thi« Uti4e«r ÍDtrn^r<»t«iH^» hoverpr, h«s heeo oommoaly pat apeo the 
A*. 1^, Míe H. WUTK« ifoncy amd Bamktt^, Ut 6(L, p. ML 



Obebnbaoes and Cost of thb Civil Wab 407 

ing the objects of govemment ezpenditnre is of very great 
importance for the present problem. For, since prices 
advanced in mnch greater ratio than wages, it is olear that 
the greenback issues must have increased the sums paid for 
commodities more than the Bxims paid for labor. Indeed, 
this difference between increase in cost of commodities and of 
labor seems to have been much wider in the case of the govem- 
ment than in the case of private persons; for, as was shown 
in sec. vüi of chap. v, the wages of federal employees were 
advanced on the average considerably less than the wages 
of other persons. Clearly, then, the first step in any 
estímate of the effect of the legal-tender act upon the 
expenditures incnrred by govemment during the war should 
be a carefnl separation of expenditures for commodities from 
expenditures for services. 

Accordingly, it is a very serious obstacle that one 
encounters in finding that such a separation cannot readily 
be made. A statement of the expenditures of the preceding 
fiscal year is published in each annual report of the sec- 
retary of the treasury. Bnt in these statements the items 
are arranged rather according to the department of govem- 
ment through or for which the specified sums were spent, 
than according to the object of expenditure. For example, 
the first general división of expenditures is placed under 
the caption ''Civil," and under this caption the first three items 
are "For Congress, including books,'' "Forexecutive," "For 
judiciary." It is obvious that each of these items must 
include payments for both commodities and services; but 
there is no way of separating the two classes of payments. 

A more detailed statement is given in the annual Account 
of ihe Beceipts and Expenditures of the United States 
rendered by the register of the treasury. But even these 
bulky documents do not make possible such a división of 
expenditures as is desired. A careful examination of the 



408 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOES 

regíster^s accounts for the fiscal years 1863-65 shows that 
about one-third of the total expenditures each year con- 
sists of ítems which appear to inclnde payments for both 
labor and commodities in xmknown proportions. Such, for 
example, are expenditures apon fortifícations, armones, and 
hospitals, repairs of ships, constniction of bnildings, inci- 
dental expenses of varíous bureaus, and the like. The best 
that can be done with these accounts is to divide the items 
into three classes: (1) expenditures for salaries and the like, 
most of which appear to have been little affected by the 
paper currency; (2) expenditures for commodities; (3) ex- 
penditures that include payments for both commodities and 
labor. Even with such a scheme of classification it is some- 
times difficult to decide where certain items should be 
placed. 

If this división of expenditures be accepted, the next 
step is to determine in what ratio the expenditures falling 
within each of the three classes shall be assumed to have 
been increased. In the first class the largest items are the 
pay of the regular and volunteer armies. As was shown in 
sec. viii of chap. v the wages of prívate soldiers was 
increased from $13 to $16 per month after May 1, 1864. 
Since this increase was made with the avowed object of 
compensating soldiers in some measure for the decline in 
the purchasing power of the paper money, one must con- 
sider three-sixteenths of the pay of the army after that time 
as an addition to the money cost of the war. It is not im- 
probable also that, had the specie standard been maintained, 
it would have been unnecessary to grant such lavish bounties 
to Bti muíate enlistments. If so, a part at least of the large 
sums reported as paid in bounties should be added to the 
increase in the cost of the war. To be on the safe side, 
however, this item will be neglected. As for other employees 
of the govemment besides the soldiers, it appears that in 



Obbbnbacks and Cost of thb Civil Wab 407 

ing the objects of govemment ezpenditure is of very great 
importance for the present problem. For, since pnces 
advanced in much greater ratio than wages, it is clear that 
the greenback issaes must have increased the sums paid for 
commodities more than the sums paid for labor. Indeed, 
this difference between increase in cost of commodities and of 
labor seems to have been much wider in the case of the govem- 
ment than in the case of private persons ; for, as was shown 
in sec. vüi of chap. v, the wages of federal employees were 
advanced on the average considerably less than the wages 
of other persons. Clearly, then, the fírst step in any 
estimate of the effect of the legal-tender act apon the 
expenditnres incnrred by govemment doring the war should 
be a carefnl separation of expenditnres for commodities from 
expenditnres for services. 

Accordingljy it is a very serióos obstacle that one 
encoonters in finding that such a separation cannot readily 
be made. A statement of the expenditnres of the preceding 
fiscal year is pnblished in each annnal report of the sec- 
retary of the treasnry. Bnt in these statements the items 
are arranged rather according to the department of govem- 
ment throngh or for which the specified sums were spent, 
than according to the object of expenditure. For example, 
the first general división of expenditnres is placed nnder 
the caption ''Civil/' and nnder this caption the fírst three items 
are "For Congress, inclnding books/' "For executive," "For 
jndiciary.^' It is obvions that each of these items mnst 
inclnde payments for both commodities and services; bnt 
there is no way of separating the two classes of payments. 

A more detailed statement is given in the annnal Account 
of ihe Receipts and Expenditures of the United States 
rendered by the register of the treasnry. Bnt even these 
bnlky docnments do not make possible such a división of 
expenditnres as is desired. A carefnl examination of the 



410 HlSTOBT OF THE GbBBNBAOKS 

inoreaae in príoe. For these varíous reasons the divergenoe 
between the two seríes possesses little significance. 

Much greater weight should be attached to the general 
conclusión drawn in chap. iv — that the dominant factor in 
determining príces during the war was the fluctuating valoa- 
tion of the curreney. There is no reason why knowledge 
that he would be paid in greenbacks should affect in differ- 
ent degrees the prices that a dealer would ask from the gov- 
emment and from private men. Since, then, the fairly 
satisfactory wholesale-príce data show a rather cloee paral- 
lelism between príces of commodities and of gold, it seems 
fair to infer that the sums asked of the govemment for 
identical goods also rose and fell in rough agreement with 
the premium. True, príces seem not to have advanced so 
quickly as did the gold quotation, but neither did they fall 
io quickly. Everything considered, then, the most trust- 
worthy index of the increase in the sums expended by the 
govemment upon commodities is probably found in the aver- 
age premium upon gold in the several fiscal years. 

Aii even larger element of conjecture enters into the esti- 
mate of the increase in the expenditures of the third class, 
which includes payments for both commodities and labor. 
8o far as commodities are concemed it is as fair here as in 
Olass II to apply the average premium upon gold as an 
index of the increase. But with reference to labor a new 
problem aríses. The salaríes of most persons in the regular 
servictí uf the govemment, aside from soldiers, were not in- 
oreakknl at all. But the tilles of the items grouped in Class 
IIl US they appear in the register^s accounts seem to indicate 
that tho great mass of the labor was not that of officials, but 
that of workmen employed on a stríctly commercial basis. 
la cunatructing fortifications, erecting and repairing public 
iMlUiliugH, etc., it is probable that the govemment or its 
OQüiraotora paid as much for the labor hired as a prívate 



Gbbbnbaoks and Cost of thb Civil Wab 411 

employer would have done. If so, it foUows that the beet 
índex of the increased expenditure on the labor included in 
this clase is found in the tablee of chap. v, particularly Tabla 
XXX, which shows the averave relative wages for all em- 



TABLELXJy 



■8TIMATBD XNOSSASB DI THB 



OBDINABT KX PMWDI TU K B» OP THB 
MHirT CAU8XD BT THB OBBBNBACK8 

(In millions of doUars) 



FBDBBAJj OOVBBV- 



Expenditures:^ 

Class I, salaríeB, etc 

Class II, commodities 

Class III. both labor and 

commoaities 

Assumed ratdo of increase: 

Class II> 

ClassIII» 

Estimated actuid increase: 

Class I, increase in pay of 
soldiers^ 

Class II 

Class III 

Total estimated increase each 

year 



Fiscal Tbabs 



1862 

Six 

Months 



92 

82 

89 
35Í 



2 
3 



1863 



242 

214 

238 

37)í 

27)í 



58 
51 

109 



1864 



259 
258 

294 

56^ 
44^ 



6 
93 
90 

189 



1865 



406 
402 

405 

102jt 

71% 



82 
203 
176 

441 



1866 

Two 

Months 



45 
43 

44 

4» 
4W 



20 
13 

14 

47 



^The ñgíU9B for the üsoal years 186ÍMKS are obtained from the annnal reporte on 
*'Reoeipt8 and Expenditores. " For the second half of the fiscal jear 1862 the ordinary 
expenditores were estimated on the hasis of the ** Treasnrer's Acooonts'* (H. B. JBs. 
Doc No, 4, 88th Ck>ng., Ist SessOt f^^^ these exi>endi tares were divided amoo^the three 
dasses aooordin^ to the proportions giren by the oompntations for 1868. Similarlj, 
the expenditnres for the months Jnly and Aognst, 1865, are assumed to be two-thirds 
of the total for the qnarter Jnly to September and are divided among the three 
elasses in the same ratio as the expenditores for the fiscal year 1865. 

s ATerage preminm niwn gold as given in Appendix A below. 

s ATerage of preminm on gold and increase in money wages aooording to system 
of TariaUe weights, as shown by Table XXX aboye. For wages in eaoh fiscal year I 
haTe taken the index nnmber for Jannary of the oorresponding calendar year. 

^Three-sixteenths of pay of army (exoept bonnties) after May 1, 1864, as the pay 
is reported in **Beoeipts and Expenditores/* For the months Joly and Aogost, 186S, 
the inerease is oompoted on one-half the som stated by the paymaster-general as 
paid to the army between Jone 80 and Ootober SI. (Sx, Doo, No, i, Part II, p. 886| 
aoth Gong., Ist Sess.) 



412 HlSTOET OF THE GeEE!ÍBACKS 



flojet»tarwhom data ize gÍTea ín Table XH of the Aldriek 
RíparL ÁMBaming so mnciu we hETe two rmtioE of inewemae 
ín expmidiiiirfr Cor tbm djaa — one a(>plicEble to the príees of 
coHimoditíeE, the otfaer to the wEges of Ubor. Since there 
if Bo wmj of dvstmgni^hmg between expeaditnre for goods 
and labor it is necessarj to make sonie poiel j arlntrarj 
aoRimptioQ regarding theír relatire amoontaL The simplest 
i—iimption is that the increaae in the total expenditnres of 
CUum III was midwaj between the arerage preminm apon 
gold and the arerage increase in monej wages. PerhapB 
this asBomption maj be accepted as well as an j other, for, 
if no definite reason can be aangned for it, neither can anj 
mson be assigned in faror of anj riral assomption* 

In accordance with the preceding plan, Table LXIY has 
been constmcted to show the probable increase in the ex- 
penditore of the goTemment caosed bj the issnes of pEper 
WDonej between the date of sospension and Angost 31, 1865, 
when the pablic debt reached its maximnm amoont.' The 
taltal ¡ncTease for the whole period is $791,000,000. After 
ai I that has been said of the elements that enter into the 
probiem ít is hardly necessary to insist strenuoosly that this 
total is bat a very roogh estimate. 

III. THE OBEEXBACKS AXD BECEIPTS 

Almost all the wríters who have discnssed the financia! 
amm^lufmcM» of the legal -tender acts have confíned their 
atUfiition tí} the increase of expenditures. This procedure 
tu \)*'rhfnm nataral for ardent critics of the paper-money 
firiliry, btit a little consideration shows that it is unfair. The 
rufKirtM i){ the secretary of the treasnry give the govem- 
m^fif. rovíínoe nnder five heads — customs, sales of public 
UfidH, ílirfH^t tax, mLscf?llane<ju8 sources, and intemal revenue. 
Of thíjwí receipts some were and some were not afifected by 

^lUjnrri nf the HccTttary of the Treatury, 1M6, p. 6. 



Gbeenbacks and Cost op THE CiviL Wab 413 

the greenback issnes. In accordance with the provisions of 
the first legal-tender act cnstoms duties were paid in gold, 
and the od valorem duties were assessed on the foreign 
specie valuation of goods. The receipts from this source 
therefore remained on substantiallj the same footing as if 
specie payments had been maintained. During the war 
receipts from the sales of pnblic lands were an item of 
little importance — less than $1,000,000 per year — despite 
the decline in the valué of the currency that might be paid 
by the purchaser of lands. The receipts from direct taxes 
were all coUected under one law passed six months before 
suspensión. This law fixed the total amount of the tax at 
$20,000,000 and determined the precise amount to be raised 
by each state.^ Accordingly the legal-tender acts had no 
efFect upon this item — except that the states were enabled 
to pay their quotas in greenbacks instead of in gold. The 
revenue derived from miscellaneous sources includes a con- 
siderable number of small items. Of these, some were doubt- 
less increased by depreciation, e. g., proceeds of sales 
of captured and abandoned property. Other items were 
onafiFected, e. ^., receipts of fees by American consuls abroad. 
Premiums on sales of gold coin among these miscellaneous 
receipts may be set down from the present point of view as 
clear gain. 

The last of the enumerated govemment receipts remains, 
the intemal-reyenúe duties. This system of taxation was 
inaugorated by an elabórate law passed July 1, 1862, which 
imposed certain duties, partly ad valorem^ partly specifíc, 
upon a great yariety of manuf actured articles ; imposed a tax 
upon the gross receipts of cañáis, railroads, theaters, etc.; 
taxed auction and brokers' sales; reqtiired licenses for prac- 
ticing professions; levied an income and a legacy tax, and 
placed certain taxes upon articles of luxury, such as carriages, 

1 Aot of Au^rost 6, 1861; 12 SUituteg at Large^ p. 294. 



pi&nofi and píate.' This law was superseded two years later 
by aaotlier intemal-revenue act whicli raised the rates of 
taxatíon, and increased the namber oí articles made to p&y 
dntieB,' 

At the time the firet law was passed the depreciation of 
the currency was not great, aiiil probably tlie ratee of taxa- 
tion imposed do not differ much from what tliey woald have 
been apon a spocie hasis. But without any modifícatioQ 
of the terma of the law, the progreesive rise of pricea innst 
have caused an iucFease of the revenne from ad vntorem 
dnties, and from taxes on groas receipts and upuu ínoomeB. 
Receipts from epecifíc dutiee. Uceases, etc., however, prob- 
ably did not increaee except as cijaiiges were made in the 
law or in ita administration. While, tlien, the yield of thís 
most important of the soarces of federal revenne wae materi- 
ally affect-ed by the legal-tender acta, it would he too mnch 
to argüe, as was done with reference to expenditare» for 
eommoditiee, that it was increased in the ratio indicated by 
the premium on gold, Some arbitrary aseumption, however, 
must be made regarding the ratio of increase if any estimat«^ 
íb to be had. Again, it ¡a perhape best to adopt the eimplest 
espedient, and coant the increase of receipts from intenial 
taxea at the full amonut indicated hy the premium, bat, on 
the other hand, take no account of the increase of receipts 
from miscellaneous sources. Since the latter sama are 
relatively small, it is prolmble that an estímate thiu made 
will err rather on the aide of over. than of understating the 
increase of revenue. 

The total increase of receipts ahown by this method as 
applied in Table LXV is $174,000,000. Again the caution 

I It íltalttlea a( XrfKpb pp. UG-U. Th« unendiiHnits tfl tblí act wsntDotroch M tu 
iDonus thn IMmI nnana dnrliml rrom II. Sm bcU of Jal» II, ■•£ OS » 
•SI): ll*reh3,lM3(<(il<l., pp. 7I.V3I), ■DdUarob^lMt (ISfifofWn. D-III. 




Gbeenbaoks and Cost of THE CiviL Wab 415 



TABLELXY 

mCBBABa m THB OBDIN ABT BECEn>T8 OF THS WKDWaULL OOVESNMSirT 
GADBKD BT THS OKEENBACKS 

(In millions of doUars) 





Fiscal 

Year 

1882 (Six 

Months) 


Fiscal 
Year 
18A8 


Fiscal 
Year 
1864 


Fiscal 
Year 
1865 


Fiscal 

Year 

1866 (Two 

Months) 


Current receipts: ^ 
Prom customs 


33.5 

.1 

1.8 
.5 


69.1 

.2 

1.5 

3.0 

37.6 


102.3 

.6 

.5 

47.5 

109.7 

260.6 

56^ 
39 


84.9 
1.0 
1.2 

33.0 
209.5 


31.3 


From sales of publio lands. 
From direct tax 


.1 
.0 


From miscellaneous sources 
From intemal reyenue — 


12.3 
64.4 


AflHumed ratio of increase . . . 
Estimated actual increase . . . 


35.9 



111.4 

31% 

10 


329.6 

102)í 
106 


108.1 
19 



Í8 hardly necessary that the result is to be accepted subject 
to a wide margín of error. 

So far the discussion of the increase both of expenditures 
and of reyenues has proceeded as if the paper currency had 
exerted none but simple and direct effects. There were other 
financial conseqnences of the shift from the specie to the 
paper standard, howeyer, that were not unimportant, thongh 
they were indirect and difficult to gauge. Three of the most 
prominent mnst be indicated. 

1. It is probable that not a little of the layishness with 
which pnblic fonds were appropriated by Congress during 
the war can be traced to the paper-money policy. At least 
snch was the opinión of a man so well placed to obserye the 
operations of the treasury as Hngh McCuUoch. In his report 
of 1867 he said: ''As long as notes could be issued and 
bonds conld be sold at a preminm or at par, for what the 

1 As glTon by the annaal statements of the register of the treasury (see Finance 
i2^portf,1862,p.87; 1863, pp. 34, 35; 1864,p.33; 1865, pp. 44, 45, 48). For 1862 the reoeipts 
of the last two qoarters of the year are given ; for 1866 two-thirds of the receipts for 
the flnrt qnarter. 



416 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEEXBACKS 

statote made monej, there was a constant temptation to 
liberal, if not mmecesBarr, expenditnres. Had the specie 
standard been maintaincd and bonds been sold ai a disooont 
for real monej, there wonld have been an economy in all 
branches of the pnblic service which unfortunately was not 
witnessed*'^ ' 

2. If the paper cnrrenc j tempted the govemment to reck- 
less expenditnres, it also predisposed the people to snbmit 
more willinglj to heavy taxation. It has been remarked 
sereral times that the advance of monej wages and of money 
prices made most people feel wealthier, and, feeling wealthier, 
thej were less inclined to gmmble over the taxes. 

3. Bnt while the feeling of prosperity may have been 
instrumental in procuring a cheerfnl acceptance of war taxes, 
it is very donbtfnl whether the net efFect of the paper-money 
system was favorable to revenne. It was pointed ont in the 
last chapter that the lagging of money wages behind money 
prices necessaríly diminished the consnmption of wealth 
among wage-eamers. In so far as this diminntion affected 
the consnmption of articles that paid either an import or an 
excise dnty — and there were but few articles exempt from 
taxation by one of these methods — the fall of real wages 
mnst have lessened the tax receipts. Mnch the same must 
have been true, although in less degree, of the indirect taxes 
coUected from the consnmption of the great agricultural 
class, if the conclusión of chap. viii is tme, that farmers were 
injnred rather than benefited by the price flnctnations. On 
the other hand, the extravagance of the fortúnate families 
enriched by the receipt of high profits tended to increase 
the revenne for the timo being; bnt it is improbable that the 
increase of receipts from the enlarged consnmption of this 
limited class offset the decrease of receipts from the enforced 
economics of wage-eamers and farmers. 

1 Repori of the SecrHarp o/theTrcatwrp, NoTember 30, 1S67« p. zi. 



Gbeenbaoks and Cost of THE CiviL Wab 417 

Wliile, then, these indirect effects of the paper currency 
on expenditures and receipts could not by anj system of 
bookkeeping be bronght to definite qnantitative statement, 
it is probable that their net resolt was unfavorable to the 
treasury. 

lY. THE GBEENBAOKS AND THE PUBLIC DEBT 

It maj seem that in a discnssion of the financial conse- 
qnences of the legal-tender acts accoont shonld be taken of 
the effect of the deeertion of the specie standard npon the 
terms on which the govemment could borrow. The resort 
to a legal-tender paper currency, one may argüe, is a con- 
fession of acute financial distress and as such must depress 
the market for bonds. Therefore, to the financial loss caused 
by the increase of expenditures should be added a second 
loss from the unfavorable terms to which the govemment 
had to submit in selling its securíties. 

Of oourse, it is true that the secretarles of the treasury in 
their efforts to borrow money were obliged to agree to some 
very hard bargains. There was little ground for exultation 
over the sale at par of bonds bearing interest at 5 or 6 per 
cent, in gold when the currency received from purchasers 
was worth in specie but 50 per cent, of its face valué. But 
this loss arising from the difiference in valué between the 
paper dollars received by the treasury for bonds and the 
specie dollars which the treasury contracted to pay bond- 
holders after a term of years is not a further loss in addition 
to the loases discussed in the preceding sections, but rather 
these same loases looked at from another point of view. For, 
the estímate of the increase of expenditures above receipts, 
and therefore of debt contracted, rests precisely upon the 
decline in the valué of the paper doUar from the specie 
standard. One may arrive at an estímate of the loss either 
by computing the increase in the number of dollars that had 



to be borrowed in paper money to be repaid in gold, or by 
estímating tbe decline in the specíe valué of the paper monej 
raiaed by the sale of bonda; but to malee estimates bj both 
ot these methods would be to include two guesses at the 
Bame itew. 

It íb, of conree, tme that, had gold bonds been Bold largeiy 
at lesB than par for paper monej, a second Iosb would have 
been incurred from the discoiint in addition to the lose from 
the emaller purchasing power of tha currency received. But, 
as a matter of fací, the deviations from par in the aubecríp- 
tion prices for bonda were not of great importance. The 
pricea of govemment securítíes did nut fiuctuate vt-ry widely 
during the war, for the very good reaaon that these prictte 
ehowed merely the valué of ene Bet of govemment promiaee 
to pay, viz., bonds — in terms ot another Bet — viz., green- 
backs. Most factore that affected the credit of the govem- 
ment would aSect the apecie valué of all itB promises in much 
the same manner, and therefore would not alter materialiy 
the ratio ot one to another. 

It remains only to sny a word about the effect ot the 
legal-tender acts npon the intereat charge borne by the gov- 
emment. The great fínancial argument in favor ot the 
greenbacks baa always been that they conatitute a "loan 
withont interest," However many millionathe depreciation 
of tilia current-y added to the princi[>nl of the public debt, 
the greenbackfi should be credíted with whatever aum waa 
really aaved in this taahion. But agaínst the sa^'ing of 
interest effected by isauíiig greenbac-ks instead of selUng 
bunds ahould t>e put down the losa of interest uu the 
increase of debt arísiug from the augmeutation of cxpendi- 
tnres. If the rate of interest be taken at O per cent., a 
simple calculation ehowa that the interest saved by the 
greenbacks up to Angust 31, 1865, waa but 928,000,000 
greater than the interest lost through the excess ot increaso 



fü^ 



Gbebnbaoks and Cost op thb Civil Wab 419 

of expenditures over the increase of receipts as shown by 
Tablee LXIV and LXV. By the end of this period the 
aogmentation of debt caused by the greenbacks had appar- 
ently become greater than the volame of greenbacks in cir- 
culation, so that from this time forward the annual loss of 
interest probably exceeded the gain. 

V. CONCLUSIÓN 

The public debt reached its máximum amonnt Angust 31, 7 'i i 
1865, when it stood at $2,846,000,000.' Of this immense . * ' "» 
debt the preceding estimates indicate that some $589,000,000, r i J 
or rather more than a fífth of the whole amonnt, was dne to 
the substitution of United States notes for metallic money. 
Little as these estimates can pretend to accuracy, it seems 
safe at least to accept the conclusión that the greenbacks 
increased the debt incurred during the war by a sum run- 
ning into the hundreds of millions. If so, it follows that, 
even from the narrowly financial poiñt of view of their spon- 
sors, the legal-tender acts had singularly unfortunate con- 
sequences. 

The present chapter, to agree with its predecessors, must 
end with the OiyU War. But it may be pointed out that 
the financial effects of the legal-tender acts, like the eco- 
nomic efFectSy did not cease with the retum of peace. No 
additional discussion is required to show that the varying 
depreciation of the currency continued to affect the volume 
of both receipts and expenditures until resumption of specie 
payments in January, 1879, restored the greenbacks to 
equality with gold. It is equally clear that the United 
States notes continued to be a " loan without interest," and 
that, on the other hand, the govemment continued to pay 
interest on the unnecessary debt created during the war. 
But there is another phase of the subject that deserves spe- 

1 B^itcrt cf the Secretary of the Treatury, 1866, p. 6. 



*I3} HlSTOBT OF THS GbBBNBACKS 



cial T^mark^ becanse it is freqaentlj overlooked. A consid- 
^mbfe portioii ot the immeiiae pablic debt ín ezistence 
Aoifwt $1^ 1S63^ coDsisted of obligatíons expreeslj payable 
m *^ tBwfttl rnaaej.** In so far as the govemment was able 
W pttv tihwe debts oat of revenae before the greenbacks had 
appreciaUíd to par» it effécted a saviiig.' But all such top- 
isc«^ tihí coatmoied effect of depreciation on govemment 
Mtap^uvlitxii^na^ and reviHiine^ the annnal loss or gain of Ínter- 
in!» ih^ v.\Mi at which the "^lawful money'' debt was paid, 
||h> oxp^'tiiw at which specie payments were resnmed, and 
ihM viid&cultitíi^ encoontered in maintaining the conyertibility 
\it Uk« pa(M»r mon^ir into specie — belong to a later períod in 
llk«> hunurv v^ th^ ^r^enbacks. It is probable, however, that 
>^^xv a car^ñtl ^udv made of these topics the indictment 
bNCv^icht ^^púiu»! the (preenbacks on financial gronnds woold 



* sM «HMn«fc «ItoM lá» 1a«M wu mm f dibl was paid bj rofudinc opentioos— 

i4»h . y sHit vp¿ »i>» ^^*u»^1J> ot mw» loi» thuMiwlirwii pajmble in gold — po wich saring» 
f^*t^>v«J> «^«1*1» Uw ^MW IkmkI» w«»r«» :M>Id at a premiom. An estimaU» of the saTÍnir 
%^^w«. >> N «te<Mj4 i«M^ b« fbouU lA tíM JomrmMl of PUiticat Kcomom^^ YoL Y, pp. 145-9. 
IHék v^^^l .t4 44«wJ ju 1* nSkOM^OML If UlÍ2» 4um ba dedncted from the abore estímate 
•s «^K- :ihi.«va.^ -ik ^ia^ Um aM Ums* W tha govenuneot caiLsad by the craonbacks 
t^njí^ .«K ^wu vuU 3>4iU JH i p aar tu bava bss« ovar balf a bUlioa in gokL 



STATISTICAL APPENDICES 



420 HlSTOBT OF THE GbEBNBAOKS 

cial remark, because it is frequently overlooked. A consid- 
erable portion of the immenBe pnblic debt in existence 
August 31, 1865, consisted of obligations expreesly payable 
ín " lawful money/^ In so far as the govemment was able 
to pay these debts out of revenue bef ore the greenbacks had 
appreciated to par, it effected a saving.* But all such top- 
ics — the continued efifect of depreciation on govemment 
expenditures and revenue, the annnal loss or gain of inter- 
est, the cost at which the "lawful money'' debt was paid, 
the expense at which specie payments were resumed, and 
the difficulties encountered in maintaining the convertibility 
of the paper money into specie — belong to a later period in 
the history of the greenbacks. It is probable, however, that 
were a careful study made of these topics the indictment 
brought against the greenbacks on fínancial groonds woold 
be rendered yet more serious. 

lOf oonrse, when the lawful money debt was paid by refonding operatioiu— 
that is, out of the prooeeds of new loaos themselTes payable in gold — no such sa rings 
restüted, unless the new bonds were sold at a preminm. An estímate of the saving 
actnally effected may be found in the Journal qf Political Economy^ VoL V, pp. 146-9. 
The total arrived at is $72,000,000. If this sam be dedacted from the aboTe estímate 
of the increase in debt, the net loss to the govemment caused by the greenbacks 
dnring the war will still appear to ha ve been oyer half a billion in gold. 



Appendix a 





Jannarj 


Februnrr Uarcb 


April 


May 


Joiia 


14 
15 

la 

ü 

20 

3S 

SR 


W9.50-B8.K 
99.01 -W.TI 
99,01-88.17 

97.80-ffJ.M 
BJ. 33-91. OB 
96.63 

<n. 00-01. OB 

S;gS3 

ei.8l}«T.5« 
m.SM7.M 

BT. «0-91. se 

Si 

M.8V9s.a: 
K.az-as.so 


!96. 62-98.83 
BS. 71-88.82 

B6:i4-9n:8K 
68.14-98.50 

SB.ez-se.so 
«,a)-9a.S7 

S6.Í1-99.1.Í 
98.15-98.04 
95 92-9^,81 

95:!.8-95,47 

98 99-98.27 
98.74-SB,3a 

S¡:K!:8 

96,97-98,97 

i'ÉI 

(ll!02-B7*BO 
97.92-97.80 


ÍB7.6^ffí.58 
96.04-97,68 

ee ie-M,a4 

98. 04-96. H 
«8.04-91.92 

9h!28-98:iS 

98,04-98,04 
98,40-9828 
98,40-98.40 

i;pi 

98.52-98.40 

98:52-98: 40 
98.77-98.64 

9B:77-B8:g« 

98.77-88.64 
98.B9-B8.TI 
98.77-98.64 

i;g|:i 

98.64-98.» 


(98,18-98,04 

98:2S-98:16 
98,28-98 16 
98,16-98,04 

98:'¿8-B8.ia 
9B.IS-98.W 
98,28-98,01 

98,28-08,18 
98,28-98 18 
96,40-98,40 

98:52-98:tó 

98,40-96,40 
98.40-98.40 
98,40-98,28 
98,52-98,40 

Ba.r>2-aa.r,2 

98,52-98,40 

S!:á!:i 

98,M-«8.0I 


891,92-97,80 

96.97-96,39 
97.44-98,73 

lili 

96,14 96,50 
98.83-96,74 
96,8-,-96,S5 
9S.6.-Í-98.50 

^■¥-^' 

96.K-9«.&'1 
98,85-98,74 
96,85-96,62 

spii 

96,15-96,» 

9621-96:15 
98. 39-96, ?I 


8. 

ts6.ez-ea.go 

98,15-95.91 
9e.lMS.M 

95:92-95:8! 
«6,14-95,69 

ilíS 

94:lo:w:tó 

94.84-98.79 
84.01-93.70 
94.0J -93.90 

93.68-02,50 
02,38-9) e& 
02,38-9106 

fMi 

91,85-01,53 










Jolx 


Aoimat 




October 


NDfemb..r 


DocemW 


Id 

h 

i 


«)1.9$-9l.¡a 
91,32-91.01 

lÉI 

8aii9-«r)!ii 

S3.I5-S8.21 
Í1.SZ-8I.M 

M,rAv93 

8J.6»^.(1 
81,09-83,88 

83.51M«.25 
84.03-83.98 
8i.41d(,3e 

U'.'ti-ia'.n 

BS.1(-SS,0£ 

87! 43-86:87 
8T,S4-«8,87 


•S-.l|ü:S 

SI.E4-«,99 

B8.a|«,j9 
88.89-88. SO 

P:lü!:g 

88.77-86,30 
87!s4-8T;24 

ao.9é'86!7i 

86.77-86.30 

SS.i|iSS 

88.71-88.30 

!S:SÜ:S¡ 

88.98-86.49 


18^.84-85.41 
33.84-83.65 
84.93-84.75 
84.93-84.84 

lÉI 

«.".,. '58-85. 47 
85,65-85.3)1 

iÉ-i 

88:38-82:81 
83:30-80:65 


«,6^,30 

81,38-80,58 
M.3(^«0.13 

iSil 
lili 

til 

n, 75-17. 22 

lili 

16.92-76,19 
77;K'-lfl:9S 


ÍTJ. 15 16.19 

lili 

lili 

70 9S-76.34 
76 78-76,63 
76 18-78,56 
78.63-16,18 

76,85%, 18 

Ifül 

■ S. 


177,82-16,05 

?.Sf. 

75,19-14,68 

7S:6S^75:76 

7a.«i7,06 
75.40-15.19 
75.69-15,47 

lli:i 
i:li;l 

75,69-15, as 

75,7^15:» 
75,61-15,10 

ÍP 

75 83-75,83 









APPENDIX A 
GoLD Valüe op THE Papeb Cubbency, 1862-65 

ExPLAMATOBT NoTS.— Thero are two well-anthenticated tables that show ihe 
ayerage monthly and yearly valae of enrrency in gold daring the Civil War: (1) a 
table pnblished by the American Almatuus (see, e. g.^ issae of 1889, p. 341} ; (2) a table 
prepared by the Bareau of Statistics {Finance^ Commerce and Immigratíon of th9 
United States, Series of 1895-96, No. 4, p. 518). For the years 1862-65 these tables are 
identical; the flgnres given below are taken from the second. This table was pre- 
pared by Mr. K B. Elliott, aetaary of the treasnry, In the following manner : four 
daily qnotations of the rates of gold at New York, viz., the opening, highest, lowest, 
and dosing prices, were recorded ; from them a daily average was made, and from 
these aTerage daily prices was prepared the ayerage rate for each month. 

The table of daily highest and lowest prices is based, for the reasons assigned 
in the text (Part 11, chap. iii, sec. i), upon the table gi ven in the Report of the Ckam' 
ber qf Commerce of the State of New York for 1865-66, Part II, pp. 130-33. The figures 
for the flrst eleven days of January, 1862, however, are supplied from the daily 
reporta of the premiom on gold in the New Tork Commercial Advertiaer, 



TABLE 1 

KOWTHLT HIOHBST, AVSBAOB, AND LOWBST OOLD PRICB OF $100 OF PAPEB MONBT 

IN THB NEW TOBE M ABEET 



1862 



Month 


Date of Highest Price 


Highest 1 


Ayerage 


Lowest 1 


Dateof 
Lowest Pr. 


January 

February . . . 

March 

Apríl 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September.. 

October 

November. . . 
December... 


1 

27,28 

25 

8,18,19,24,25,26 

11 

1 

9,11 

1, 2, 16, 17, 18 

1 

29 
1 


199.50 
97.92 
98.77 
98.52 
97.92 
96.74 
91.95 
88.89 
85.84 
81.97 
77.52 
77.82 


$97.60 
96.60 
98.20 
98.50 
96.80 
93.90 
86.60 
87.30 
84.40 
77.80 
76.30 
75.60 


$95.24 
95.47 
97.56 
97.68 
96.04 
91.32 
83.25 
86.02 
80.65 
74.91 
75.05 
74.63 


10 

15 

1 

2 

27 

27 

22 

29 

30 

22 

10 

4 



1 The highest and lowest prioes are taken from the following tables of daily 
prices. 

423 



424 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAGKS 



TABLE 1 - Continued 

MOMTHLT UOHBIT, AVKKAOB, AND IX)WB8T OOLD PEICS OF $100 OF 

m THX MEW TOBK MAULBT 

1863 



PAPBB Morer 



Month 


Dato of Húrhast Price 


Hiffhasti 


Ayera«e 


Lowesti 


DAtoof 
LowwtPr. 


January 


2 


r74.84 


$68.90 


$62.21 


31 


February . . . 


10,11 


66.57 


62.30 


57.97 


26,28 


March 


26 


71. 9á 


64.70 


58.22 


1.2 


April 

May 


8 


68.73 


66.00 


63.34 


1 


26,28 


69.69 


67.20 


64.62 


7 


June 


10 


71.17 


69.20 


67.40 


16 


July 


20 


81. U 


76.60 


68.97 


1 


Aufnist 


25 


81.88 


79.50 


77.07 


1 


September. . 


1 


78.82 


74.50 


69.87 


29 


October 


1 


71.24 


67.70 


63.80 


15 


November. . . 


27 


69.93 


67.60 


64.94 


21,23 


December.. . 


1 


67.51 


66.20 


65.47 


4,29 



1864 



January 

February . . . 

March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September. . 

October 

November.. . 
Deceml)er. . . 



6 
27 
1 
4 
10 
2 
1 

30 
30 
3 
18 
19 



$66.01 


$64.30 


$62.75 


63.64 


63.10 


62.11 


62.89 


61.40 


58.91 


60.15 


57.90 


54.13 


59.52 


56.70 


52.63 


53.05 


47.50 


40.00 


45.06 


38.70 


35.09 


43.20 


39.40 


38.20 


52.36 


44.90 


39.29 


62.91 


48.30 


43.91 


47.62 


42.80 


38.46 


47.00 


44.00 


41.15 



19 
16 
26 
26 
31 
29,30 
11 

6 

2 
31 

9 

7 



1865 



January.. . 
February . 
March — 

April 

May 

Juno 

July 

AuKUHt . . . 
BeptenilM'r 
OctolM'r . . 
Novenib<»r 
|>toemlK'r 



21 
21 
24 
10 
11 

5 

3 

11.15 

15 

2,3 

1 

9 



$50.70 


$46.30 


$42.67 


50.92 


48.70 


46.14 


67.51 


57.50 


49.75 


69.09 


67.30 


64.73 


77.82 


73.70 


68.91 


73.94 


71.40 


67.74 


72.14 


70.40 


68.43 


71.30 


69.70 


68.73 


70.11 


69.50 


68.97 


69.38 


68.70 


67.11 


68.73 


68.00 


67.23 


09. 20 


68.40 


67.34 



4 

7 

1 

5 

1 

15 
28 

2 

1 

G 
29 
1.4,5 



iTkíehUrhesiandlowesi prices are iakea from the foUowing tables of dail> 



Appendix a 





Jannnrr 


Fobruarr 


Uareh 


AprEl 


May 


Jann 




(».50-ge.si 


198.62-98,83 


197 .6^17.56 


«»,I9-»6.01 


«7.92-97,80 


B. 






S. 


8. 






tsa.si-as.sa 






99.71-B6,63 


98.01-97.68 




97:56-97:32 


9g.8Z-w.a 




Qüi^g-BaiM 


9S. 62-98. SO 


98 18-98. M 


08:28-98 16 


8. 


B8,ffi:w.m 




8. 


9S. 71-98.82 


9a.0l-98.W 


98.16-98.01 


96.07-96.39 


96 .80-98. IS 




91.»«7.58 


B8. 71-96.82 


98.01-97.92 


B. 




08,lS-BS.tt 




?7. 32-97 .09 




08.01-97 9! 


97,92-97 80 




96.15-96.04 




KM 






98.52-97.92 


97:33-97:09 






95.92 




8. ■ 


98.28-98 16 


96.97-96.85 


95,92^95,81 




M.aí-9S.M 


98 50-96.27 


98.01-98.01 


98,28-98.16 


Ba.K>-9B,71 






9«. 02-96.15 


S8.27-B9.1S 


98,10-98.28 




3. 


96:74-95:69 








98.10-98.40 


98:28-98.04 




95.17-95.01 




9T.I»-9T.a9 




98.52-98.52 




96:85^96:71 


95,01-91.90 




97,32-9»,85 


95.81-95 58 


98,52-98,40 


98,28-98.18 


98.85-96.85 








S5.M-95.n 


98,52-98,52 


98.28- »8,16 


96,85-96.50 








8. 


S. 




97. 09-96. e-.! 


O3.90-g3.gg 






98.X>-eS.27 






97.09-90,97 


94.31-1>3,00 




98:!8-98:m 


98.71-98.39 


98:61^18:52 


98:53-98:K 


B. 


94.90-W,45 




8. 


97,09-96.85 


98,52-98.10 


98,52-98,10 


«I,M-98,S5 








98.8,Í-Bfl.71 




8. 


96 85-96,71 












98.10-98,10 




94:01-93:90 




97:M-in:31 


97:0^97:0» 


98:77-Bg:al 


98 10-08.10 


96:62-98:50 






*«.Í1-99,3D 


8. 


8. 


98 10-88.28 


96,11-98.62 


93,6^2.59 






97.09 98.85 


98.77-fl8.8i 


9e.!^-í«.tó 




92,3«-91,gS 


25 




97. 09-98.97 


98.89-98,77 




'b. ' 


92.38-91.96 


•X 










98.15-96.15 


91.85-91,51 


V 


97.09-9S.BS 


97,92-97;» 


98:77-9g:í8 


8. 


96,15-96.01 


91,13-91,11 




98.74-98.71 


97.92-97.80 


98-77-98,61 


98.10-98.28 


96.21-08.15 


91.74^1,01 




eB.gS-96.71 




98.a2-Se,52 


98.28-S8.2a 








«a.a-M.fsz 




8. 




96:90-96:50 


si.&'i-in.ss 




ea.ffi-se-w 




98,61-08.23 




98.62-98,50 












~ 


JnlT 


Anmut 


flaptBinbor 


Ootobor 


Noíemb>.r 


D«ember 


~ 


|9l.9S-fll.Kl 


(88.86-86.39 


185.84-85.47 




»17.1!v76.19 


(17.82-76.05 


2 


B1.8S-M.» 


86.9ft«-TI 


85,81-85.05 






16.34-18,05 




91.112-91.82 


S. 


81,9S-M,75 


81 ,72^1, .55 


76.63-76.05 


76.81-70,78 




Holídar 


ST.tt-86.9S 


81.93-84,84 


81,61-81,30 




75-19-74,61 








8. 










87:21-«7:i5 


8i:ál-83:«8 


81.38-80.58 




76:83-75:78 




90.91-90.70 


87.72-87.05 


8. 


81,30-80.72 


76 05-75,78 


S. 




RB.SS-Bft.BS 


M.7M7.72 


81.21-83.68 




73.18-15 n 


76-12-87,08 










79:81-79:(S 


8. 


75.40-75,19 




w\e-65!ii 


B. 


81:30-84:21 


78.50-77,52 


75 61-75.05 


75.60-75,17 




87.15-86.21 


8S.SB-S8.20 




78,12-17.97 


76.34-75.33 


75.69-75,81 




87.82^1.31 


88.11-87.53 


8i:»tí:2i 


8. 


76-«5-75,76 


76.(B-75.B«) 




B. 


87.1S-87.S1 


81.7M4.S7 


77.52-77.37 


76.05-75,76 


76.26-75.78 




88.S8-8S.ra 


88.77-88.30 




76,31-75.19 




S. 


K 


K. 85-83. 17 




85,11-81,93 


75,76-75,33 




75. 83-75. M 




8S.flS-T5.29 


87;31-87;21 


85.81-8193 


75,76-75.11 


■ 8. 


75-16-7S.2a 




81.91-81.12 


B. 


8.7. 81-85. 11 


75 76-75.17 


75,76-75.61 


75.61-75.18 


W 




88 88-88.77 


85.81-85.58 


76.a!-76.78 


76.12-7S.76 




19 


u.msi'.a» 


87. IS-8S.83 


8), 56-85. 17 


8. 






M 




88.96-88.77 


85,65-85.38 


71. 75- "7. 22 




73.7B-75:íB 


n 


83..'i1-8S.S3 


«6.TJ-flfl.30 






76,78-76,56 


S. 


22 


e3.J(M».S5 


88 58-86.02 


87.38-85.11 


7.5:10- 1:91 


16,63-76,18 


75.ei-7S.tO 




U. 03-83. 88 


86.86-86.30 






8. 




!t 


8-'>.17 S1.8S 


5. 




76.31- i!:76 


16.85-76,18 


75:78-75:61 


a 


87.S3-85.81 


8fl.77-88.an 


g3:ss-82:si 


78.92- 8.1B 




l'Si^ 






88.77-88,67 


83.18-82-99 


8. 


77-37-77:22 


•n 


85.«^.U 




82,39-82.89 


78.92-76.19 


77,37-77,23 


73.88-75.40 


3S 


8B.74-85.ae 


88Í58-86I49 


8. 


75,97-7.5 fil 




» 




88. 21-86. ce 




76,19-75.90 




75.83-75.33 






86.19^.39 


82:3^80:6.5 


76,78-76.48 


■ 8. 


75.40-15.19 




87!31-86^B7 


B. 




77,22-76,92 















426 



HlSTORY OF THB GrEBNBACKS 



TABLE 2 - Ckmtimued 

DAILT nOBBBT AXD U>WBST TAX.ÜB VK OOLD OT $100 DI CCKBBSCY 

186S 





Janoary 


Fehraary 


1 Maivb 


Apríl 


May 


Jone 




X TcM*!^ 


S. 


& 


004.VK6S.94 


080.94-6S (« 


000.40-67.08 




f;4.M-;4.'90 


m.to^.M 


IB.»-«.2S 


6S.2S-6S.60 


6S. 72-61. 45 


68.14-67.01 




14.77-74.S 


64.71-64.18 


a.«-so.2S 


60.91^.19 


& 


68.14-68.68 




& 


61.<»-6a.0» 


60.6l^aO.St 


6l.6^64.tt 


67.fi-60.67 


68 040.28 




T4.»-n.M 


6I.K-6S.9 


60.0^0.9 


a. 


67.90-68.61 


0040.98 




74.0-74.91 


6I.»-6S,0» 


60.6;-64.04 


60.20-6S.41 


00.60-64.04 


O.9I-O70 




74.0-74.<R 


6I.K-6S.9I 


64.6^64.a 


60.67-6S.tt 


64.8044.6S 


& 




'a.m-Ti.n 


& 


& 


60.79-60.00 


64.8044.79 


O.08-OO 




72.4^:2.90 


64 7»«90 


64.21-6S.90 


60.98^.57 


67.U-6I.56 


70 90-70 21 


10 


73.00-72.<R 


6S.57-64.I» 


6*.a»6l.9S 


Ol.aMCTU 


a. 


n. 17-70 


11 


& 


e.57-«&.04 


61.91-60.00 


6l.45-6:;.57 


6f.94-67.n 


70 54-7» e 


IS 


71.11>?0.90 


64.»-64.79 


6I.0»«.4S 


a. 


67.94-67.60 


70 00-70 79 


u 


W.4S<«.44 


64.16-64.10 


co»«.6e 


6s.<o^a.» 


60.7840.72 


90.90-7(»tt 


14 


«.i4«€;.s; 


64.tt-64.IO 


6o.a»«io 


64.52-64.90 


60.7840.67 


& 


IS 


<7a-CS.9l 


& 


^ 


60.70-64.04 


60.7848.67 


0.900 


M 


«;»4i.a 


64.1V48.» 


64.7»^.a 


60.7»«.O4 


60.Y40.90 


6:.6i^4: 


17 


«.»«.7« 


6i.»^4S.7> 


64 67-64.0 


60.2^^.21 


& 


60.7941^0 


Ut 


& 


«Sa-6I.7S 


6&.90^.SS 


60.1540.5! 


60.9-60.67 


07-0 14 


n 


c;.»^9i 


«.02-60.00 


64 57-64. U 


& 


67.a-6;60 


oo»4s<s; 


» 


c;.»^9i 


6I.S4«.0: 


64.7>«.SS 


67.2040.94 


67.2047U 


0.6^40 


a 


C7»^.9l 


6l.7Ma.M 


64.0^44.57 


60 «-60.00 


67.2840.67 


«. 


a 


CM-CM 


& 


& 


60.61-6S.00 


6:.9»-66 70 


75-00 


s 


4k»4e;.s; 


0116^ fi 


60 2M&.1S 


67 4(MK.6; 


^m ^^ j^> ^^ 


0.754iiO 


3« 


cs.i^^.c; 


90.61-ai.SI 


6IL7»4S.OO 


6S0I-6S.7» 


s. ■ 


0.17-0 44 


S 


& 


».a-ai.6i 


71 .6^-70. S 


60.70-64.04 


60 61-60.90 


O.Oi^OO 


» 


«in-^si» 


aooo^fc 


71.00-n.90 


& 


00 6040 9; 


O.Oi^OO? 


»• 


eSMMC 


aLs;«» 


71.O>70.«l 


60.67-64.10 


00 6840 00 


68J(40O 


21 


O.S^«4.M 


m.a-s?*; 


?0.9O«.f7 


60.00-61.90 


60 040 98 


s. 


9> 


«afr^o 


1 


& 


«6^60 90 


6oaM»n 


0.9047 f; 


» 


«S9M»1> 




60.9^#::fl 


uLabnoA: rwi 


60 «u» S 


43^-» 14 


S 


c»-cn 


.... 


r: 9i-«f fT 




S. 






Ji:^ 


Aim:72<4 


f> S > M 


Or:..S r 


\\-.T«*xr.hK- 


I»«Mn.:»--r 


1 


JW- flS-^ V* 


fTa Sr • • k'» 


m 24- TI t4 


S. 


$r ia-r «o 


*■ 


«• jtf»« !S 


¿V 


TIS 4^-> u 


70 3>-«' íü 
70 ll-W.fT 


" í' Si ' iffi .^r 


«T 9Mr > 


5 


«• 44-«C 


5«-> 2!^ 


TT 3C;-T4 ií" 


fiS 4M» » 


6F. O-C ÍT 


« 


H^idaj 


■ 1 !••- . • t»T 


T4 «-:4 c 


S. 


6^ 4M» 41 


«. STr-C. 4T 


t 


¿V 


-» 2í^> 2r 


w flp» t: í** 


ff 44-60.1» 


«K OMT «D 


6. 01^^ 70 


f 


r 4<^71 fi 


1«|- T>.ar.te 


5V 


«^ 4MÍT « 


fT r:-r s 


¿V 


• 


-. 4* :: 3n 


> :♦ > 2*» 


TI. ifr-TT. rr 


«^ »4k9r 


» i^-fT je 


« ^'-fi: T4 


y 


> -4^ 'Hi » 


7t a > iJ 


TJ.Tf-Tr. fií' 


os ri:>-«K 4^ 


¿V 


f" 2M0 » 


í- 


% ?f»7^ (R 


s. 


Ti. 5i4-TI 4J' 


Ok 144K K 


» SMiL sr> 


fT M-IT > 


ii 


T Q - r 


Tf. 2!-> » 


Tft 2h-Tf '1 


ir. M'-fr.u 


6^ r-* Tj 


r: 204F1B 


11 


T;. «-Tí. 4: 


T*. a-> ít. 


TT 2^"* ¡i" 


& 


6lvTI^4K a 


flr. 2MV a 




>i 


TU 2^> If 


T,.^". Hí 


«F. «HKTif 


« 2l>-<» Oí 


flr. 5Mif ü* 


* • 
1 > 


"»!*-- «r 


TKK > *r4 


S. 


<w <M-M :;: 


«K ri'-cr « 


x 


'•4 


> :í-Tf (í 


> M > ÍE 


Tf r- - r 


c :.--& r«i 


oíi 2r> üK a 


0R7*-* a» 


4 • 


- >-- r 


T» >-> fil^ 


Tf \é t: ífc. 


fu KHR w 


5v 


«f. M»-« A 


If 


Tí fT -» 2t 


:s 


Tt. u-TT <;: 


f*.*-** s: 


«^ «--fT fT 


fT «o^k TO 


• • 


> 5: > JT 


TJ. «- Tf !2 


"T B •^ «~ 


r iv^-oh f 


«: «L-fT 311 


or. SMV. 4& 


:> 


> S» >!■ 


■»- «• T- «• 


TT. iK t: -e 


¿V 


Wn W*-W» f»T 


C. «.-C. T4 


u 


5s 


Ofi Jt TUt 


% t: •:* « 


OT 2^-^* rt 


OR»-*; 4T 


6f. IB-4E. 9 


2f 


« 1* > -» 


W: (K-!«. f» 


^ 


« »-«. > 


«:. rr^T;. s 


S 


•« 


> JT > 5a 


> M- "*■ > 


T. f»-T: «a 


» :."-* 4' 


<w. j :•.*%. M 


c T4-C rr 


rt« 


w. c- > 5: 


or. ]^ !«>. 1» 


t: of-T: 21 


Tf ii"-« rr 


Ñ 


»s^. T*-*? 0^ 


*«• 


> s: > 21. 


Si 


t: ts^t: r 


* ur-flf- > 


tr. !^.^-f4t 


<r. >^. ::: • 




> 2i->21 


or ÍE--IV fc 


TMÍ-Tl » 


» :••- 6K (£ 


* ,. -ñ: Tf 


<w. ff^-t::. » 


••: 


> ::: > 44 


fC OK-N «T 


TI 4f. T: 4Í 


5v 


*r ;::-.rv n 


\m»» I' y 


> 


5v 


K. «5-*i }4 


r. í* •:: te 


W HM^ > 


"iM^A. r^t 


6t. (ft-« a 


;■■ 


> ^- > :r 


«f s:-«w * 


5. 


* 4*-#r u. 


• OS-fls TJ 


S 


> 


> •> > a^ 


or. iE->*</ 41 


7! st: tt 


* rt. -*> > 


» 3*-* 14 


fC. Of-fiT 2 


;;% 


> ^^>2^ 


or. sf--« » 


71. 1Í-* fT 


f^ íT-'-íT :r 


fi 


C ni-C XT 


iír 


•^ S-> 2^ 


<; 


71. ««^ TI. C 


*^ 4»--fi^ rr 


r u^T T 


<c. m*-*!. ~ 


ti 


TK ». - 2. 


7K>-^r fT 


- 


» TV-«i TJ 


■ 


C s».C. ?4 



Appbndix a 



TABLE Z-Contim 



H OOLD or tico IN CDKKBNCT 





JuiDarr 


Febniarr 


March 


April 


Ma» 


Juno 


1 


¿.sS^fSl 


ÍB3,40-8a.39 






S. 


(52,03-52.83 


z 


83.59-63,54 


aí:fl3-fl2:65 


80:08-59:97 


156 82-58.38 


53,05-W.flS 




S, 


6S.39-fl3.2B 


62,31-62 11 












a3.ZB-(t3,2» 


B2.4S-fll.9S 


30.15 60.02 










flS.3B-fl3.lfi 


61. 87-61. 78 


59.66-58,31 









ealra-oeira 


83.39-63.19 


8. 


59.28-58,81 


57: 17-58:58 


51. 55-51. K 




fó.»4-as.sg 


S. 


61.82-61.82 


58.61-58,18 


57.89-57.85 






GS.tO-SÍ.W 


62.99-82.79 


81.49-61.38 




8. 






....„.,... 


fl3.«»-82.BO 


IÍB.8ÍI-5B.61 


59.HV-5b:0O 


58.01-58.48 




10 




62,79-62.79 


80.70-80,70 


S. 


59.53-59.35 


50:3it5Ó:3Í 




6S,S3-B5.57 


62.75-82.70 


flO. 74-60.70 


5fl.»,.1fl,00 


67.39-58.74 


50.4,4-50.38 




ia.ot-6t.ia 


62,89-62.79 










13 


a5,(H-M.B9 


Si.lOSZ.Si 




m.íÍm'.m 




51, 09-,^). 09 


U 


81.73-W.57 




62,31-62.21 


58,82-56,43 


58:il-58:08 


51.15-50,63 




a4.4i-s4.at 


ez.K^ffi.as 


Ol.M-ai.M 


57.81-57,55 


8, 


50.57^0,57 




Si. 21-03.0) 






58.10-58.39 




50,70-50,70 


17 


a 


(E'.s&ei.so 




8. 


Sfl:50-56:i8 


5O.88-50,7B 


18 


a2.7B-B2.79 


82..«-fl2,W 


61.35-81.3; 


.W.6,V5B.65 


M.25-55.17 


51.22 51,15 




Ba.TO-«3,75 


83.29-83,0* 




59,88-50,52 


55.10-M 06 


a 


20 


flS.lS-fC.M 


a2.S4-«!.79 




59,88-59,70 






;i 


w.oo-as.BB 


8. 


ai.7s4l.73 


5g,ea-,5e.lo 


55:ro-,í5:io 


50:2S-18:ü8 


!2 


es.Hvea.M 


62.89-63.89 




57,81-57,22 


9. 


47.62-13,18 


£3 


M.1(M>3.BS 


63,59-6,1.39 


9Ó:H8-áó:43 


57,13-58,31 


El. 91-51.91 






a. 




80.08-80.08 


S. 


51.63-51.63 


46:95-46:08 




ta. 44-63.31 










«8. 73-15, 4,5 




63.!fr«).24 


63:49-63 14 


«ÜawTM 


65:i7-Si:Í3 


51:81-51:50 


a 




«.e»«3.«t 


«3.64-68.49 


8. 


55,25-55.17 


58.16-53.69 


4S.2i-ll,87 


ZR 


iB.M-u.ae 


S. 




.58.22-55.48 


53.78-53.78 




9 


a,«>4S.44 


62,8^^,79 


8Ó:33^:29 


58,80-55 tí> 




tí:5s-io:ao 


an 


iB.HV«).a( 






55.71-S-5.56 


53 78-53.78 


40.82-10.00 




s. 




«o:B8-60:88 




52.63-52.63 






Jnlr 


AnKiist 


Septombpr 


October 


Nov^mb., 


Docmbír 




íl.1.06-40 00 


t39,84-S».Bl 


W1.15-10.M 


X52.63-,5I,61 


(43.48-11,41 


Í14.10-43.87 








40.»-3H.^ 


S. 




43.13-12.78 






3a!DS-3s!88 








13.81-43.28 




HolJdar 






52:63-52:02 


(3:17-11:91 


a 




tó.sü-ifía 


ssIísImIzs 


42,S,V41,07 


52,84-52.29 


42-48-10.86 


41.06-43,53 




40.3&-38.Z4 


38,57-38.20 


41.58-41,32 


52.02-50,76 


a 


43,48-42.60 




3S.17-SS.fl3 




11,32-11,19 




41.93-40,87 


41,93-1115 




J7,4»«.n 


38. 95-38.51 


12,42-11,49 




40.73^0.1» 


41.84-11,19 




SS.*a-36.3B 


39,80-39.11 


«,71-12,37 


8. 


4U,65-38.48 


41,75-11,28 




J. 


39.29-39.14 


15,87-13,76 


Bl .02-50.» 








3S. 23-33 .oe 


39. 39-3». m 


9. 




4z:¿-4o'go 






ae.w-K.4s 


39.20-38.» 




19:94-48:84 


41.24-10.82 


43.01-42.11 




37,21-38-83 


3».8S-:i9.IK 


15:98-13:86 


49.00-47.68 




42,87-12.16 




as.1S-37.31 


S. 


14,74-43,86 


48.aM6.D3 


41.15-40.55 


12,85-42,46 




10.0»^. 08 


39.10-38. B3 




18.89-15.15 


41,BH0.fl8 


42.84-42.08 




t0.24-3M.^ 


39 12-38.95 




S. 


43.76-41-67 


42,78-42.60 


7 




39,10-.'». 91 


45:27-14:72 


45.82-14.94 


45,82-44.10 


41,43-43 2! 


8 


39.33-38.24 


38,91-38.76 


3. 


18.lit-16._51 


47,62-15,66 


a 


9 


SS.SVBT.SI 


SH-BI-S8.78 


44,87-44,10 




48.30-14.35 


47.0tMa,0S 





38.31-31.91 


38.99-38.89 






9. 


45.3V44,08 




3g.W-38.4e 






18:22-47:bS 


45,98-15,15 


44.IS-44ZS 




».aa-:i8,su 


38.93-K,87 


K.m-a.-x 


n. 73-16.84 


l4.ttH3.67 


45,25-41.54 




]».41-38.Da 


aa.89-38.Ti 


47,3»^a,0H 


8. 


15.35-14.74 


45.Si-44,B9 




8 


39. 35-38.91 






!¿T<^'& 


45.38-15 06 












8. 




38:a>- :m 


39:17-39:08 


51.27-50.47 


n:09-16:0fl 


15.58-14,51 


HoUdar 




3B.an- .87 


«,82-39.13 


52,02^1,27 


16,54-46.16 


a 


48.30-15.87 


■X 


ia.W-39S8 


S. 


51,28-18,78 


18.18-45.92 


M,a>-lí.l8 




2S 


40.00-3». 45 


12.S3-10,82 


51,48-19.50 


45.92-45.20 




45:05-44,43 


DO 


as A3^ .78 




62,38-51 SI 


8. 


44:00-12:92 


11.25-43.57 




8. 


12:73-11:15 




15.15-13 91 




U. 59-43 88 







HlSTOBI OF THE GbEENBACKS 



TABLE í— CoiMrHial 

LOWXST VALim I> SOLD Or nao IH COMBMOt 





Jfluu.rr 


Pebniury 


Harch 


April 


M., 


Jana 






(19. 38-48.83 


100. 12-49,75 


(66.23-65.79 


(70.11-68 91 


«?-7|í^f, 


I 


,«°ál2l'.&i 


^.fl8-48.H 


50,09-50.51 


8. 


7I.CK-70.I8 


s 


18,72-47.88 


60.47-50.25 


88.73-67.57 


70.86-70.18 


73. 36-72. OB 




U.»4S.a7 




50.Í5-50.X 


68,32-67.23 


70.42-60.75 






u.i7-iaüi 




S. 




70.18-09.50 


73 94-73.13 


a 


U-(»-«.81 




50.51-50,23 


«6:58-65:57 


70,05«6S 


73.39-72.98 


7 


u.n-u.9e 


47.08-48.il 


50.73^.25 


67.91-88.15 


8. 


72.99-72.66 




B. 


17.51-16.92 


51,05-50.57 


87.31-68,31 


72.33-69.63 


72.60-72.16 




14 S-U.OG 


17.S4-(6.73 




S. 


73. 66-72. 88 


72,93-72.16 


10 


44,W-43.eB 




53Í5»Í2!32 


flB,a9-8g.67 


79.36-73-68 


72.93-72.60 




«,tó-tlfl9 


n'siMi'.ea 


S3.13-52.22 


88,49^18.03 


77.82-75.90 


B. 






8. 


B. 


68.91-68.19 


76. 56-75. C6 


7Í 33-70.92 




l5;7M5;05 


18.75-48.31 


53.98-52.22 








U 


tó.B2HS.a 


18.28-17.90 


56.26-51.05 






7O:61-fl0:9S 


a 


B. 


18,84-48,43 


57,39-55.90 


bcb. 'lüHd 


77.07-76.63 


09.80^.71 


IB 


tó.gs^'i.a 


IB. 26-48.78 


M. 71-58.54 


s. 


76.70-76.18 


09 09-68.85 




4a.S2-U.I» 






67.51-«5.38 




09.57-88,91 


IB 


MnMSoa 


á.m^M 




68.38-67.88 


n: 15- 79:31 


8. 


19 


W.08-4«-U 


a. 


B. 


HoKdor 


76,56-76.05 


71.4M9.75 


20 


«Bl-lí.lS 


M.ll-19.94 


82.40-59.57 


Holidiiy 


76-78-76,34 


72.60-71.9! 




BO.TD-U.H 


50,fl^50.DS 


W. 73-63. 79 


87 91-66.83 


8. 


71.68-70.48 






aolidar 

50.»49.M 




67.06-66.45 


76.96-76.19 


71,11-70 55 




80,54-»-» 


66:3I-fl3:eO 


8. 


76,36-75.51 


70.61-70.30 




50-S4-«.(» 


50.28-19 91 


67.51-65.57 


Holidny 




70.61-70.18 




W-»S-48.ie 




ra, 15-63. 18 


iBi 




8. 


20 


m.so-a.a 


B. 


S. 


73!66-73:4e 


71.43-70.61 


27 


ii.m-K.il 


50.12-49,57 


6S.3í~ei,3l 




7S-6O-73.04 


70,80-70.12 


28 


4e.os-is.is 


19.81-19.11 


65.04-64,67 


68:il,<7:57 


8. 


71.81-70.80 




3. 




68.23-65.63 


68.19-68-28 


73,53-72-99 




SD 






68.83-65.84 


5. 




7i;«i-7o:bo 




4fl:.»-n;jB 




U6. 12-65.81 




73:29-72:73 














July 


Ati>iU'<t 


SpptfimlBT 


Octobpr 


No.enibcr 


Dccember 




Í71. 75-70,11! 


(69.50^. ni 


««.28-68.97 




ÍOfl.7S-61t 5,i 


(ri7.,'-,7-67.34 




B. 


tB.os^i».^3 


69,32-68.14 


189.38-69., -e 


6*.1»J18.20 


67.80-87.15 




15.14-Tl.n 


e0 3S«l.14 


8. 


flO. 38-69.08 


68.20-68 03 


S. 




HolidoT 


60 75-69.32 




60. («-68. 11 


88.14-67.97 


67.62-67.31 




71,68-71,24 


69.87-69.57 


eD^ie 69^14 






67.51-67 SI 


a 


71.iW-ll,4B 




69 ai-68.97 


88:43-67;n 


68,03-67, M 


68.14-07.57 




71.BS-71.56 


69-69-69.lt 




88.19^.08 


88.06-07-91 


n«<t.. ti.. 




11, 38-71. M 


69.32-69.08 


6B>.'0-S9;ü8 


B. 






S. 




69.14-69.06 


68.61-88.14 


68:48-08!l4 


69:20-68:91 


10 


71,88-71,30 


70'3O^:fl3 


S. 


99.03-68.79 


68.29-08.20 


S. 




7Í.-.M1.43 


71.80-70. 48 


66.20-W.14 


69.08-08.91 


68-26-08.08 


89.08-68.85 










88.91-68.79 


8. 


69.14-88.91 




70!lS-70!42 






09.11-69.01 


68.14-67.97 




14 


70,18-69, as 






9B. 14-69.05 


98.03-67 91 


6S:a5-88:t3 


ir. 


70 12-70. IB 


71,30-^70,73 


70.ll-fl9.81 


8. 


67,91-67.85 


68.38-68.14 




8. 


70. 86-70, 39 


70.05-OB.SI 


69.97-68.73 


97.97-07.91 


88,19-68.36 




-0,42-«B.B3 








68.14-88.01 




IH 


60.H3-6B.7B 




69- 75 -66., 77 




68.01-68.03 


98.13-93,20 




70,30-69, S7 


6e!63-69Í32 


69.63-69,41 




9. 


08.26«1.20 




70.:;l-70.«i 


3. 


69,KÍ-69.41 


68.49-68.S8 


68,20-68.03 


BU. 19-68.11 




70.39-70 06 


69.38-69.118 






68.20-68,08 




22 


70 ÍB-7O.0G 




69Í81-69Í50 






6s'Vi-68:Í3 


23 




60 69-60 50 


60.81-69,57 


68.lP-68.aS 


68:08-68:03 


68,79-68.61 


24 


T0.1I-Í».8I 


09 63-69,50 


8, 


68,4M8.38 


6a.li-68.M 


S, 


2S 


BB.llVflfll» 


60.69-69.14 


B9.Ea-69.50 


68,73-68.38 


e8.W-67,97 


Xmu D-j 


26 


69. 9», 1» 1» 








s. 


68.85-68.73 








69:50-69:32 


ffi<:73-«8:55 


67.87-67.71 


68 8.'V-68.7Vi 


28 


09:i4-m:i.1 


60.50-69,38 


69,50-69.38 


«8.83-08.67 


67.85-67 40 


eS.79-Wl.67 


2B 


70 05418.73 


80. 384,9.28 


69.50.69..T8 


S. 


67 57-97 23 


68,91-68.07 






8». «-69. 03 






67 91-67.40 


60.00-68. U7 




89.87-69 38 


09. 20.68, 97 




66:5,'i-a8'3g 




S. 











APPENDIX B 

Relatite Pbiges of Commodities 

TABLE 1 

KKLATITB PUCE8 OF FARM PBODUCT8 

A. Individual Series 





Barlet 


Cloyer Seed 


CORN 


Date 


New 
York 


Chi- 
cago 


Cin- 
cinnati 


New 
York 


Chi- 
cago 


New 
York 


Cin- 
cinnati 


1860. January 


103 
100 


101 

117 

93 

89 

64 

71 

34 

59 

59 

80 

101 

131 

161 

186 

195 

181 

205 

233 

233 

248 

220 

165 

101 

129 

110 

89 

76 

140 


84 

109 

98 

109 

92 

78 

57 

52 

57 

80 

80 

115 

155 

184 

• • • 

172 
190 
155 

• • • 

224 

184 

149 

86 

« • • 

161 
132 
172 
184 


103 
94 

• • • 

103 

103 

91 

91 

• • • 

84 
98 
89 
89 
126 
117 

• • • 

149 
161 
183 

• • • 

251 
326 
294 
343 
274 
160 
123 

• ■ • 

183 


99 

88 

99 

114 

102 

89 

89 

92 

85 

105 

83 

102 

124 

107 

120 

120 

143 

139 

161 

193 

309 

298 

161 

163 

158 

114 

137 

137 


122 

97 

87 

94 

97 

88 

65 

75 

89 

79 

75 

82 

109 

126 

103 

119 

178 

178 

217 

217 

257 

196 

102 

125 

127 

106 

120 

130 


107 


April 


95 


July 


97 


October 


96 
90 
88 
94 
81 
94 
113 


101 


1861. January 


71 


April 


67 


July 


57 


October 


57 


1862. January 


57 


April 


69 


July 


73 


October 


75 
166 
191 


81 


1863. January 


91 


Aüril 


133 


July 


115 


October 


Í63 
178 
165 


182 


1864. January 


208 


April 


212 


July 


218 


October 


232 
257 
202 
163 
160 
135 
153 
135 
175 


242 


1865. January 


212 


April 


141 


July 


131 


October 


127 


1866. January 


107 


April 


97 


July 


125 


October 


166 







429 



430 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



TABLE 1 — CorUinued 

BKLATITS PEICE8 OF FARM PBODUCT8 



Date 



1800, January . . . 

Apríl 

July 

October 

1861, January . . . 

Apríl 

«I uiy ....... 

October . . . . 

1862, January . . 

April 

July 

October 

1863, January . . . 

April 

July 

October — 

1864, January . . . 

April 

July 

October 

1865, January . . . 

April 

July 

October 

1866, January . . . 

April 

July 

Octol)er 



Flax Sbed 



New 
York 



08 
102 
101 

99 
101 

91 

• • « 

98 
116 
liO 
129 
125 
193 
182 
165 
165 
207 
223 
231 
200 
233 
176. 
142 
190 
187 
160 
203 
209 



Cin- 
cinnati 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
91 
91 
114 
136 

• • • 

114 
182 
295 

• • • 

182 
227 
236 
255 
255 
259 
182 
136 
245 
227 
205 
264 
255 



HlDES 



Mbat: Bkkybs 



Cin- 
cinnati 



100 

107 

107 

85 

93 

93 

63 

85 

78 

100 

100 

100 

126 

130 

137 

137 

148 

141 

174 

159 

156 

156 

96 

119 

133 

141 

133 

133 



Chi. 
cago 



91 
100 
106 
103 



82 
58 



72 

86 

79 

103 

106 

120 

113 

141 

132 

156 

161 

120 

139 

100 

91 

122 

ft3 

76 

93 

120 



New 
York 



100 

103 

103 

94 

68 

75 

61 

86 

83 

75 

83 

94 

99 

94 

94 

103 

125 

139 

161 

las 

153 
101 
&3 
128 
139 
133 
125 
139 



Cin- 


New 


cinnati 


York 


103 


103 


117 


108 


90 


92 


90 


97 


97 


103 


110 


90 


76 


90 


90 


90 



83 

90 

97 

76 

90 

131 

124 

97 

131 

179 

166 

193 

221 

262 

ia3 

1G6 
172 
193 
207 

ia3 



103 
97 
87 
87 
97 
118 
110 
103 
118 
144 
162 
178 
164 
215 
159 
190 
174 
159 
172 
169 



Chi. 
cago 

97 
113 
105 

85 
105 
106 
110 

77 

73 

97 

90 

85 

92 
145 
110 
101 
105 
141 
177 
153 
169 
242 
145 
222 
179 
155 
210 
185 



Date 



Mbat: Shekp 



1860, Jan. . 
Apr. . 
July . 
Oct. . 

1861, Jan. . 
Apr. . 
July . 
Oct. . 



New 
York 



101 
110 
92 
97 
101 
99 
78 
87 



Cin- 
cionati 



110 
138 

a3 

69 

138 

124 

55 

55 



Meat: Pork 



Ch¡- 
cafro 



91 

100 

101 

108 

87 

87 

53 

51 



C¡n- Now 
cinuati York 



121 
101 

62 
116 
115 

98 

es 

61 



90 
97 
107 
106 
86 
82 
68 
63 



Oat« 



Rtb 



111 
103 
95 
92 
90 
80 
72 
83 



New Cin- | Cin- 
York citmati cinnati 



119 
106 
101 
74 
64 
6á 
57 
59 



113 
119 
87 
81 
70 
63 
52 
41 



Nt»w 
York 



107 

100 

99 

94 

• • 

77 

• • 

82 



Appendix B 



431 



TABLE \—C<mtinued 

KKLATIVB PRICES OF FABM PBODUCT8 





Heat: 


Shbbp 


Meat: Pobk 


Oats 


Rye 


Datb 






















New 


Cinoin- 


Chi- 


Cincin- 


New 


New 


Cincin- 


Cincin- 


New 




York 


nati 


cago 


nati 


Tork 


York 


nati 


nati 


York 


1862, Jan.. 


106 


90 


48 


65 


60 


99 


69 


49 


101 


April 


110 


110 


52 


65 


74 


93 


72 


63 


94 


July. 


97 


72 


45 


47 


57 


103 


84 


56 


87 


Oct.. 


101 


103 


57 


63 


67 


138 


99 


66 


75 


1863, Jan.. 


110 


83 


69 


94 


75 


166 


128 


69 


107 


April 


138 


179 


84 


76 


88 


200 


173 


113 


126 


July. 


87 


114 


76 


74 


88 


178 


156 


85 


121 


Oct.. 


97 


121 


79 


57 


79 


168 


173 


113 


130 


186á,Jan.. 


136 


145 


92 


141 


113 


224 


205 


153 


152 


April 


179 


200 


144 


151 


139 


214 


195 


149 


151 


July. 


117 


110 


184 


151 


176 


238 


200 


175 


236 


Oct.. 


147 


166 


142 


237 


179 


208 


185 


158 


173 


1865, Jan.. 


175 


207 


227 


314 


219 


261 


212 


164 


203 


April 


211 


276 


197 


227 


191 


212 


148 


113 


145 


July . 


101 


117 


147 


174 


169 


177 


153 


70 


101 


Oct.. 


124 


152 


235 


257 


229 


144 


111 


88 


119 


1866, Jan . . 


161 


166 


176 


244 


165 


122 


96 


85 


121 


April 


140 


179 


175 


189 


171 


115 


101 


73 


101 


July. 


113 


138 


176 


188 


165 


147 


111 


107 


143 


Oct.. 


108 


131 


183 


196 


173 


137 


111 


127 


149 



Date 



1860, Jan.. 
April 
July. 
Oct.. 

1861, Jan.. 
April 
July. 
Oct.. 

1862, Jan.. 
April 
July. 
Oct. 



TlMOTHT SeED 



Cincin- 


Chi- 


nati 


cago 


87 


83 


121 


113 


• • • 


116 


92 


87 


• • • 


89 


107 


85 


• • • 

58 


• • • 

57 


58 


64 


66 


65 


• • • 

64 


• • • 

60 



New 
York 



94 
110 

• • • 

96 
98 
120 
101 
72 
77 
82 
67 
74 



Tobacco 



Leaf 
Aver'ge 



Cincin- 
nati 



100 
100 



84 
145 
116 
148 
222 



Leaf 
Fine 



Cincin- 
nati 



100 
100» 



118 
123 
105 
127 
182 



Wrap's 
Ohio 



New 
York 



100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

88 

88 

88 

104 

104 

131 



Wrap's 


Wrap's 


Penn. 


Conu. 


New 


New 


York 


York 


100 


126 


100 


91 


100 


91 


100 


91 


100 


91 


100 


91 


88 


74 


88 


74 


88 


74 


104 


94 


104 


94 


131 


118 



Leaf 
Ky. 



New 
York 



112 

98 

89 

101 

104 

98 

110 

125 

146 

152 

153 

223 



432 



HlSTOBT OF THE QbEENBAGKS 



TABLE 1—CorUinued 

XSLATITB PEICBS OF FARM PBODUCT8 











TOBACCX) 


Datb 


TlMOTHT SbKD 


Leaf 

Ayer'ge 


Leaf 
Fine 


Wrap*8 
Ohio 


Wrap's 
Penn. 


Wrap's 
Conn. 


Leaf 
Ky. 




CiBcin- 
nati 


Chi- 
cago 


New 
York 


Cincln- 
nati 


Cincin- 
nati 


New 
York 


New 
York 


New 
York 


New 
York 


1863, Jan.. 
April. 
July. 
Oct.. 

1864, Jan.. 
April. 
July. 
Oct.. 

1865, Jan.. 
April. 
July. 
Oct.. 

1866, Jan.. 
April. 
July. 
Oct.. 


68 
78 

• • • 

99 
120 
110 

• « • 

229 
227 
174 

• • • 

155 
140 
136 
178 
128 


72 
59 

• • • 

91 
110 
101 

• • • 

162 
218 
152 
181 
144 
129 
147 

• • • 

114 


110 
82 
94 
94 
104 
106 
120 
192 
226 
211 
134 
182 
163 
163 
259 
127 


241 
284 
284 
220 
255 
253 
220 
216 
261 
247 
273 
240 
237 
216 
216 
212 


218 

236 

236 

205 

218 

218 

218 

205 

295 

318 

341 

341 

250 

205 

205 

205 


131 
173 
173 
173 
173 
231 
269 
269 
269 
135 
96 
115 
115 
115 
115 
115 


131 
173 
173 
173 
173 
231 
269 
269 
269 
135 
96 
115 
115 
115 
115 
115 


118 
191 
191 
191 
191 
235 
265 
265 
265 
176 
135 
162 
169 
169 
169 
169 


259 
312 
238 
213 
262 
262 
253 
318 
333 
387 
226 
297 
297 
297 
297 
232 



Datb 



1860, January 
April . . . 
July. . .. 
October 

1861, January, 
April . . . 
July.... 
October 

1862, January 

April 

July 

October, 

1863, January 

April 

July 

October , 







Wheat 


Winter 


Spring 


Prime 


New 


New 


Cincin- 


York 


York 


nati 


102 


105 


103 


105 


98 


110 


102 


103 


93 


91 


94 


95 


98 


97 


84 


99 


102 


as 


78 


65 


63 


95 


94 


66 


103 


103 


72 


97 


102 


78 


86 


85 


69 


93 


92 


72 


107 


103 


83 


125 


99 


108 


108 


102 


89 


98 


103 


93 



No. 2 
Winter 



Chi- 
cago 



99 
105 
105 

91 

• • • 

96 

• • • 

76 
71 
73 
76 
85 
93 
112 
100 
95 



No. 2 
Spring 



Chi- 
cago 



99 

105 

108 

88 

82 

81 

57 

74 

70 

74 

75 

83 

86 

110 

97 

104 



Appendix B 



433 



TABLE l-Continued 

BXLATIVB PXI0B8 OF FARM PRODUCTS 



Datb 



1864, January, 
Apríl . . . 
July.... 
October. 

1865, January 
Apríl ... 
July.... 
October. 

1866, January. 
Apríl . . . 
July.... 
October, 







Whsat 


Winter 


Sprin«r 


Prime 


New 


New 


Cincin- 


York 


York 


nati 


116 


118 


110 


126 


131 


110 


190 


193 


1^ 


143 


149 


143 


185 


184 


173 


134 


137 


127 


107 


103 


105 


166 


141 


181 


148 


139 


165 


141 


112 


198 


177 


155 


228 


199 


177 


236 



No. 2 

Winter 



Chi- 
cago 



108 
123 
176 
129 
144 

• • • 

111 
132 



191 



No. 2 
Spring 



Chi- 
cago 



115 

114 

199 

149 

160 

101 

92 

126 

98 

93 

119 

195 



B. AWBAOBS lOB THB SbVBRAL PrODUCTS 



Date 



1860, January 
Apríl . . . 
July. ... 
October 

1861, January 
Apríl . . . 
July.... 
October 

1862, January 
Apríl... 
July . . . 
October 

1863, January 
Apríl . . . 
July. . . . 
October 

1864, January 
Apríl . . . 
July . . . 
October 



Barlej 


Clover 
Seed 


Com 


Flax 
Seed 


Hides 


96 


101 


115 


99 


97 


109 


91 


96 


101 


103 


96 


99 


92 


101 


105 


98 


109 


98 


100 


94 


82 


103 


84 


101 


77 


79 


90 


78 


96 


83 


62 


90 


61 


91 


61 


64 


92 


66 


95 


80 


70 


85 


73 


115 


78 


91 


102 


74 


138 


87 


91 


86 


74 


129 


87 


107 


96 


82 


120 


99 


161 


125 


100 


188 


110 


187 


112 


130 


239 


115 


195 


120 


109 


165 


115 


172 


135 


151 


174 


127 


191 


152 


193 


217 


135 


184 


161 


195 


230 


145 


233 


161 


218 


243 


165 


235 


222 


230 


228 


137 



Meat: 
Beeves 



101 

113 

96 

91 

102 

102 

92 

86 

86 

9& 

91 

83 

93 

131 

115 

100 

118 

155 

168 

175 



434 



HlSTOBY OF THE ObEENBACKS 



TABLE 1—ConUnued 

RKLATIYB PRZCE8 OF FABM PBODÜCT8 



Date 



ISG^January 

Apríl ... 

July ... 

October 
1806, January 

April ... 

July ... 

October 



Barle7 


CloTer 
Seed 


Com 


Flaz 
8eed 


Hidat 


220 


318 


235 


246 


149 


172 


296 


169 


179 


120 


117 


252 


117 


139 


90 


145 


219 


126 


218 


123 


135 


159 


117 


207 


122 


125 


119 


102 


183 


117 


128 


137 


123 


234 


117 


166 


160 


li8 


232 


121 



Meat 

Bee 



185 
240 
166 
193 
175 
169 
196 
182 



Date 




1860, January 106 

April 124 

July 88 

October 83 

1861, January 120 

April 112 

July 67 

October 71 

1862, January 98 

April 110 

July 85 

October 102 

1863, January ; 97 

ApriL 159 

July ! 101 

October • 109 

1864, January ! 141 



April. 
July . . . . 
October. 

1865, January. 

April 

July.... 
Octolwr . 

1866, January. 

April 

July . . . . 
October. 



190 
114 
157 
191 
194 
109 
138 
1G4 
100 
126 
120 



101 
99 
90 

113 
96 
89 
61 
58 
58 
64 
50 
62 
76 

as 

79 
72 
115 
145 
170 
186 
t£>3 
205 
163 
240 
195 
178 
176 
184 



Oats 



115 

105 

98 

83 

77 

72 

65 

71 

84 

83 

94 

119 

147 

187 

167 

171 

215 

205 

219 

197 

237 

180 

165 

128 

109 

108 

129 

124 



Bye 


Tim. 
Seed 


Tobác- 
eo 


110 


88 


106 


110 


115 


98 


93 


116 


95 


88 


92 


98 


70 


94 


99 


70 


156 


97 


52 


101 


90 


62 


62 


96 


75 


66 


111 


79 


71 


113 


72 


67 


122 


71 


66 


168 


88 


83 


183 


120 


73 


228 


103 


&4 


216 


122 


95 


196 


153 


111 


212 


150 


106 


238 


206 


120 


249 


166 


194 


257 


184 


224 


282 


129 


179 


233 


86 


158 


195 


104 


160 


212 


103 


144 


197 


87 


149 


186 


125 


146 


186 


138 


123 


175 

i 



Wlieai 



102 

105 

102 

92 

90 

92 

66 

81 

84 

85 

78 

85 

94 

111 

99 

99 

113 

121 

185 

143 

169 

125 

101 

149 

138 

136 

170 

2U0 



Appendix B 



435 



TABLE 2 

SSLATXYS PRIC1S9 OF VARIOUS COM MODITIES AT WHOLB8ALB 



Date 



1860, Jan... 
April. 
July . 
Oct.. 

1861, Jan... 
April. 
July . 
Oct.. 

1862, Jan... 
April. 
July . 
Oct .. 

1863, Jan . . 
April. 
July . 
Oct. 

1864, Jan . . 
April. 
July . 
Oct.. 

1865, Jan . . 
April. 
July . 
Oct.. 



Beans 



100.0 
93.3 
93.3 
120.0 
100.0 
103.2 
120.0 
120.0 
136.5 
116.6 
173.3 
153.3 
145.9 
153.3 
180.0 
129.9 
160.5 
146.7 
146.7 
146.7 
173.3 
142.7 
106.7 
120.0 





Bread 




BUTTEB 


Bostoa 


Boston 


Boston 


Crackers : 


Crackers : 


Crackers: 




1 


2 


£z. Grade 




100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


81.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


81.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


95.2 


107.1 


117.6 


116.7 


81.0 


107 1 


123.5 


116.7 


85.7 


100.0 


129.4 


116.7 


61.9 


100 


129.5 


116.7 


64.3 


107.1 


135.3 


116.7 


90.5 


107.1 


141.2 


120.8 


97.6 


100.0 


147.1 


120.8 


73.8 


100.0 


147.1 


120.8 


90.5 


107.1 


164.7 


141.7 


116.7 


107.1 


152.9 


133.3 


119.1 


107.1 


147.1 


133.3 


92.9 


107.1 


147.1 


129.2 


114.3 


185.7 


152.9 


133.3 


145.2 


185.7 


158.8 


137.5 


230.9 


185.7 


158.8 


137.5 


157.1 


185.7 


158.8 


137.5 


202.4 


185.7 


117.6 


116.1 


250.0 


185.7 


129.4 


116.7 


150.0 


157.1 


129.4 


116.7 


142.9 


157.1 


117.6 


116.7 


204.8 



Chebsb 



100.0 

110.0 

75 .t) 

100.0 

100.0 

90.0 

60.0 

60.0 

70.0 

75.0 

65.0 

80.0 

110.0 

145.0 

106.0 

120.0 

140.0 

170.0 

150.0 

205.0 

225.0 

210.0 

125.0 

150.0 





COFFEE: 

Rio, Fair 


Eoos 


Floüb: 
Rye 


Feuit 


Fi8H: 


Date 


Apples : 
Dried 


Currants: 
Zante 


Cod 


1860, Jan... 
April.. 
July .. 
Oct. . 

1861, Jan... 
April.. 
July . . 
Oct... 

1862, Jan... 
April . . 
July . . 
Oct... 


100.0 
115.2 
117.4 
121.7 
100.0 
104.3 
104.3 
134.8 
156.5 
178.2 
182.6 
195.7 


149.1 
88.9 
78.8 
83.2 

103.2 
88.9 
64.5 
74.5 

134.8 
74.5 
68.8 
83.2 


100.0 

100.0 

95.0 

100.0 

92.5 

95.0 

75.0 

87.5 

100.0 

100.0 

87.5 

106.3 


100.0 
90.3 
87.1 
77.4 
77.4 
51.6 

103.2 
77.4 
96.8 
90.3 
71.0 
71.0 


100.0 

104.2 

91.7 

79.2 

75.0 

75.0 

66.7 

158.3 

150.0 

158.3 

166.7 

179.2 


Feb. 100.0 
May 100.0 
Aug. 112.5 
Nov. 125.0 
Feb. 125.0 
May 125.0 
Au«. 125.0 
Nov. 125.0 
Feb. 125.0 
May 125.0 
Auff. 300.0 
Nov. 125.0 



436 



HlSTOBT OF THE GrEENBAGKS 



TABLE 2 — C<nUinued 

BELATIYE PBICE8 OF VARIOUS OOMMODITIB8 AT WHOIiB8AI«a 





Coffkk: 
Rio, Fair 


EOOB 


Floub: 
Rye 


Peuit 


FiflH* 


Datb 


Ai)ples: 
Dríed 


Currants: 
Zante 


Cod 


1863, Jan . . . 
April.. 
July . . 
Oct.... 

1864, Jan . . . 
April.. 
July . . 
Oct . . . 

1865, Jan... 
April.. 
July . . 
Oct . . . 


243.5 
269.6 
252.2 
265.2 
293.5 
339.1 
373.9 
317.4 
378.3 
279.6 
243.7 
243.1 


114.7 
134.8 
111.8 
114.7 
166.3 
120.9 
146.2 
166.3 
252.3 
106.1 
152.0 
163.4 


118.8 
112.5 
106.3 
125.0 
137.5 
137.5 
181.3 
187.5 
212.5 
143.8 
127.5 
168.8 


83.9 

87.1 

90.3 

83.9 

122.6 

125.8 

148.4 

167.7 

200.0 

177.4 

132.3 

167.7 


175.0 
233.3 
250.0 
241.7 
239.6 
275.0 
306.3 
283.3 
341.7 
216.7 
206.3 
233.3 


Feb. 150.0 
May 125.0 
Auff. 150.0 
Nov.150.0 
Feb.20O.O 
May 175.0 
AW200.0 

NOT. 

Feb. 387. 5 
May 225.0 
Auff.4ñ0.0 
Nov. 200.0 









Mbal: 




Meat 






Fbuit: 
Baisins 


Lasd 


Ck>ni, 

Yellow, 

Kiln-Dned 








Datb 


Beef: 

Salt Mess 


Beef: 
Loins 


Beef: 
Ribs 


1860, Jan . . . 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


Feb. 100.0 


100.0 


April.. 


103.3 


97.6 


96.4 


91.3 


May 100.0 


93.3 


July . . 


106.5 


114.3 


89.2 


87.0 


Au«. 100.0 


a3.3 


Oct . . . 


123.9 


116.7 


92.8 


82.6 


Nov. 94.4 


93.3 


1861, Jan . . . 


89.1 


95.2 


84.3 


91.3 


Feb. 88.9 


93.3 


April . . 


68.5 


85.7 


90.4 


91.3 


May 88.9 


100.0 


July . . 


50.0 


76.2 


72.5 


82.6 


Aug. 83.3 


93.3 


Oct.... 


102.2 


76.2 


73.5 


95.7 


Nov. 83.3 


86.7 


1862, Jan . . 


139.1 


76.2 


78.3 


104.3 


Feb. 83.3 


86.7 


April . . 


139.1 


73.8 


75.9 


100.0 


May 83.3 


86.7 


July . 


135.9 


73.8 


71.1 


104.3 


Auflr. 83.3 


86.7 


Oct .. 


. 154.3 


73.8 


94.0 


113.0 


Nov. 83.3 


86.7 


1863, Jan . . 


152.2 


88.1 


108.4 


108.7 


Feb. 94.4 


93.3 


April . 


173.9 


100.0 


112.0 


113.0 


May 100.0 


100.0 


July. 


184.8 


89.3 


106.0 


100.0 


Au«. 100.0 


100.0 


Oct. . . 


. 180.4 


102.4 


115.7 


104.3 


Nov. 100.0 


100.0 


1864, Jan . . 


173.9 


114.3 


144.6 


106.5 


Feb. 105.6 


106.7 


April . 


. 178.3 


126.2 


148.2 


95.7 


May 138.9 


146.7 


July . 


. 184.8 


157.1 


192.8 


217.4 


Aug. 155.6 


153.3 


Oct .. 


. 173.9 


185.7 


189.2 


130.4 


Nov.150.0 


146.7 


1865, Jan . . 


. 254.3 


195.2 


212.0 


165.2 


Feb. 194.4 


186.7 


April . 


. 215.2 


147.6 


156.6 


191.3 


May 194.4 


213.3 


July . 


. 250.0 


152.4 


124.1 


113.0 


Aug. 177.8 


186.7 


Oct .. 


. 204.3 


233.3 


122.9 


139.1 


Nov. 166.7 


166.7 



Appendix B 



437 



TABLE 2 — Continued 

RELATIYE PBICB8 OF VABIOU8 OOMMODITIE8 AT WHOLBSAIíB 





MOLABSES 


Salt 


MSAT 


Date 


PVtoRico: 
Best 


N.Orleans: 
Prime 


Ashton's 


Ashton*s 
Liv., fine 


Pork: 
SaltMess 


Matton 


1860, Jan . . . 

April. . 

July . . 

Oct... 
1861, Jan ... 

April.. 

July . . 

Oct .. 
1862, Jan ... 

April. . 

July . . 

Oct ... 

1863, Jan . . . 
April.. 
July . . 
Oct .. 

1864, Jan . . 
April. 
July . 
Oct .. 

1865, Jan . . 
April. 
July . 
Oct .. 


100.0 

107.9 

100.0 

. 105.3 

92.1 

86.8 

71.2 

118.4 

105.3 

100.0 

97.4 

131.6 

126.3 

118.4 

139.5 

. 164.5 

. 171.1 

. 223.7 

. 289.5 

. 223.7 

. 289.5 

184.2 

. 184.2 

. 250.0 


100.0 
90.6 
90.6 
94.3 
69.8 
70.8 
67.9 
103.8 
103.8 
84.9 

óóié 

105.7 
105.7 
94.3 
113.2 
132.1 
160.4 
217.0 
311.3 
283.0 
207.5 
217.0 


100.0 

76.9 

89.7 

82.1 

82.1 

82.1 

82.1 

84.6 

87.2 

92.3 

92.3 

105.1 

110.3 

143.6 

138.5 

130.8 

143.6 

174.0 

230.8 

256.4 

243.6 

161.5 

166.7 

212.8 


100.0 

77.9 

90.9 

83.1 

83.1 

83.1 

83.1 

85.7 

88.3 

93.5 

93.5 

106.5 

111.7 

145.5 

140.2 

132.5 

145.5 

176.6 

233.8 

259.7 

246.8 

163.6 

168.8 

223.1 


100.0 

109.1 

109.8 

116.7 

101.5 

109.1 

97.0 

90.9 

75.0 

76.5 

65.2 

71.2 

86.4 

98.5 

84.8 

86.4 

118.2 

145.5 

275.8 

254.5 

212.1 

162.1 

163.6 

213.6 


Feb. 100.0 
May 120.0 
Ang. 100.0 
Nov. 100.0 
Feb. 110.0 
May 110.0 
Ang. 100.0 
Nov. 90.0 
Feb. 100.0 
May 100.0 
Ang. 90.0 
Nov. 100.0 
Feb. 100.0 
May 125.0 
Aug. 120.0 
Nov. 125.0 
Feb. 120.0 
May 140.0 
Aug. 160.0 
Nov. 150.0 
Feb. 190.0 
May 190.0 
Aug. 170.0 
Nov. 170.0 





Salt: 
Turk's 
Island 


Ship 

BUCITIT 


Spices 


Stabch: 
Cora 


SUGAR? 


Datb 


Nutmegs 


Pepper : 

Whole, 

Sumatra 


Fair, 
Refining 


1860, Jan... 
April . . 
July . . 
Oct... 

1861, Jan . . . 
April.. 
July . . 
Oct... 

1862, Jan... 
April.. 
July . . 
Oct . . . 


100.0 

90.0 

97.5 

100.0 

85.0 

95.0 

100.0 

120.0 

100.0 

120.0 

150.0 

155.0 


100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
112.5 
112.5 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 


100.0 

102.4 

101.2 

100.0 

90.5 

95.2 

97.6 

113.1 

142.9 

160.7 

154.8 

161.7 


100.0 

clO.& 

101.5 

95.5 

101.5 

134.3 
185.1 
191.0 
209.0 
238.8 


100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

94.1 

94.1 

94.1 

94.1 

100.0 


100.0 

93.1 

91.4 

86.2 

74.1 

65.5 

63.8 

106.9 

106.9 

101.7 

101.7 

120.7 



438 



HI8TOST OP THB ObBBNBACKS 



TJIBLB l—Ctmtinued 
WMLkTTwm mcmtí or VASiotm oovMODmss at wbouebaub 









Sficbs 












UUad 


teftCCTT 








Stakh: 
Oon 




SoftAB: 

Pair. 
Bfrfhímg 


Hatb 


NvtaMcs 


'^a:sL 


1 




IJWO 






SnBMtra 










iMci,jrM .. 


1».0 


I90,h 


274.6 




111 8 




131.0 


Ai*rü, 


1«»0 


135 


áCIR.3 


322.4 




117.6 




134.5 


•luly , 


»0 


135 


190,5 


S16.4 




111.8 


! 


141 4 


iVl , , 


ií^O 


135.0 


lSt.5 


304.5 




111.8 


I 


158.6 


UM^Jm ,, 


ttoo 


IRS^ 


214.3 


316.3 




12d.4 


• 


1655 


Apiil., 


»V0 


1IIS5( 


«7.4 


4d».6 




141.2 




2069 


July , 


«VO 


IR^S 


tí«(6 


5I9.3 




1529 


\ 


2690 


iVt .. 


ÍUVO 


IIW^ 


a»i 


417.» 




164.7 




220.7 


lÜffi^JÍMI 


»V0 


lít: 5 


tí8€ 


537. o 




176.5 


, 


244 8 


,i^nl 


»V0 


lfl7 ^ 


»76 


; 358.2 




176 5 




141 4 


,li»ly 


«&0 


MC ü 


ÍJ7S« 


316.3 




1S29 




158.6 


iW 


t:^o 


líCíi 


3tS.7 


3f&.2 


— 


1^.9 

1 




189.6 




5íl^ 


^«.K 




Tw 


u 


TA»« 






l\*r» 


)iak«>«a»«. 












C.A1.KT» 




í»\^ 






*'tui* 1 





wtaír :r 






5?^\i .^ni^ 


-jíV r 


Trtw3v\ 


;jia. :i4S 


«k 


IX c- 


Vi^»: 


«^ f 


í>^ :- 


lilt 4 


TttK' í^^' 





A^yr-i i55rr 


« * 


icf r. 


.>mI> 


ftj^ 


lA » 


f^T f 


Auc 12^ 6 


.luí? llf 


« 


3ÍII J 


iVm 


<c ^ 


ft<i> 


9r f 


Nm llV 





:«. líic* 


1 


iv\ : 


5^ú ."im 


"*<» * 

• ■• 


?;.^> 


?2: p 


TiQ. liV 


;í«. rrü 


• 


rx ? 


Vn:**; 


tV í 


A . 


«^ : 


lÉit' I2^ 6 


A.ti¡tI11^ 


«» 


H T 


.^»> 


tk : 




-r?^ r 


" '". ^ 


H 


^lU? ^4K 


«k 


K T 


vX>. 


l.V l 


1* > 


??i f 


xm r.4 


.^ 


rtre. 1» 


•- 
• * 


IX r 


:i?«í; .^.ui 


fr ^ 


.1* . 


«: : 


t>^::ííí' 


fí j«i. i::i 


■ 


:is: f 


\>\**i 


*r f 


ii^ :- 


sr < 


it«.. ::2?^ 


fí 


í;n-i:rs 


4 ' 




.n;> 


* f 


iií . 


«: ^ 


AUP^Í^ 


{^ 


.lur Iflf. 




is: f 


.v>. 


1 rv > 


"líS '^ 


i.Y < 


xm ::2«^ 6 


.>% Iflf 


t 

• 


I"!!" : 


:j^<; :5»»» 


■*v^ 


^.« : 


vs: t 


•'^>a.::íi: 


4 


.1.x. i::i 


« 


2aí ; 


Vn^i 


^3* f 


>*:. > 




Xi^icr 


^^ 


i4jT-i I^ 


• 




^»^> 


".5lí * 


z^^ : 


1/V ^ 


.x^Z'^í^ 


fi 


.^ur 1511 


• 




.V' 


:*: y 


^^ < 


lAJ > 


Xm ^-^ 


9 


:«ri rff 


i 




í!^^ .;>*i 


ÍA * 


M^ > 


^■^sm > r 


s.^::^ 


f 


-iia. a3íf. 




S^ f 


<^n'*l 


■"3^. y 


-v ^ 


^5w ♦ 






iXvr]. 2SL 


• 


ÍC i 


i.:^ 


r^' * 


.%% ( 


^1^ > 




■«i 


->ur ^T 


• 


<:i : 


,\ 


« *^ 


^- í 


r^'. t 


Xrr. 


f 

■n 


rtev sur 


4 


3fr f 


-T?^» . i*ii 


S:^ 


5s^ / 


'T- ^ 


x^s;! 


■< 


oao. 2?r 


« 


3W : 


s"^"^» 


',Sí i 


?^ í 


vr ? 




« 


4«Ti2:i 


• 


m T 


u»:* 


•.-^ * 


T^. / 


ift ^ 


'^ *^ 


« 


.íar 1^ 


« 


2* : 


.\^ 


1» » 


sríL - 


>¿. % 


x^ :i^ 


■^ 

•« 


i^ a». 


^ 


se ^ 



Appendix B 



439 



TABLE 2 — CofUinued 

BBLAnVB PBICE8 OF VABIOUS COMMODITIE8 AT WHOIíBSALB 



Datb 



1860, Jan . . 
April. 
July . 
Oct.. 

1861, Jan . . 
April 
July . 
Oct.. 

1862, Jan . . 
April. 
July . 
Oct.. 

1863, Jan . . 
April. 
July . 
Oct.. 

1864, Jan . . 
April. 
July . 
Oct .. 

1865, Jan . . 
April . 
July . 
Oct.. 





Ca&pbtb 




CkyrroN: 


Denimb 








Upland 


Bmssels 


Ingrain 


Wilton 


Middllng 




100.0 


100.0 




100.0 


100.0 


96.2 


100.3 


100.0 


101.1 


103.5 


92.3 


99.3 


97.3 


97.7 


103.5 


92.3 


98.0 


97.3 


97.7 


103.5 


92.3 


101.4 


97.3 


109.1 


103.5 


96.2 


95.0 


100.0 


117.0 


103.5 


96.2 


95.1 


100.0 


134.1 


103.5 


96.2 


92.6 


100.0 


195.5 


106.2 


100.0 


106.6 


105.4 


327.3 


124.1 


100.0 


109.1 


105.4 


250.0 


136.2 


107.7 


119.3 


108.1 


336.4 


137.9 


115.4 


123.4 


116.2 


509.1 


210.3 


134.6 


149.5 


132.4 


613.6 


258.6 


165.4 


174.5 


151.4 


663.6 




153.8 


166.0 


151.4 


627.3 




146.2 


154.9 


143.2 


768.2 


• • • • • 


165.4 


179.4 


162.2 


736.4 


379.3 


173.1 


196.7 


173.0 


690.9 


396.6 


269.2 


299.3 


270.3 


1400.0 


425.8 


269.2 


250.9 


270.3 


1090.9 


606.9 


269.2 


260.6 


270.3 


1090.9 


4a3.8 


192.3 


208.2 


202.7 


318.2 


412.1 


192.3 


219.9 


202.7 


454.6 


424.1 


211.5 


241.2 


216.2 


400.0 


455.2 



Dril- 
linos : 

dO-inch 
Pepperell 



100.0 

97.2 

100.0 

100.0 

97.2 

97.2 

97.2 

116.8 

146 O 

146.0 

157.2 

292.0 

393.0 

404.3 
449.2 
449.2 
701.8 
729.9 
673 8 
336.9 
336.9 
404.3 





Lbathbb: 
Hamess 


Print Cloths 


Shbbt- 
iMoa: 

BrowDf 

^i 
AtiantioA 


Shibt- 
iNOs: 

Bleached, 
N.Y.lfnis 


SlLK : 


Datb 


2S-iiich, 

7yd8.toíb. 

Standard 


28-iiich, 

64X64. 

Metaoomet 


Raw 

Italian 


1860, Jan . . . 
April.. 
July . , 
Oct... 

1861, Jan . . . 
April. . 
July . . 
Oct ... 

1862, Jan . . . 
April . . 
July . . 
Oct . . . 


100.0 

100.0 

102.9 

100.0 

94.3 

88.6 

85.7 

100.0 

94.3 

94.3 

91.4 

102.9 


100.0 

97.8 

100.0 

97.8 

84.4 

77.8 

80.0 

106.7 

160.0 

128.9 

153.3 

220.0 


100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

86.0 

79.1 

76.7 

104.7 

107.0 

125.6 

155.8 

251.1 


100.0 
102.9 
102.9 
102.9 
102.9 
102.9 
106.8 
135.1 
164.5 
164.5 
188.0 
296.9 


100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

96.8 

96.8 

96.8 

103.2 

109.7 

116.1 

129.0 

167.5 


100.0 
100.0 
105 6 
100.0 
100.0 

a3.3 

77.8 
72.2 
72 2 
72.2 
a3.3 
80.6 



440 



HlSTOBT OP THE GbEESBACSS 







XABLE 1—OmUñ 


^ 






m 


WLéTirm nu 


3Bi Qtr TéMMxrc* commsM 


DnZBi AT 1 


™u.*^ 






1 


PXDTT CUOTMB 


8-«T- 




f^ 










^VOv - 


xw». 




Datu 


ÜAnMMB 


2li»ek.7 


»iae*L 


, ggsa-ii. 


1 ^^^^^v^^^^ 


Kav 




i 


jrd^ to Ib.. 


«4X«4, 


4^ 

AÜasücÁ 


I 4^ 




laC.JaiL. 


. 1086 


2S33 


279-1 


356.3 


309 7 


750 


AfiríL 


. 1».6 


257.8 


297.7 


445.4 


2Ü9.7 


^.2 


JüJj. 


1^6 


257.8 


290.2 


4156 


232.3 


66.7 


Oet.. 


. 131.4 


280O 


295.3 


445.4 


237.1 


66.7 


VȒ,Jmn.. 


. 112.9 


302.2 


3163 


504.6 


9956 


694 


ApríL 


. 1513 


288.9 


3(».0 


475.0 


2S3.8 


75.0 


JoJj. 


105.7 


524.4 


5030 


831.3 


467.7 


88.9 


Oct . - 


. in.4 


568.9 


480.0 


682.8 


3073 


91.4 


iaKí.Jaa . 


. in.4 


480.0 


537.2 


712.5 


4U.3 


88 9 


ApríL 


. 165.7 


177.8 


188.4 


463 1 


270.9 


1000 


Juij. 


137.1 


337.8 


390.5 


386.0 


2903 


111.1 


Oct.. 


. 151.4 

1 


484.4 


453.5 


3B7.8 


354.8 


100.0 


Date 


TíefctiicB 


Aknbol 


▲Inai 


Biduttm. 
KÁ PüUsh 


Bine 
Titriol 


BriBstooe 


imj.jtLD . 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


1000 


Apríl 


10)0 


^.2 


106.6 


95.2 


97 4 


1000 


July. 


100.0 


81.5 


100.0 


100.0 


97 4 


122 2 


Oct. 


100.0 


85.2 


100.0 


100.0 


94 7 


128 9 


l»5i.Jan.. 


95.6 


74.1 


94.4 


100.0 


94.7 


133.3 


Apríl 


95.6 


66.7 


94.4 


1000 


86.8 


% 6 


Julv. 


98 5 


63.0 


94.4 


100.0 


89.5 


88.9 


Oct.. 


101.5 


74.1 


94.4 


^2 


94.7 


88.9 


1862, JaiL. 


122.1 


74.1 


94 4 


100.0 


94.7 


133.3 


Apríl 


. L50.0 


88 9 


100.0 


96 2 


94.7 


96 6 


July. 


L36.8 


107 4 


1000 


97 6 


94 7 


97 8 


Oct.. 


211.8 


122.2 


133 3 


» 2 


100.0 


106 7 


1863, Jan.. 


266.3 


14Í.6 


155.6 


104.8 


121.1 


111 1 


Apríl 




174.1 


166.7 


114 3 


157.9 


122.2 


July. 




161 1 


166 7 


114 3 


1.34.2 


111.1 


Oct.. 




192.6 


133 3 


107 1 


142.1 


116 7 


1864, Jan.. 


416.2 


a42.6 


161.1 


114 3 


142 1 


127.8 


Apríl 




379.6 


161 1 


119.0 


168 4 


131 . 1 


Julv. 


413.2 


&57.4 


2UÜ.0 


133.3 


189 5 


188 9 


Oct.. 


617.6 


6:«.9 


266.7 


133.3 


221.1 


166 7 


1865, Jan. . 


451.5 


814.8 


255 6 


142 9 


192.1 


222.2 


Apríl 


. i 411.8 


796.3 


222.2 


133.3 


178.9 


200. 


Julv. 


: 469.2 


759.3 


188.9 


104.8 


147.4 


138 9 


Oct.. 


472 1 


833.3 

t 


183 3 


104.8 


142.1 


133.3 



Appendix B 



Ul 



TABLE 2 — Ckmtinued 

KKLATIVE PRICB8 OF YAUOU8 OOMMODITIBS AT WHOLBSAIíB 



Date 


Castor Oil 


Copperas 


Flaz8ecKl 


Linseed 
Oil 


Mercury 


Mn natío 
Acid 


1860, Jan... 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


April.. 


104.8 


125.0 


98.2 


105.3 


100.0 


100.0 


July . . 


100.0 


125.0 


103.1 


103.5 


100.0 


100.0 


Oct... 


lOá.8 


125.0 


101.2 


101.8 


100.0 


100.0 


1861, Jan... 


85.2 


125.0 


89.0 


187.7 


100.0 


100.0 


April.. 


85.7 


125.0 


85.8 


105.3 


100.0 


100.0 


July . . 


85.7 


125.0 


92.0 


94.7 


100.0 


100.0 


Oct... 


102.9 


112.5 


92.0 


103.5 


81.8 


100.0 


1862, Jan... 


119.1 


150.0 


110.4 


149.1 


81.8 


116.7 


ApriL. 


152.4 


125.0 


135.0 


149.1 


81.8 


116.7 


July.. 


150.5 


125.0 


107.4 


150.9 


81.8 


116.7 


Oct... 


145.7 


150.0 


116.6 


150.9 


109.1 


116.7 


1863, Jan... 


190.5 


200.0 


171.8 


219.3 


127.3 


100.0 


April.. 


214.3 


200.0 


245.4 


298.2 


127.3 


100.0 


July . . 


190.5 


175.0 


147.3 


210.5 


127.3 


100.0 


Oct. . . 


176.2 


150.0 


147.3 


236.8 


141.8 


100.0 


186i,Jan... 


190.5 


175.0 


184.0 


250.9 


150.9 


133.3 


April.. 


195.2 


175.0 


214.7 


280.7 


200.0 


133.3 


July.. 


261.9 


187.5 


220.9 


298.2 


281.8 


133.3 


Oct... 


333.3 


250.0 


199.4 


245.6 


345.5 


133.3 


1865, Jan... 


319.1 


237.5 


230.1 


271.9 


250.9 


150.0 


April.. 


342.9 


200.0 


168.7 


245.6 


181.8 


150.0 


July . . 


323.8 


150.0 


116.6 


207.0 


96.4 


150.0 


Oct... 


314.3 


250.0 


177.9 


271.9 


96.4 


150.0 



. Date 


Opimn 
100.0 


Oxide of 
Zinc 


QaioksiW'r 
100.0 


1860, Jan... 


111.1 


April.. 


121.7 


111.1 


112.3 


July . . 


95.7 


100.0 


113.3 


Oct... 


104.3 


100.0 


113.8 


1861, Jan... 


82.6 


100.0 


113.3 


April. . 


91.3 


100.0 


108.7 


July . . 


95.7 


100.0 


98.5 


Oct... 


100.0 


100.0 


96.4 


1862, Jan... 


87.0 


100.0 


96.4 


April.. 


87.0 


100.0 


88.2 


July . . 


108.7 


100.0 


114.8 


Oct... 


125.2 


100.0 


129.2 



Qainine 



100.0 
122.7 
136.4 
159.1 
154.5 
172.7 

Í9Ó.9 
227.3 
204.5 
236.4 
259.1 



Soda Ash 



100.0 

100.0 

94.7 

89.5 

89.5 

89.5 

78.9 

105.5 

121.1 

111.1 

105.5 

115.8 



Soj^r of 
Líead: 
Brown 



100.0 

93.3 

93.3 

100.0 

100.0 

as. 3 

93.3 
93.3 
126.7 
113.3 
113.3 
126.7 



442 



HlSTOBT OF THE GbBENBACKS 







TABLE Z-CoHtitmed 






BBLATIVB PBICn OF TABIOUS OOMMODinaB AT WBOL^ñALM 




Date 


Oplnm 


Oxide of 

Zinc 


QoieksÜT'r 


QQinine 


BodaAsh 


Socar of 
Lead: 
Brown 


1863, Jan... 


146.1 


100.0 


130.5 


254.5 


126.3 


166.7 


ApriL. 


173.9 


144.4 


164.1 


286.4 


142.1 


20D.O 


July . . 


147.8 


144.4 


164.1 


263.6 


142.1 


20O.O 


Oct... 


169.6 


L38.9 


160.0 


227.3 


142.1 


120.0 


1864, Jan... 


169.6 


144.4 


184.6 


231.8 


152.6 


186.7 


April.. 


a04.3 


155.6 


256.4 


272.7 


168.4 


213.3 


July . . 


243.5 


188.9 


389.7 


295.5 


221.1 


213.3 


Oct... 


300.0 


200.0 


307.7 


304.6 


205.2 


640.0 


1865, Jan . . . 


121.7 


200.0 


256.4 


295.5 


273.7 


533.3 


April.. 


116.5 


2000 


194.9 


231.8 


110.5 


533.3 


July . . 


102.6 


177.8 


153.8 


200.0 


89.5 


493.3 


Oct... 


126.1 


200.0 


174.4 


268.2 


136.8 




— ■ 


Sdoabof 
Lbad; 


Süu- 

PHÜBIC 


Candlbs 




Goal 




Dat« 








Whitk 


ArTD 




Anthracite 


Anthracite 


Antbraeite 










Chestnat 


EflTflr 


Orate 


1860, Jan... 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


April. . 


95.7 


100.0 


100.0 


• • • • • 


100.0 


100.0 


July . . 


95.7 


100.0 


96.3 


92.1 


97.4 


97.3 


Oct... 


95.7 


100.0 


96.3 


107.9 


111.8 


112.2 


1861. Jan... 


100.0 


109.1 


96.3 


98.4 


105.3 


116.2 


April.. 


. 100.0 


109.1 


96.3 


103.2 


ai 4 


110 8 


July . . 


100.0 


109.1 


96.3 


95.2 


97.4 


97.3 


Oct . . . 


100.0 


109.1 


96.3 


107.9 


97.4 


102.7 


1862, Jan... 


104.3 


127.3 


92.6 


95.2 


97 4 


108.1 


April.. 


100.0 


127.3 


88.9 


85.7 


92.1 


91.9 


.luly.. 


104.3 


127.3 


88.9 


82.5 


93 4 


90.5 


Oct... 


139.1 


127.3 


88.9 


85.7 


94.7 


86.5 


186:j,Jdn... 


156.5 


109.1 


96 3 


92 1 


98.7 


102.7 


April. . 


226.1 


109.1 


100.0 


187.3 


155.3 


159.5 


July.. 


173.9 


109.1 


100.0 


190.5 


168.4 


168.9 


Oct . . . 


139.0 


109.1 


100.0 


190.5 


203.9 


196.0 


1864, Jan... 


191.3 


109.1 


100. 


198.4 


2:ío 3 


216.2 


April.. 


208.7 


109.1 


100.0 








July . . 


287.0 


145.5 


10:^7 


293.7 


2¿3.Í 


263.5 


Oct . . . 


478.3 


172 7 


148.1 


230 2 


223.7 


229.7 


1865, Jan.. 


413.0 


172.7 


148.1 


269.8 


250.0 


24;J 2 


April.. 


391.3 


181.8 


148.1 


• • • • • 


• • • • • 




July... 


347.8 


181.8 


111.1 


198.4 


184.2 


186.5 


Oct . . . 


434.8 


181.8 


111.1 


309.5 


276.3 


283.8 



Appbndix B 



443 



TABLE 2 — C<nUinited 

PUCBB OW yABIOUB COM MODITIE8 AT WHOIíBSALS 



Datb 



1860, Jan... 
Apiil.. 
July . . 
Oct... 

1861, Jan... 
ApriL. 
July . . 
Oct... 

1862, Jan... 
Apríl.. 
July.. 

1863, Jan... 
ApriL. 
July.. 

186á,Jan... 

Apríl.. 

July.. 

Oct... 
1865, Jan... 

Apríl.. 

July . . 

Oct.. . 



Goal 






Cbmbnt: 






Matches 


Bbick 


Anthracite 


Bitami- 






Rosendale 


Store 


nons 








100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


114.3 


80.0 




106.0 


100.0 


97.1 


100.0 


98.7 


102.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


102.6 


105.0 


100.0 


102.8 


100.0 


116.7 


106.0 


100.0 


102.8 


100.0 


94.9 


96.0 


100.0 


91.4 


90.0 


98.7 


92.0 


100.0 


80.0 


900 


97.4 


97.0 


100.0 


85.7 


90.0 


98.7 


97.0 


100.0 


85.7 


90.0 


92.3 


135.0 


100.0 


91.4 


90.0 


93.6 


122.0 


100.0 


91.4 


90.0 


94.9 


180.0 


100.0 


94.3 


90.0 


100.0 


160.0 


100.0 


137.1 


90.0 


151.3 


150.0 


100.0 


140.0 


120.0 


166.7 


150.0 


100.0 


137.1 


120.0 


201.3 


160.0 


100.0 


148.6 


120.0 


243.6 


173.0 


100.0 


205.7 


120.0 


• • • • • 


180.0 


100.0 


171.4 


140.0 


262.8 


199.3 


206.3 


1600 


150.0 


224.4 


233.2 


208.3 


217.1 


160.0 


243.6 


256.2 


208.3 


211.4 


160.0 




250.0 


395.8 


217.1 


160.0 


179.5 


165.0 


395.8 


171.4 


150.0 


275.6 


200.0 


395.8 


262.9 


175.0 



Chestnüt 

Lamber, 

in the Log 



100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
104.2 
104.2 
108.3 
108.3 
108.3 
116.7 
125.0 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 
L33.3 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 



I>ate 



1860, Jan.. 
Apríl. 
July. 
Oct.. 

1861, Jan.. 
Apríl. 
July. 
Oct.. 

1862, Jan.. 
Apríl. 
July. 
Oct.. 



Hemlock : 


Lime: 
Bockland 


Pine: 


Pine 


Lnmber, 


Lamber, 


Boards: 


in the Log 


in the Log 


B'rdSflin. 


100.0 


133.3 


100.0 


106.4 


100.0 


141.7 


100.0 


106.4 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


133.3 


125.0 


125.0 


106.4 


133.3 


133.3 


125.0 


106.4 


133.3 


133.3 


125.0 


106.4 


133.3 


133.3 


125.0 


106.4 


133.3 


133.3 


125.0 


106.4 


166.7 




187.5 


106.4 


166.7 


137.5 


187.5 


109.6 


183.3 


91.7 


187.5 


106.4 


191.7 


116.7 


193.8 


109.6 



Putty 



100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
116.7 
116.7 
116.7 
116.7 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 
133.3 



Rabber : 
Para 



100.0 

109.1 

122.7 

118.2 

100.0 

68.2 

81.8 

77.3 

87.3 

90.9 

104.5 

121.8 



444 



HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBAOKS 



TABLE 2 — Ckmtinued 

RBLATIVE PRICE8 OF VABIOU8 COMMODmBS AT WHOLE8ALB 



Date 



1863. Jan... 

April . . 

July . . 

Oct... 
186á, Jan . . . 

April.. 

July . . 

Oct. . . 
1865, Jan... 

April. . 

July . . 

Oct... 



Hemlock : 

Lumber, 

IntheLog 



200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
20O.O 
200.0 



Lime: 
Bockland 



141.7 
141.7 
166.7 
191.7 
175.0 
225.0 
166.7 
206.3 
250.0 
266.7 
200.0 
300.0 



Pine: 
Lamber, 
in the Log 



200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 
200.0 



Pine 

Boards: 

B'rds, 1 in. 



109.6 
132.0 
132.0 
148.0 
148.0 
164.0 
196.0 
196.0 
196.0 
196.0 
196.0 
228.0 



Pntty 



150.0 
150.0 
150.0 
150.0 
166.7 
166.7 
166.7 
166.7 
183.3 
183.3 
183.3 
183.3 



Bnbber: 
Para 



159.1 
154.5 
131.8 
136.4 
145.5 
150.9 
172.7 
218.2 
218.2 
154.5 
127.3 
136.4 





Spbuce : 


TUBPEN- 


WiMDOW GliASS 


Date 










Boards 


TINE 


American, 


American, 


French, 


French, 








10X14, 


10 X 14, 


10X14 


10X14, 








firsts 


thirds 


flrsta 


thirds 


1860. Jan... 


91.7 


110.0 


91.7 


105.8 


85.1 


106.3 


April. . 


91.7 


115.0 


91.7 


100.0 


100.0 


106.3 


July.. 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


Oct. . . 


100.0 


105.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


1861, Jan . . . 


100.0 


87.5 


100.0 


94.0 


93.8 


100.0 


April. . 


100.0 


90.0 


100.0 


95.6 


108.9 


97.7 


July . . 


87.5 


206.0 


100.0 


103.4 


96.1 


97.7 


Oct... 


83.3 


362.5 


100.0 


111.2 


96.1 


109.1 


1862, Jan... 


a3.3 


350.0 


100.0 


118.5 


96.1 


118.9 


April. . 


83.3 


245.0 


100.0 


159.3 


96.1 


140.7 


July. . 


79.2 


325.0 


100.0 


159.3 


96.1 


156.3 


Oct. . . 


97.9 


562.5 


100.0 


159.3 


96.1 


146.6 


1863, Jan... 


97.9 


625.0 


133.3 


159.3 


115.3 


140.7 


April. . 


97.9 


675.0 


133.3 


171.5 


140.6 


156.3 


July . . 


131.3 


895.0 


153.1 


159.3 


132.8 


156.3 


Oct... 


127.1 


687.5 


131.3 


159.3 


117.2 


156.3 


1864, Jan . . . 


127.1 


750.0 


131.3 


220.5 


125.0 


185.3 


April. . 


177.1 


800.0 


256.9 


206.8 


146.4 


185 3 


July . . 


202.1 


900.0 


208.3 


245.0 


223.4 


224.7 


Oct... 


191.7 


607.5 


250.0 


254.8 


205.9 


254 


1865, Jan... 


191.7 


512.5 


242.2 


274.4 


232.0 


259.9 


April. . 


168.8 


500.0 


209.9 


240.1 


193.4 


218.9 


July . . 


168.8 


337.5 


177.6 


161.7 


154.7 


150.5 


Oct... 


168.8 


262.5 


226.0 


212.3 


180.5 


177.8 



Appendix B 



445 



TABLE 2^ConHnued 

BSLATIYB PRICBS OF YARIOU8 COMMODITIE8 AT WHOLE8ALB 





BuTTs: 


Coppkb: 




Lead: 


Date 








Ikon: 






Joint, 
castSXSin. 


Ingot 


Sheet 


Wire 


Drop-shot 


Pig 


1860, Jan... 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 




100.0 


100.0 


Apríl.. 


100.0 


97.9 


100.0 




119.1 


101.7 


July . . 


93.0 


89.4 


100.0 


100.0 


114.9 


98.0 


\JClt ... 


89.5 


90.4 


100.0 


100.0 


110.6 


97.8 


1861, Jan... 


89.5 


80.9 


100.0 


100.0 


110.6 


95.2 


April.. 


89.5 


80.9 


93.2 


100.0 


110.6 


95.2 


July . . 


89.5 


76.6 


m.2 


100.0 


110.6 


84.8 


Oct... 


89.5 


87.2 


93.2 


100.0 


119.1 


100.4 


1862, Jan... 


89.5 


112.8 


a3.2 


100.0 


144.7 


121.2 


ApriL. 


89.5 


93.6 


103.4 


100.0 


144.7 


116.9 


July.. 


112.3 


97.9 


103.4 


100.0 


144.7 


116.9 


Oct. . . 


133.3 


119.1 


103.4 


100.0 


148.9 


123.4 


1863, Jan... 


133.3 


131.9 


128.8 


105.8 


170.2 


138.5 


April.. 


133.3 


129.8 


144.1 


232.7 


204.3 


155.8 


July . . 


140.4 


129.8 


135.6 


169.2 


204.3 


145.0 


Oct... 


140.4 


138.3 


128.8 


137.5 


187.2 


147.2 


1864, Jan... 


178.9 


160.6 


162.7 


211.5 


229.8 


186.1 


April.. 


207.0 


172.3 


178.0 


211.5 


263.8 


201.2 


July . . 


266.7 


197.9 


194.9 


211.5 


357.6 


251.1 


Oct... 


306.8 


200.0 


237.3 


285.6 


340.4 


251.1 


1865, Jan... 


308.8 


206.5 


220.3 


264.4 


340.4 


259.7 


April.. 


308.8 


144.7 


169.5 


211.5 


272.4 




July . . 


277.2 


121.3 


152.5 


148.1 


238.3 


173.1 


Oct. . . 


277.2 


138.3 


169.5 


169.2 


255.4 





Date 



1860, Jan... 
April.. 
July . . 
Oct. . . 

1861, Jan... 
April.. 
July . . 
Oct... 

1862, Jan... 
April. . 
July . . 
Oct. . . 



Lead: 
Pipe 



100.0 
116.7 
112.5 
104.2 
104.2 
108.3 
108.3 
116.7 
141.7 
141.7 
141.7 
145.8 



Shoyels 



100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

94.7 

94.7 

98.7 

98.7 



Spelter : 
Imported 



100.0 

100.0 
99.0 
95.2 
90.5 
90.5 
81.0 
85.7 

109.5 
95.2 

114.3 
83.3 



Tin Plates : 
I. C. Coke 


Wood Serawa: 

1-inch, No. 

10, Fia* HMd, 

I ron 


100.0 


100.0 


101.7 


100.0 


101.7 


80.5 


96.5 


116.7 


94.7 


116.7 


98.2 


116.7 


\M ,£ 


116.7 


89.5 


116.7 


108.9 


116.7 


105.3 


116.7 


105.3 


116.7 


122.8 


116.7 



Zinc: 

Iniported 

mieet 



100.0 
100.0 
101.8 
96.4 
92.9 
100.0 
100.0 
103.6 
103.6 
103.6 
103.6 
128.6 



446 



HlSTORT OF THB GrEENBACKS 



TABLE t-Omtinued 

mBLATIYB PBICB8 OF yABIOÜS GOMMODUTEH AT WHOLESAUB 



Bate 


Lead: 
Pipe 


ShoTels 


Spelter: 
Imported 


Tin Platas : 
I. C. Coke 


WMd IcffMra: 

l-bek. Ho. 
10, nai BMd. 


Zinc: 


lB63,Jan... 


166.7 


102.6 


142.9 


129.8 


135.0 


146.4 


Apiil.. 


166.7 




161.9 


154.4 


158.3 


178.6 


July.. 


200.0 


• • • • • 


147.6 


136.8 


158.3 


164.3 


Oct... 


183.3 


122.8 


161.9 


136.8 


118.8 


157.1 


1864, Jan... 


225.0 


135.9 


176.2 


154.4 


158.3 


171.4 


April.. 


258.3 


161.0 


238.1 


196.5 


158.3 


214 3 


July.. 


350.0 


200.4 


333.3 


306.8 


215.7 


^7 1 


Oct... 


333.3 


200.4 


257.1 


210 5 


215.7 


257.1 


1865, Jan... 


333.3 


184.2 


285.7 


238.6 


215.7 


285.7 


April.. 


266.7 


184.2 


171.4 


147.4 


215.7 


lfó.7 


July.. 


233.3 


134.2 


171.4 


143.8 


215.7 


171.4 


Oct. . . 


216.7 


1^.2 


202.4 


154.4 


215.7 


207.1 







FCRNTTURB 




Tailb: Woodbh 


Datb 
















Chairs, 


Chairs. 


Tables, 


2Hoops 


SHoops 


S Hoopj 




Bed-Room 


Kitchen 


Kitchen 


(1) 


12) 


1860. Jan . . . 


1000 


100.0 


1000 ; 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


April.. 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


lOÜ.O 


100.0 


July.. 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


Oct... 


80.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100 


100.0 


1861,Jan ... 


80.0 


100.0 


1000 


96.2 


100.0 


100.0 


April. . 


80.0 


1000 


100.0 


96 2 


100.0 


100 


July.. 


80.0 


100.0 


100.0 


96.2 


1000 


100.0 


Oct... 


80.0 


100.0 


100.0 


98.2 


98.1 


96 9 


1862, Jan... 


80.0 


100.0 


1000 


92 9 


92.6 


93.8 


April. . 


• 80.0 


100.0 


100.0 


92.9 


92.6 


9:^.8 


July.. 


80.0 


100.0 


1000 


107.1 


107.4 


106.3 


Oct... 


80.0 


100.0 


ia)o 


121.4 


119.3 


118.8 


1863. Jan... 


a5.o 


100.0 


100.0 


121.4 


122 2 


i-r>.o 


April. . 


105.0 


100.0 


112.5 


1500 


151 9 


146.9 


July.. 


1Ü6.0 


100.0 


112.5 


139.3 


138.5 


137.5 


Oc»t... 


110.0 


111.1 


112.5 


139.3 


138.5 


140.6 


1864. Jan... 


125.0 


122.2 


112.5 


160.7 


163.0 


156 3 


April. . 


125.0 


1^ '2 


125.0 


178.6 


183 


176.3 


Julv. 


145.0 


133.3 


137.5 


178.6 


181.5 


176.9 


a-t . . . 


180.0 


im.i 


1(Í2.5 


178.6 


183.0 


17S.1 


1865. Jan . 


180.0 


166.7 


l(r2.5 


17S.6 


18.^0 


178.1 


April. . 


irio.o 


!,>'> 6 


lni).0 


178.6 


181.5 


178 1 


July.. 


145 


144 4 


i 150.0 


142.9 


146.7 


140.6 


Oct... 


145.0 


144 4 


150.0 


214.3 


218.5 


1 2U3.1 



Appendix B 



447 



TABLE 2 — Contintíed 

BSLATIVB PBICBS OF VABIOU8 COMMODITIE8 AT WHOLSSALB 







TUBS: WOODBN 








Date 










JüTK 


Powder: 










Rifle 




(1) 


(2) 


(3) 


(4) 






1860, Jan... 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


April.. 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


97.8 


108.6 


100.0 


July.. 


100.0 


1000 


96.6 


as. 3 


105.7 


100.0 


Oct... 


100.0 


100.0 


89.7 


889 


100.0 


100.0 


1^61, Jan... 


90.0 


93.8 


89.7 


88.9 


114.3 


100.0 


April.. 


90.0 


93.8 


89.7 


88.9 


91.4 


100.0 


July. . 


90.0 


93.8 


89.7 


88.9 


91.4 


120.0 


Oct... 


90.0 


93.8 


86.2 


86.7 


102.9 


120.0 


1862, Jan... 


90.0 


83.8 


81.4 


80.0 


146.3 


140.0 


April. . 


100.0 


100.0 


89.7 


98.7 


125.7 


120.0 


July.. 


110.0 


100.0 


96.6 


95.6 


108.6 


130.0 


Oct... 


120.0 


112.5 


105.2 


104.4 


148.0 


130.0 


1863, Jan... 


140.0 


137.5 


124.1 


124.4 


205.7 


130.0 


ApriL. 


148.0 


142.5 


127.7 


126.7 


257.1 


135.0 


July. . 


1480 


142.5 


131.0 


128.9 


194.3 


135.0 


Oct... 


152.0 


150.0 


131.0 


128.9 


182.8 


147.0 


1864, Jan... 


170.0 


162.5 


148.3 


144.4 


251.4 


145.0 


April. . 


189 6 


168.5 


165.5 


151.1 


320.0 


152.0 


July.. 


200.0 


175.0 


175.9 


' 157.8 


354.3 


174.0 


Oct... 


170.0 


168.8 


148.3 


148.9 


314.3 


172.0 


1865, Jan... 


180.0 


150.0 


170.3 


154.2 


320.0 


180.0 


April.. 


140.0 


193.8 


124.1 


126.7 


302.8 


175.0 


July.. 


160.0 


156.3 


144.8 


140.0 


200.0 


170.0 


Oct. . . 


170.0 


162.5 


148.3 


144.4 


171.4 


170.0 





ROPE 


Soap: 
Castile 


Starch 


Date 


Manilla 


Tarred, 
American 


Ontario 


Pearl 


Pare 


1860, Jan... 
April.. 
July. . 
Oct... 

1861, Jan... 
April.. 
July. . 
Oct... 

1862, Jan... 
April. . 
July.. 
Oct... 


100.0 

100.0 

97.0 

97.0 

97.0 

106.1 

93.9 

90.9 

121.2 

130.3 

124.2 

145.4 


100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 

ióéü 

105.1 

ÍÍ8*.9 
118.9 
113.5 
129.7 


100.0 
114.7 
117.6 
108.8 
114.7 
111.8 
117.6 
141.2 
152.9 
158.8 
155.9 
164.7 


ióóió 

100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
110.0 


100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

91.7 

91.7 

91.7 

91.7 

100.0 


100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

100.0 

92.3 

92.3 

92.3 

92.3 

100.0 



448 



HlSTORY OP THE GrEENBACKS 



TABLE 2 — Ctmlinued 

RKLATIVB PRICES OF VAUOU8 GOMMODITISa AT WHOLESALB 





ROPE 


Soap: 
Castile 


Sta»ch 


Datk 


Manilla 


Tarrod, 
.\merican 


Ontario 


Pearl 


Puré 


imi,Jan... 

April.. 

July.. 

Oct... 
1864,Jan... 

April.. 

July.. 

Oct... 
1865, Jan... 

ApriL. 

July.. 

Oct... 


151.5 
218.2 
172.7 
184.8 
197.0 
2303 
254.5 
308.0 
284.8 
242.4 
242.4 
272.7 


143.2 
164.9 
162.2 
154.1 
164.9 
164.9 
167.6 
205.4 
200.0 
194.6 
194.6 
194.6 


170.6 
202.9 
200.0 
194.0 
217.6 
205.9 
282.4 
247.1 
294.1 
247.1 
194.0 
252.9 


130.0 
140.0 
130.0 
130.0 
160.0 
180.0 
*J00.0 
244.2 
240.0 
240.0 
200.0 
200.0 


116.7 
125.0 
116.7 
116.7 
141.7 
158.3 
175.0 
191.7 
208.3 
208.3 
175.0 
175.0 


115.4 
123.1 
115.4 
115.4 
138.5 
153.8 
169.2 
184.6 
200.0 
2000 
169.2 
169.2 





Stasch 


Date 


Staech 


Date 












Reflned 


Silver 
üioss 

100.0 




Refltipd 


Silver 
Gloss 


1860,January. 


100.0 


1863,January. 


. 114.3 


112.9 


April 


100.0 


100.0 


April. . . . 


. 121.4 


119.4 


July 


100.0 


100.0 


July 


114.3 


112.9 


October . . 


100.0 


100.0 


October . 


114.3 


112.9 


1861.January.. 


100.0 


100.0 


1864, Jan uary. 


135.7 


132.3 


April 


100.0 


100.0 


April. . . . 


150.0 


145.2 


July 


100.0 


100.0 


July 


164.3 


158.1 


October . . 


92.9 


a3.5 


Octol>er . 


178.6 


171.0 


1862, January. . 


92 9 


as. 5 


1865, January. . 


192.9 


ia3.9 


April 


92.9 


as. 5 


April 


1 192.9 


183 9 


July 


92.9 


a3 5 


July 


164.3 


158 1 


October . . 


100.0 


100.0 


October . . 


164.3 


158.1 



Appendix B 



449 



TABLE S 

BXLATIYB PHICBS PAID BT FEDBSAI< OOVKRNMENT FOB 8UPPLIB8, 1860-65 1 

1. RelatiTO Prioes Paid by the Qnartermaster (General (War Department). Pp. 1506, 

1507. Date within Year Not Specified 



Caps, forage 

Hats, uniform 

Great coate 

Coats, blue flannel, sack 

Coats, blue flannel, sack, lined. 

Trousers 

Shirts, flannel 

StockingB 



1860 


1861 


1862 


1863 


1861 


100 


111 


98 


102 


114 


100 


66 


69 


70 


77 


100 


113 


148 


117 


133 


100 


102 


114 


112 


126 


100 


103 


123 


122 


127 


100 


107 


126 


89 


110 


100 


98 


162 


170 


174 


100 


106 


133 


133 


146 



1865 

175 
96 
188 
191 
188 
168 
258 
200 



2. RelatiTO Prioes Paid by the Office of the Commissary General of Subsistence 
(War Department). Pp. 1806-9. Average Prices for Year 



Pork 

Bacon 

Ham 

Beef cattle 

Fresh beef 

Salt beef 

Flour 

Soft bread 

Hard bread 

Com meal 

Beans 

Peas 

Rice 

Hominy 

Desiccated potatoes .... 

Mixed y^etables 

Green ooffee 

R. and R. and O. coffee 

Tea 

Brown sugar 

White sugar 

Vinegar 

Canales 

Soap 

Salt 







100 


89 






100 


100 






100 


90 






100 


100 






100 


100 






100 


96 






100 


111 






100 


100 






100 


100 






100 


200 






100 


1.33 






100 


100 






100 


86 






100 


100 






100 


110 






100 


109 






100 


153 






100 


145 






100 


129 






100 


111 






100 


120 






100 


91 






100 


106 






100 


120 






100 


117 



110 


217 


100 


229 


130 


190 


124 


200 


100 


167 


94 


147 


130 


175 


100 


133 


100 


150 


300 


300 


167 


167 


150 


150 


114 


157 


150 


200 


100 


110 


87 


78 


213 


2a3 


190 


250 


167 


239 


133 


211 


160 


250 


146 


264 


122 


172 


140 


220 


119 


119 



238 
300 
250 
232 
183 
144 
170 
133 
175 
400 
133 
300 
143 
200 
140 
109 
247 
160 
280 
167 
260 
318 
167 
220 
119 



1 The data f rom which the followinff series of relatiye prices have been com- 
peted are fonnd in the **exhibits** of the Aldrich Report on the pagos iodicated 
under the seTeral divisions of the table. 



HlSTOBT OP THE GsEESBACKS 





■«» 


1B61 


ise2 


.« 


lau 


ISCS 




100 
100 
100 
100 

... 

ióó 
ióo 

100 
100 
100 
100 

ióo 


86 
101 
94 
92 
100 
100 

m 

100 
98 
71 
86 

10» 
97 

100 

117 


100 

91 

li 

123 
99 
93 
92 
91 
97 
68 
74 

102 
« 
64 

310 


150 
86 
100 
84 
132 
124 
103 
99 
106 
75 
83 
113 
97 
123 
576 


216 
125 
281 
77 
232 
232 
201 
IHO 
IM 
1.32 
134- 
208 
214 
IBO 
188 


216 
















329 












238 


Trouser», caovae duck 


.150 








234 












838 


pe 





Aconite 

Aloes 

Alum 

Ammonia 

Calomel 

Camphor 

Caittor oil 

Chalk 

Chloro'orn» 

Codliveroil 

Ether 

Eitrsct otfTinKer 

BttraCTt of wiW chorry bark 

OumArabic 

Ipeoac 

I^udanum 

Mafrnt^i* — 

NitTic H'-id 

Olivnoil 

Opium -- 

p[llB,cathsrtitr.. 



100 


107 


107 


lüü 


im 


167 


100 


87 


91 


lOÜ 


lili 


lüü 


100 


11.=-. 


1.T3 


100 


un 


92 




119 




100 


«H 


90 


loo 


Hlü 


100 


lÜO 


99 


100 


lüü 


71 


71 


100 


ir.ü 


54 


lüü 


113 


114 


loo 


lüü 


128 


100 


l.il 


131 


lüü 


104 


116 






100 


lüü 




83 


llIO 


9;i 


TT. 


IIXI 


loo 


lOU 


lUü 


1Ü1 


m 


100 


7.-> 


■- 



100 I 300 I .-no 

93 ¡ 208 I 283 

I» I 68 ' a> 

lüü I 147 147 

115 I 185 185 



TABLE 3 — CoHtinwd 





1880 


IMl 


186S 


tm 


UM 


IB6S 




100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 


10* 
100 
123 
100 

111 

81 
90 
124 
100 


101 
100 
149 
100 
131 
67 
83 
163 
100 


104 
100 
187 
100 
100 
78 
120 
283 
100 


aoo 

126 
196 
118 
100 
111 
120 
200 
267 


























120 















■ CONMODinSS AT HBTAII.' 



Mass. ... 




Conn. . . . 


JewettCity 








New Cumberland 


W. Va. . . 


Wheeling 






Ohio .... 


Cincinnati 






Jnd 




Ind 


Lanrenceburg... 


Tnd 


Nbw Albany 


lU 


Bloomingtan 



I The «oaioa ol the toUowlii« seilns ot relatiTs priesa at retuíl ia the report pn- 
pand br Mr. J. D. Wfwka tn UW-SSand pabUshed as Vol. KX ot thflTeath Censos. 
Not al) of the material aopplied by Ur. Weeka, hownTer, haa been naed, fur he gires 
aome aerles of pricej at niupeeifled timee ot the ;ear Bnd othors "on or about 
Jone 1." ThDHfl series " shoviag arera^ tor tho year " aloae vare usad as the basis 
fot the somputatiooB lu the teit, aad tbejr alone are giiea hore. Tba eeoeral ditl- 
sioni of the series — drygoods, sroceries, proiisiona, etc. — are the same aa Íd the 
Censna leport ; but ander thase beads a clasaifleatlon accordinfr to articles was fouad 
mora 0(Ki*eDleDt tbao the ODe accordins to towna which Ur. Weeka adopted. Eow- 
«Ter, as tb« rtst« and town fmm vhich eTerj seriea comea ara carefnllj stated. thare 
need be ao diOeolt; in tranlns anr series to ite soarce. In the case of reiit flcoraa 
■te glTen foi IWI and ISDB tor tbe purpose* ot Part II. chap. li. 



1- 






"1 


^^H 




4S2 


HlSTOBY OP THE GrEENBACKS 




TABLE 1-a.nlinucd 










TtTB FMCKH OF DBI OOODS AT BETAIL — HOOB* 


«j«« "» ■^" 






























^PVa. 














"" 


Mnsa... 
Cunn .... 


Woburn 


0.33 
Mi 


100 

100 


100 


91 

IfKI 


fli 

150 


loo 

?50 


115 


100 

268 


JewettCity 






NewCaetlB 


.25 


1IN1 


1(10 


¡■«1 


140 


]m 


¡(Xl 






W. Va... 




.iñ 


1(«1 


¡s» 


■arj 


4110 


Wl 


4(i7 


267 




W. Va... 


WheeÜng 


W 


iim 


l'M 


150 


ItiO 


V4(l 


-m 


150 


























Ohio .... 




.•£> 


1011 


HK) 


lOI 


150 


im 


1(H) 


160 




Ohio.... 


ZanesíUlo 


15 


iim 


2:« 


air/ 


;*io 


4117 


2tr7 


233 




Ind 


EvansviUe 


.20 


IIKI 


IVñ 


175 


K*i 


ÍWI 












.20 




¡Vi) 


r/.s 


175 


l'ih 


175 






Ind 




.a> 


iim 


1(«) 


140 


irtí 


am 


1H0 


160 




Ind 


NewAlbany 


IH 


loo 


¡11 


lfi7 


U*4 


«22 


1(Í7 


130 




IIL 


Bloamin){ton 


.25 


lUÜ 


loo 


_ü^ 


^ 


140 


1(J0 


^ 




MasB.... 


^^^^^ 


0.13 
.125 


100 
100 


115 
lili 


15j 

lia 


151 
17(1 


154 
MO 


2M 
300 


199 
264 




JewettCitj 




Pb 


NewCaetle 


IVñ 


1110 


10(1 


144 


ax) 


.IK) 


««> 


900 








.09 


11» 


í«? 


OTH 


444 


550 


hM 


333 




W.Vb... 


Wheeling 


.1*25 


1(«) 


lai 


axi 


24<f 


4(10 


320 


210 




Ohio.... 




.125 
.125 


lUÜ 

iiin 


HO 
no 


144 
HIO 


240 
IW 


400 


320 

.TOO 


240 
380 














1INI 


Wí 


¡•■«I 


17« 


;mi 








Ind 


EvansviUe 


,10 


10(1 


10(1 


ir*i 


2.50 


ñ<N» 


450 


300 




Ind 


Jeffer»onvÍlle 


IWV 


IIN) 


KXI 


10(1 


100 


lili 


1V)I 


200 




Ind 


Iiawrenceliurg. . . 


.{•£> 


1(11 


iim 


IIXI 


24(> 


4H(1 


•/HO 


200 




Ind 




10 


UN) 


Kf. 


UOd 


:m 


4011 


2íi(l 


200 




IIL 


Bloomington 


.l-iT) 


luo 


100 


aio 


240 


360 


440 


320 


1 




■ATMK», MBDItm 4CAUTI 




1 




Conn. . . . 


Jewett City 


D75 


ion 


ino 


13a 


1150 


177 


177 


173 






NewCaetle 


1.00 


loo 




l'*i 






14(1 


IGÜ 




W.Vfl... 


New CumberUnd 


l.tl 


loo 


227 


;«M 


4:¿) 


iA¡t 


£>Í5 


273 




W.Va.., 


Wheeling 


Tu 


IIXI 


];« 


1(17 


itr7 


21X1 


2011 


ler _ 




Ohio .... 
Ohio .... 


Cantan 


.7S 
.75 


loo 


loo 
iiai 




un 

113 


iw 


1(S7 


1.33 m 


H 






Ohio ... 


ZanesviUe 


«1 


iim 


10(1 


i:,o 


a-io 


213 


IB3 


150 ■ 




Ind 


Jeffereonville.... 


75 


iim 


i:ci 


i;« 


i.-n 


13:í 


l.tl 






Ind 


Lawrenceburg. , . 


.70 


lili 


\m 




179 


214 


14:1 


m ■ 




Ind 


New Albany 


.fíSñ 




1011 


la) 


172 


172 


144 




■ 


L '» 






lUO 


87 


lU, 


133 


ITl 


itn 


.. ■ 


1 


k 


X. 


J 


J 







Appendix 


B 










453 


^„ 


VE nucn op un 


TABLE i-Ctoníini<«l 
OaOM AT RnAII.-8HZ 
BIAHDAIO qDAUTT 


■™--«-°.'"<'- 


BMW 


Towo 


iDítial 


ISSD 


1B8I 


1M2 


im 


itu 


.» 


1868 


Hose.. . 




D.U 
.17 
-10 
.15 
.15 
.25 
.13 
.30 
.095 
.113 


100 
100 
100 
100 

loo 
loo 

100 

100 
100 
100 


lU 
118 
2Ü0 

107 
100 

lio 

1.38 
107 
111 
133 


321 
185 
350 
233 
250 
13Ü 
169 
217 
2J2 
200 


357 
204 

450 

sst 

367 
150 
231 
317 
400 
300 


250 
353 
500 
5.33 
533 
160 
577 
333 
579 
400 


286 
353 
600 
400 
467 
170 
346 
283 
471 
433 


m 








W.Va... 
W.Va... 


NewCumberlaad 


500 














Ohio .... 




fí» 


Ind 

Ind 

JU. 


New Albany 

Bloomington 


300 
421 
30O 





tnErraiw. h 


lOWlt, ■ 


XÍ.B1 


ANDA 


»D gUALITI 








Hoaa.... 




0.13 


ion 


115 


f«H 


34fi 


,Tn« 


rufi 


308 


Pb 


NewCastle 


1115 


^m 


VA) 


WN) 


;-Mio 


440 


MV 


MU 


W.Vb... 


New Cumberland 


.08 


uní 


ítífi 


37r> 


ñOO 


ff^ 


6i'r> 


501 1 


W.Va.. 


Wheeling 


.125 


100 


m) 


IMI) 




600 


4(N1 


320 






.125 


loo 
ion 


1W 


280 
IñO 


400 
175 


600 
190 


520 

■xm 




Ohio .... 


Cincinnati 


im 


Ohio .... 


Zanesville 


.13 


ton 


i:« 


irtft 


Wll 


ftW 


308 


26S> 


Ind 




,16 


100 


167 


167 


IHV 


1h"í 


ÍKI 


1«7 


Ind 






10(1 


107 


ÜU 


:m 


;-fi7 


;«M 


321 


Ind 


NewAlbany 


.0775 


UN) 


I3ñ 


•m 


tm 


H77 


tW4 


ñññ 


111 


Bloomington 


.15 


lou 


133 


a;a 


333 


433 


500 


333 



MSBS.... 


Conn.... 


Pft 


W.Va. . 


W.Va.,. 


Ohio .... 


Ohio .... 




Ind 


Ind 


Ind 


Ind 


111 



Wobum 

Jewett City. 

New Castle. 
New Cumberland 

Wheeling 

Cantón 

Cincinnati 

Zanesville 

Kvansvilk 

Jeffereonville ., 
Lawrenceburg. 
New Albany, . , 
Bloomington . . 



0.125 


ino 


104 


■w 


.im 


í-W) 


?40 


.16 


1IN) 


Hl 


1IN> 


v;m 


3Vh 


41K 


.15 


llN) 


120 


1«7 


:-«io 


:f73 


3177 


.08 


100 


«ffi 


375 


500 




SW 


.10 


IINI 


\m 


;«N) 


4t)l 


m) 


Hit 


.125 


100 


ivn 


t>40 


400 


>w 


480 


.15 


11X1 


m 


Wl 


i;« 


267 


267 


.10 


l<<) 


150 


¡too 


3on 


ftSO 


350 


.10 






\Vl\ 


:m<i) 


6(NI 


mt 


.125 


100 


120 


m> 


280 


440 


im 


.125 


1(N) 


l->0 


176 


;wn 


(iOO 


:vú 


.065 


1(N) 


II? 


935 


4\-f. 


riHH 


471 


.125 


100 


120 


¡ajo 


:m 


440 


480 



HlBTOBT OP THB GbBENBACSS 



TABLE 1 — Cnatimal 









qnAíin 














StaM 


TOWD 


H 


,» 


«» 


1862 


isas 


.» 


1865 


i8es 






Q.U 
.125 

.10 
.06 
.10 
.09 
.10 
.10 
.0B5 
.10 
.08 
.0675 

,iañ 


100 
100 

loo 
100 
100 

lio 

100 
100 
100 
100 
lüO 
ItW 
lüO 


100 

120 

2W 
125 
111 
150 

150 
100 
150 
113 
111 
120 


318 
112 

:¡20 
417 
*¿5U 
222 
5O0 
2Ü0 
IIB 
ÍOO 
225 
Í22 
240 


409 
280 
4O0 
600 

400 
556 

eüo 

350 

ñse 
aoü 

5ft5 
741 
3G0 


227 
400 
500 

607 
750 
833 
750 
700 

500 
Sl.1 
%3 

480 


227 
440 

450 
667 
500 

750 
SO 
824 
750 

ñoo 

741 

5C0 








JewettCity 

NewCastle 

New Cumberland 
Wheeling 


360 


W.Va 
W.Va 




500 
400 


Ohio. 
Ohio. 


Cindnnati 

Zanesville 

EvanBville 

Jüffersonville 

Lawrenceliurg... 

New Albany 

Bloomington — 


6Í0 
300 








Ind.. 
Ind.. 




500 
5ÍW 









Pa. 



W.Va 
W.Va 
Ohio 
Ohio. 
Ohio. 
Ind.. 
Ind . . 



Woburn 

Jewelt City. . 
New Caalle . . 
New Cumberland 

Wheeling 

CantOQ 

Cindnnati 

Zanesville 

JefforsonTiUe . 
Lawrenceburg. 
New Albany. . , 
Bloomington . . 





BoBton 


.11 
.16 
.12 
,16 
.15 
.15 
.25 
.08 


100 

1» 

100 
100 
100 
100 

100 


108 
100 
100 
125 
94 
80 
100 
100 
100 


172 
118 
150 
150 
125 
100 
100 
140 
125 


197 
155 
319 
167 
250 
100 
133 
140 
313 


319 

291 
250 
208 
313 
167 
167 
160 
438 


254 
318 
219 
208 
250 
267 
167 
140 
438 




Pa 

Md 

W.Va.. 


Philadelphia .... 
New Cumberland 


309 
188 
167 


Ohio . . 
Ohio . , 
Ind ... . 
lowa 


SpringReld 

Zanesville 

Lawrenceburg.. 
CedarRapids.... 


333 
200 
160 
375 



ÁPFENDIX B 



State 


Town 


iDÍtml 


.» 


<«, 


IWZ 


uo 


.«. 


1805 


im 


Pa 

W. Va. . . 


New Cumberland 


Q.40 
.10 
.40 

.50 
.60 
.50 


ióó 

100 
100 

100 


100 

im 

100 
100 

loo 

100 


125 

188 
250 
lOO 
100 

100 


150 
2-25 
375 
150 

im 

120 


175 
250 
375 
200 
2C7 

leo 


200 
225 
313 
200 
250 
220 


275 
225 


Ohio .... 

Ind 

lowa.... 


Lawreaceburg. . . 
Cedar Rápida . . . 


250 
167 
240 



W.Va. 
Ohio.. 
Ohio . . 
Ohio . . 



Philadelpbia. 
Balümore. .. 
New Cumberlaad 

Cantón 

SpringfEeld .... 

Zanesville 

Lawrenceburg 
Cedar Rapidd. 



245 


22.1 


2IKI 


21» 


■Wxt 


mt 


:-v»i 




•m 


'M:^ 


150 


IfiO 


r^i 


■/■r/ 


■Ato 


21» 


1Ü7 


167 



W.Va 
Ohio. 
Ohio. 



PhUadelphii 

Baltimore 

New Cumberland 
Springfleld .... 

Zanesville 

Lawrencebui^. 
Cedar Rapidú. . 



050 




ino 


lio 


no 








m 


llXI 


H») 


10(1 


117 


fttt 


v:« 




4(1 


1011 


1H5 


IHH 


•m 


;íih 


250 




rti 


KM) 


\->i> 


\:\i 


ihi 








7.^ 


10(1 


m 


H> 


121» 


1(17 


l(i7 




m 


1011 


w 


va 


lA-í 


i-;'ñ 


IW 




bu 




loo 


laj 


laj 


140 


140 



Jewett City.. 
Philadelphia. 
New Cumberland 

Zanesville 

Lawrencebui^ 
Cedar Rapide. 



BO 


100 


im 


ino 


IfiO 


ino 


UNÍ 


i-'.^ 






i:« 


1B7 


1(17 


1(17 


1(17 


lOíl 


10(1 


mi 


1(10 


100 


riKi 


1011 


140 






1111 


1(10 


1IK) 


V.'»\ 


120 


JiX} 


117 


133 


175 


203 



HlSTOBT OF THE QbEEKBAOKB 



TABLB t — Comtinued 



W.Vb. 
Oblo . . 
Ühlo . . 



PbUadelpbi 
. New Cumberlasd 

Can too 

SprÍDgtleld 

ZanceTÍIIc^ 

Lnnrenceburg. . 
Codar Rápida... 



'píS' 


1Mn 


imi 


IMÜ 


IMI 


1MH 


IPMi 
















0.07 




ion 


1,4 


U1 


171 


214 


.07 


11» 


i';i 




«ID 




ímn 


.10 


11)0 


«) 


Itíi 


]U) 


VfKÍ 


vim 


-10 


)(I0 


1(KI 


lllt 




V*) 


■¿m) 


.10 


K» 


100 


l.-VT 


finí 


ilX) 


i«) 


.12 




11X1 


iim 




ir; 


117 


.07 


... 


lÜU 


129 


129 


157 


157 



W.Vm. 
Ohio . . 
Ohio . . 



Philodelphia 
New CumberUnd 

Cantón 

Zanesville ..... 
Lawrentwburg 
Cedar Rápida. 



0.08 




m 


113 


l*í 


Iffl 


«« 


.06 


<M 


mi 


*/l)ll 


vm 


yiio 


200 


.11 




71-1 


114 


l-tfi 


m 


Ift? 


.11 


(10 


1(W 


KM 


HNl 


•i») 


Krr 


.11 


fio 


100 


IMI 


111(1 


lOíl 


10» 






lUU 


IS) 


luí, 


150 


160 



Boaton 0.06 

JewettCity 06 

Philadelphia 06 

Now Cunberland ,07 

Cantón 06 

Springüold | .05 

Zanesville .Ü6íá ] 

Iiawrenceburg.. .1 . 
CedarRapidtí....! . 



W.Va. 
Ohio , , 
Obio . . 
Ohio . . 
Ind. ■■ 
lowa . . 



Philadelpbia 0.06 

Now Cumbcrlund .00 

Cantón... 06 

Sprín^tiold 05 



Appbndix B 



TABLB 4— ODntinMd 



Stata 


TOWD 


InitiaJ 
pe"fb. 


ism 


1S6I 


1«6Z 


.^ 


™ 


osos 


ISW 








100 
100 
100 

ióó 

100 

100 
100 
100 
100 


99 

100 
lüO 
100 
8S 
167 
75 
89 
100 
100 
100 


133 
113 
114 
117 
125 
200 
100 

125 

100 

lai 


175 

175 
157 
150 
156 
200 
150 
111 
350 

loo 

133 


26G 
250 
314 
183 
250 
aoo 
250 
122 
225 
l'JO 
187 


2-25 

18fl 
233 
188 
200 
250 
167 
225 
110 
167 




N.J. . 




Jersey City 

Norriatown 

Philadelphia .... 

Baltimore 

New Cumberiand 




08 
07 
06 
08 
06 
08 
0» 
08 
10 
06 


300 








Md. . 
W.Va 




175 
200 


Ohio. 
Ohio. 


Springfleld 

ZanesTiUe 

Lawrencebur^... 
CedarRapids.... 


200 
225 


lowa. 




278 



Pa 


Philadelphia.... 


0.16 




100 


113 




7.38 


Wl 


WI 






.20 


l(K) 


Id) 


1ÜI) 


lílO 


250 


Vid 


IH(I 


W. Va... 




U 


ll«l 


143 


17it 


ntt 




214 


n» 


Ohio .... 


Springfield 


IH 


10(1 


1(» 


100 


1O0 




ftSI 


xa 






.16 




M 


Í14 


113 


I-'h 


\'fU 


\i>H 


Ind 




..■» 


l(N) 


100 


i:« 


1.« 


15(1 


i;« 


150 


lowa .... 


Cedar Rápida,... 


.10 




100 


lao 


auü 


4)0 j 450 


■£U 



w.v».. 

Ohio . . . 
Ohio.., 
Ohio . . . 



Philadelphii 
Baltimore . . 
New Cumberiand 

Cantón 

Springfield .... 

Zanesville 

Lawreocebui^. 
Cedar Rápida.. 



O.BO 




.60 


l(«l 


.50 


100 






).60 




.925 


100 


1,00 


KMl 


0.30 





100 ino lio i;j0 250 250 

125 IbT 167 2ÜÜ 250 208 

120 160 160 160 ISÚ 160 

100 VJñ l.ÓO 200 200 180 

lOO 100 la") 250 3;« 293 

97 97 1-J2 fW 149 176 

90 100 125 160 160 125 

100 -2.33 467 5.33 667 687 



Pa 

W. Va .. 


Philadelphia 

New Cumberiand 


0.07 
.07 
.10 
.05 
.08 
.10 
.06 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 


100 
114 
lÜO 
100 
125 
80 
100 


114 
143 
125 

100 
125 

100 
ICO 


143 

ii;í 

150 
180 
125 
120 
140 


171 
143 

150 
200 
1B8 
100 
200 


200 
114 

iri 


20O 

114 
100 


ühio .... 
Ohio..,, 
nd 


Springfleld 

Zane&ville 

Cedar Rápida.... 


200 
188 
100 
360 


200 
188 
100 
360 



i:%^ 



HlSTOXT OF TBS 6XS£K&AC£S 



4 — 



AT BBZAZL— : 



i 






<D.€B1& 

C5íy OB 

OS 

m 



100< se SI7 

Mo no ' no 

100 l<Kt| 100 
-, IWilOO 

K» iss! ia& 
... loo iss 

100 SQ «2 

lOD 1<IC« lOíi 

lOC* 100 100 



13S{ Ifil SQO IM 

08: lá6 150 lOB 

liO , no 140 láO 

13& • 175 2S5 i 2S 

IS 156 1^7 



i ?^i ^^ 



Ma^ 


Bi-vQ^-v: ♦. 


.n: 


idc- 


DA 


D(C' 


3X' 


lOf 


v: 


íül 


iXüxu 


Nrw IxtiiD. tL 


:s 


^vH 




iir^ 


D^ 


11^ 


1» 


D«^ 


N .1 


^^íamáfn: 


li 


DA 


DA 


DA- 


i:^ 


3-5* 


2^* 


2Eií» 


iSi 


PhümatCjüua 


1.' 




DA 


DA 


12. 


lé¿> 


líü» 


!*• 


W Vit 


Srw ^^^iixi.:»f<rmii¿ 


.I?' 


DA 


Dü. 


!iíx 


Dr». 


Vk^ 


DIW- 


l^Ci 


lM\K^ 


^tfcTiT.tt 


v^^ 




DA 


-»«T 


ITff 


1* 


11* 


lñ« 


i>tuo 


Sí]tmirf»«ii 


vi?e 


DA 


H 


f^ 


K 


ir: 


KT 


D*T 


l^hlO 


rAiM*!-T-lli* 


,1^ 


DA 


*- 


DA- 


ii: 


n: 


^ ■» ^ 


ni 


hut 


K^-Mfc-'V^ 


v'siT- 




DA 


DA 


JtX 


^n: 


^« 


^«« 







KT 


--^i 














Xl..-.. 


H.>Gra. •. 


« 


DA 


Sf 


J». 


::*f 


1^ 


:?w 


:» 


V '. V 


."^•f •f'r: v^ : « 


-••í 


DA 


:*f 


K. 


: íf 


•»<«4 


iií5 


'.m 


V'-x 


}'*l..aia-':-:iL.j. 


a 




J X 


« • 


1% 


^£ 


^K* 


:#■ 


W \ K 


\r» 04.n.:i-'rikT':. 




DA 


• «¿^ 


' y 


■^.K 


2£ 


^x JJJ 


•»«: 


V*:... 


04.TT.a 


«■ * 


DA 


f* 


?;• 




sss 


2fÜ 


2« 


v^:... 


Ss;ir."nrí>?*«- 


D. 


DA 


s. 


s 


DA 


av 


3&. 


11 


vs:- . 


ÍJkTtra-T'^H 




DA 


i*? 


^ ' * 


4^<j « 


251 


1&* 


:£4 


Ivi 


V-iv-^ai.-^'M-rr 


3t 


DA 


<' 


J % 


S5 


». » •» 


1.3%. 


DA 


U 


iVoj^ iUi^it> 


.«f 




DA 


2^% 


:£ii 


J^ 


4Lr 


SSII 



Appbndix B 



TABLE i — Clmtiinieil 



Btote 


^ 


Initial 


,» 


■™ 


^m 


18S3 


im 


IS6S 


laas 




New London 


0.11 

.12 
.11 
.10 
.10 
.10 
-11 
.075 


100 
100 

ióó 

100 
100 
100 


109 

11» 

140 

lio 

lÜO 

fll 

lüO 


109 

lOi 
1Ü7 
léO 
125 
100 
91 
100 


127 

133 
114 
140 
150 
100 
109 
167 


145 
208 
11.^ 
140 
180 
150 
109 
2Ü0 


164 

250 
179 
140 
150 
150 
109 
200 


16* 


Pa 

W. Va. . . 


fhiladelpbia . . . 
New Cumberland 


17B 
140 


Ohio .... 
Ohio .... 
Ind 


epringfleld 

Zanesville 

EvaneviUe 


150 
109 
200 



Conn, . . - 


New London 


0.055 
.09 
.07 
.03 
.04 
.07 
.06 
.06 


100 
100 

ióó 

100 

100 
100 


127 
100 
100 
233 
100 

m 
loo 

lOÜ 


127 
100 
100 
233 
125 
S6 
100 


164 
100 
114 
S33 
150 
86 
100 


Iftl 
175 
129 
233 
200 
143 
117 
167 


164 
200 
171 

aj3 

150 
143 

m 

167 


161 


Pa 

W. Va. . . 


Philadelphia .... 
New Cunuberland 


171 
233 


Ohio.... 
Ohio.... 
Ind 


Springfteld 

ZaneBville 

Evansville 


143 

117 
167 



W. Va. 
Ohio . . . 
Ohio . . , 



Jewett City 
Philadelphii 
Baltimore . . 
New Cumberland 
Spñngfíeld . . . 
Zaneaville .... 
Cedar Rápida 



4.0925 

3,92 

5.00 

5.25 

3.75 

3.50 

4.25 

2.00 



W.Va. 
Ohio . . 
Ohio . . 
Ohio . . 



Jewett City 

Pbiladclpbii 

Baltimore.. 

New Cumberland 

Cantón 

SprinRfleld 

. Zaneaville 

. Cedar Eapide . . 



peíbbT. 
8.50 

8,00 
8.25 



'- 




^ 




«60 


HlSTOBT OP TUE GbEENBACK8 ^M 




TABLE 1 - Conttnued H 






"""""■""'"™"""-"— I 
























Sl»l« 


Toirn 


perbbl 


IMO 


IMI 


IHZ 


un 


UN 


un 


uss 


Maas. . . . 
Conn. . . , 




4.87 
■í,92 


100 

1(X) 


loo 


70 

7ñ 


07 
7ñ 




101 
150 


Jewett City 


150 


IñO 




Pa 


Pbiladelphia.-.- 


im) 




1110 


ion 


lOK 


13:^ 


flXI 


aoo 




W.V«. . 


Ne» Oumberland 


1.50 


11» 


i;« 


IHI 




mv 


IHY 






Ohio .... 




3.00 


100 


irio 


117 


\m 


■x» 


'/ID 


117 




Ohio .... 


SprinKfield 


¿■Jñ 


1IX) 


iñrt 


15(1 


iñrt 


*m 


?fi7 


356 




Ohio .... 






IIX) 


i:« 


í:« 


I7H 


'/IXI 


yixi 


200 




Ind 




.70 


lU» 


114 


I2« 


i4;i 


IñO 


ir.7 


1« 




la 


Cedar Kapds . . . 


1.50 




lUÜ 


133 


ax) 


aou 


2a. 


233 






- J 






ríA- 
















Conn. . . , 


Jewett City 


13^ 


100 


77 


18) 


»2 


123 


15i 


177 ■ 




Pí 


Philadelphia .... 


IS 




lí«) 


1W 


ir.0 


un 


Í10H 


'208 ■ 






Nen Cumberland 


.11 


11» 


i:wi 


i:« 


i;«i 


i:« 


i:« 


145 ■ 




Ohio .... 




.10 


101) 


ni 


H(l 


i«i 


WiO 


•,«1 


auo ■ 




Uhio .... 


Springfleld . , 


m 


100 


1110 


l(»l 


i<» 


lis 


150 


Iffl ■ 










HX) 


HO 


Hll 




ItiH 




















Ki 




l.'ill 


83 H 




I». 


Cedu RApids . . . 


.10 




lUO 


120 


120 


150 


2UÜ 


280 ■ 






J 


J 






r,t 






^^^1 




Conn.... 


Jewett City 


.n 


100 


K-l kvt lili lis 1«I^^^^^H 




P» 


Philadelphia .... 


,1H 




ir» i«i III 117 ll^^^^^ 




W. V«. . . 


New Cumberlsnc 


10 


mi 


1-1.1 111. ii/> 1J.1 i^^^^^H 
















Ohio .... 


SpringSeld 


,07 


Klt) 


ii-( 171 iw i^^^^^m 






ZanesvUle 


15 


1KI 


11. .n 11» t^^^^^H 




Ind 




■JO 


HK) 


11.. h.. -jh ti£^^^^ 




u 


Ced>t Rapid» . . 


.06 




1U0| ii)ü a«i »■■ —' '"^^^™ 






^^M 




W.Va. 
Ohio.- 
Ohio . . 
Ohio . . 



Boston 

Jewett City. 
New Iiondon , 
Philadelpbia 
New Cumberland 

Cantan 

Sprín^fleld 

ZanesTÍlle 

Lawreaceburg. 











porib. 




0.12t 


ino 




i(«) 


1« 


1IK) 


.10 




.10 


IIX) 


1» 


1IK) 


117 


ItX) 


.10 


KX) 


.15 


lÜÜ 



Pa . . .".' 
N.J 



W. Va. 

OUo.. 
Obio.. 
Ohio.. 



New London. 
Fhiladelphia.. 

Camden . 

New Cumbefland 
ZanesTÜle 



^16 


1(10 


ion 


ino 


lOf) 


100 


llfl 


-10 




ion 


lio 


l',^) 






.12 


\m 


MV 


117 


lai 


IñO 


VN 


.08 


KJII 


IñO 


IñO 


IñO 


INI 


rno 


.10 


100 


70 


70 


uu 


«0 


eo 



Jewett City.. 
. Pbiladelphia. 
. Baltimore . . . 
. New Cumberland 

. Cantón 

. Spríngfield . . . 

Zaneaville .... 
. CedarRapidn. 



«rbbL 
7.50 


100 


93 


97 




J.50 




HX) 


lifi 


VM 


1.00 


1(X) 


1IM 


IW 


iv:. 


i.50 


100 


i:n 






5.75 


Itl) 


m 


101 




4.00 


11» 


lañ 


11.-1 


n : 


i.2S 


1U1 


lU 


IH !■■ 


3.00 




lOÜ 


1Ü8 


■M 



líT «TI» 

im\ Uft — 
m. un 
jtn' un 





HlSTOBT OF THE GbEENBAOSS 



tabi;b 1— omUmmi 



8t>ta 


Town 


per 1ü. 


IMO 


leai 


me: 


un 


leu 


aa 


™. 


Godo 

Pa 

W.V«... 


Jewett City 

PhiUdelphia 


O.OB 
.08 
.M 
.08 
.10 
.08 
.07 


100 

icio 

100 

lúú 

luü 


78 
lOO 
160 
75 
50 
loo 
lU) 


88 
113 

aoo 

100 
60 
lUÜ 
lU 


89 
126 
200 
125 

70 
125 
141 


m 

175 

axj 

135 

80 
1148 
179 


111 

115 
lou 

1» 

17» 


1.1 
225 
200 


Ohio .... 

Ind 

U 


ZacesvUle 

IjBwreiiceburg... 
Ced&r Rápida. . . . 


100 
125 
17» 



ifDTTOii: rougoAmii 







Conn..., 


NowLondon 






Pa 


Philadelphia 




New Cumberland 


Obio .... 






ETansriUe 



/rio'í, 


ion 


W> 


fíl 


88 


17 






1(11 


l.'XI 


i;io 








.07 


KNI 


114 


114 


14:4 


57 


171 


.06 




11X1 


IVÍI 


\'H) 


lio 


340 


! .06 


IINI 


140 


140 


141) 




















.075 




100 


lOU 


107 


ÜUO 


2UÜ 



W Va. 
Ohio.. 
Ohio . . 



üev Iiondon. 
Philadelphia. 
New Cumberland 

Cantón 

Spríni^old 

ZaneHville 

liawr^ncehun;. 



1? 


ino 


117 


^\^ 








OH 




IIX 


i;») 


111 


i:tt 


¥«r) 


Ofi 


M¡ 


1:« 


1N) 


liiO 


IVh 




m 




loo 


l.ít 


v;*> 


:<» 




(ftr> 


MI 


109' 101* 


im 


?i« 


218 


10 


HK) 


100' lA) 


141) 


\m 


2U0 


18 


lUO 


78 Ki 


W 


«7 


s:t 



I JewettCity 

New London.. . , 

Philadelphia 

Xew Cumberland 
Zanettville 



TABLK 4 — COntiiHied 



sute 


Town 


per Ib. 


1860 


.« 


1862 


18S3 


lesi 


1S6S 


IM6 


Conn.... 
N.J 


New Ijondon 


0.16 

.09 
.10 
.06 
.07 


100 

loo 

ióó 
loo 


100 

111 

100 
150 
86 


100 
133 
110 
150 

86 


100 

133 
120 
150 
100 


100 
178 
140 
150 
100 


113 
2U 
180 
160 
lié 


113 


P» 

W.Va... 
Ohio.... 


PhÜftdelphift 

New Cumberland 
ZKnesTille 


180 
150 
129 



W.Va 
Uhio. 
Ohio. 



New London. 
Pbiladelpfaia. 
New Cumberland 
Cantón . . . 
Zanesville 



5?0975 


ino 


87 


Ai 


ítS 


lífl 


IflS 


.11 


un 


10B 


l«H 








.10 




lU) 


mi 


l?fl 


14(1 


MKl 


.01 


UK( 


IXi 


iñd 


ir-*) 


15ÍI 


'fí») 


.04.-1 


lOO 


i;n 


i:« 


fíH 


7IH 


vm 


.06 


lUJ 


i:*) 


IbU 


1«7 


;ax) 


:ím 






Ohio. 
Ohio. 
Ohio. 



JewettCity.. 
New London. 
Pbiladelphia. . 
New Cumberland 

Cantón 

SpHngfield . . . 

ZaneeviUe 

Lawrenceburg 



n.'ft 


im 


03 


•4 


07 


IM 


197 




Huí 


Kti 


v; 


m 


TiO 


192 




lori 












.10 




UNÍ 


UlO 


VM) 


VÁ) 


1'4(1 


.12 


\m 


\ii 


1:tt 


I.-Vl 


i:« 


1.W 


.09 


\m 




i;t!i 


nrí 






.075 


11)0 


m 


1117 


1(17 


'Mt 


20(1 




100 


11» 


1;W 


IfM 


isí 


2'^ 


.■20 


lüu 


'ib 


»b 


9U 


»> 





Boston 0. 

New London 

Philadelphia 

New Cumberland 

Sprin^eld 

Zanesville 



ll.tl 192 176 
117' IItI 133 
150 I *2IJl) I 220 
140] lúUi im 
114 lU 114 
212 235 235 



- 




^ 




464 


HlSTOBY OP THE QbEENBACK» ^| 




TABLEl-CoKiínwid 




BELATTTB PRIOU OF mOTISIOHS AT WtTAH, — M>m» : inOÜUnU 


























Town 


^X 
















Conn.... 




Odfi 


100 


IñO 


IñO 


iño 


150 


150 


.TT, 1 




Pa 


Philadelphia .... 


m 




lOT) 


100 


M4 


14.1 


Vil 4 


229 ■ 




W. Vb... 




.07 


¡MI 


i4;i 


171 






m> 


200 ■ 




Ohio.... 




.06 


KXI 


r« 


r« 


1(17 


VñO 


■«y) 






Ohio.... 


Spríngfield 


(f. 


mil 


101) 


1(10 


HX) 


IHI 


IIK) 


lilO 




OhLo .... 




.06 


Km 


irtv 


«m 


'/Ut 


:«» 


¡«i 


333 




Ind 


Lawrenctiburg... 


.13 


lüU 


lOÜ 


115 


115 


12a 


12a 


92 








pifi 


100 


113 


iin 


113 


113 


ia5 


135 




N.J 


Camden 


.14 


tOII 


IIN) 


IINI 


\m 


IV» 


liU 


179 




Pb 


Philadolphia .... 


.15 




l(» 


Jdl 


un 


la» 


1HT 


lao 




W.Vb.. - 


NewCumberlBDd 


111 


IIX» 


lai 


lai 


lai 


lai 


la) 


lao 




Ohio .... 


ZaneBTiUe 


10 


lOT) 


m 


»i 


ÍN) 


ti» 


11» 


120 




Ind. 




•JU 


— 


lOU 


100 


100 


V2b 


12b 


125 








l: fou 


1 guA 






77 












NewLondon 


in' 


UN) 


i:íi 


i:») 


m) 


1441 


150 


150 




Pa. 


Philadelphia ... 


,1111 




KKI 


II» 


117 


IhO 


VIXI 


auo 




W.Va... 


NewCumberland 


04 


itxt 


lal 


IñO 


150 


150 


150 


150 






























.(» 




TOO 


i«i 


lai 


1411 


140 


14U 




Ind 


EvanavillB 


.075 




100 


loo 


167 


200 


au) 


xo 






™.,™_ 1 






NewLondon 


Í>U 


ion 


107 


107 


114 1 114 


laa 


,» 1 




N.J 




,10 


1IK1 


1111 


IKI 


11» 


140 


14i> 






P« 


PhiUdelphiB .... 


,10 




100 


1(11 


lili) 


121) 


ir» 


150 ■ 






NewCumberland 


(Ifi 


1(KI 


US) 


ItlO 


ino 


1011 


i«) 


100 ■ 




Ohio - - - 
Ohio .... 




.M 
06 


lUO 

lüü 


lOU 

1(11 


l-Jb 
100 


117 


133 


250 

laa 


fs 1 




Zanesville 




Ind 


Evanevill» 


.08 


100 ¡ 100 


100 


168 


im 


188 


,« ■ 


■ 


^ 


J 



TABLE I— Continuad 



auto 


TOwn 


« 


18S0 


'•" 


1862 


,« 


IBU 


IMS 


1S66 


Conn. 




JewettCity 

Phil&delphia .... 

Baltimore 

NewCumberUnd 


D.06 
.08 
.06 
.07 
-06 
.08 
.0625 
.10 
.05 


100 

ióó 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 


117 
100 
100 
1Í3 
100 
100 
160 
100 
100 


150 

113 
150 
2H 
133 
125 
192 
150 
200 


167 
125 
167 

21i 
208 
125 
240 
■200 
2í0 


167 
162 
250 
214 
333 
1-J5 
288 
200 
240 


250 
175 
250 

214 
250 
125 
320 
120 
250 


250 








W.Va 




214 


Ohio.. 
Ohio. 


Springfleid 

Lawrenceburg... 
Cedar Rápida..,. 


lt@ 
320 













W.Va 
Ohio. 
Ohio. 



Jewett City 

Philadelphia . . . . 
New Cumbedand 

Springfield 

Zkneeville 

LnwrenCBburg . . . 
Cedar Rapids 

























¿?§S. 














Coon.... 


Jewett City 


1 no 


100 


7ñ 


75 


75 


w. 


1(10 


W) 


Coan.... 




















N.Y 








KM 


4^ 


.S4 


TA 


un 




Pa 




0.70 


KXl 


■\w 


m\ 


11» 


171 


171 


148 


Pa. 


Fhiladelpbia .... 


2f> 




lOll 


\Ú\ 


4lNl 


4ÍXt 


41» 


!m 


W.Va... 








\m 




i:h 


líVJ 


167 




Ohio.... 




.50 


1IKI 


w> 


m 


KN) 


I'fll 


1(«l 


80 


Ohio.... 


ZanesTille 


60 


lili 


lOíl 


vn 


KNl 


líK» 


IIXI 


117 


IlL 


RockleUad 


.35 




luo 


171 


•¿Bá 


286 


22» 


171 



Maw< . 



HlSTOBT OP THE GbEENBAO: 



TABLE t— ConJiniMd. 



:;k8 ^I 



Stata 


..„ 


iDltíal 


,., 


last 


imi 


IM4 


UB 


IW 


Masa... 
MdBX .... 

Pa 

Pa 


BostonlH 

Baítaal'¿) 

Philadelphiad) . 
Philadelphia (2| . 


6.00 100 
5,75 100 
5,00 ,,. 
3.41 . . 
2,5Ü ... 
3.00 100 


93 
121 
100 
100 
100 
lOÜ 


117 
117 
100 
123 

lüU 
133 


175 
173 
120 
186 
180 
167 


217 
22U 
130 
277 
230 
IffJ 


217 
22» 
IW 
281 
260 
167 


204 
102 
160 
219 


Ohio .... 


ZanesTjlle 


167 



















W.Va... 


New Cumbo rían d 


1.40 
2.00 
3.á0 
1,50 
3.50 
1-82 
3-12 


100 
100 

íóó 

100 
100 
lUO 


171 
88 
100 
100 

m 

-80 


179 
lUO 
100 
lUO 
111 

« 


214 

175 

la) 

200 
114 

iói 


S14 

175 
100 

aoo 

120 
171 
lOt 


196 
150 
100 
21» 
114 
171 
101 


196 


Ohio... 
Ohk) , . 
Indiana . 
Illinois. . 
lüinois.. 


SprinKfield 

ZaneBTiUe 

Lawrenceburg. . . 

BcUeville 

Rock Maod 


100 

auü 

107 
171 
IM 



Haas... 

W. Va.'. 
Ohio - . . 

lUilKHS. 



Boston (11 ... 
BoHton (21.... 
DanielaonvUle 
Jewett Cit]' . . 

New Cumberland 

Cantón 

Sprin^eld 

Zkneeville 

Lawrencebui^, 
Bock Uland, . , 
Cedar Bapide . , 
Pilot Knob , , , , 



Boaton(l).... 
Bwton (2) , . . . 
DaniebonviUe 
New Cumbo ría Dd 
Zane«ville . . . 
Rock Mand, 




Appbndix B 



TABLE l-amltniml 



AuBonla 

JflwettCUr.... 
WaMrbnry 

Camden 

Shanm 

Nbw Camberlan 

WbMlJIlB 

Cantón- 

ClDeiiinati 

ZanMTilla 

EratuTlile 

FoitWajne.... 

LaFucUo 

New Alban; (II 
New AlbanT it) 
Terra Haate .... 

Vincennea 

BellcTiUedl... 
BeU<iTUle(Z)... 
Bloomliütan... 

Sprinfdeld 

CedarRapíds.. 

PUotKoo^ 

aLLoDls 



Slate 


t™ 


'9' 


I9I5Ü 

100 

1« 
j« 


101 

la 


100 
100 
isn 
so 
m 
10 

u 

!S 

IX 

10 

121 
100 


1883 

1 

100 

1 

101 

IZÍ 

i 

lüi 


IS 

138 
M 

1! 

2W 

ií 

lÓi 


i 

10¡ 

i 


a» 
1» 

lor 
'♦■ 

i 

1« 


101 

K 

i: 

2 

w 
lao 


I86S 






1 

e.oo 

12.00 
7.00 

ROO 
7.00 
8.00 

sao 

S.DQ 
lU.OO 










g-J 


Carnd™ 




W.Va 




í¡» 










spriwtfiBid::. ::.■■■■■;...* 


n 


?^ 


LouisTlIte -- 


f 


























]<!.. 


cíd!írRÍ''fd¿ 


m 





















HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 



TABLE i — CoRtinual 



Jswett citT.', 

HokeñdADqni 
PhUsdelpbiR. .. 
Nsw CamberUnd 
Cantón 

ClDEinnatíü!. 
Z*iies*ille — 

IndUnspolla , 
La Payetle.... 
Lswrencebnra 
Bloomiiurtali.. 

Cedar Baplda. 




Suta 


Towo 


JE. 


ISM 


IMI 


ism 


IK33 


IMU 


1805 


im 


9^' 


fb7£'d*fe.:;.:::.. 




ICO 
100 

lua 
un 

iin 


100 
IBO 

i 

100 

1«0 

i 


IDO 

100 

IDO 
I«0 


fio 

i 

TI 

i 

28 
00 

00 


130 

»n 
su 

i 

a 

00 

s 

no 


ISO 

i 

loo 

i 


m 








a,!- 






















Kjj. 










Í2á::::::;; 




iS 








!■ 


PiíS;;:;;;;: 


m 











I 



k 







«so 
■» 

s 

.00 

.00 
.00 

:oo 


ióo 


DO 

s 

00 
00 
00 

00 


DO 
«0 

1 

00 
33 


100 

1» 

180 

i 

US 

m 

s 


iS 

loo 

i 

1«1 

K 

1VI 

m 


i 

1» 


i 




kSu:^:;;; 
















r-^ 


aüSII:.......:::- 


is 














if. 


?!ísi£3*::;;:;;: 












Appbndis B 



Sbirtiogl: 
Tickingí: 



Besom 



: bro«n. 4^, Atlantic A... . 
1 btowTi. (-1, AUaotio A — 
¡ bleBched,l-4, N. Y. Uüls.. 
: ble«:hed,<-4, N. T. UIlls.. 

Anuwkeag, A.C^ 

AnuHksBK, A.C.A 



Biee: Csrolina prime. 
Bies: Caiolina prime . 

Silgar ; good brown — 
MoU3K8:N.O.prims. 
UolaBBi99:N.O.prÍDie. 
Ualgiees: Porto Rico, t 



B«t 

Hotton 

Uutton 

Porki h>n9,aTig8r-oDred ... 

Pi>rk.: hamii, smoked 

Pork: baeuD.elear 

PorkiBültme» 

Pork; comed orMlEed. 

Lard 

Lsrtl ..,, 

-ConUoDthraalteíatovci. .. .. . 

CoaliaotbrBolte, BtoTo 

Caal : bitnminom 

Coalibítnminoiia 

Aienuce of nJatin iirlecs.. . 
ATeraco of relatÍTa prioea . . . 



Betsil . 



Retail 

Wbolesal 

Retall 

Wboleul 

ReUU 

Wholasal 

Beta 11 

Wholoaal 

Betail... 

Whulesal 

BeMil 

Wbolesal 

RetaU 

Wholesali 



Wboleeali 
ReUU,. 

Rptall. 
Wboleei 
RbMII . 
Wholesi 
ReUU. 
Wbolesal 
Retall .. . 
Whule«a1 
Retail .. 



BeUil .. 
Whotoai 
BeUU.. 
Wholesa 
ReUÜ.. 
Wliolosal 
Retail . 
Wbolssal 



WÁo; 



APPENDIX C 
Relativb Waobs 

TABLE 1 

FBOM TABLA Xn OF THB ALDUOH 
▲OBXCULTUBAL IMPLBMBMTS 

1. Maraachasetts 



L 





FomBMBM 
WOODWOBX*S 


Laboekbh 


Machinists 


Pazntbbs 


WOODWOKK*8 


Sez 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 






Initial wage 
perday.... 


$1.64 


$1.00 


$1.665 


$1.25 


$1.333 




No. 


ReL 
Wa«w 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
5 
2 
3 
3 
7 
6 
5 


Reí. 
Wa«w 


No. 

2 

2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
6 
5 


Reí. 
Wagee 


No. 


ReL 
Wagee 


No. 


ReL 
Wagee 


1860, Jan... 
July . . 

1861, Jan... 
July . . 

1862, Jan... 
July . . 

1863, Jan... 
July . . 

1864, Jan . . . 
July . . 

1865, Jan... 
July . . 

1866, Jan... 
July . . 




100 

100 

100 

99 

99 

98 

108 

112 

122 

152 

152 

175 

175 

183 


100 
100 
100 
100 

88 
100 

90 
112 
117 
142 
150 
161 
163 
169 


100 
100 
108 
108 
100 
84 
113 
101 
108 
123 
125 
138 
131 
134 


• • 

• • 

• ■ 

3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

• • • 

• • • 
■ • • 

89 
106 
113 
127 
124 
120 


3 
2 

2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
4 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 


100 
103 
103 
94 
113 
113 
113 
119 
124 
161 
169 
189 
191 
179 



I Iq the following tablee the series of rolative wages from the **exhibits** of the 
Aidrich Keportt osed in chap. y of Part II, are reprodoced in full. As in the exhibí te, 
the series are classifled by establishments, and the pstablishmeDts by industries. To 
facilítate references, the same order of arrangement is followed and the number 
assÍRued to each establishraent in the exhibits and thestate in whích it is located are 
given. A changa has been made, hüwever, in the arrangement of thp series by group- 
ing the füremen, OYerseors, etc., in any establishment at the beginning and th<^ 
females at the end. The initial wage from which yariations are computed and thn 
nomber of employees are giren becanse they were made use of in preparing certain 
of the tablas in the text. 



470 



Appbndiz C 



471 



wAo: 



FBOM TABIM 



TASLBl — ConUnuod 

Xn OF THB ALDRIOH BBPOmT — ALB, BUEB, AHD 

2 New Tork 





FORBMBN 


Bbewebs 


COOPERS 


Labobebs 


Teamstebs 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 






Initial wage 
perday.... 


$1.34 


16.39 


$1.505 


$0.85 


$1.44 




No. 

2 
3 
3 
3 

4 
4 
4 


Ral. 
Wages 


No. 


Ral. 
Wages 


No. 

8 
8 
8 
10 
7 
6 
7 
8 
6 
7 
5 
4 
5 
5 


Ral. 
Wagea 


No. 

26 
28 
32 
30 
26 
33 
26 
27 
29 
28 
23 
18 
30 
21 


Reí. 
Wagee 


No. 

4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan... 
July.. 

1861, Jan... 
July . . 

1862, Jan... 
July.. 

1863, Jan... 
July.. 

1864, Jan . . . 
July . . 

1865, Jan... 
July.. 

1866, Jan... 
July.. 


100 
100 
120 
120 
120 
120 
120 
115 
124 
129 
136 
130 
132 
132 


100 
100 
100 
100 
150 
150 
150 
150 
150 
150 
150 
150 
250 
250 


100 
101 
101 
100 
101 
101 
101 
103 
125 
131 
127 
148 
146 
143 


100 

99 

99 

100 

99 

101 

102 

114 

134 

147 

151 

149 

154 

152 


100 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 



4Md. 



BOOKS AND NEWSPAPEB8 

5 N. Y. 5 N. Y. 5 N. Y. 



5N.Y. 



5N. Y. 





Pbintbbs: 
Bk. and Job 


FOBXICEN 
COMPB. 


FOBBMBN 

Pbbbsmen 


Cabpbnt's 


COMPOSI- 
TOR8 


Coifps. 
Lbabnbbs 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day .. 


$1.665 


$2.00 


$2.00 


$1.315 


$1.665 


$0.695 




No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

1 
1 
1 

1 
1 
1 
1 

• • 

• • 

1 
1 

1 
1 

1 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 
1 

• • 

2 
2 

• • 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

17 
11 
20 
17 
16 
18 
21 

■ • 

¿3 
27 
25 
23 
26 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

10 
7 
8 
6 
5 
7 
5 

• • 

• • 

4 
4 
4 
5 
3 


Ral. 

Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


• • 

• • 

8 

8 

6 

6 

6 

8 

6 

9 

12 

12 

12 

12 


• • • 
... 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
120 
150 
180 
180 
180 
180 


2 
2 
2 

2 
2 
2 
2 

■ • 
• • 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

• • • 

• • ■ 

138 
150 
150 
150 
150 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

• • • 

• ■ • 

133 
133 
142 
150 
150 


100 

100 
95 

• • • 

95 
95 
102 
102 
102 
127 
127 
127 
140 

• • • 


100 
100 
99 
99 
99 
99 
99 

• • • 

• • • 

150 
150 
150 
150 
150 


100 
81 
76 
72 
81 
88 
94 

• • • 

• • • 

99 
108 
105 
120 
132 



HlMTORY OP TIÍE tiBBBNBACS 



TABLEl-COnttna 






lUeiBIM'M 


P»™-.. 


Hahob 


PolTBKB 


FomKwi 


«■'HT/tT' 


B» 


U. 


u. 


M. 


U. 


P. 


F. 


'"¿•íJr. 


$1.705 


111.666 


ío.ei2 


$0.915 


W.47 


«0.466 




No 


Wagos 


1 

-i 

2 
2 
2 

2 
1 
3 
3 
3 


WngBS 


3 

1 

3 

i 
5 
3 
2 

4 
5 
4 
B 
5 


w1r¿. 


No 


W^i^ 


No. 

16 
7 
16 

12 
11 

26 
41 
30 
30 
22 


w'""' 


No 

6 
5 

a 

10 
7 
9 
9 

Í4 
14 
13 
13 
13 


»*"'■ 


1960. Jan, 

July 
1861. Jan. 

July 
1962. Jan. 

July 
lB83,Ja¿. 

July 
lB61,Jan. 

July 
1966. Jan. 

July 
1966,JaD. 

July 


2 
3 
3 
i 
3 


100 
95 
B5 
95 
I» 
88 
92 

Í37 
161 
156 
163 


100 

ióó 

100 

loo 

100 
100 

i¿6 

150 
133 
130 
130 


100 
41 
106 
104 
113 
95 
12« 

ÍÍ9 
139 
133 
134 
115 


2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 

5 
4 
5 
3 


100 
109 
115 
103 
103 
109 
11» 

Í38 
144 
146 
144 

140 


100 
99 
91 
94 

lÜO 
106 
101 

ÍÍ9 
110 
117 
U» 
134 


100 
104 
97 
96 
84 
05 
103 

isa 

133 
140 
140 

lis 



I 











í N.W Yo 


k 












FOBUn 


M 


COHTOlITaU 






E>an» 




















M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 










lultUl v>s» 


$2.50 


$1.835 


$0.755 


$2.335 


$0.33 


























IJo 




2 




IJo. 




■'"■ 




"■* 


Wm« 


1860, Jan... 


S 


100 


100 


fl 


100 




100 


, 




July.. 


V. 


100 






9 


101 










1861, Jan... 


2 


100 


3 


108 


H 


88 




93 






Jnly.. 


íl 


100 


4 


104 


7 


83 




93 




100 


1862, Jan... 






















July.. 


2 


100 


« 




H 


91 








158 


1863, Jan... 


2 


100 


rt 


107 


fí 


88 




93 




153 


July.. 


•f. 


loo 


rt 


111 


n 


89 




KI 




152 






lio 




114 




121 










July - . 


2 


117 


H 


117 


3 


99 




m 




164 


1865, Jan.. 


3 


129 


n 


138 


4 


98 








174 


July.. 


3 


129 


ft 


136 


3 


121 








189 


1868. Jan.. 


« 


129 


Ul 


1.34 


4 


97 








SOS 


July, 


3 


120 


10 


134 


3 


103 








sos 




Appendix o 



473 



TABLE l—Continved 
wáLom-ñSBJaa fbom tablb xn of thb aldbich refobt— buildino tbadbs 
7C01111. 8Conn. 8Conn. 9Coniu 9Codii. 10 Md. 





Cabpbnt*b 


Cabpent*s 


Cabpent*s 
Hblpbbs 


HOD 

Cabbibbb 


Masons 


Paintbbb 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day .. 


$1.50 


$1.715 


$1.00 


$0.80 


$1.765 ' 


$1.75 




No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

1 

• • 

1 
2 

• • 

1 

• • 

2 
6 
9 
6 

• • 

• • 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

8 
17 
12 
40 
15 

9 
10 

7 

• • 

17 

• • 

5 

• ■ 

13 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

6 
11 
12 
1 
9 
9 
7 
4 

• • 

21 

• • 

7 

• • 

10 


Reí. 

Wages 


No. 

2 
4 
2 
1 
1 
6 
1 
8 
2 
9 
5 
9 
5 
11 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


4 
6 
3 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 

■ • 

3 

4 
4 
4 


100 
117 

89 
100 

89 
100 
100 
117 
117 

• • • 

150 

las 

171 
188 


9 
10 
9 
6 
1 
7 

• • 

20 
19 
23 
10 

• • 

• • 

• • 


100 
99 
91 
87 
87 
89 

• • • 

112 
111 
131 
127 

• • • 

• • • 

• • « 


100 

• • • 

138 
132 

• • • 

134 

• • • 

125 
125 
157 
146 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 


100 
137 
125 
125 
125 
125 
188 
202 

• • • 

199 

• • • 

206 

• ■ • 

208 


100 
116 
105 
113 
113 
113 
158 
131 

• • • 

140 

• • • 

160 

• • • 

170 


100 

100 

86 

86 

86 

86 

86 

100 

114 

143 

143 

143 

143 

143 



12 Massachusetts 





FOBBMKM 

Brickl^bb 


FOBEMEM 

Masons 


BrICKIí*BS 


Bbickl*b8 
Helpebb 


Masons 


Masons* 
Helpers 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day .. 


$2.50 


$2.50 


$1.765 


$1.12 


$1.875 


$1.055 




No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

9 
12 
12 
28 
10 
11 

4 

17 
15 
19 

9 
20 
15 
13 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

5 

6 
12 
35 
13 
14 

9 
14 
11 
13 

9 
18 
11 
11 


ReL 
Wages 


No. 

5 
11 
11 
13 
10 
13 

4 

9 

7 
19 

7 

8 
13 
15 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

9 
15 

9 
15 
20 
17 

6 
16 
11 

8 

9 

8 
13 
21 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


1 
1 
1 

1 
1 
1 

1 

2 

1 

• • 

• • 

• • 

1 
1 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

lio 

120 

• « • 

• ■ ■ 

• • • 

160 
160 


100 
100 
100 

120 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
120 
120 
160 
160 
160 


100 
86 
107 
101 
106 
105 
110 
105 
120 
131 
139 
146 
147 
167 


100 
91 
100 
100 
101 
110 
109 
108 
122 
1.14 
134 
134 
156 
156 


100 

85 

101 

96 

84 

105 

93 

102 

114 

102 

116 

137 

143 

167 


100 

100 

85 

92 

97 

110 

118 

114 

130 

142 

142 

142 

160 

166 



HlSTOBT OP THE GbEESB 






ISMmb, 


I! Mías. 


13 


Ma98. 


13 Hb^. 


13Ha>8. 


una». 




c!t?sn 


ÍSSS 


Cabpbbt's 


C>tmFKItT> 


Paihtber 


Stií. * QAfl 


Soi 


M. 


u. 


M. 


U. 


M 


M. 


Inil. W.ÍO 
p«r.lnr.. 


tl.67 


fl50 


(1.426 


Í0.83 


É1.165 


11.875 












No. 


















.Jo 




''" 






Un. 




llu. 




lío 




186Q,Ja>i 




ion 


1 


TOO 


7 


ino 


1 


100 


fi 


ino 


4 


100 






100 


1 


100 


\'i 




4 


100 


fi 








1861, Jan, 




KN) 




UNÍ 


14 


Íi3 


;í 


im 


H 


][)! 


4 


106 


July 




KNl 


I 


1(«1 


«1 


Wi 


3 


lUO 


4 


fW 






1862,Jan. 




120 


1 


1110 


m 


«1 






4 


iir? 


4 


93 


July 




llft 






\H 


% 


3 


1(0 


4 


103 






1863, Jan. 




IWI 






ai 


MI 


3 


1») 


« 


11» 


3 


111 


July 




120 


1 


111 


AS 


KK 


r. 


l-flt 


rt 


107 


ü 


110 


1964, Jan, 




IX 


1 


111 


i.'i 


110 


4 


120 


V 






115 


Jul> 




i.'ir. 


1 


117 


a) 


11» 


H 


120 


¿0 


1.30 


fi 


106 


1865, Jan. 




l.Tñ 


1 


l.'tt 


17 


ivrt 


3 


151 


3 


150 


4 


123 






150 


1 


150 


iM 


147 


:t 


151 


.S 




4 


lao 


1866, Jan. 




l(5r> 


1 


1117 


Kl 


W¿ 


r. 


IKl 


lf> 




« 


113 


July 




195 


1 


183 


2á 


167 


Ü 


ai 


4 


IW! 


6 


lao 





1 


U^. 


IS UasB. 


18 N. J. 




9N.J. 




BN.J. 


17 N. r. 


























Helpkrh 


HOUHE 


Pí-C-BÍE. 


La 


•"«>» 


TwiÉDTm 


Cmpwit* 


Sea 


U. 


U. 


H. 


M. 


M. 


H. 


•"^.sr 


«1.195 


il.10 


IS.00 


11.18 


81.52 


R.186 






























2 


WWM 




WSKM 


.Jo 


Wi«»'^" 


W.«.„ 




WasM 




Vttm 


18^, July 


100 






















1880, Jan. 






El 


10O 


1 


100 


3 


IflO 


H 


1(1) 


2 


100 


July 






1» 


101 


1 


100 


3 


11 X) 


H 


KM 


5 


110 


1861, Jan. 


1 


S4 


5 


un 


I 


100 


« 


85 





10B 


5 


112 








17 


101 


1 


100 


V 


85 


5 


110 


5 




1882, Jan. 


2 


110 


3 


114 


•2 


«I 


3 


tí? 


3 


lia 


3 


127 


July 






fi 


^^^.'. 


9. 


84 


2 


«5 


3 


113 


« 


127 








i> 


116 




9i 




!Ki 




115 


C> 


133 


July 


1 


42 




nti 


2 


100 


'¿ 


«7 


a 


un 


10 


isa 




1 


112 


2 


i:w 


íl 


113 


3 


«7 


4 


13;! 





1S2 


July 


3 


77 


7 


175 




IW 


3 


117 


4 


V.'9 


14 


1«B 


18eB,Jan 


3 


63 


!>• 


iCA 




125 


4 


l'i'i 


3 


12K 


12 


183 


July 


4 


7B 


H 


1115 




150 


3 


15.-) 




148 


13 


174 


18e6.J.n 


•Á 


H4 


4 


«tn 




150 


5 


151 


5 


14H 


10 


ise 


July 




73 


10 


108 




13» 


2 


l&f. 


b 


Iba 


10 


líe 



■ Honra ndoesd Jouiurj, 18G&, Ir 




Appbndix o 



475 



TABLB l—CoiUinued 

WASB^aSISB FBOM TABLB ZU OF THB AIíDRIOH BBPOBT— BüILDZMO TBADB8 

17 N. Y. 17 N. Y. 17 N. Y. 17 N. Y. 18 N. Y. 19 N. Y. 





Cabpent*b 
Appben. 


Cabpemt*s' 
Hblpebs 


LtABOBERS 


Tbamstbbs 


Patntkbs 


CabpkbtY» 


Sez 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
perday.. 


$.375 


$1.00 


$0.88 


$0.75 


$2.00 


$2.00 




No. 

• • 

4 
5 
4 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
4 
2 

• • 

• • 

1 

• • 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 


ReL 
Wagee 


No. 

• • 

1 

1 

3 
3 
1 
2 

• • 

2 
1 

• • 

• • 

• • 

1 
2 


Ral. 
Wages 


No. 
1 

• • 

• • 

• • 


BeL 
Wagea 


No. 

« • 

15 
60 

8 
40 

8 
45 
10 
40 

7 
45 
12 
45 
10 
45 


ReL 
Wages 


No. 

• • 

30 
65 
30 
70 
15 
40 
12 
60 
20 
65 
25 
50 
40 
80 


Reí. 
Wages 


1869, Jan. 

1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863,Jan. 

July 
1864, Jan. 

July 
1866, Jan. 

July 
1866, Jan. 

July 


... 
100 
123 
147 

88 
112 
100 

96 
133 
139 
183 

• • • 
■ • • 

267 

• • ■ 


• • 

1 
3 
3 
4 
5 
8 
6 
2 
2 

■ ■ 

1 
1 

. . 
1 


• • • 

100 

79 

79 

92 

100 

111 

113 

125 

125 

• ■ • 

150 
150 

... 
150 


• ■ ■ 

100 
100 
99 
109 
142 
142 

• • • 

114 
114 

... 

... 

... 

142 

156 


100 

• • • 

• ■ • 

• • • 

100 
100 
100 
133 
167 
167 
233 
233 
233 
233 
233 


• • • 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
113 
113 
150 
150 
175 
175 
175 


• • • 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
113 
150 
150 
163 
175 
176 



20 N. Y. 



21 N. Y. 22 N. Y. 



22 N. Y. 



22 N. Y. 28 N. Y. 





Plumbbbs 


ROOFBBS 
SL.ftMVL 


Brickl^bb 


Bbiokl'bb* 
Hrt.pebs 


PlA8T*S*B 


Paintkbs 


Sez 


M. 


M. 


M. 

$2.00 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
perday.. 


$1.876 


$1.26 


$1.25 


$2.00 


$1.915 




No. 


Ral. 
Wagee 


No. 

2 
6 
3 
4 
2 
3 
3 
6 
6 
8 
2 
5 
2 
6 


RaL 
Wagee 


No. 

8 
8 
7 
7 
6 
6 
4 
5 
9 
9 
5 
5 
5 
6 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

12 
10 
10 
10 

8 

8 

6 

6 
10 
10 

3 

4 
10 
10 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

8 
8 
7 
7 
5 
5 
4 
5 
9 
9 
5 
5 
5 
5 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

• • 

3 

• • 

6 

• • 

2 

• ■ 

3 

• • 

4 

• • 

2 

• • 

4 


ReL 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1866,Jan. 

July 
1866, Jan. 

July 


4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
10 
12 
4 
4 
4 
4 
6 
6 


100 
100 
100 
100 
101 
107 
107 
133 
160 
187 
187 
187 
196 
196 


100 
126 
120 
120 
160 
160 
240 
240 
280 
280 
320 
320 
280 
280 


100 
100 
100 
100 
113 
113 
125 
125 
125 
150 
150 
150 
175 
200 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
130 
130 
180 
180 
180 
180 
180 
200 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
113 
125 
125 
125 
150 
150 
150 
175 
200 


ióó 

■ • • 

93 

• ■ • 

91 

... 
113 

• • • 

150 
Í86 
Í83 



HtSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 






31 N. Y. 


asPa. 


zaPa. 


!JPa. 


28 P». 


»P«. 




ROOPEKB 


Bkicei.ai'« 


Bricklay-b 


Cabíkdt'r 


Castent's 


PunVi 


Su 


H. 


H. 


H. 


M. 


U. 


U. 


p.rd«»-. 


ei.835 


t2.00 


81.12 


tl.75 


Í1.7Ó 


«685 




,. 


W^"»^ 


No. 


W^ 


No. 


W^"''9 


No 


w»t. 


No. 


W^¿. 


No 

B 


Reí. 

w»eB!i 


1860, Jan 


2 


100 


« 


ion 


100 


3 


ino 


fi 


im 


100 


Julj 


« 


fli 


Wl 


10(1 


10 


mi 


K 


t(X) 


10 


100 


13 






:^ 


82 










4 


100 


h 




» 




Ju]y 


■¿ 


H2 


•Jf> 


10(1 


m 


112 


10 


100 


12 


114 


1« 


9» 


1862, Jbd 


i 


7H 


« 


lia 


:^ 


I1V, 


4 


114 


7 


111 


10 


99 


July 


4 


82 






111 




10 


114 


10 


143 






1883, Jan 


fi 


H4 










4 


114 


r> 


143 


H 


116 


July 


4 


1llf> 










10 


114 


10 


171 


1? 


115 




4 


113 


10 


iiíñ 


10 


134 


10 


1"fl 


« 


171 


111 




July 


.'. 


Uil 


;ft 


ri^ 


IS 


i;h4 


14 


129 


H 


171 


14 


116 


1865, Jan 


4 


1ñ(l 


10 


IñO 


ft 


17» 


at 


i:« 


7 


171 


10 


114 


July 


4 


ISI 


;«i 


\f*i 


li> 


17» 


1Í1 


133 


12 


143 


14 




1868, Jan 


4 


163 


ití 




1-.Í 


179 


11) 


151 


K 


IVi 


8 


139 


July 


4 


1B3 


4U 


lau 


üü 


17» 


1» 


151 


20 


143 


10 


166 



I 



InitUl mga per dsj. 

lBaO,Januar7 

July 

1861, January 

July 

1882, JanuuT 

July 

1863,Januar7 

July 

lS64.JanuHry 

July 

ISGS, Jsnuary 

July 

1806, Janusry 

July 




Appbndix o 



477 



TABLE 1 — Continued 

WAOB4BBZB8 FBOM TABUB XO OF THB ▲IJ>RICH mSPOBT— OITT PUBUO WOBXB 

MMasB. MMass. S5N.T. 35N.T 35N.T. 35N.T. 





FOREMEN 
LtABOREBS 


Laborxbs 


FomBimr 
Labobbbs 


Blacksm^s 


Blacksm's* 

HsiiPBBS 


Blastbbs 


86X 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day.. 


$L25 


$1.02 


12.00 


$1.82 


$1.25 


$1.25 




No. 

1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
6 
3 
5 
4 


RaI. 
Wa«w 


No. 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

42 
30 
25 
28 
20 
22 
19 
20 
17 
16 
12 
11 
12 
8 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

16 

23 

17 

25 
9 
7 
4 
7 
8 
7 
7 
5 
2 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

15 
12 
19 

8 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
7 
5 
5 
1 
1 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

6 
10 
15 

■ • 

• • 

• • 

2 

• • 

• • 

1 
1 
1 
1 

• • 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864» Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 
140 
140 
170 
100 
160 
160 
170 
147 
220 
193 
167 
180 
180 


7 

24 
18 
16 
21 
27 

7 

12 
29 
14 
75 
19 
12 
32 


100 

99 

99 

99 

99 

100 

107 

146 

119 

131 

120 

153 

147 

157 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
110 
125 
150 
150 
150 
150 
150 


100 

99 

99 

96 

97 

99 

106 

110 

137 

151 

176 

179 

179 

192 


100 

100 

92 

84 

92 

91 

100 

108 

128 

152 

160 

160 

160 

160 


100 
100 
100 

• • ■ 

• • • 

• • • 

128 

• • ■ 

• • • 

152 
160 
160 
160 

• • • 



85 New York 





Bbzcki«at*s 


Cabpent'b 


Gardem*b8 


Labobkm 


Masons 


StON18CUT*8 


Sez 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
perday.. 


$2.00 


$1.72 


$1.40 


$1.00 


$2.00 


$2.00 




No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

36 
18 
28 
38 
14 
13 
19 

8 

8 
10 

9 
10 

8 
11 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

20 
40 
14 
30 
10 
15 
15 
16 
16 
30 
20 
22 
12 
12 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

1225 
1500 
1200 
1100 
800 
900 
800 
800 
700 
650 
500 
450 
420 
500 


Ral. 
Wages 


No. 

150 

165 

58 

55 

8 

8 

7 

12 
6 
8 
5 
3 
3 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

240 

185 

290 

20 

• • 

16 
15 

5 

5 
20 
10 

1 
11 

2 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


25 

45 

25 

35 

7 

8 

7 

12 
5 
8 
5 
3 
2 
1 


100 

100 

100 

90 

88 

88 

100 

110 

125 

150 

160 

150 

175 

175 


100 
100 
101 

97 
100 

99 
114 
116 
145 
158 
174 
187 
189 
203 


100 

93 

93 

82 

79 

79 

93 

100 

114 

136 

143 

143 

143 

143 


100 
100 
100 
90 
100 
100 
125 
125 
150 
180 
190 
190 
190 
190 


100 

100 

100 

90 

88 

88 

100 

110 

125 

150 

160 

150 

175 

175 


100 
100 
100 
113 

• • • 

88 
100 
113 
125 
150 
160 
150 
175 
175 








CurENT'H 




Si^^is; 


F.^^- 


L^»™ 


Bei 


u. 


M. 




H. 


M. 


M. 


[«rdaj.. 


$1.10 


$2.00 


$2.125 


«1.25 


$1.25 


$1J36 


































•'"■ 




,4 o 


W.gM 


- 




lio. 








1860, Jan 


110 


100 






+ 


inr) 


100 


3 


ino 


23 


100 




:w 


100 




100 


4 


lüO 




lOO 




100 




97 


1861, Jan 


■m 


UK) 




lio 


H 


90 




HH 




IINI 


-n 


97 


July 








IIK) 


H 


m 




«M 




1(0 


M 


96 


1862, Jan 










H 


99 




83 




103 


u 


ge 


JuJy 








100 


K 


W 




KB 




lid 


» 


oe 


lB63,JaD 










B 


IM 


r. 


ÍW 


1 


ii« 


H 


96 














9i 


h 




1> 


99 


H 


96 


lB6í,J8n 


71 


I4I> 






It 


06 


f> 




10 


99 


w 


112 


Jul) 


i^ 


n;í 






It 


Wt 


f> 


1«¡ 


10 


99 


« 


112 


lS66,Jan 


7( 


ifiv; 






4 


llft 


f> 


i:w 


« 


131Í 


?I 


131 




hl 






138 


4 


119 


K 


1.32 


K 


132 




131 


1866, Jan 


:« 


1K2 




LT8 


4 


119 


7 


i;kí 


K 


i:í2 


15 


131 


J.ly 








13» 


4 


11» 


tí 


i:m 


8 


132 


13 


131 



I 



Hachucuts ?,*7???i' 



S*i 

IniUal WMM pu dmjr. .. 

1860,JaDuar7 

July 

1861,JanuHry 

July 

1862,jBnuary 

July 

lB63,JanuArT 

July 

1S61. Januarr 

July 

1865, Januarj 

July 

1866,JaDuai7 

July 





Appendix C 



479 



TABLE 1 — ConUnued 

WAeB4aBIB8 FBOM TABLB XH OF THS AIJ>RZCH KKPOBT — OOTTON GOODB 

88 Massaohnsetts 





M*8T*B Ma- 
CHIMI8T8 


ovbbsrbrb 

Cabdiko 

Dbp't 


OVEB8RRB8 

Cloth 

ROOM 


ovebsbrbs 

Dbbssinq 

Dbp*t 


ovebsbrra 

Spinnino 

Dep't 


OYBB8BBB8 

Wbayino 
Dbp't 


Box • • • • 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. waffe 
per day . . 


13.33 


13.00 


12.00 


^3.00 


$3.00 


$2.065 




No. 


Reí. 
Wa«es 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 


Rol. 
Wuges 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 




100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

100 
106 
106 
120 
120 
120 
120 
150 
150 




100 

100 

83 

83 

83 

as 

100 
100 
117 
117 
117 
117 
133 
133 


100 

100 

84 

84 

84 

84 

100 

100 

125 

125 

113 

113 

138 

138 


100 

100 

83 

83 

83 

83 

100 

100 

117 

117 

117 

117 

133 

133 


100 

100 

83 

83 

83 

83 

100 

100 

113 

113 

117 

117 

las 

133 


100 

100 

85 

85 

85 

85 

103 

103 

129 

129 

121 

121 

157 

157 





Sboond 
Hakds 


Third 
Hamds 


Bacbbots 


Balebs 


Beam- 
Cabeiebs 


Beltmen 


8ex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day.. 


$1.365 


$0.97 


$0.265 


$1.00 


$0.835 


$1.50 




No. 


ReL 
Wages 


No. 

17 

17 

18 

18 

12 

12 

9 

9 

4 

4 

6 

6 

13 

13 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

13 
13 
12 
12 
13 
13 
14 
14 
14 
14 
13 
13 
13 
13 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Rol. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Rol. 
Wages 


No. 


Rol. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jaa. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
10 
10 
12 
12 
11 
11 
12 
12 


100 

100 

77 

77 

78 

78 

101 

101 

113 

113 

139 

139 

157 

157 


100 

100 

71 

71 

80 

80 

103 

103 

155 

155 

159 

159 

175 

175 


100 

100 

87 

87 

74 

106 

136 

158 

177 

177 

172 

172 

187 

187 


100 
100 

as 
as 

83 

as 

108 
108 
133 
133 
133 

las 

167 
167 


100 
100 

as 

83 

as 
as 

129 
129 
150 
150 
159 
162 
175 
175 


100 
100 
100 
100 
111 
111 
111 
111 
117 
117 
122 
122 
150 
150 





^^ 




480 HisTOBY op THB Obeenbacss ^M 


TABLEl-Cotiímual ■ 




WJLDtMnU» rBDH TABI.> lO OT THE AIJIUCH ■EPOBT - COTTON OOOD* 1 




» Hae«Mbii»tt« fl 




B[.*ci- 


BoBBn 


BoiLMam 


B'l'bm'h'i' 


Cakpeht's 


C.» ■ 








Un 




Hbi-tou 


OaiKnaa ■ 


8ei 


ii^ 


U. 


M. 


H. 


H. 


"' 1 


Ipit WM« 

perdí, 


11. TO 


$1.415 


•1,75 


«1.08 


•1.52 


•1.02S ■ 




~ 


Rol. 




tul. 


Z R<j1.~ 




Rrí. 




R«l. 




Rol. 






No. 




So. 


W«aoa 


No. 


W»g« 




W.»M 


No. 


W.«M 


No. 


W.K« 


18eO,J>n.| 4 


100 








100 


2 


100 


5 


100 


7 


100 




July 1 


100 








lOO 


2 


100 




100 


7 


100 




1861, Jan, 4 


97 


2 


ióó 




86 


2 


1(X) 


6 


102 


7 


90 




July 4 


97 


2 


100 




86 


2 


100 


6 


102 


7 


90 




1862,Jan. 3 


100 


2 


106 




95 


2 


loo 


7 


113 


3 


111 




Jgljí 3 


1U6 


2 


1U6 




9ó 


2 


100 


7 


113 


3 


Ul 




1863,J«n.! 3 


loa 




124 




100 


1 


116 


6 113 


3 


Ul 




July 


3 


106 




124 


2 


lUÜ 


1 


116 


6 113 




Ul 




1861, Jan. 


3 


116 




159 


2 


98 


1 


116 


6 


132 


3 


120 




July 


3 


116 




159 


2 


98 


1 


116 


S 


132 


3 


120 




1865, Jbd. 


3 


151 




IM 


2 


un 


2 


130 


6 


168 


3 


140 




July 


3 


151 




153 


2 


107 


2 


130 


6 


168 


3 


110 




1866. Jan. 


3 


158 




114 


1 


114 


1 


1.3» 


6 


164 


3 


lU 




Ju]yj 3 


158 


— 


U4 


1 


114 


1 


138 


8 


161 


3 


Ul 






Dorma 


fíTa-i 


Entithbii 


mL.™ 


L» 


H-cnnm H 




a» 


H. 


M. 


U. 


H. 


U. 






-íi-ísr 


t0.315 


10.64 


10.92 


•0.83 


•0.71 


(1.565 








Ral. 


~ 


Bat. 








ReL 




Reí. 




RH. 






No. 


Wag« 


N. 




No. 


WaaéB 


No. 


Wiff.» 


No. 


WagM 


So 


WWH 




18eO,Jan. 


33 


100 


G 


100 




100 


5 


lat 


2 


100 




100 




July 


33 


100 


6 


lUO 




100 


5 


100 ; 2 


100 




100 




1861, Jan. 


33 


92 




88 




82 




81 


2 


92 




»7 




July 


33 


92 




88 




82 




81 


2 


92 




97 




1962,Jbd 


.33 


97 




110 




82 




Bl 


2 


120 




106 




July 


33 


87 




110 




82 




91 


2 


128 




106 




1883, Jao 


27 


12i 




117 




109 




111 




118 




109 




July 


27 


m 




117 




109 




111 


2 


118 




100 ■ 




lS61.JHn 


26 


13» 


3 


113 




136 




Ul 


2 


146 




128 M 




July 


28 


139 


3 


113 




136 




141 


2 


146 




128 ■ 




1866.Jan 


26 


186 


3 


198 




136 




15ñ 


3 


114 




144 ■ 




July 


26 


186 


3 


198 




1.16 




155 


3 


114 




114 ■ 




1866. Jan 


27 


183 


3 


198 




163 




155 


3 


192 


8 


166 


É 


July 


•2r> 


187 


3 


198 




163 




155 


3 


192 


8 


186 


^ ^J 



Appendix o 



481 



TABLE 1 — Oowtinued 

W AO»ffBBZIB FBOM TABLB XH OF THB ALDBIOH BBPOBT — OOTTON OOOD8 

88 Massaehnsetts 





lÍAsomi 


OlLMBS 


Paintkbs 


PiCKXBS 


ROLLBB 
GOYBBEBS 


Wabtb 
Handb 


8ez 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day.. 


$1.48 


$0.42 


$1.36 


$0.71 


$1.50 


$1.10 




No. 

5 
5 
6 
6 
7 
7 
5 
5 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 


ReL 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 


ReL 
Wagas 


No. 


Reí. 
Wagas 


No. 


ReL 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Reí. 
Wuges 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863,Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 

100 

99 

99 

98 

98 

115 

115 

151 

151 

192 

192 

225 

225 


100 

100 

107 

107 

107 

107 

107 

107 

112 

112 

131 

131 

242 

242 


3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


100 
100 
104 
104 
107 
107 
107 
107 
113 
113 
135 
135 
156 
156 


12 
12 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
7 
7 
9 
9 
9 
9 


100 
100 
111 
111 
109 
109 
146 
146 
181 
181 
193 
193 
200 
200 


2 
2 
2 
2 

2 
2 
2 
2 


100 
100 
100 
100 

111 
111 
111 
111 

122 
122 
142 
142 
151 
151 


100 

100 

91 

91 

86 

86 

121 

121 

136 

136 

132 

132 

114 

114 





WATCHmN 


Whbslpit 
Mex 


Yabd 
Hands 


Yabn 
Cabbiebs 


Cabd 
Stbippbbs 


SCBUBBEBS 


Saz 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


F. 


F. 


Init. wage 
per day.. 


$1.33 


$2.00 


$1.10 


$0.68 


$0.71 


$0.45 




No. 

2 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

1 
1 
1 
1 

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 


ReL 
Wages 


No. 

6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
7 
7 


Rcl. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 

100 

81 

81 

81 

81 

107 

107 

113 

113 

132 

132 

150 

150 


100 
100 
113 
113 
113 
113 
113 
113 
125 
125 
133 
133 
150 
150 


100 

100 

91 

91 

82 

82 

110 

110 

127 

127 

114 

114 

127 

127 


100 

100 

74 

74 

74 

74 

74 

74 

92 

92 

178 

178 

145 

145 


100 
100 
96 
96 
113 
113 
141 
141 
162 
162 
190 
190 
180 
190 


100 

100 

83 

83 

83 

83 

111 

111 

129 

129 

149 

149 

164 

164 



r 


482 HlBTOBY OP THE OBEESBACKS 


1 


TABLK 1-Oonlmutd 


\ 










38 Masa. 3S Mas.-. 3BMu9. IKUt,^^. 36 Haas. 


39 Han. 




Sfoolbm 


Shed-ebh 


C^tBFRNT'B 


M*"SíI??s 


^Y¿"" 


CA.D.DBP. 


Sai 


F. 


F. 


U. 


M. 


M. 


i 


Iiilt.wuie 
par dny.. 


«0.50 


S0.71 


K.75 


$1.75 


»&00 


nw ■ 




No. 


wí^ 


No. 


«■ü. 


No 


w-S. 


No. 


^^^ 


No 


Rol. 


».. 


H«L ~ 




1860, Jan 


47 


ion 


2 


ino 




ino 




ino 




ion 


1 


100 




Julv 






•f. 


loo 








lUO 




100 








X8Cl,J8n 


4i) 


84 


1 


70 




107 




100 




1(11 




100 ■ 




July 


4ñ 


K4 


1 


70 




Kr7 




100 




i(») 








1862, Jsn. 


4!, 


«1 


1 


K5 




KI7 




(14 




100 




100 ■ 




July 






1 


85 




114 




94 




100 




■ 




1863, Jan 


4.'! 


Ilí» 


A 


»7 




114 




114 




KNI 




100 ■ 




July 


4.'> 


lifi 


3 


«7 




114 




114 




100 




100 ■ 






44 










114 




119 




100 








J«ly 


44 


95 


H 


iir¿ 




129 




12» 




1(11 




113 ■ 




1865, Jan. 






H 


1(12 




14:í 




143 




100 




113 1 
























113 










:í; 


200 


14 


104 




171 




171 




125 




125 




July 


:i7 


auo 


14 


104 




171 




lae 




126 




125 


as HasHchiuatts 






OVK«»«™i 


OvnuKBU Ovnrana 


Oruonu 


SttOBD 


CAJOTJfrt 






CwfTHR'll 


D«wi».Dbp, 


Spm.D«f. 


WBAV.Dap. 


HASoa 


Sax 


M 


M. 


M. 


M. 


H. 


" 1 


perday... 


$3.25 


Í1.75 


$2.00 


$iM 


»1.175 


I1.4S 1 






RoL 


No. 


RoL 


No. 


Reí. 


So. 


Rr-l. 




Bal. 




R.L ■ 






.lu. 




Wagea 


Wagea 




""■ 






"— ■ 


1860,jBn. 




ino 




inn 




inri 




100 


fi 


ion 


11 


100 H 




July 




100 




100 




lUÜ 




100 


'; 






96 ■ 




1861. Jan. 




HKt 




KM 




111) 




loo 


« 


](H 


» 


S8 




July 


1 


Km 




111» 




1110 




100 


2 


ll« 


n 


W 




1862,Jan 




KKI 




1(H> 




K» 




100 


3 


101 


10 


98 




July 




79 




m 




76 




75 


4 


8» 


12 


96 




1983, Jan 




W 




114 




KIO 




100 


I 


í(9 


24 


90 








7« 




114 




Kiri 




lof) 


1 


ilO 


» 


»S 








78 




114 




100 




100 


2 




14 






July 




vr¿ 




114 




MH 




113 




KKi 


« 


128 




1866,Jan 




KKI 




m 








113 


« 


1(« 


H 


1» 




Jul) 




100 




12» 




113 




113 




i:» 


14 


lis 








111 




143 




I-i'» 




138 


r> 


14» 


12 


H7 




July 




111 




143 




129 




138 


i 


IM 

M 


12 

1 


lEO 

J 



Appendix C 



483 



TABLE l—Contínued 

WAMB-UnnB FBOM TABLB XH OF THX ALDRZCH BBPOBT — OOTTON OOODS 

39 Massachusetts 





Cabd 
osindmbs 


Cakd 
Stbippeks 


Machim'ts 


Paintbbb 


PlOKKBS 


SECnON 

Hanos 


8ez 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day... 


$0.83 


80.625 


il.SR 


$1.14 


$0.735 


$0.76 




No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 


ReL 
Wages 


No. 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

24 
24 
14 
13 
14 
17 
7 

10 
11 
10 
10 
12 
16 
15 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 

2 
2 
3 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
5 
7 
7 


Bel. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan« 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 
110 
110 
110 
114 
104 
110 
110 
151 
160 
160 
201 
202 
192 


6 
6 
3 
4 
4 
2 
1 
1 
5 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 


100 
103 
111 
112 
112 
104 
96 
96 
120 
179 
179 
179 
179 
179 


100 
101 
104 
106 
97 
99 
109 
102 
112 
126 
145 
136 
146 
149 


7 
7 
7 
5 
4 
6 
4 
6 
8 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 


100 

104 

111 

111 

111 

100 

95 

97 

97 

119 

130 

133 

132 

136 


100 
102 
102 
102 
102 
102 
113 
113 
136 
170 
204 
181 
171 
165 


100 
110 

106 
107 
109 
103 
113 
113 
109 
123 
109 
147 
185 
185 





Slabhbb 

TsirDMBS 


Watchmkn 


Yasd 
Handb 


Dbawsba- 

IK 


Dbawino 
Hands 


Sprkdeks 


8ez 


M. 


M. 


M. 


p. 


F. 


F. 


Init. wage 
per day... 


$1.06 


$0.86 


$0.855 


$0.475 


$0.42 


$0.52, 






Bel. 




Bel. 




Bel. 




BeL 




Bel. 




Bel. 




No. 


Wages 


No. 


Wages 


No. 
17 


Wages 


No. 
5 


Wages 


No. 
4 


Wages 


No. 
4 


Wages 


1860, Jan. 


3 


100 


14 


100 


100 


100 


100 


100 


July 


4 


92 


14 


100 


12 


101 


3 


112 


3 


119 


4 


106 


1861, Jan. 


2 


83 


14 


100 


12 


101 


4 


84 


3 


119 


4 


104 


July 


2 


83 


14 


100 


14 


102 


5 


113 


3 


119 


4 


101 


1862, Jan. 


1 


84 


14 


100 


10 


92 


4 


114 


3 


119 


4 


104 


July 


• • 


• • • 


13 


100 


18 


101 


3 


117 


2 


95 


2 


96 


1863, Jan. 


2 


97 


13 


100 


14 


104 


2 


114 


2 


95 


1 


92 


July 


2 


97 


13 


100 


13 


105 


2 


114 


2 


95 


1 


92 


1864, Jan. 


5 


111 


15 


116 


8 


119 


5 


123 


3 


119 


2 


106 


July 


3 


131 


14 


145 


9 


150 


2 


143 


2 


119 


3 


110 


1865, Jan. 


2 


127 


15 


145 


5 


148 


2 


141 


2 


119 


2 


110 


July 


2 


139 


14 


145 


10 


152 


7 


133 


4 


129 


5 


121 


1866, Jan. 


6 


148 


16 


174 


14 


154 


6 


189 


4 


160 


4 


161 


July 


4 


155 


15 


174 


13 


168 


5 


171 


5 


160 


5 


161 



HlSTOBV OP THB GbEENBACKS 



TABLE 1 - Cmtinund 






X Urnas. 


SBUbbb. 


»M««!.. 


4C 


Hh»^. 


« Míw. 


WUui. 




SpINMKRB 
FSAHB 


w.„„. 


Wkatbbh 


Uabtkk 


Xa«p 


C»«>. Dbí. 


Sm 


F. 


F. 


F. 


U. 


H. 


u. 


Init.wiin 


«0.475 


(0595 


$0.46 


«2.00 


tl50 


8SL50 




N- 


w"*ÍÍ;s 


(i 


Rcl. 


So. 


Rcl. 


No 


Reí. 
Wnp» 


No 


Reí. 


No. 


w'i-J» 


ia60.Jan 


w 


iiin 


ino 


Itl 


Irt) 




100 


1 


inn 




100 


July 


•¿1 




It 


115 




itti 




1(X) 


1 


KNI 




loo 


IBei.Jan 


w 


H7 


7 


HK 


•v> 


110 




ii;í 


1 


117 




100 


July 




B5 


fi 




IH 








1 


IIT 




100 


18e2.Jan 


») 


102 


V 


79 




112 




113 


1 


117 




loo 


Jub 




loa 


r. 


H4 


1» 


102 




113 


1 


117 




lUO 


1863, Jan 


?;t 


fl7 


1 


Íi7 


21 


117 




113 




117 




lU) 


July 




99 


1 


«7 




118 




125 


1 


117 




100 


1861. Jan 


•¿A 


1H 


'¿ 


IM 


ai 


12H 




1.^) 


1 


150 




lio 


July 




VfA 


1 


1(1» 


M 


Ult 




150 


1 


un 




lio 


1865, Jan 


w 


118 


i 


97 


■'4 


140 




150 


1 


167 






July 


m 


131 


a 


141 


«1 


132 




ir.0 


1 


167 




120 


1866, Jan. 


■M 


11)1 


4 


V.fi 


■M 


IHrt 




im 


1 


157 




lao 


July 


31 


189 


1 


161 


23 


198 


^ 


ift) 


1 


167 




120 



I 



I 



























Hahd* 




Sbi 


H. 


1 


H. 


U. 


H. 


U. 


M. 


lDÍt.«.«<> 

p«r<l.y.. 


H.42 


1.83 


$Í50 


(2.25 


n.486 


SLaBB 






R-1 






No 


















llu 




llu. 






Uki. 




.Jo. 




.Ju 




1860, Jan 




100 




100 




ino 


2 


inn 


6 


ino 




100 






111» 




1(10 




KKI 


•¿ 


1(10 


fi 


ino 




lOÚ 


1861. Jan 




10(1 




100 




100 






7 


97 




100 


Julj 




106 




1(» 




HKI 


•i. 




7 


97 




100 


1862. Jan 




IIK 




i:r7 




1110 


V, 




ti 


97 




10» 


July 




KKi 




i;í7 




UlO 






.s 


97 






1863, Jan 




106 




LT7 




100 


1 




<t 


97 




82 


Julj 




10(1 




i:n 






1 




3 


9« 




83 


1801. Jan 




Hit! 




150 




120 




IK 


13 


10» 






July 












120 


2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


102 


13 








1866, Jan 




I2;i 




m 


1 


lio 


lltt 


14 


114 




133 


Jul) 




v¿:^ 




ItM 




110 


111 


14 


11H 




125 


18ee.Jan 




i«) 




IfM 




IW 


111 


i:i 


119 






July 




123 




164 




120 


m 


U 


121 




138 



Appendix C 



485 



TABLE l-Cfmtinved 

WAOB^aBZBS FBOM TABLB XH OF THB ALDRZOH BEPOBT— OOTTON GOODS 

40 Massachosetts 



\ 


BAino 

BOT8 


CABPENT*8 


Cabd 

GRINDBBa 


Caxd 
Strippebs 


Cloth-R'm 
Hands 


Drawinq 
Hands 


Sez 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init.wage 
jMr day .. 


$0.79 


$1.49 


$0.83 


$0.755 


$0.50 


$0.662 




No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 

Wa«es 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 

1 

1 
1 

1 

• • 

• • 

• ■ 

• • 

2 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
2 

• • 

• • 

2 
3 
3 
3 

5 
6 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


2 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
. • 

. • 
1 

4 
1 

• • 


100 
89 
93 
105 
127 
127 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

63 

111 
127 

... 


8 

8 

7 

7 

7 

9 

9 

9 

13 

9 

11 

11 

14 

8 


100 
100 
104 
104 
105 
106 
103 
107 
128 
139 
128 
140 
141 
159 


11 
11 
8 
8 
8 
2 
1 

• • 

6 
7 
5 
6 
6 
6 


100 
100 
105 
105 
105 
96 
106 

• • • 

181 
178 
179 
189 
189 
189 


3 

. . 
9 
12 
10 
9 
9 
9 


100 

100 
99 
99 
99 
99 

100 

• • • 

166 
175 
180 
179 
180 
181 


100 
100 
108 
108 
116 
116 
116 
116 

• • • 

• ■ • 

• • • 

• • • 

169 
169 


100 
100 
95 
95 
79 
94 

• • • 

• • • 

106 
113 
121 
129 
157 
176 







DOFFKBS 


Enoinsbbs 


FntBMEN 


Habnisbs 
Hands 


Labobebs 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Ixiit.wage 
per day .. 


$0.98 


$0.303 


$3.00 


$1.415 


$0.38 


$0.995 




No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 

• • 

• • 

1 
1 

• • 

• ■ 

2 
1 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

16 
16 
11 
11 

9 

6 

5 

4 
11 
14 

8 
13 
13 

8 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
7 


100 

100 

101 

102 

88 

90 

88 

92 

94 

100 

73 

88 

111 

117 


27 
28 
25 
15 
14 
5 
9 

• • 

15 
15 
15 
14 
10 
9 


100 
100 
102 
107 
105 
114 
94 

• • • 

124 
124 
132 
132 
165 
165 


100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

92 

92 

96 

96 

96 

100 


100 

102 

98 

99 

100 

105 

105 

99 

104 

106 

107 

108 

112 

118 


100 
97 
121 
121 
126 
132 

• • • 

• • • 

197 
197 

• • ■ 

• • • 

216 
234 


100 
100 
103 
103 
100 
106 
107 
124 
147 
173 
164 
174 
176 
177 



486 



HlSTOBT OF THB ObBENBACKS 



TABLE 1—Comiinmed 

WAOB^aBZBS FBOM TABLM XH OF THB ▲IJ>BZCH BKFOIT— COTTOM OOOIW 

40 MasBMhiiaetts 





MACHI]f*T8 


Machiii*t8* 
Appbevt's 


PlCKINO 

Boom H*Ds 


Borneo 
Hands 


Sbction 
Haitim 


SFOOUDtfl 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init.wace 
per day.. 


$1.765 


80.875 


$0.85 


$0.38 


$1.25 


$0.448 




No. 


B«L 
Wa«es 


No. 


Bel. 
Wftcee 


No. 


Bel. 
WmgM 


No. 


Bel. 
Wa«es 


No. 


Bel. 
Wftcee 


No. 


Bel. 
Waices 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


14 
13 
10 
10 
10 
10 
9 
10 
14 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 


100 
102 
105 
105 
105 
105 
103 
102 
125 
127 
126 
134 
L32 
142 


2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
2 

• • 

1 

1 


100 
100 
114 
114 
114 
114 
124 
137 
119 
126 
129 

■ • ■ 

77 
114 


4 
4 
6 
6 
7 
7 
2 
2 
3 
5 
2 
4 
7 
8 


100 

100 

98 

98 

98 

96 

106 

106 

123 

165 

162 

162 

181 

187 


4 
5 
4 

4 

• • 

1 

• • 

• • 

7 
3 
2 
2 

4 

4 


100 
101 
101 
104 

• • • 

132 

• • • 

• • • 

108 
132 
145 
151 
153 
168 


4 
4 
4 

4 
1 
1 

• • 

• • 

7 
7 
5 
3 
4 
5 


100 
102 
107 
108 
106 
106 

• • • 

• • • 

108 
108 
127 
131 
122 
115 


4 

5 
2 
2 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
3 
7 
6 
8 
5 


100 

101 

84 

96 

119 

128 

62 

61 

92 

96 

107 

114 

144 

183 





Tbambtkrs 


Watchjusn 


Cloth-R'm 

HAND8 


Dorruts 


Drawtng 
Hands 


DRE88SS8 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


F. 


F. 


F. 


F. 


Init. wa^e 
por day . 


$1.50 


$1.06 


$0.61 


$0.315 


$0.455 


$1.059 




No. 

1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 


Rol. 
Waíre« 


No. 

o 

2 
4 
4 

• • 
■ • 

8 
8 
4 
4 
4 
;> 
5 
3 


Reí. 
W aires 


No. 

G 
6 
5 
5 

• ■ 

• • 

1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
8 
8 


Rol. 
Wages 


No. 


Bel. 
Waices 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No 

9 

10 
8 
7 
6 
6 
3 
3 
5 
5 

10 

11 

11 
7 


Reí. 
WaKes 


1800, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

18G3, Jan. 

July 
18GÍ, Jan. 

July 
18G5, Jan. 

July 
1866, Jan. 

July 


100 

100 

92 

92 

92 

92 

89 

83 

94 

94 

91 

91 

117 

117 


100 

100 

94 

94 

• • • 

• • • 

94 
94 
134 
158 
158 
158 
165 
165 


100 
100 
87 
87 
82 
82 

• • • 

• • • 

99 
99 
130 
130 
138 
136 


2 
5 
5 
3 
2 
1 
4 

■ • 

• • 

• • 

• • 

6 
8 
8 


100 

ia3 

103 
112 
105 
105 
98 

• • • 

• • ■ 

• • • 

• • • 

127 
159 
159 


22 
23 

9 

9 

8 

5 

3 

1 

13 

18 

20 

20 

21 

19 


100 
105 
130 
134 
114 
122 
101 
114 
127 
125 
117 
127 
139 
134 


100 

105 

107 

106 

69 

71 

54 

55 

lOi 

105 

92 

98 

117 

138 



Appendix C 



487 



TABLE l—CorUinued 

WAOB-BXBIB8 FBOM TABLE XH OF THE ALDRICH SEPOBT— COTTON OOOD8 

40 Massachusetts 





Habness 

HANI>8 


ROOM 

Hands 


Speedebs 


SPOOLEB8 


Stretch- 

ER8 


SWEEPEBS 


Rnx 


F. 


F. 


F. 


F. 


F. 


F. 


Init. wage 
per day .. 


$0.464 


$0.67 


$0.503 


$0.404 


$0.533 


$0.39 




No. 

5 

4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 


Reí. 
Wa«es 


No. 

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
8 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

8 
8 
6 
6 
6 
1 
1 

• • 

10 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

9 
U 
15 
20 
12 
12 

7 

7 

10 
11 
15 
17 
19 
24 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

3 
3 

6 
6 
8 
3 
8 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 

1 
1 

• • 

• • 

• • 

• • 

3 

2 
2 
5 
6 

7 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 
103 
125 
125 
140 
140 
151 
151 
162 
162 
162 
162 
185 
192 


100 
100 
112 
112 
112 
112 
112 
112 
93 
106 
106 
149 
152 
153 


100 
100 
104 
106 
106 
99 
99 

• • • 

144 
154 
152 
156 
155 
159 


100 

95 

86 

90 

98 

101 

88 

103 

120 

127 

118 

125 

173 

200 


100 
100 
110 
114 
113 
118 
119 
116 
117 
120 
122 
124 
134 
143 


100 
100 
103 
103 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • 

128 
147 
154 
156 
182 
187 



Sez. 



Initial wage per day 



1860, January 
July ... 

1861, January 
July — 

1862, January 
July.... 

1863, January 
July . . . 

1864, January 
July... 

1865, January 
July... 

1866, January 
July . . . 



WABPBB8 



F. 



$0.059 



No. 



7 
9 
11 
12 
6 
5 
1 
1 
3 
3 
2 
3 
6 
3 



Reí. Wages 



100 

100 
99 
103 
100 
103 
102 
102 
137 
148 
127 
126 
162 
202 



Wbatebb 



F. 



$0.321 



No. 



12 

14 

14 

15 

10 

10 

3 

9 

8 

6 

16 

10 

45 

52 



ReL Wages 



100 
100 
106 
106 
106 
106 
109 
116 
116 
116 
125 
125 
125 
125 



Weayebs 



F. 



$0.42> 



No. 



8 
7 
6 
9 
5 
6 
8 
9 

10 
8 

10 
8 
9 
6 



Reí. Wages 



100 
100 
100 
100 
102 
102 
107 
107 
107 
107 
107 
119 
119 
119 



1 Per cut for sheetings 46 inches wide, 48 yards per cut. 
< Per cat for sheetings 72 inches wide, 40 yards per cut. 



488 



HlSTOBT OF THE ObEENBAGKS 



TABLE l—CtmtinM€d 

TABLK XH OF THB ALDBICM BBPOBT — DBT OOOOS 

12 New HampBhire 



Iniiiml wage per day. . 



1860, 
1861, 
1862, 
1863, 
1864, 
1865, 
1866, 



January 

July 

Januaiy 

July 

January 

July 

January* 

July 

January 

July 

January 

July 

January 

July 



PORTKKS 



$1.00 



No. 



BeL 
Wases 



100 



100 
100 
100 
125 
125 
125 
125 
125 
125 
125 
125 



Salí 



$1.125 



No. 



4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
é 
4 



Reí. 
Wa«e8 



100 



100 
100 
100 
156 
156 
156 
156 
178 
178 
178 
178 



F. 



$0.80 



No. 



5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
é 



BeL 
Wases 



100 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
104 
104 
104 
104 



OIMOHAM8 

43 Massachnsetts 





OVSE8EER8 


Qm. 




» 


■» . 




Cardinir 
Dep't 


Dressinff 
Dop't 

M. 


8pÍDDÍn^ 
Dept 


WeaTÍDff 
DepH 


Hands 


Back 
BOTII 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wa«e 
X>erday.. 


$3.00 


$3.00 


$2.50 


$3.00 


$1.55 


$0.30 




No. 


Bel. 
Waires 


No. 


Bel. 
WaffGS 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Bel. 
Wa«es 


No. 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 


Bel. 
Wa«es 


No. 

16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 


B«-l. 
Waires 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

18a3,Jan. 

July 
1864, Jan. 

July 
1865,Jan. 

July 
1866, Jan. 

July 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
108 
106 
108 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
108 
117 
117 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

lio 
lio 

120 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

la) 

100 
100 
108 
133 
133 


100 
100 
100 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
103 
116 
124 
132 
148 
152 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
117 
117 
123 
133 
150 



Appendix C 



489 



TABLE l—Continued 

WAOB4BBIBS FBOM TABLB Xn OF THB ALDRZCH BSPORT— OINOHAMS 

43 Massachnsetts 





BOILBB 

Tkndebs 


Carpbm- 

TBB8 


Card 
Obindebs 


Card 
Stbippebs 


Ca&d 
Tendbbb 


DRB88EB8 


Sox 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
perday.. 


$1.165 


$1.75 


$1.25 


$0.83 


$0.75 


$1.64 




No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
4 


Reí. 
Wa«es 


No. 

4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
6 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 


Reí. 
Wa«es 


No. 

3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
6 
3 
3 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

14 
14 
14 

9 
10 
10 
10 
11 
11 

9 
10 
11 
14 
14 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
129 
129 
140 
140 
140 


100 

100 

100 

86 

86 

86 

86 

100 

100 

114 

114 

129 

129 

134 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
107 
120 
120 
140 
140 
140 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
114 
114 
135 
135 
169 
181 
181 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
111 
111 
111 
133 
149 
167 
187 
187 


100 
112 
110 
112 
114 
120 
117 
107 
110 
112 
118 
131 
137 
138 



48 Massachnsetts 





»^ 




liOOM 


Machin- 


Pa 




TV- 




Smahh 




Insaa 


FncBs 


I8TS 


INTEB8 


PiCKSBS 


Mbndebs 


Sez 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day . . 


$1.00 


$1.58 


$1.55 


$1.75 


SI. 00 


$1.30 




No. 

24 
24 
24 
22 
22 
22 
12 
12 
16 
23 
24 
33 
35 
35 


ReL 
Wages 


No. 

13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
12 
12 
13 
13 
14 
17 
18 
17 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

6 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
4 
4 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
4 
4 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 


Rol. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
125 
150 
150 
175 
175 
175 


100 

99 

97 

103 

94 

84 

107 

96 

97 

99 

128 

136 

146 

147 


100 

90 

90 

99 

97 

92 

97 

100 

100 

107 

110 

128 

145 

152 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
103 
103 
114 
120 
120 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
112 
112 
125 
125 
150 
165 
165 


100 

100 

100 

100 

87 

87 

87 

87 

87 

90 

£6 

106 

115 

115 



490 



HlSTOBY OF THB GbEENBACKS 



wAo: 



TABLE l—Continued 
raoM TABLS xn of thb au>ri€:h bbpobt< 
43 MasBaehnsetts 





Watchmkm 


Weavkbs 


Yabd 
Hands 


Deawbbs- 
nr 


DRAwnro- 

Frams 

Tkndbbs 


QUILLKBS 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


F. 


F. 


F. 


Init. wage 
perday.. 


ti. 165 


$0.93 


$1.00 


$0.80 


$0.49 


$0.57 




No. 


Bel. 
Wa«M 


No. 

85 
93 
108 
100 
82 
65 
23 
11 
35 
40 
40 
34 
85 
98 


Bel. 
Wa«es 


No. 

10 
10 
10 

8 

6 

6 

6 

6 

8 

8 
10 
10 
12 
12 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

5 
5 
4 

4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

10 
10 
10 

9 
10 
10 

8 

8 
11 
14 
12 
15 
10 
12 


Bel. 
Wa«es 


No. 


Bel. 
Wa«os 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1od6, Jan. 
July 


2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
115 
115 
129 
129 
129 


100 

98 
100 
104 

97 
104 

97 
104 

99 
105 
129 
135 
167 
185 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
125 
150 
163 
163 
163 


100 
100 
100 
115 
118 
111 
108 
104 
103 
IOS 
103 
100 
125 
150 


100 
102 
102 
102 
102 
102 
102 
102 
112 
122 
133 
163 
163 
173 


36 
35 
37 
36 
34 
29 
23 
20 
25 
2d 
29 
39 
45 
45 


100 
100 
100 
96 
96 
104 
104 
100 
100 
128 
128 
L31 
153 
160 



43 Massachasettá 





Berleus 


Speedehh 


Spiknbrs 
Frame 


W ARPEES 


Weaverí» 


Wixder» 


Sex 


F. 
10.66 


F. 
$0.60 


F. F. 


F. 


F. 


Init. waKC 
perday.. 


$0.56 


$0.73 


$0.72 


$0.56 




No. 


Rol. 
Wa^es 


.\o. 

12 
12 
10 
13 
12 
12 

6 

6 
12 
11 
11 
13 
17 
17 


Reí. L, 
Wa«es ^o. 


Reí. 
Watfes 


No. 


Reí. 
Wajpes 


No. 

115 

103 

98 

97 

120 

89 

88 

90 

115 

160 

140 

188 

196 

172 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

103 
101 
99 
70 
61 
54 
43 
37 
44 
25 
49 
70 
82 
85 


Bel. 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


34 
38 
33 
28 
26 
19 
14 
14 
21 
25 
26 
39 
45 
43 


100 
100 
120 
120 
120 
145 
145 
132 
132 
130 
130 
129 
144 
148 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
108 
117 
133 
158 
158 
167 


19 
17 
10 
10 
10 
10 
6 
8 
16 
18 
20 
29 
26 
25 


100 
103 
103 
10-3 
10*3 
1(^ 
103 
107 
116 
125 
143 
170 
170 
170 


26 
26 
27 
20 
20 
19 
11 
13 
18 
25 
20 
28 
.-G 
34 


100 
100 
100 
134 
133 
130 
12.3 
108 
104 
101 
110 
142 
144 
144 


100 

97 

99 

111 

101 

114 

107 

106 

101 

109 

134 

151 

1654 

178 


100 
103 
107 
121 
121 
121 
121 
121 
121 
141 
14.5 
168 
175 
186 



Appendix C 



491 



TABLE 1 — CmUinued 

WAOBHSXBZX8 FBOM TABLB XII OP THX AIJ>RIOH BBPOBT^-OBOCXBDBS 

44 New Hampshire 





Saleamem 


TBAMBTBR8 


Sex 


M. 


M. 






Initial wa«e per day. . . 


10.875 


$1.50 




No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Rel.Wages 


No. 


ReLWages 


1860, January 

July 

1861, January 

July 

1862, January 

July 

1863, January 

July 

1864, January 

July 

1865, January 

July 

1866, January 

July 


100 
100 
100 
129 
157 
157 
186 
186 
186 
186 
186 
186 
186 
186 


100 
100 
100 
100 
133 
133 
133 
133 
133 
133 
133 
133 
133 
133 



ILLUMINATINQ OAS 

45 Mass. 46 Mass. 46 Mass. 46 Mass. 47 N. Y. 47 N. Y. 





Rstobtm'n 


Ckx>L 
Hamdlsrs 


FlBBMBN 


Labobbbs : 
Strebt 


Black- 

8MITH8 


BliACK8M*8 

Helpers 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day.. 


$0.965 


$1.00 


$1.00 


$1.00 


$1.965 


$1.125 




No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

3 
12 

• • 

8 
2 
6 

• • 

5 

• • 

6 
2 
4 

• • 

4 


Bel. 
Wages 


Xo. 

7 

8 
10 
10 
10 

9 

6 

6 

7 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

4 
3 
3 
6 
5 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 


Bel. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 
109 
109 
109 
109 
109 
109 
109 
116 
136 
138 
146 
138 
160 


3 

• • 

4 
1 
2 
1 
2 

• ■ 

5 

1 
1 

• • 

2 

• • 


100 

• • • 

100 
100 
100 
100 
100 

• ■ • 

143 
150 
150 

• • • 

150 

... 


7 

6 

7 

6 

12 

10 

14 

9 

14 

10 

15 

8 

11 

9 


100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
113 
113 
137 
137 
175 
175 
175 
175 
200 


100 
100 
• • . 
100 
109 
100 

• • • 

110 

• • ■ 

125 
125 
125 

• * • 

150 


100 

98 

97 

97 

97 

97 

104 

140 

124 

140 

151 

151 

151 

153 


100 

111 
111 

100 
100 
100 

111 

156 
133 
156 
178 
178 
178 
178 



HlSTOBV OF THE GbEENBACKS 



TABLE 1 — Conti-niáed 













«> 


ow York 














BUOSI.AT- 

■u 


\"¿ÍÜ? 


CiíFBH- 


EüHIHEEMI 


FnUKBS 


L.1IOUU 


Sil 


U. 


11. 


U. 


u. 


M. 


U. 


laH. ww 
per dar. 


tuoe 


tl.335 


Í1.TO 


S2.165 


•13* 


«X65 


































■'"■ 














WlWHI 








7 


100 


ít 


ino 


fi 


int) 


3 


ion 


«n 


100 


Tlfl 




July 


at 


97 


4 


11 H 


fl 


1U> 


H 


](« 




11» 


21» 


08 


1861, J«n 


II 


1(7 


4 


lio 


10 


ll«l 


3 


IIX) 


«1 


1(«l 


?* 


90 


July 


[h 






lül 


9 


100 


:t 


100 


<o 


100 


Vil 


m 


1862, Jan 


ti 


97 


i> 


101 


H 


loo 


H 


100 


«1 


10(1 


221 


09 


July 


4 


lili 


4 


IIK 


lí 


iim 


3 


100 


a) 


11» 


IW 


97 


lS63,Ja[i 


V. 


1117 


;í 


IIH 


4 


10(1 


3 


n? 


H) 




III 




July 


? 


131 


4 


131 


4 


143 


3 


123 


to 




Hl 




ieM,Jan 


4 


n» 


V. 


VM 


3 


i:« 


K 


112 


«i 


14fl 


W 


143 


July 


I 


ii« 


2 


i:ti 


4 


143 


3 


I-íl 


*( 


168 


t» 


142 




:í 






IDO 


!> 


171 


3 


135 


/o 


187 


Vh 




July 


7 


i4;i 


6 


150 


:> 


171 


3 


i;w 


«1 


1H7 


■i! 


188 


1866, Jan 


3 


iw 


H 


IWt 


« 


171 


S 


i:« 




1H7 


«f 


188 


July 


» 












2 


IS2 


ÜU 


m 


hb 


173 



1 





n N. T. 


« N. Y. 


47 N. Y. 


MOhin 


UOhlu 


u 


Ohio 






Pavbm 


Stabi,». 


Bl« ca- 


Blac«»«'s' 


Bucu.«T- 
















Oa .... 


U. 


" 


H. 


li. 


U. 


M. 


^¿rd-vr 


I1J30 


$155 


Í156 


n.50 


«1.00 


9135 








No, 




No. 


R.l 


No. 




















*«e. 












18eO.Jan. 




100 


3 


100 


3 


ion 




100 




100 




100 


July 




lili) 


rt 


11» 


3 


11» 




100 




ion 




100 


1861, Jan 




ion 


« 


11» 


3 


100 




loo 




ion 




11» 


July 




117 


4 


100 


3 


100 




100 




IIIU 




111 


18G2,Jan 




117 


3 


11» 


3 


loo 




l(» 




11» 




Ul 


July 




117 




11» 


3 


lai 


3 


111 




ii.=i 




111 


1863,Jan 




117 




100 


3 


lOí 




128 




115 




1S8 


Julj 




1H7 




14(1 


2 


iii) 


3 


1.19 : 1 


12f. 




122 


1861. Jan 




l.'ÜI 




VA) 


3 


140 


3 


172 , 1 


nri 




133 


July 




167 




110 


1 






178 . 1 


20O 






1865, Jan 




isri 




Kü) 


2 


IW) 


3 


IftB 


1 


ano 




178 


July 




lí» 




IflO 


» 


im 


3 


1MB 


I 


son 




17S 




'/ 






100 


Y 








1 






m 


July 


' 


217 




IBÜ 


•¿ 


160 


3 


217 


1 


mu 




900 



Appendix C 



493 



TABLE 1 — CotUinued 

WAGB-BXBIB8 FBOM TABLB XII OF THB ALDSICH BSPOBT — II«LUMIN ATINO GAS 

iSOhio 



Sez 



Initial wage per day. 



1860,January 
July . . . 

1861, January 
July . . . 

1862, January 
July . . . 

1863, January 
July . . . 

1864, January 
July . . . 

1865, January 
July ... 

1866, January 
July . . . 



Cabpentebs 



M. 



$1.525 



No. 



5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 



Reí. 
Waflres 



100 
103 
103 
103 
103 
107 
115 
131 
148 
164 
164 
197 
197 
180 



FlBBMEN 



Id. 



$1.225 



No. 



58 

58 

58 

75 

75 

75 

75 

75 

90 

123 

123 

123 

123 

133 



Reí. 
Wages 



100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
113 
116 
141 
204 
169 
169 
169 
184 
184 



Labobbbs 



M. 



$1.00 



No. 



40 

40 

40 

40 

40 

65 

65 

65 

111 

46 

10 

10 

10 

10 



Rol. 
Waffes 



100 

100 
100 
100 
100 
113 
115 
125 
150 
175 
175 
175 
190 
190 



Watchken 



M. 



$1.10 



No. 



2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 



Reí. 
Waires 



100 
100 
100 
102 
102 
114 
114 
136 
159 
159 
159 
159 
159 
159 



lbatheb 
50 Massachnsetts 





Blaokxbs 


Cbllab 
Hamds 


Finishbbs 


Flattbn- 

EB9 


Olossebs 


Settbbs- 

OUT 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init. wage 
per day.. 


$1.00 


$1.00 


$1.195 


$1.165 


$1.165 


$1.165 




No. 

2 
2 
2 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

9 

9 
10 
10 

7 

7 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 

3 
3 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


No. 


Reí. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 
100 
100 
100 
117 
117 
117 
134 
134 
134 
134 
134 
159 
159 


100 
100 
117 
117 
125 
125 
142 
150 
175 
184 
200 
200 
200 
192 


100 
100 
109 
118 
128 
137 
144 
146 
141 
143 
157 
160 
144 
146 


100 
100 
115 
129 
129 
143 
158 
158 
172 
172 
186 
186 
162 
158 


2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


100 
100 
115 
115 
129 
129 
143 
143 
143 
143 
143 
150 
150 
158 


100 
100 
115 
115 
1-29 
143 
158 
172 
186 
186 
186 
186 
172 
172 



HiSToev op THE Gbeenbacks 




TABLE I- Continuad 





SOUau. 


XUass. 


XUnsa. 


MHana. 


Sltlua. 


SI Ha». 




SHJTTÍía 


S-Tvrruaa 


Hahm 


WkttWwi 


GUBDUU 




Bu 


M. 


H. 


M. 


U. 


M. 


U. 


[aJLvM* 
per dar.. 


fl.50 


iLoes 


$1.055 


11.035 


«1.50 


•1.50 
































WflBffi' 


IJu. 


Wbsob 


.Ju. 




""- 


WasKi 






'•"■ 




lBt¡0,Jaii 




ino 


9. 


100 


3 


100 


5 


100 


2 


inn 


5 


100 


July 




nt> 


'¿ 


H)(l 


:i 


iiin 


r. 


IIM 


2 


IIW 


h 


100 


1861, Jan 




laa 


•/. 


iirj 


:i 


lifi 


5 


ii;i 




111 


.1 


111 


July 






V, 


107 


H 


105 




116 




111 




111 


1862, Jan. 




i;« 


y 


I2:i 


:i 


127 


4 


i:íi 




111 


h 


12» 


July 




i:« 


■¿ 


iv:i 


;í 


i.tn 


4 


141 




111 


íi 


12» 


lB63,Jan 




144 


:i 


143 


s 


112 


:i 


150 




líi 


5 


140 


July 




144 


:i 


14« 


;i 


147 


;í 


161 




i:« 


h 


140 


18M.JaQ 




l.-Ml 


4 


l.-ií! 


:h 


147 


2 


1«5 




144 


4 


144 


July 






4 


i.-sa 


;i 


U7 


¥1 


wn 




144 


4 


144 






156 


A 


17» 


4 


15S 


;i 


18H 




144 


4 


144 


Julj 




IfW 


.1 


17» 


4 


1(111 


;i 


IHH 




144 


4 


144 


1866, Jan. 




l.-ifl 


.1 


174 


« 


IM 




177 




144 


4 


144 


July 




i;)6 


3 


i;4 


2 


158 


i 


1(W 




144 


4 


144 



Initlal «asB por daj. .. 

1800,jBDuaTy 

July 

lB61,January 

July 

ISBS.January 

July 

1863,Janu8I7 

July 

1864,JanuBry 

July 

1865, January 

July 

1866,January 

July. 




Appendix o 



495 



TABLE 1— Continuad 
WAaB-sxBixs ntOM tabiaK xn of thx aij>bich bbpobt— lumbbb 

52 New Hampshire 





LABOKEB8 


LUMBERMEN 


Sex 


M. 


M. 






Initial wage per day 


10.385 > 


10.505 > 




No. 

4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 


ReL 
Wages 


No. 

19 
16 
23 
24 
17 
16 
12 
11 
14 
16 
15 
23 
21 
19 


Bel. 

Wages 


1860, January 

October 

1861, January 

October 

1862, January 

October 

1863, January 

October 

1864, January 

October 

1865, January 

October 

1866, January 

October 


100 
100 
100 
100 
119 
119 
160 
160 
179 
179 
179 
179 
179 
179 


100 
104 
99 
100 
130 
126 
182 
186 
189 
194 
202 
201 
202 
208 



53 New York 





Salbsmen 


Tbamstebh 


Tard Hands 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 






Init. wage per day . . 


$1.50 


$1.125 


$1.04 




No. 

1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 

2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 


BeL 

Waffes 


No. 

9 
11 
14 
14 
12 
11 
11 
10 
11 
11 
15 
14 
13 
12 


Bel. 
Wages 


1860, January . 
July 




100 
100 
100 
92 
92 
100 
114 
101 
115 
120 
139 
139 
139 
139 


100 

100 

115 

99 

94 

94 

98 

98 

117 

111 

111 

111 

1Z2 

122 


100 
lOi 


1861, January . 
July 




104 
106 


1862, Januarv . 
July 




101 
106 


1863, January . 
July 




105 
119 


1864, January . 
July 

1865, January . 
July 




123 
131 
135 
135 


1866, January . 
July 




129 
130 







1 Board supplied. 



HlSTOBT OP THE GbEBNBACKB 



TABLS 1— rontinuad 



H CoDooctieiit 


















Bou.Ea-11-a 














Sei.. 


M. 


M. 


H. 


u. 


H. 


M. 


loil. w«íe 


*3,00 


83.835 


t&S!5 


f2.25 


«1.3T5 


$1.71 






























-'"■ 


Wages 


iJii. 




.111. 




Uo. 




íto. 




..o 




19G0,Jan 




ino 




100 




11X) 




100 


3 


ion 


1 


100 






100 




100 




104 




100 


;i 




í) 


»9 


1861, Jan 




lui 




100 




104 




mi 




un 


3 


101 


July 




11» 




100 




líM 




100 




101 


* 


101 


18e2.jJ 




10(1 




100 




101 




»i 




06 


1 


99 


July 




100 




lüO 




1(H 




100 




100 


1 


99 






100 




IIX) 




1(M 




IIXI 




imi 


2 


lao 


July 




117 




lor> 




m 




M 




iift 


3 


141 


1864, Jan 




L33 




125 




lis 




111 




100 


3 


127 


July 




IKI 




]«7 




157 




i;« 




121 


5 


144 


1865, Jan 




V»IO 




1«7 




157 




15ti 




i:« 


3 


141 






200 




187 




157 




L« 




121 


10 




lBe6,JBn. 




i:« 




»K 




i;« 




iryi 




121 


3 


i3e 


July 




i:t3 




OU 




i:» 




148 






g 


14» 





aaLPEBH 


B-a««« 


Ha 


ca«-„ 


Eu-rna 


HOLCKU 


ss^- 


8« 


u. 


U. 


U. 


U. 


H. 


U. 


Inií. -w 
per dar. 


•1.15 


$1.50 


$1.765 


«1.16 


fl.625 


tl.215 




No, 


w-a. 


No 


Reí. 

Wiige, 


No 


Bel. 
Waims 


No. 


Bal. 
WagM 


No. 


WW. 


No. 


wV¿, 




fi 


100 


100 


19 


100 


« 


100 


100 


7 




July 


5 


102 




loo 


15 


llXI 


4 


UM 


2 


112 


10 


loo 


1861.Jaii 


3 


KKt 




UX) 


» 


KK 


7 


IW 


1 


1«1 


9 


100 


July 








loo 


« 


106 


IK 


110 


V. 




H 




1862. Jan 


3 


10» 




IIXI 


IH 


9T 


26 


100 


1 


l'it 


7 


loe 


Julj 


3 


1(1» 




1011 


14 


IH 


13 


110 


1 


VXi 


7 


tl2 


18Kl.Jaii. 


« 


1(10 




101) 


fi 


96 


4 


125 


V. 


119 


ft 






H 


106 






IV 


103 


1 


97 


5 




5 




1861, Jan 


» 


121 




117 


M 


111 


7 


12H 


3 


imi 


11 


109 


July 


12 


143 




150 


21 


vnt 


4 


i:io 


4 


I.^a 


7 


134 




H 


145 




167 


Kl 


149 


.S 








V 




July 


6 


145 




1K7 


14 


144 


2 


122 


4 


152 


7 


123 


1866, Jan 


5 


152 




1«7 


211 


145 


7 


IWt 


ID 


147 


in 


120 




6 










151 


'/ 


137 


15 


IB» 


u 


lao 



I 

I 





¿FFENDIX O 



TABLBl-Conlimial 





HConn. 


HConn. 


MCom.. 


SSCúim. 


KCoan. 


SSCodu. 




Pattkbm- 


Black- 


Blacksb'b 


BOILEK- 


Dol 


EH-M'a 


Machín"» 




Hamrbb 


s 


«Taa 


BUl-PKBB 




HSI,I.BIU1 


Se» 


H. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


H. 


U. 


'I^Atr 


Í1.75 


H.895 


tl.00 


$1.555 


81.005 


«1.645 






Bel. 




Rol. 




Rcl. 


No. 


Rol. 




Reí. 








■'"■ 




llu. 




llu. 


Wasea 


Wages 


llu. 














fi 


ion 


10 


inn 


11 


lOO 


I'í 




46 




1860, Jan. 


'¿ 


100 










































































Julj 


:^ 
























1962, Jan 


H 


1(«) 


8 


m 


» 


IIW 


21 


108 




114 


Rñ 


106 


July 
















lOB 






m 


109 


1863, Jan. 


4 


89 






ti 


ii;i 


H> 


121 


KI 


117 


iW 


122 


July 


;í 


102 


H 


108 


■M) 


I2ñ 


•Ai 


1«« 


■» 


V?ñ 


fl6 


126 


1864, Jan. 


V: 


111 


7 


IIH 


Iñ 


IH'Í 


42 


138 


4K 




6il 


141 


July 












147 


4V 


i«;í 


«) 


141 


K^ 


158 


1865, Jan. 


4 


138 


6 


136 


11 


14S 


4.'. 


IT-Í 


'>» 


144 




171 












i:i 


146 




170 






hl 


1C8 


1866,Jan 












147 


26 


I7H 


.M 


IñO 


4» 


173 


July 


4 


152 


■1 


145 


14 


151 


;« 


178 


(2 


147 


VSJ 


176 





UCODD. 


SSCODD. 


UConn. 


íaConn. 


MCoDii. 


SeCoon. 












FOBEMAK 






Hn,PBBS 








UOLDBBH 




8ei 


H. 


H. 


U. 


U. 


H. 


M. 


perdsT-. 


«1135 


«L675 


tlJOO 


«4.79 


«2.4» 


«1.75 




No. 


A, 


No 


W^ 


No 


W^ 


No. 


W^ 


No. 


wífc. 


No. 


wíft. 


185» 


2! 


ino 


10 


ino 


2 


ino 














1880, Jan 














1 


ino 




100 




loo 
















1 


1110 




10(1 




100 


1881, Ju 














1 


100 




100 




100 


Julj 


























IS^JaD 




99 










1 


IIK) 




121) 




114 




22 


un 


14 


lio 






1 


1(10 




1211 




114 


1883, Jan 


2r> 


iin 


11 


lio 












vm 




114 


July 


:<i 


111 


l« 


117 




75 








128 




114 


1864, Jan 


Hl 


115 


18 


12» 


2 


75 








12H 




12» 


July 


41 


121 


17 


14Í) 


2 


inii 




t» 




im 






1865, Jan 


31 


127 


]| 


147 




lü» 








192 






July 


:a 


126 


8 


IñO 


1 


15(1 


1 


«7 




192 
































July 


2» 


138 


» 


173 




165 


2 


lU) 




257 







498 



HlSTOBY OF THE GbEENBACKS 



TABLE l — CotUinued 



WAOB-«: 



raOM TABI«B Xn OF THB ALDRICH BSPOBT — lOTALS AKD 

GOOD8 



56Coim. 







Machik^ts 


Machim*ts' 
Appkbnt's 


MACHIH*T8* 

Hklpkrs 


MOLDKBS 


AppaxMT*a 


8f»x 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Iiüt.wage 
per day. . 


$1165 


11.715 


$0.615 


$1.04 


$1.53 


$0.55 




No. 


Bel. 
Wa«es 


No. 

12 
12 

8 
10 
19 
14 

9 

5 

7 
12 
12 
12 
27 
23 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 


Bel. 
Wa«es 


No. 


Bel. 
Wa«es 


No. 


Bel. 
Wages 


No. 


Bel. 
Wages 


1860, Jan. 
July 

1861, Jan. 
July 

1862, Jan. 
July 

1863, Jan. 
July 

1864, Jan. 
July 

1865, Jan. 
July 

1866, Jan. 
July 


100 
100 
100 
107 
107 

• * • 

129 
129 
143 
158 
172 
172 
172 
186 


100 

102 

98 

99 

99 

105 

106 

110 

119 

119 

127 

137 

143 

149 


5 

5 

7 

8 

9 

9 

6 

4 

4 

3 

11 

12 

13 

12 


100 
102 
101 
109 
107 
109 
96 
102 
103 
106 
129 
140 
145 
154 


4 
4 
4 

6 

11 

9 

9 

5 

5 

6 

6 

10 

8 

12 


100 

106 

105 

104 

106 

109 

109 

117 

127 

135 

141 

150 

142 

149 


12 
9 
11 
15 
12 
12 
9 
12 
18 
25 
14 
18 
17 
23 


100 
101 
102 
101 
104 
104 
105 
112 
113 
126 
145 
149 
141 
146 


2 

1 
2 
2 
2 
2 

• • 


100 
108 
115 
119 
U9 
125 
121 
182 
205 
145 
155 

• • • 

182 

182 



56 Coim. 56 Conn. 



57 Md. 



57 Md. 



57 Md. 



57 Md. 





MOLDKRS* 

Hri.pbbs 


Pattkrn- 
Makers 


Black- 

SMITHa 


Blacksm's' 

HELPBSa 


BOILER- 

Makkrs 


Laborera 


Sex 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


M. 


Init.